

14

Part II

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

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Second Series

14 Part II

A large, stylized white signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke that curves upwards at the end.A small, stylized white signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, identical in style to the larger one, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke that curves upwards at the end.

“So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. . . .the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



AT COCHIN AIRPORT, 2 JUNE 1950

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Fourteen

Part II

(8 April–31 July 1950)

A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund

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S. Gopal

FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Indira" and the last name "Gandhi" clearly distinguishable.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

The dominating feature of the period from 8 April to 31 July 1950, which is covered by this volume, was the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement. The Agreement brought confidence and hope as well as relief to millions in both countries. There was a marked falling off in the exodus both ways in Bengal and Assam and a resumption of trade between India and Pakistan.

Other major problems were the rehabilitation of refugees, arrangements for the first general elections, general economic policy, the formation of a new Council of Ministers, shortage of foodgrains, and the control of prices. In foreign affairs, apart from the perennial Kashmir problem, Nehru's attention was engaged primarily by the issues raised by the war in Korea.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to provide access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us documents in her possession and these papers have been referred to in the footnotes as the J.N. Collection. The Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, the National Archives of India and the Press Information Bureau have authorized the reprinting of material in their possession. Much of it is classified and some portions of it have necessarily had to be deleted. A letter published in *Two Alone, Two Together—Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964* edited by Shrimati Sonia Gandhi has been included in the volume. Some items from the volumes of *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50* and from the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. 8, have also been included.

CONTENTS

1. Sequel to the Indo-Pakistan Agreement

1	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	9 April	1950	3
2	To K.C. Neogy	9 April	1950	4
3	At the Edge of a Precipice	10 April	1950	5
4	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	10 April	1950	9
5	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	10 April	1950	11
6	Difficulties in the Implementation	10 April	1950	12
7	To B.C. Roy	10 April	1950	16
8	To K.C. Neogy	10 April	1950	17
9	To Gopinath Bardoloi	10 April	1950	18
10	To Rajendra Prasad	10 April	1950	19
11	A Turn in the Right Direction	10 April	1950	20
12	To C. Rajagopalachari	11 April	1950	23
13	Telegram to B.C. Roy	11 April	1950	23
14	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	12 April	1950	24
15	To K.C. Neogy	12 April	1950	25
16	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	12 April	1950	26
17	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	12 April	1950	27
18	To B.C. Roy	13 April	1950	27
19	To C. Rajagopalachari	13 April	1950	29
20	To C. Rajagopalachari	13 April	1950	30
21	To Kailas Nath Katju	13 April	1950	32
22	To Gopinath Bardoloi	13 April	1950	33
23	To R.R. Diwakar	13 April	1950	33
24	Hope of Better Relations	13 April	1950	34
25	To Rajendra Prasad	14 April	1950	36
26	To C. Rajagopalachari	14 April	1950	37
27	To Liaquat Ali Khan	14 April	1950	38
28	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	14 April	1950	40
29	To Rajendra Prasad	14 April	1950	40
30	To C. Rajagopalachari	15 April	1950	41
31	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	15 April	1950	42
32	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	15 April	1950	43
33	To K.C. Neogy	15 April	1950	44
34	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	15 April	1950	44
35	To Liaquat Ali Khan	15 April	1950	45
36	To B.C. Roy	15 April	1950	48

37	To C.R. Attlee	15 April	1950	49
38	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	15 April	1950	50
39	To V.K. Krishna Menon	15 April	1950	50
40	To Sri Prakasa	16 April	1950	51
41	To F.R. Roy Bucher	16 April	1950	52
42	Telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan	16 April	1950	53
43	To Vallabhbhai Patel	18 April	1950	53
44	To C. Rajagopalachari	18 April	1950	55
45	The Follow-up Steps	19 April	1950	55
46	To P.C. Ghosh	19 April	1950	58
47	To B.C. Roy	19 April	1950	59
48	To Liaquat Ali Khan	19 April	1950	61
49	To Liaquat Ali Khan	20 April	1950	63
50	The Futility of War	21 April	1950	64
51	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	24 April	1950	66
52	To B.C. Roy	24 April	1950	67
53	To V.K. Krishna Menon	24 April	1950	69
54	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	25 April	1950	71
55	To Achyut Patwardhan	25 April	1950	72
56	Rumours in Periodicals	26 April	1950	73
57	Telegram to Vallabhbhai Patel	27 April	1950	74
58	Record of Talks with Liaquat Ali Khan	27 April	1950	75
59	Hope of Unravelling Many Knots	28 April	1950	81
60	To Lord Mountbatten	30 April	1950	82
61	To B.C. Roy	1 May	1950	82
62	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	1 May	1950	85
63	To B.C. Roy	3 May	1950	86
64	To P.C. Ghosh	3 May	1950	87
65	On Talks with Liaquat Ali Khan	3 May	1950	88
66	The Role of the Press in Settling Differences	4 May	1950	90
67	To B.C. Roy	5 May	1950	99
68	Forging of Goodwill and Reconciliation	7 May	1950	100
69	To B.C. Roy	7 May	1950	102
70	To Vallabhbhai Patel	9 May	1950	104
71	Functions of the Central Ministers for Minorities	10 May	1950	105
72	To V.K. Krishna Menon	15 May	1950	108
73	To Kailas Nath Katju	15 May	1950	108
74	To Lester B. Pearson	19 May	1950	109
75	To Zafrullah Khan	20 May	1950	111
76	To B.C. Roy	20 May	1950	112
77	Restrained Optimism	22 May	1950	112
78	To B.C. Roy	23 May	1950	132
79	To B.C. Roy	23 May	1950	135
80	Note on Talks with Ghulam Mohammad	24 May	1950	136
81	To Chief Ministers	29 May	1950	138

82	A New Picture of Asia	24 June	1950	139
83	To B.C. Roy	29 June	1950	141
84	To B.C. Roy	8 July	1950	142
85	To Gopichand Bhargava	9 July	1950	145
86	To B.C. Roy	14 July	1950	146
87	To V.K. Krishna Menon	27 July	1950	147

2. Kashmir

1	To Shaikh Abdullah	24 April	1950	151
2	Propaganda by "Azad" Kashmir Radio	9 May	1950	152
3	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	29 May	1950	152
4	To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad	30 May	1950	153
5	To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad	4 July	1950	154
6	To Shaikh Abdullah	4 July	1950	154
7	To Owen Dixon	8 July	1950	157

3. Problems of Refugees

1	To Mohanlal Saksena	9 April	1950	161
2	To Mohanlal Saksena	11 April	1950	162
3	Telegram to Gopinath Bardoloi	11 April	1950	162
4	To Mohanlal Saksena	14 April	1950	163
5	To Gopichand Bhargava	16 April	1950	165
6	To Gopichand Bhargava	18 April	1950	166
7	To B.C. Roy	7 May	1950	167
8	To B.C. Roy	12 May	1950	168
9	To Kailas Nath Katju	24 May	1950	170
10	To B.C. Roy	24 May	1950	171
11	To Vallabhbhai Patel	25 May	1950	172
12	The Faridabad Development Board	26 May	1950	174
13	Evacuee Laws	29 May	1950	176

4. National Reconstruction

I. Perspectives

1	The Meaning of Culture	9 April	1950	183
2	The Spirit of Science	22 April	1950	188

3	Freedom and Responsibility	1 June	1950	191
4	The Kosi Project	12 July	1950	204

4. National Reconstruction

II. Planning

1	The Necessity for Planning	25 April	1950	209
2	To Vallabhbhai Patel	25 May	1950	213

4. National Reconstruction

III. Food

1	To Edwina Mountbatten	18 May	1950	217
2	To B.C. Roy	13 July	1950	218

4. National Reconstruction

IV. Social Issues

1	Fair Wages	18 April	1950	221
2	To Jayaprakash Narayan	26 May	1950	222
3	Zamindari Abolition	25 July	1950	223

5. Administration

I. Resignation of John Matthai

1	To John Matthai	3 May	1950	227
2	To John Matthai	4 May	1950	229

3	To V.K. Krishna Menon	8 May	1950	232
4	To John Matthai	28 May	1950	234
5	To John Matthai	4 June	1950	234
6	Cable to Sri Prakasa	4 June	1950	239
7	To C.D. Deshmukh	4 June	1950	239
8	To C. Rajagopalachari	4 June	1950	239
9	To Vallabhbhai Patel	4 June	1950	240
10	To V.K. Krishna Menon	4 June	1950	241
11	Cable to Vallabhbhai Patel	5 June	1950	243
12	To Vallabhbhai Patel	5 June	1950	244
13	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	5 June	1950	245
14	Cable to Vallabhbhai Patel	6 June	1950	246
15	To John Matthai	27 June	1950	247
16	To Asaf Ali	27 June	1950	249

5. Administration

II. Reconstitution of the Cabinet

1	To Sri Prakasa	1 May	1950	253
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	1 May	1950	254
3	To G.B. Pant	1 May	1950	254
4	To G.B. Pant	2 May	1950	256
5	To C. Rajagopalachari	11 May	1950	257
6	To G.B. Pant	11 May	1950	258
7	To C. Rajagopalachari	26 May	1950	259
8	To Vallabhbhai Patel	26 June	1950	259
9	To C. Rajagopalachari	26 June	1950	261
10	To C. Rajagopalachari	6 July	1950	262

5. Administration

III. Migrations from U.P.

1	Telegram to G.B. Pant	11 April	1950	267
2	To G.B. Pant	6 May	1950	267
3	To Vallabhbhai Patel	27 May	1950	268

5. Administration

IV. The Sikhs

1 To Vallabhbhai Patel	10 July	1950	273
2 To C.M. Trivedi	10 July	1950	273
3 To Baldev Singh	11 July	1950	274
4 To Baldev Singh	14 July	1950	274
5 To Vallabhbhai Patel	30 July	1950	275

5. Administration

V. Other Matters

1 To G.B. Pant	10 April	1950	279
2 To Baldev Singh	10 May	1950	280
3 To Jayaprakash Narayan	23 May	1950	283
4 To Vallabhbhai Patel	27 May	1950	284
5 Security for the Prime Minister	9 July	1950	285
6 Security Measures	11 July	1950	286
7 To Sri Krishna Sinha	11 July	1950	287
8 Alternative Systems of Medicine	22 July	1950	288

6. Ayodhya

1 To G.B. Pant	17 April	1949	293
2 To B.C. Roy	18 May	1950	295
3 To Lal Bahadur Shastri	9 July	1950	296

7. Congress Organisation

1 To K.D. Malaviya	25 April	1950	301
2 To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	12 May	1950	302
3 To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	21 May	1950	302
4 To Vallabhbhai Patel	30 June	1950	303

8. Korea

1	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	27 June	1950	307
2	Loy Henderson's Record of Talk with Nehru	28 June	1950	307
3	To Vallabhbhai Patel	29 June	1950	308
4	To Agatha Harrison	30 June	1950	310
5	To B.N. Rau	1 July	1950	311
6	To Thakin Nu	2 July	1950	315
7	The Korean Question at the U.N.	3 July	1950	317
8	To V.K. Krishna Menon	6 July	1950	318
9	Fifty-Fifty Possibility of a World War	7 July	1950	320
10	To S. Radhakrishnan	8 July	1950	341
11	To S. Radhakrishnan	8 July	1950	342
12	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	8 July	1950	343
13	To C. Rajagopalachari	8 July	1950	344
14	Cable to C.R. Attlee	10 July	1950	345
15	Cable to Sita Ram	10 July	1950	346
16	To Marshal Stalin and to Dean Acheson	12 July	1950	347
17	Cable to C.R. Attlee	14 July	1950	348
18	Cable to S. Radhakrishnan	16 July	1950	349
19	Cable to C.R. Attlee and Dean Acheson	16 July	1950	350
20	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	18 July	1950	350
21	To P. Subbarayan	18 July	1950	351
22	To Dean Acheson	19 July	1950	352
23	Cable to C.R. Attlee	20 July	1950	353
24	To C.R. Attlee	21 July	1950	353
25	Cable to S. Radhakrishnan	21 July	1950	356
26	Cable to B.N. Rau	29 July	1950	357
27	Cable to Trygve Lie	29 July	1950	357
28	To Dean Acheson	29 July	1950	358
29	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	31 July	1950	360

9. Foreign Affairs

I. People's Republic of China

1	To Madame Sun Yat-sen	29 April	1950	363
2	Cable to Nahas Pasha	26 June	1950	364
3	To Ernest Bevin	27 June	1950	365

9. Foreign Affairs

II. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers in London

1 To S. Radhakrishnan	5 May	1950	369
2 To Horace Alexander	8 May	1950	369
3 To V.K. Krishna Menon	12 May	1950	370
4 Cable to Ernest Bevin	24 May	1950	371

9. Foreign Affairs

III. United States of America

1 The World Situation	25 April	1950	377
2 To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	9 May	1950	379
3 To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	10 May	1950	380
4 To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	29 May	1950	381
5 To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	1 July	1950	382

9. Foreign Affairs

IV. Indonesia

1 To A. Soekarno	16 April	1950	385
2 Seeds of Conflict in Asia	7 June	1950	386
3 The Gandhian Way	8 June	1950	388
4 The Need for Vigilance and Hard Work	10 June	1950	390
5 No Toleration of Violence	11 June	1950	391
6 Communist Activities in India	12 June	1950	392
7 Military Pact with Indonesia	16 June	1950	392
8 Message to A. Soekarno	17 June	1950	394
9 To Mohammad Hatta	1 July	1950	394
10 To Vallabhbhai Patel	4 July	1950	396

9. Foreign Affairs

V. Malaya

1	The Re-emergence of Asia	17 June	1950	401
2	The Forces of Conflict in South East Asia	17 June	1950	401
3	No Quarter of Terrorism	18 June	1950	404

9. Foreign Affairs

VI. Burma

1	Indian Attitudes	22 June	1950	409
2	The Obligations of Freedom	22 June	1950	423
3	To Thakin Nu	25 June	1950	427

9. Foreign Affairs

VII. Portuguese Settlements in India

1	Negotiation with Portugal	30 June	1950	433
2	To B.G. Kher	26 July	1950	433

9. Foreign Affairs

VIII. Other Matters

1	Exclusion of Some Countries from the U.N.	5 May	1950	437
2	The Sydney Conference	6 May	1950	438

3	To S. Radhakrishnan	26 May	1950	439
4	To B.V. Keskar	4 June	1950	440
5	To S. Radhakrishnan	6 June	1950	441

10. Letters To Chief Ministers

1	I	8 April	1950	445
2	II	15 April	1950	447
3	III	2 May	1950	455
4	IV	17 May	1950	461
5	V	26 May	1950	469
6	VI	30 May	1950	471
7	VII	2 July	1950	478
8	VIII	15 July	1950	490

11. Miscellaneous

1	To Vincent Sheean	12 April	1950	503
2	Basic Truths taught by the Buddha	2 May	1950	503
3	To K.N. Katju	23 May	1950	504
4	To Indira Gandhi	5 July	1950	504
5	To S.S. Dhawan	15 July	1950	505
6	To D.B. Desai	18 July	1950	506
7	To K.M. Munshi	20 July	1950	507

ILLUSTRATIONS

At Cochin Airport, 2 June 1950	<i>frontispiece</i>	
With Vallabhbhai Patel at Palam Airport, New Delhi, before departure for Karachi, 26 April 1950	<i>between</i>	40-41
With Liaquat Ali Khan, Karachi, 26 April 1950		
With Liaquat Ali Khan and Begum Liaquat Ali at State Banquet, Karachi, 27 April 1950		
At a reception given by Muslim citizens of West Bengal, Calcutta, 24 June 1950		
With Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Srinagar, 14 May 1950	<i>between</i>	168-169
At the National Fuel Research Institute, Dhanbad, 22 April 1950		
With C.V. Raman and S.S. Bhatnagar at the National Fuel Research Institute, Dhanbad, 22 April 1950	<i>between</i>	232-233
Being sworn in as Prime Minister by President Rajendra Prasad, 6 May 1950		
On INS <i>Delhi en route</i> to Indonesia, June 1950	<i>between</i>	392-393
With P. Subbarayan on arrival at Djakarta, June 1950		
Taking the salute with President Soekarno, Djakarta, 8 June 1950		
At Borobudur, 12 June 1950		
Before an image of the Buddha at Borobudur, 12 June 1950	<i>between</i>	424-425
Bidding farewell to President Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, Djakarta, 17 June 1950		
Facsimile of a cable to President Soekarno, 17 June 1950	<i>between</i>	456-457
Laying the foundation-stone of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial, Singapore, 18 June 1950		

ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.N.E.C.	All India Newspaper Editors' Conference
A.I.R.	All India Radio
B.P.C.C.	Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee
C.B.E.	Commander of the Order of the British Empire
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
D.M.	District Magistrate
D.P.M.	Deputy Prime Minister
E.N.T.	Eastern News Trust
G.O.	Government Order
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government
I.L.O.	International Labour Organisation
I.N.S.	Indian Naval Ship
J.C.O.	Junior Commissioned Officer
M.E.A.	Ministry of External Affairs
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.A.I.	National Archives of India
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
O.B.E.	Order of the British Empire
P.C.C.	Provincial/Pradesh Congress Committee
P.E.P.S.U.	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
P.I.B.	Press Information Bureau
P.M.	Prime Minister
P.M.S.	Prime Minister's Secretariat
P.N.E.C.	Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference
P.P.S.	Principal Private Secretary
P.T.I.	Press Trust of India
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
U.C.R.W.	United Council for Relief and Welfare
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.N.E.S.C.O.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
U.N.H.C.R.	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
U.N.O.	United Nations Organisation
U.N.T.O.K.	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
U.P.	United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh
U.P.A.	United Press of America
U.P.P.C.C.	Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee
U.S.A.	United States of America
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

1. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
9th April 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

When you wrote to me tendering your resignation from the office of Minister, I sent you a reply.² I did not mention this matter to anyone except the President and the Deputy Prime Minister. I find, however, that a great deal of publicity has been given to it.³

2. I had hoped that we might consider this in a more leisurely fashion after the talks with Liaquat Ali Khan were over. Your resignation was connected with those talks.⁴ Indeed it was related to an intermediate stage of those talks. I realised then of course, and you stated as much, that there were certain basic differences of opinion between you and me which rather embarrassed us. I had no desire to embarrass you in any way. But I did feel then, and I feel now, that whatever has to be done should be done as gracefully as possible and in a way to cause the least injury to the national cause.⁵ The Agreement with Pakistan has been arrived at and will be placed before Parliament tomorrow. It seems to me that, whatever one's views might be about the proper approach to the basic question, the fact of this Agreement has to be recognised. Any attempt to weaken that or to create dissatisfaction and distrust in the public mind in regard to it will, from any point of view, be harmful to the interests we have at heart.

3. Another aspect of this question that has come to my mind is the procedure that we have to adopt. This is, of course, not a personal question; it derives from certain principles and basic approaches. I think it would be desirable for the Party to consider these principles and basic approaches—not the personal equation—and then for us to take such action as is appropriate. Of course, the Party has no

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, pp. 175-176.

3. Mookerjee replied on 10 April: "The first publicity was given by a Delhi newspaper which was certainly unfortunate. That was not my responsibility. Subsequent publicity followed as a matter of course. Whenever I was approached by pressmen I did not give them any hint or indication; on the contrary I requested them to desist from giving publicity to such matters for obvious reasons."

4. He replied that he communicated to Nehru on 1 April that a pact of this kind would be no solution and it ignored the basic problem altogether. "I found that in such circumstances that the only honourable alternative open to me was to resign from the Cabinet." To avoid embarrassment during the talks with Liaquat Ali, Mookerjee suggested that his resignation might come into effect after his departure.

5. He wrote that there might be an honest difference of opinion on whether the Agreement was likely to promote the national interest or not. While no responsible person should do anything to injure the national cause, no democratic government could prevent any legitimate criticisms of any action taken by it.

right to prevent a person from doing anything that he thinks that he should do; and certainly it cannot insist on a person holding office against his will. But it does seem to me right that the matter should be placed before the Party, and until that is done, no other step to be taken. I have tried to think about it as objectively as possible and I feel that any other course would not be appropriate.⁶

4. Of course, I am strongly of opinion that in the circumstances that have arisen it would be most unfortunate for anything to be done which discredits or lessens the importance of the Agreement arrived at. If that is done, the burden of breaking in spirit something we had agreed to would be upon us.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Mookerjee replied that after the Agreement was announced in Parliament, subsequent reference of his resignation to the Party was hardly of any practical value.

7. He wrote that those who had accepted the Agreement would not discredit it but the others might not approve of it. "In any case the very fact that you unhesitatingly sacrificed two of your colleagues on this issue would prove indisputably to Pakistan your determination to arrive at the Agreement and to implement it. In some measure this will perhaps strengthen your position all the more, both here and abroad."

2. To K.C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
9th April 1950

My dear Neogy,

I had a long talk with you last evening and requested you to give further thought to the various aspects of the question. Whatever the past might be, we have to face a present situation when this Agreement has been finalised, and it will be placed before Parliament tomorrow. At this stage to do anything to run down the Agreement or to lessen its significance would undoubtedly be harmful to our cause and more specially to what we hope to achieve in Bengal. Indeed we would be accused of playing a double game, and our credit everywhere will suffer. There would be confusion in people's minds, more specially in Bengal. Therefore we have to give very careful thought to this matter quite apart from the personal factors involved.

2. In any event, I feel that some kind of reference should be made to the Party before any step is taken. Even that reference should not be personal; but it is due to the Party to be informed of this and for them to come to some decision or expression of opinion.

1. J.N. Collection.

3. I have written to Syama Prasad Mookerjee today more or less on these lines, and I enclose a copy of my letter to him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. At the Edge of a Precipice¹

I beg to place on the Table of the House an Agreement signed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and by me on behalf of our respective Governments. This Agreement² was signed on Saturday afternoon, after discussions lasting for a full week. I shall not read out this Agreement, as copies of it are going to be given to Members of the House. I shall only refer to some of its salient features and I earnestly hope that this House and the country will give full support to this Agreement and to the policy which underlies it. We have had many agreements in the past and we have had many breaches of agreements also. I think I may say with justice that this particular Agreement, both in regard to its contents and its timing, has a peculiar significance and importance. Our future depends upon the measure of compliance in Pakistan and India.

During the past weeks and months, the whole country, and more particularly Bengal, have faced tragedy and disaster and it is not surprising that people's mind should have been excited and passion let loose. Yet the disaster that came and the tragedy that overwhelmed vast numbers of people appeared to be a prelude to an even greater catastrophe. As I sat, hour after hour, discussing these matters of grave import with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I saw an unending stream of unhappy, fear-stricken refugees, uprooted from their homes, facing a dark and unknown future. I experienced their sorrow and misery and I prayed for guidance as to how this could be stopped. All the ideals I had stood for since fate and circumstance pushed me into public affairs, appeared to fade away and a sense of utter nakedness came to me. Was it for this that we had laboured through the

1. Nehru's statement in Parliament on the Agreement signed between India and Pakistan, 10 April 1950, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. IV, Part II, 1950, pp. 2675-2678.
2. For the text of the Agreement between India and Pakistan see *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. IV, Part II, 1950, pp. 2678-2680.

years? Was it for this that we had had the high privilege of discipleship of the Father of the Nation?

We have to grapple with material facts, but even more so we have to grapple with immaterial things in people's minds and hearts. We have to deal with fear and passion and prejudice. As the House knows, scenes of horror have been enacted in many places. News of this had unnerved and angered many people. The time had come when we had to make a final effort to stop this rot or to drift inevitably towards catastrophe. Formal State communications were too slow and too barren of results. It became essential that there should be some personal touch and a frank discussion of the situation and the problems, and an earnest attempt to solve them.

I invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan to come to Delhi and he was good enough to accept this invitation. For seven days we discussed the Bengal situation as well as many other matters which have poisoned the relations of India and Pakistan. Both of us were burdened with a heavy sense of responsibility for the fate of our countries and of many millions therein was involved in these discussions. The matter was not merely a political one or an economic one, but essentially a human problem in which human lives and human suffering were involved in a measure that was almost unthinkable. The problem was not a mere Bengal one but essentially all-India. Indeed its repercussions went far beyond the borders of India and Pakistan. Because of this, the world took deep interest in this meeting and its result.

The first part of the Agreement deals with certain fundamental democratic rights of all citizens and nationals and it is declared therein that minorities must have complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country, freedom of occupation, speech and worship, equal opportunity to participate in the public life of the country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in the country's civil and armed forces.

All this has been laid down, as the House knows, in our Constitution and it was not necessary for us to repeat it. It became necessary however to say so, because doubts had arisen in people's minds, and these doubts had been frequently expressed, that the Pakistan State was based on a certain communal idea and therefore could not give equality of citizenship to its minorities. The Prime Minister of Pakistan repudiated this with force and said that in the Constitution they were framing, it was their intention to lay down these democratic rights, as we had done in our Constitution. Indeed this had been stated already in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He assured me that his Government believed in the modern conception of a democratic State and that indeed there could be no other form of State under modern conditions. This assurance is embodied in Part A of the Agreement.

We have called our State a secular State, and there has been some misunderstanding of this, as if it was something opposed to religion or morality.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

Some misguided people in our country have even demanded something in the nature of a communal State here. But so far as this House is concerned and the vast majority of the people in our country, we have definitely adopted the idea of a secular State and we intend to adhere to it in full measure. This does not mean that religion ceases to be an important factor in the private life of the individual. It means that the State and religion are not tied up together. It simply means the repetition of the cardinal doctrine of modern democratic practice, that is the separation of the State from religion and the full protection of every religion. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has made it clear in the Agreement that his State is based on these modern democratic ideas.

Part B of the Agreement deals more especially with the migrants from East and West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. We have ensured in this that these migrants should have freedom of movement and protection in transit and that they shall be free to remove as much of their moveable personal effects, household goods and personal jewellery, as they may wish to take with them; also a fixed quantity of cash. Further that the migrant may deposit his or her jewellery or cash in a bank and facilities would be provided to him or her for their transfer to him or her, subject, as regards cash, to exchange regulations.

There has been much complaint about harassment by customs authorities and others. In order to prevent this, it has been agreed that liaison officers of the other Government shall be posted at these Customs Offices.

While freedom of movement from one country to another has been assured, it has been laid down that migrants can return to their homes when they choose. If they return by the end of this year, that is 31st December 1950, they will be entitled to the restoration of their immoveable property, house or land. In the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all immoveable property shall continue to vest in him and he shall have unrestricted right to dispose it of by sale, exchange or otherwise. Arrangements will be made for trustees to hold this property and to recover rent and necessary legislation will be passed to enable this to be done.

This last provision, that is the retention of the ownership of immoveable property and the right to sell or exchange it, will apply to all the migrants who have left East Bengal or West Bengal or Assam since the 15th August 1947. Thus this provision will include those 15 lakhs of persons who have come away from East Bengal in the course of the last two years and a half. This provision will also include the migrants who have left Bihar for East Bengal owing to communal disturbances.

Part C of the Agreement deals with the restoration of normal conditions, the punishment of all those who are found guilty, collective fines and special courts. It deals also with the setting up of agencies for the recovery of abducted women and for the non-recognition of forced conversion and the punishment of people who are found guilty of converting people forcibly. I should like specially to mention to the House that it is laid down that any conversion effected during a period of communal disturbance shall be deemed to be a forced conversion.

It is proposed to set up Commissions of Enquiry to report on the causes and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendations with a view to prevent them in future. Further, it is stated that prompt and effective steps will be taken to prevent dissemination of news and mischievous opinion calculated to rouse communal passion. Propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them will also not be permitted.

All this is specially applicable to the affected areas in East and West Bengal and Assam. But some of it is of general application to any part of Pakistan or India.

Each Government has decided to depute a Minister to remain in these areas. These Central Ministers will be charged with the responsibility to help in restoring confidence, so that the refugees may return to their homes, and in generally supervising the implementation of this Agreement.

It is also proposed to include in the Cabinets of East Bengal and West Bengal a representative of the minority community.

In order to assist in the implementation of this Agreement it has been further decided to set up Minority Commissions in East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. The Central Ministers will have the right to attend and participate in any of the meetings of any Commission. Either of them may call for a joint meeting of any two Minority Commissions. These Commissions will be charged with the implementation of this Agreement and to report from time to time thereon.

In the event of the Central Ministers supporting any recommendation, they will be normally given effect to. If there is disagreement between the two Central Ministers, the matter shall be referred to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who shall either resolve it themselves or determine the agency and procedure by which it will be resolved.

This, in brief, is the substance of the Agreement that has been arrived at. I think it may be said with justice that this Agreement should bring immediately a certain relief from the tension that has persisted for some time. The problem of Bengal and Assam will not be solved by this Agreement alone, but for millions of people there it will not only bring some immediate relief but also a ray of hope for the future. It depends on the two Governments and the peoples of Pakistan and India as to how far that ray can be extended into the full flood of the light of the sun.

The problem before us has many aspects, but perhaps the most important is the psychological and human aspect. Conditions have been created which make it difficult, if not impossible, for people to live in their homelands and so vast numbers of them have preferred to leave everything they possessed and go to distant places rather than live always with insecurity and fear as their companions. Unless this fear and insecurity are removed completely and normal civilised conditions of life prevail, this problem will not be solved in spite of all agreements. An agreement is a step, and a step only, in a certain direction. It has to be followed

up by many other steps and more particularly by a change in the very conditions of life. By this Agreement the Governments of Pakistan and India have pledged themselves to take those other steps also and I feel sure that this House will give its full support to this great enterprise, which means so much to millions of our countrymen. To the people of East and West Bengal and Assam, I would make a special appeal, for they have suffered most from these tragic upheavals and they are concerned most with the implementation of this Agreement. The whole of India has not only sympathised with them but has shown that sympathy in many ways. Their cause has become the cause of the whole country. So far as the refugees are concerned, the Government of India has undertaken unlimited responsibilities for their welfare. But while we shall undoubtedly look after, to the best of our ability, those unhappy persons who come as refugees and try to rehabilitate them, it is clear that this is no satisfactory solution of this great problem. The only solution is to produce proper conditions to live in their homelands, wherever they may be. The only solution is to put an end to the barbarism and inhuman behaviour that we have witnessed during these past weeks. If one thing is certain, it is this: that we shall not serve our people or our country or the cause of humanity by encouraging private violence and inhuman behaviour. That is the way of degradation and weakening of the nation.

The brief course of our history as an independent nation has been bedevilled by our strained relations with Pakistan and the conflicts that have resulted from them. Those conflicts led to this disaster in Bengal and we came on the verge of something far greater even than that. We have stopped ourselves at that edge of a precipice and turned our backs to it. That by itself is, I submit, a definite gain. It is now up to us, as it is up to the Government and people of Pakistan, to live up to our professions and to face all our problems with sanity and goodwill and the fixed determination to put an end to that vicious atmosphere that has surrounded us for these two and a half years.

4. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,
Thank you for your letter of today's date.

There is no question of our not appreciating each other's convictions, feelings or honesty of purpose. I have no doubt that you are moved deeply, as I am moved in a somewhat different direction. There is that different approach. Nevertheless, I do not myself see how we could act otherwise than we have done. The alternative

1. J.N. Collection.

was war. While no one can say that war is ruled out whatever happens, and we have always to be ready for an emergency, it seemed clear to me that war would be disastrous to all concerned and would bring about consequences of the most far-reaching character which most people could not even envisage now. Therefore, it seemed to me that we must do our utmost to avoid this catastrophe, if it could possibly be avoided. The only alternative was direct dealing with Pakistan.²

Apart from this, the position now is somewhat different from what it was previously. That is to say that an Agreement has been arrived at. This does make a difference. Whatever our approach to the problem may be, it should be common ground that this Agreement must be implemented to the fullest extent. Otherwise we are put in the wrong completely.

I am merely mentioning these matters, though I realise that perhaps you feel differently. When you mentioned your resignation to me, I felt that I could not come in your way, if you were of that definite opinion. That would merely embarrass each one of us. But I did suggest that the matter might be considered a little later.

I did not complain about premature publicity or suggest that you were responsible for it. I only expressed my regret that this should have taken place.

When I suggested a Party meeting, it was not my intention that personal matters should be discussed there or the justification of your resignation. That certainly will be undesirable. My suggestion was based on the avoidance of all kinds of whisperings and rumours that are spread, which have no foundation. I thought it would be desirable to face the issue squarely at a Party meeting. That issue was not, I repeat, a personal one or directly dealing with resignations, though undoubtedly indirect mention might be made of it. I wanted the Party to face the principles involved without personal references, so that the Party's mind might be clear. That would have been a courtesy to the Party. In any event the Party has to meet and I was informed by Satya Narayan Sinha that he has fixed the 13th April for this meeting.

I agree with you that this matter was not a personal one between you and me and differences on a public issue should not give rise to any bitterness. Of course, a Minister has a right to make a statement before Parliament after resignation.

What I would suggest to you is that in view of the gravity of the situation that we have to face, both you and I and others, we should not hurry into any final arrangement. Obviously, the matter cannot be postponed indefinitely. As the Party is meeting on the 13th, let us consider this matter afterwards and come to decisions.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Mookerjee had written that from the very beginning he had tried to convince Nehru that this kind of pact would be no solution at all. Unfortunately he had no opportunity of discussing matters with Nehru except at Cabinet meetings. "In any case I must reserve to myself the right to express my views on the potential inherent in the Agreement and also on the basically wrong approach to the solution of the problem."

5. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
10 April 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

Thank you for your letter of today's date which I have received this evening.

The question of your resignation is of course not dependent on a Party meeting. Of course, if you so choose you could address the Party meeting on the subject, but that is entirely for you to decide.² Why I suggested your postponing this matter was to give us time to consult each other about it. It also seemed to me a more graceful way of proceeding.

I recognise that you must be a little embarrassed by the present position, when your resignation has been announced throughout the country.³ But a few days do not make much difference. In your letters to me you have pressed so much for the resignation and emphasized your different viewpoint that I had to write to you that if you insisted I had no other course but to accept your resignation, however much I regretted it.

You refer to certain rumours that have reached your ears about my intention not to include you in a reconstituted Cabinet.⁴ As a matter of fact, for the last three months or more, that is at the time when Rajaji was here, a number of vague talks have taken place about this matter between me and him and later with the President. There have also been talks with Sardar Patel. All kinds of possibilities were discussed and no conclusion was arrived at that time. Of course, it would have been my business to speak to you, if any such idea had taken shape.

I shall consult the President tomorrow and then write to you again.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mookerjee had written: "I am not anxious to address the Party and explain why I have differed from you and have offered my resignation."

3. He had written that his position was a little awkward on account of his resignation. "I am getting telegrams from all parts of India and many requests are coming, asking me to explain what exactly my standpoint is."

4. He wrote that he had been a victim of whispering campaigns and rumours that he had resigned (1) because of reasons of a personal nature affecting him and Nehru, (2) because of the arrests of Hindu Mahasabha leaders, which actually happened after 1 April when he had offered to resign, (3) because he knew of Nehru's intentions to remove him from the reconstituted Cabinet and wanted an excuse for an honourable exit.

6. Difficulties in Implementation¹

I am perfectly satisfied that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan is going to do his utmost to implement the Agreement signed by us on Saturday. His position, I believe, in Pakistan is such that his word goes a long way. There were some talks at the secretariat level with regard to trade matters. I believe a meeting has been fixed at Karachi next week to continue them.

Question: Do you intend to go to Karachi?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I should, indeed, not only like to go to Karachi² but to East Bengal.

Q: Do you see any difficulties in the way of implementing the Agreement?

JN: I see quite a lot of difficulties all round, but I also foresee our overcoming them. The broad principles of the Agreement have been discussed with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Dr B.C. Roy.

Q: So many agreements between India and Pakistan have been violated in the past.

JN: But remember that a number of agreements were acted upon, and even those that were not fully acted upon were partly acted upon.

The real fact of the matter is that we had come up against a particular situation in Bengal which would lead either to a complete break and all that followed, or to an improvement thereon. There was not much room left for play-acting. So we had to consider what had to be done because otherwise consequences of a serious nature followed. So we met under that strain and compulsion of events which makes discussions frank and serious, and which makes the decisions arrived at also serious and to be acted upon.

Q: Was this strain of compulsion of events equally felt on the other side?

JN: Yes, I am quite sure of that. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan is an old resident of my province, the U.P., and I have known him for about twenty years. Many of my

1. Press conference at New Delhi, 10 April 1950. Patel was also present at the conference. From *National Herald*, 11 April 1950.

2. Nehru was in Karachi on 26 and 27 April 1950. See *post*, pp.74-81.

colleagues in the U.P. have known him for much longer, for instance, he was a colleague of Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant in the Assembly there for many years and they know each other thoroughly. So he is not a stranger to us. I also got to know him during the period of the Interim Government. It was not a very happy period for any of us, but I hope we have always had respect for each other and certainly on this occasion our meetings and our talks were very frank and there was no attempt on my part, and I believe on his part also, to avoid any difficult subject or controversial issue or bypass it, but there was a desire to face up to the issues in a friendly way.

I am quite sure that the Agreement is bound to bring a certain sense of relief in East Bengal. I do not think that the number of people coming over from there will decrease for some little time for the simple reason that people have been on the move in large numbers and are at the river ports, stations, etc. and they are not likely to go back. But it is bound to bring a certain sense of relief to those who have not left their homes. The first change that will occur immediately is a lessening of the immediate fear and apprehension.

Q: What will be the criterion of the success of the Agreement?

JN: Obviously, two of the most important criteria are the preservation of order and protection to the people and, secondly, decrease in the exodus. I have in mind the appointment of military officers for the time being as liaison officers, but I am not quite sure.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and I have also briefly dealt with other disputes between the two countries but decided to concentrate on the Bengal issue for the present and deal with the others later. The Kashmir issue was just touched upon.

Q: Have Pakistan's views on Kashmir undergone any change?

JN: I do not know, but apart from their views undergoing a change, a particular approach may undergo a change, that is, there may be a greater flexibility in approach.

Q: In view of this Agreement with Pakistan, do you contemplate an end to the cold war between India and Pakistan and further will efforts be made to solve questions like Kashmir, the canal dispute, and the evacuee property dispute by direct negotiation without the intervention of a third party like the Security Council?³

3. At this stage Patel intervened: "This is the first step towards reversing the process that has gone on."

JN: The United Nations comes in only in regard to Kashmir. The proposal for the appointment of a mediator is not intended to compel us to do anything but to help us in arriving at a mutual settlement. Let the United Nations help by all means. We have no desire to push it out. But I think it is correct to say that the proper way of settling questions is between ourselves and not by being pushed about by third parties.

Q: Has India accepted the Australian jurist, Sir Owen Dixon, as mediator?

JN: That is a dark secret.

Q: Will there be consultations between the two Governments on the choice of representatives?

JN: No. The representative will be chosen by the Chief Minister in charge of the State concerned. The Chief Minister can choose anyone he wants to.

Even apart from the Agreement, in most of the States in India there was minority representation in the Cabinet. The Agreement for minority representation in the Cabinets of East and West Bengal deals with a particular set of circumstances.

Q: Would there be minority representation in other provinces of Pakistan as well?

JN: Remember in some of their provinces there is no minority left.⁴

Some of the representatives of the press saw Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and they raised the issue of freedom of information. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan gave certain assurances that he would look into the appointment of correspondents there and other matters.

I also drew his attention to the United Nations convention on freedom of information.⁵ My suggestion was that although it has not been formally ratified by our Governments, we might act up to it. He said he would gladly look into it.

Q: Do you expect any restriction under the Agreement on the publication of news reports?

4. Asked whether the minority minister chosen would really represent the minorities in the State concerned, Patel commented: "It depends upon the spirit in which the Agreement is worked."
5. At the Monterideo session in May 1949 of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information, a code of ethics for journalists and information personnel was prepared and a note by the U.N. Secretary General on obstacles to the free flow of information across national frontiers was discussed.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

JN: Normally not, but I should like all of you present here and the press generally in India to appreciate the position. It is not by governmental action really that we can achieve results. We can stop something for the time being, but it may erupt elsewhere. So, it is only by the full cooperation of the press that we can really achieve good results. I do hope that the press will give us complete support in this matter. It is really not a question of reporting a fact but a deliberate attempt to change a certain atmosphere, which can be done both in the presentation of news and views. That certainly does not mean suppression of truth but it means a deliberate attempt to create that particular atmosphere. And if you do it, I have not a shadow of doubt that, so far as we are concerned, we will completely fulfil this Agreement.⁶

Q: Is Pakistan a theocratic State?

JN: Mr Liaquat Ali Khan strongly repudiates that his State is a theocratic State. He has certainly used the word Islamic State occasionally, but he says that is like the “*Ramrajya* business” in India. It is not theocratic.

Q: What is *Ramrajya*?

JN: I do not know.

Q: Is the arrest of Hindu Mahasabha persons connected with the presence of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan?

JN: The arrest and externment of certain persons connected with the Hindu Mahasabha had nothing to do with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's presence here. It was entirely for other reasons.⁷

Q: Does the Preventive Detention Act⁸ have your whole-hearted support?

6. At this point Patel remarked: “We rely on the help of the press rather than on anybody else and if you all help us, I think we can change the atmosphere.”
7. Patel said that they were externed because the authorities had reason to believe that if they were allowed to carry on their activities here, there would be trouble in Delhi.
8. The Public Security Acts, passed by the provincial legislatures, were declared void by the respective High Courts as these were found inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights. Since the State Governments felt a pressing need to control the mischievous element in society, the Provisional Parliament passed the Preventive Detention Act in 1950. It empowered the Central and the State Governments to detain any person for law and order reason. It was not obligatory for the authorities to disclose the facts if it was considered against public interests.

JN: No. It is not strong enough unfortunately. Preventive detention does not go very far nowadays because there are all kinds of obstructions and my colleague (Vallabhbhai Patel) is feeling it continuously.

Q: Have you received a letter from one Maya Das, urging greater security measures for your protection in view of the serious danger to your life.

JN: Do I look it? I cannot guarantee that there is none in the country who in his moments of excitement does not want to knock me down. Only yesterday I have written to the Deputy Prime Minister⁹ expressing my dissatisfaction at being looked after so well and requesting him to reduce these heavy security arrangements.

I receive about 1,500 to 2,000 letters every day. It is physically impossible for me to go through all these letters. Most of these letters do not reach me and only those which are considered important are sent to me.

9. Not printed. For notes on security measures *see* pp. 285-287.

7. To B.C Roy¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I understand that you are back in Calcutta. I hope your brief stay in Puri was restful. You have had a very hard time, but then there is no escape in these days for people who shoulder heavy responsibilities.

Now that this Agreement has been made, there can be no doubt that we must try our utmost to give full effect to it. Indeed we should not allow any time to lapse. We have to strike while the iron is hot.

My own information is that the Pakistan Government is making a very earnest effort towards the fulfilment of this Agreement. In any event we have to do so and create a new atmosphere. The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that this may well prove a turning point in Indo-Pakistan relations....

...As you know, Syama Prasad Mookerjee has resigned. He wrote to me many days ago, but I kept the matter secret. It is now of course fully publicised. I have been trying to induce him not to be in a hurry about it and to await developments. But

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

he is insistent and I do not quite know how I can go on resisting his demand. I am going to see the President tomorrow to take his guidance in the matter.

Neogy also sent his resignation, though I rather think that his viewpoint is somewhat different. I also think that he is not so anxious to resign and that he did it rather on an impulse. I am seeing him again and perhaps might induce him to withdraw his resignation.

I confess I do not understand the basic reason for any resignation at this stage. The Agreement has now been arrived at, and I think it is a good Agreement. It is pointless for anyone to go about discrediting it. That does us no good. Even those who might have disagreed with it previously can hardly try deliberately to break it, as that will discredit us and weaken us.

I asked you in my last letter to make any suggestions that you may have regarding the appointment of the Central Minister for Bengal and Assam. I have myself some ideas on this subject. But before I place them before you, I should like to have your ideas. Then there is the question of appointing a Muslim Minister to your Cabinet....

Yours,
Jawahar

8. To K.C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Neogy,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th April.² When we met last, I suggested to you that both of us might give further thought to this matter and perhaps meet again. I hope we shall meet tomorrow. Today is terribly full. I shall let you know by telephone of a time which might suit you and me tomorrow.

My reference to a Party meeting had nothing to do with personal discussions but rather a discussion of the broad issues and the principles governing them. In any event the Party has to meet and a meeting would put an end perhaps to many unfounded rumours. I understand that Satya Narayan Sinha has fixed a meeting for the 13th April.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Neogy thanked Nehru for his letter of 9 April (pp. 4 & 5) and wrote: "I have indicated to you my attitude, and I am expecting to be relieved of office soon. As I have already assured you, I would not embarrass you in the least by any pronouncement. I do not think that any discussion in the Party will help... I propose to relapse into my wonted obscurity, and will be content to watch the course of events from a detached point of view."

Amrit Kaur saw me today and mentioned something that you had said to her, some rumour that had reached you. I was rather surprised to learn of this, because I knew nothing about it. It is this unfortunate way of rumours spreading that causes much trouble. Hence the necessity of frank talks and of not being rushed into decision without every aspect being considered.

Whatever the ultimate decision might be, I do suggest that you might continue doing your work as Minister in Parliament and in office till we decide finally. You know that it is not possible for any of us to relapse easily into obscurity, nor can we give up easily the responsibilities that have come to us, whether we remain in office or not.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Gopinath Bardoloi¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Bardoloi,

I believe that Gopalaswami Ayyangar has already communicated with you on the subject of the Assam Expulsion Act.² Thus far not much has been done under it, and some time back it was suggested to you that we had better proceed slowly.

It seems to me that we should stop all action under it for the present completely. Since that act was passed, much has happened and many upheavals have taken place. The Agreement signed by Liaquat Ali Khan and me does not refer to this matter, but I might inform you that he did talk to me about it. I told him that I could not agree to including that in the Agreement, but undoubtedly we would look into it and see how it was affected indirectly by the principles of the spirit of the Agreement.

In any event it would be most unwise to take any action under that Act now. Our main purpose is to concentrate on getting full control of the situation in East

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Mohanlal Saksena.
2. Continuous influx of refugees into Assam from East Bengal necessitated the passing of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act on 13 February 1950, empowering the Assam Government to expel from the State undesirable non-bona fide refugees and allowing only the victims of communal disturbances to come to Assam. Despite this, the immigration continued unabated. The Indo-Pakistan Agreement had made the rehabilitation of these refugees a liability of the Government of India and consequently of the Assam Government. This Act was annulled in 1957.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

and West Bengal and Assam and to remove the sense of fear from the minorities. Everything else should be subordinated to this. If we cannot succeed in this, then all kinds of other problems will overwhelm us. But we are determined to succeed. Therefore, please see to it that nothing is done under the Assam Expulsion Act.

I might mention that a case from Dibrugarh was brought to my notice the other day, where the district authorities had issued a notice to an old resident to leave within three days.

I am concerned, as I have frequently written to you, about jute cultivation in Goalpara district. I feel convinced that the only right way to solve this is for you to send the Hindu refugees who have come to Cachar district to Goalpara. I understand that very few Hindu refugees have come direct to Goalpara, though a vast Muslim population have left it. In Cachar few Muslims have left, but a very large number of Hindus have come in, so that it would be desirable in any event to send some of these Hindu refugees from Cachar to Goalpara and to encourage them to do jute cultivation for the time being at least.

This matter is important from the jute and the rice point of view and it would be a great loss if lands in Goalpara lie fallow this year.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Mr President,

I enclose copies of correspondence which passed today between me and Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee.² You will notice that he is insistent on being relieved in a day or two at the most and has made his plans accordingly. I am afraid it is too late now and too difficult to do anything in the matter. I can only agree to accept his resignation. However, I hope to come and talk to you about it tomorrow for a brief while, if it suits you.

Regarding Shri K.C. Neogy, I hope the position is somewhat different. I am seeing him again tomorrow morning.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 70/50, President's Secretariat.

2. See *ante*, pp.3-4, 9-11.

11. A Turn in the Right Direction¹

Friends and Comrades,

We have passed through trying times which test men's souls. Hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted from their homes in Bengal, and suffered intolerable agony. Millions have lived under the dark shadow of fear and insecurity. But apart from those people in East Bengal, in West Bengal or Assam, apart from the vast armies of refugees who have gone through these ordeals, all of us, wherever we might be have shared in their suffering and torment of soul, and out of this torment has come passion, and the insensate action that passion brings forth. We seemed to have lost our moorings and struggled blindly for a blind future. Fortunately we have pulled ourselves up before greater disaster overwhelmed us. As you know, for a full week the Prime Minister of Pakistan and I discussed, with earnestness of spirit, these terrible problems that faced us. I had the advantage of conferring with my colleagues from day to day, for they carried the burden equally with me. As a result of these long talks an Agreement was signed, on behalf of the two Governments, on Saturday afternoon, and I placed this before our Parliament this morning.

What is the value of this Agreement? How far will it be implemented? To what extent will it succeed in producing hope and security in those affected areas of Bengal and Assam and elsewhere? Will it solve the problems that confront us? These questions are asked, and rightly asked, for an agreement may remain on paper only, as we have seen other agreements remain. My answer to these questions is, firstly, that the mere fact of an agreement is good and to be welcomed. Because it turns people's minds to the ways of construction, and away from the ways of destruction. Secondly, I can tell you, with all confidence, and in all honesty, that both of us, who had these long talks, were animated by an earnest and urgent desire to find a peaceful and satisfactory solution. We were impelled to do so by the very gravity of the situation and by the compulsion of events. I have no doubt that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, will exercise his great influence in the fullest degree to help in implementing this Agreement, and in producing those conditions of peace and security and good living for the minorities in Pakistan. Need I assure you that my Government will do their utmost to fulfil the letter and the spirit of this Agreement.

We have crossed a very big hurdle, but other hurdles remain. I do not wish to minimize the difficulties confronting us, for they are many. But whatever

1. Broadcast to the nation, New Delhi, 10 April 1950. A.I.R tapes, N.M.M.L.

difficulties remain, if you and I and all of us are determined to surmount them, we shall inevitably succeed. I venture, therefore, to speak to you with faith and confidence. During these thirty years and more that lie behind us, it has been my high privilege to come in personal contacts with millions of my people, and they have honoured me with their love and confidence beyond measure. I can never repay that debt. Because of that intimate companionship, on occasions, both of triumph and failure, of joy and sorrow, we have grown to know each other. Even when our great Master, the Father of the Nation, was with us, we slipped occasionally and failed him, but we pulled ourselves up again, because of his teaching. So I speak with some confidence of the future though that confidence is tempered with realism. This is no time for an easy optimism, as it certainly is no time for pessimism. We shall go ahead with strength of mind and purpose, and with faith in the task we have undertaken. We shall go ahead in the confidence that we are many and that in the past we have overcome many obstacles and so also we shall do in the present, and in the future.

You may examine this Agreement closely, and you may, perhaps, criticise some part of it, here and there. But the real thing that counts is the spirit underlying it. If that spirit is absent, then the Agreement is a mere scrap of paper. If the spirit gives it life, then it may well be the beginning of a new and vital approach to our problems, an approach that is bound to succeed. What will Pakistan do? Will they implement the Agreement? That is often asked. I am sure that the leaders of Pakistan will strive to their utmost capacity to implement it. But why ask what others will do? It is for us to determine what we do, and duty rightly done inevitably produces right results. That is the lesson, not only of Gandhiji but of all the sages who have gone before him, and left their imperishable imprints on the minds of our ancient race. I do not expect some magical change suddenly because of this Agreement. I do not expect the great exodus to stop, because large numbers of people have been uprooted and are on the move. I do not expect petty incidents to stop suddenly. Let us not be frightened, because there is no sudden change of this kind. Let us not lose our balance of mind. But I do expect a new and purer atmosphere to prevail, which will gradually affect people's minds and hearts and remove those poisonous tendencies that have betrayed them. I do expect this process to go on slowly at first, and then with greater force, till it produces a sea-change of great magnitude. But changes do not happen of themselves, and even fate, if there is such a thing, takes effect through men's minds and activities. This change will come, and must come, if you and I are determined to bring it about. We have played about too long with these problems and conflicts. It is time that we face them in the way we used to face our problems of old, firm in our anchor and in our ideals and refusing to admit that any power could stop us from our onward march. This Agreement has already been welcomed by large sections of our people and by the world abroad. A few friends are critical, and are doubtful about the results that may come from

it. I can understand that criticism and that doubt. But I would ask them to look at it in the context of events and to think of what the alternatives might have been. I am convinced that the Agreement is good as far as it goes, and will bring immediate relief, in some measure, to the suffering millions of Bengal. I am convinced also that it can be made the starting point of further advance in the right direction. We have taken a turn, and although the way is hard and difficult, it points in the right direction, and we have to pursue it to get out of the forest which was crushing us into the sunlight outside.

To my friends and colleagues of Bengal, I would make a special appeal for, while all are concerned with these problems, their concern is obviously far greater, as their burden has been far greater also. Bengal has shown on so many occasions in the past that she can rise up at a moment of crisis, and face it with strength and calm vigour. The young men and young women of Bengal are the most promising material in India, to build up our nation. Unhappily circumstances have denied them opportunities, and there is the spirit of frustration among them, and the unhappiness that comes from it. We have to rid ourselves of this frustration, and lack of purpose, and divert the bright intelligence and vitality of Bengal in the direction of constructive efforts. The first effort is to face this problem of today, with faith and confidence, and not to allow oneself to succumb to the doubt that enervates and weakens. I have spoken of Bengal because East and West Bengal are the crux of the problem. I would like to speak of Assam also in the same way and I would also like to refer to my own province, now called Uttar Pradesh. All my younger days were spent in the towns and villages of this province, and I have been grieved that trouble should occur, where so many valiant fights for freedom were fought. I earnestly trust that we have seen the end of this sorry business there and elsewhere.

A great responsibility rests on the press. Governments may act rightly or firmly, but ultimately a great deal depends on how the press functions and what lead it gives to our people. I trust that that lead will be in favour of the complete success of this great enterprise on which we have launched. The test of a people and of a nation comes when they are up against difficulties and intricate problems. Any person can live an easy life. It is only in times of trial that a people prove themselves worthy or unworthy. On past occasions our people have shown their worthiness, and have not failed to do great deeds. Let us again get back something of that old spirit, that old idealism, that old courage and faith and acquit ourselves like men. *Jai Hind.*

12. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 11, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I have sent you a letter this afternoon.² I do hope that you will agree to the proposal I have made. This Agreement that we have made with Pakistan has put a great burden and responsibility upon us. I am afraid that many of our own people do not quite realise this and tend to put obstructions in the way. On the whole, it appears that Pakistan is speaking with one voice and trying to implement the Agreement, though it is too early to say what will happen. On our side, the confusion is greater, specially in Bengal. Even in the U.P., though no incidents are happening, there is almost a mass movement among Muslims to migrate to Pakistan. The common folks are concerned—peasants, artisans, metal workers, locksmiths, domestic servants and the like. Their *panchayats* decide, and whole groups pack up and want to go. Obviously, they would not do so unless they were thoroughly frightened about the present and the future.

But the root of the problem remains, Bengal, East and West; also Assam. In certain areas of Assam, notably Barpeta, vast numbers of Muslims are on the move towards Pakistan. Meanwhile, the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal and the exodus of Muslims from West Bengal and Assam continue.

These next few weeks are very important. I realise that you cannot go immediately, but the mere announcement of your name will have great effect and so I hope that you will agree to my proposal. Both Vallabhbhai and Rajendra Babu approve of it. I hope you will be able to come here as soon as your eyes are a little better.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Nehru had formally suggested that Rajagopalachari should tour East and West Bengal as a Central Minister. See *post*, p.37.
3. Reaction to a medicine had caused irritation and pain in his eyes.

13. Telegram to B.C. Roy¹

It is imperative from every point of view that we should implement Agreement arrived at with Pakistan. While migrants must have freedom and security to travel

1. New Delhi, 11 April 1950. File No. 57/94/50-Poll, M.H.A.

and will no doubt continue crossing from one country to another for some time, we have to produce conditions of security and gainful living so that these migrations might lessen and stop.

We should therefore try to discourage Muslim migrations from Calcutta. I understand that these are continuing on large scale and factory workers are leaving chiefly because of food difficulties. Also because old officials incite them to leave. I suggest that responsible people might go to them and explain situation and try to induce them to stay. Also that their food difficulties might be removed. Otherwise they will have no alternative but to leave. I understand that there are difficulties in obtaining food in Howrah villages also.

14. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
April 12, 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

I have your note of today's date.² After our full discussion of yesterday, I had hoped that you would reconsider the position. I cannot get over the fact that whatever one may have thought of the previous position, the present position can be faced only in one way. The Agreement has to be accepted and worked for to the best of our ability, and any attempt to weaken it results in weakening ourselves and in injuring our cause, from whatever point of view we may look upon this. I realise that your approach in regard to some matters is not the same as mine. We have had our say to one another and explained each other's viewpoints. The question now is something infinitely bigger than our individual selves and I have been deeply exercised about it. We have, therefore, to consider it, forgetting ourselves for the time being, and thinking only of what will be advantageous to our country and to Bengal specially. In this context, which is after all the most important, it is clear to me that we have to go ahead with this Agreement. Going ahead with it would be no good at all if we did so in a half-hearted manner. In a crisis like this we cannot be half-hearted about any step that we take.

It is obvious to me that if you resign at this stage, that will be a blow to the successful working of this Agreement. People's passions are already excited and they could only consider resignation as your strong disapproval of the Agreement.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mookerjee had written that after the full and frank discussions the previous evening he hoped his resignation would be accepted with effect from the next day.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

That will inevitably follow in their minds. The consequence to Bengal of a major conflict on this issue appeared to me to be terrible to contemplate. Bengal has suffered enough, and it is a tremendous responsibility for all of us to see that further conflict and suffering is avoided as far as possible.

I realise the difficulty of your position because of the wide publicity that the question of your resignation has received. That is embarrassing, but personal embarrassment is ultimately less important than not doing something that is obviously indicated in the interest of our cause. I have no doubt that large numbers of people would understand and appreciate if you withdrew your resignation and would realise that you have acted from the desire to serve these larger causes.

I would, therefore, request you to reconsider this question of resignation and to withdraw it.

I have had a long session, over two hours, with the Bengal and Assam members of Parliament. I found, indeed I knew it, that it was their desire that you and Neogy should withdraw your resignations. I told them that I entirely agreed with them that in existing circumstances such resignations can only have an upsetting effect on people's minds and the course of events. I hope, therefore, that you will agree.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

P.S. As you know, in this most important matter I have been in constant consultations with the President and Sardar Patel. Both are anxious that you should withdraw your resignation. I might add that another of our elders in the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, expressed the same opinion to me and asked me to press for it. My request to you, therefore, has the additional backing of our elder statesmen.

15. To K.C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
April 12, 1950

My dear Neogy,

I have just written a letter to Syama Prasad Mookerjee. So as not to have to write

1. File No. 70/50, p.17, President's Secretariat.

all this, I enclose a copy of this. I hope that at this critical moment you will stand by and help us and not, as you hinted, seek rest in a quiet place.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. As Neogy could not attend the Party meeting due to influenza he sent a long letter to Nehru on 14 April explaining his views. He referred to his official notes on various issues concerning relations with Pakistan. Stoppage of coal supplies would mean a disruption in East Bengal's economy and could lead to the minority there being treated as hostages for India and oppressed in retaliation. Again this stoppage would interrupt the communications and travel between the two Bengals. He had also thought of an agreed exchange of population by Governmental efforts. He also referred to Pakistan's efforts to negotiate for coal with South Africa and holding up of jute supply to India.

16. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I hope to send you soon name of person chosen by us to be appointed as our Central Minister under terms of Agreement. Meanwhile, I should like to send immediately my Deputy Minister, Dr Keskar,² to Dacca to confer with our Deputy High Commissioner³ there and give him certain instructions and explain scope of Agreement. I hope you are agreeable to this.⁴

Reports continue to reach us about harassment of migrants at customs posts. We have forwarded these to your Foreign Office and they have contradicted them. Would still earnestly request you to issue directions through East Bengal Government for observance of letter and spirit of Agreement in regard to migrants and customs posts. On enquiry some of these customs officials said that they had received no fresh instructions.⁵

1. New Delhi, 12 April 1950. File No. 57/94/50-Poll. M.H.A.
2. B.V. Keskar.
3. S.K. Basu.
4. Liaquat Ali replied on 15 April that he had no objection to Keskar visiting Dacca in connection with the Agreement.
5. Liaquat Ali clarified that the Government of Pakistan had issued instructions to customs authorities in East Bengal to ensure that the Agreement was carried out faithfully in letter and spirit. He also wrote that a conference of chief secretaries would be held in Calcutta on 21 and 22 April to discuss the implementation of the Agreement including customs examinations and posting of liaison officers at customs posts.

17. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
April 12, 1950

Nan dear,

...I have had and am having a very difficult time here. But I grow rather hardened and do not quite get as upset as normal human beings should. I shall not write to you much about it, because it is all too complicated. The Agreement with Liaquat Ali was, I think, really good and might mean a real turn for the better. But Bengalis are in a fever of excitement and are very angry with me. It is difficult to talk to them. If people in West Bengal do not come up to the mark or, what is worse, want to create trouble, then this Agreement rather goes to pieces. I am afraid that Bidhan, who has done rather well during these disturbances, is sometimes out of his depth. His affiliations are mostly with people who, in a crisis of this kind, incline towards some kind of communalism. Bidhan himself does not do so. But he has very little influence on the younger generation. The next week or two will show what happens in West Bengal.

I was interested to read what you have written about Floyd Blair.² It is very kind of him to tell you how he and his friends feel about Kashmir.³ If he discusses the subject with me, he will get an equally frank answer....

With love from,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. G. Floyd Blair (1891-1965); vice-president of the National City Bank of New York, 1931-56.
3. Floyd Blair told Vijayalakshmi Pandit that American opinion was against India on Kashmir and "no further loans or aid would be available until a settlement had been arrived at."

18. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
April 13, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

As I told you on the telephone yesterday, I have pressed Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy to withdraw their resignations. I am quite sure that, even from their point of view, the resignations at this stage would be harmful to the country. I hope they will agree, but I am not yet certain. Possibly in a day or two a final

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

decision will be made. If they insist on resigning, or either of them does so, obviously I cannot help it.

Regarding your suggestion that Syama Babu might be our Central Minister, I fear this will not be feasible in present circumstances. After the great publicity that his resignation has received, his appointment will be considered as almost amounting to not trying for the implementation of the Agreement. It would have that effect both in India and Pakistan. Vallabhbhai Patel is of the same opinion and he spoke to Syama Prasad about it. Indeed from Syama Prasad's point of view too, this would be embarrassing.

I might have thought of Neogy in this connection, but to some extent, though not quite so much, the same argument applies to him. Apart from this, he is rather tired out and in a highly nervous condition.

The President, Sardar Patel and I have given a great deal of thought to this matter and we feel that Rajaji would be the right person. I realise the force of what you told me on the telephone that some people may not like this appointment. But taking every matter into consideration, his appointment has great value, both dramatic and other.

Unfortunately he is not quite well at present. Something was put in his eye for examination and this led to severe reactions and he had to retire to a dark room. He is now recovering. But it will take him five or six days before he can come here. I am not quite sure yet whether he will agree to go to Bengal, as I have suggested. But I hope he will agree.

This means that in any event he cannot be expected to go there for a fortnight. We do not want this period to remain blank. Time is of the essence in this business. Therefore, it is proposed to send someone else meanwhile till Rajaji can go there. We cannot appoint a new man for such a short period and an existing minister should go. Inevitably, one thinks of Gopalaswami in this connection. It may be, therefore, that we may send Gopalaswami for ten or twelve days to begin with. He can set the machinery in motion in Calcutta and Dacca.

If Rajaji goes, it would be for about two months or so, we can then have someone else.

I wonder if you have seen two editorials in *Dawn*. In case you have not, I enclose them. You will notice how the Pakistan press is playing up completely to the spirit of the Agreement. I wish our press did likewise. The *Dawn* articles contain some things that I do not like. But the whole approach is a good one. In any event there is no choice for us. We have to go ahead full tilt to fulfil this Agreement and to see to it that the other side does so also. Half measures are no good.

In this connection I should like to tell you that many people have asked me why you have been silent since the Agreement came out. I do hope that you will make some kind of a brief statement of full support to the Agreement and saying that your Government will act in accordance with the letter and spirit of it. You might also mention that you have had some evidence, in regard to customs posts, searches, etc., that Pakistan is implementing the Agreement....

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, I intend sending Keskar to Dacca for a few days. This has of course nothing to do with the Agreement, except in so far as I want him to explain it fully to our Deputy High Commissioner and others there and to bring back his personal impressions of the East Bengal situation. I have wired to Liaquat Ali about this and I am waiting for his reply.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

19. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 13, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

Your letter of the 12th has just reached me.² I have not shown it to Vallabhbhai yet. I shall see him a little later today and show it to him. Meanwhile, I am writing to you my immediate reactions.

Both Vallabhbhai and I realised fully that we must not put too great a burden on you. Nevertheless, we were of opinion that we should ask you to take up this very important and vital post for a short time, say two months or so. That would not come in the way of your going abroad as Ambassador-at-large, because it would take some time to make arrangements for your foreign journeys. The next two months are of the greatest importance, and we felt that your presence would be of inestimable value.

As for Dr Prafulla Ghosh, I fear his appointment would be looked upon with great disfavour at present. The Hindu Mahasabha mentality is dominant there and I am almost sure that the reactions to his appointment will be bad. Dr B.C. Roy will not like it at all for other reasons also. Unfortunately Prafulla Ghosh and Dr Roy are not on good terms with each other, and Prafulla Babu cannot get out of the Bengal power politics tussle. I think, therefore, that he has to be ruled out for this particular piece of work. What he should do is to go to East Bengal as a private citizen and help in every way.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In his letter of 12 April 1950, Rajagopalachari stated: "The times are out of joint and I appreciate and understand fully what is in your mind. But the strenuous character of the work seems to be one which wholly precludes my acceptance of such responsibility in the present state of my physical condition. Let Dr Ghosh be appointed. I am prepared to go and guide and work with him in some capacity or other which you may devise for such time as may be considered necessary. Your old idea that I should be a sort of Ambassador-at-large may suit this very well and it would not be inconsistent with your proposal that I should spend some time in foreign countries in that capacity."

Even your appointment may not be wholly agreeable to certain sections of Bengal Hindus, simply because you are not considered sufficiently Hindu-minded, if I may say so, and because you have given full-hearted support to the Agreement. But your position and prestige are such that it will not be easy for anyone to object to the appointment, while others will welcome it as showing the great importance we attach to this post and to this work.

Some people, including B.C. Roy, are pressing for the appointment of Syama Prasad Mookerjee as Central Minister in Bengal. I do not like that at all for a variety of reasons. Feeling as he does, he will not work for the fulfilment of the Agreement, but rather for its breach. There will be continuous quarrels. His appointment would make Pakistan suspicious. West Bengal would come largely under the sway of Hindu Mahasabha politics and others would feel isolated.

You say that you are prepared to go and guide the work of Prafulla Babu or someone else. Practically speaking, that is all that we require of you. You would have assistants and competent ones.

I have not yet finally accepted the resignations of Dr Mookerjee and Neogy. Normally, I would have no hesitation in accepting any resignation. But undoubtedly their resignations are creating and will create a bad situation in Bengal. Neogy is reasonable enough in his outlook, but he is very sensitive and nervous. In the balance I thought that we should try to keep both of them here and I have asked them to withdraw their resignations. I have not had their final answers yet. I might mention that Syama Prasad Mookerjee would probably like to become our Central Minister to Bengal.

I realise that you have to go slow because of your eye trouble and general health. But the mere announcement of your appointment would be very helpful.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

20. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 13, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I sent you a letter this afternoon,² soon after receiving your letter of the 12th April. Later I went to Vallabhbhai and showed him your letter. He agreed with my reactions.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

The position now is that I do not yet know whether Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy will withdraw their resignations or not. I have asked them to do so. Of course, this means that they will generally support the Government's policy in regard to the Agreement. That support may be a passive support. The position in Bengal being so highly surcharged with emotion, the fact of resignation would undoubtedly make it worse. On the other hand it is obvious that we cannot allow our policy to be affected by resignations. Syama Prasad and Neogy have got rather tied up by the publicity that their resignations have received. Anyhow, the matter will have to be decided in a day or two.

This has nothing to do with the appointment of a Central Minister for Bengal, etc. Syama Prasad did hint at his agreeing to become that Central Minister. But both Vallabhbhai and I were clearly of opinion that this would not be desirable. It would practically mean indicating both to Pakistan and our own people that we were not going to implement the Agreement seriously.

Neogy might normally have suited. But at the present moment he is in a peculiar nervous condition and therefore he has to be ruled out also.

About Prafulla Ghosh, Vallabhbhai agreed that his appointment, in the existing Bengal situation, would be very much opposed and resented.

What then are we to do? We come back to our first thought, that is you. You could be our Ambassador-at-large and at the same time, our Minister so long as you are functioning there. We do not think that you need remain there for more than two months at the most. You would have every kind of help. It is clear that you cannot go there for sometime till you are well enough, let us say a fortnight. We cannot allow this period to lapse without some action in this direction being taken. The only thing to be done for a short period is to send one of our existing Ministers. Syama Prasad and Neogy being out of the picture for this purpose, inevitably one's mind goes to Gopaldaswami. In many ways he is specially suited for a brief period. He has been connected with Indo-Pakistan matters. He is balanced and wants to work this Agreement to the full. So the proposal would be, if you agree, that you should be appointed and till you come, Gopaldaswami might go there, spend a few days in Dacca and a few in Calcutta and set up the machinery of the Agreement. The initial period is obviously important. Gopaldaswami's presence in Calcutta will be good from many points of view.

I should not like Gopaldaswami to go there for a much longer period, as that would mean his giving up his work here. He is of very great help here in more ways than one and I seek his advice frequently. He is one of the few persons who can look at things in perspective and with a balanced mind.

I quite appreciate what you have written about your health, etc. We should not like to put too great a burden on you, because your health is valuable. But I feel strongly that your presence at this stage in West and East Bengal would be very valuable. I hope therefore that you will agree.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

21. To Kailas Nath Katju¹

New Delhi
April. 13, 1950

My dear Kailas Nath,
Thank you for your letter of the 12th April.

I think that the Pakistan Government is certainly doing its best to implement the Agreement. I hope that immediate effect will be felt at the customs posts and in travelling arrangements. Also that mutual raids and border conflicts will stop. Partly the fault lies on our side at times. I hope that the West Bengal Government will issue orders, as the East Bengal Government has done, about customs examination.

I am trying to get Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy to withdraw their resignations. If they refuse to do so, there is no help for it. For the moment, I shall not fill their places.

The attitude of the newspapers in West Bengal distresses me exceedingly. We hope to send some newspaperman from here to Calcutta to keep in touch with the press there. I think you will notice that the Pakistan newspapers have improved considerably.

I agree with you that we must persuade some leading residents of East Bengal who have come away to go back to their old homes. They should go with their families. But even if they went without their families, to begin with, that would be something.

I think that Dr Prafulla Ghosh should himself stay in East Bengal.

Amtus Salam's scheme is good, if proper persons are sent under proper supervision. I hope this will be pushed through.²

Regarding Nellie Sen Gupta's proposal, we are trying our best to make some arrangements.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Amtus Salam had suggested that India should arrange to send workers to East Bengal. See also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt.I, p. 181.

22. To Gopinath Bardoloi¹

New Delhi
April 13, 1950

My dear Bardoloi,

I have received two communications, one from you and one from an official of your Government, enclosing memorandum received from the Muslims of Cachar. In your covering letter you support this memorandum. Our own information goes to show that the intelligence reports that we get are sometimes coloured and exaggerated. I hope that you will keep us informed of events from your point of view.

In view of your general agreement with this memorandum from Cachar, the question arises as to what you are doing to meet the situation there. In any event you should deal with it firmly. After our Agreement with Pakistan, this becomes even more necessary. There should be no hesitation about it. We cannot allow the type of things mentioned in the memorandum to happen without immunity.

I think you should issue some kind of a statement giving your full support to the Agreement with Pakistan. It need not be a long statement. You need only say that you and your Government support it fully and will try your utmost to implement it. You should further give an assurance to your minorities.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 29(198)/50-PMS.
2. Bardoloi replied on 17 April suggesting action on the Cachar memorandum and reporting that he had already made a statement supporting the Agreement on the day it was announced.

23. To R.R. Diwakar¹

New Delhi
April 13, 1950

My dear Diwakar,²

Gopalaswami Ayyangar has told me of his talks with you today. I like the idea very much about our preparing a small leaflet about the Agreement for wide

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Vallabhbhai Patel and Gopalaswami Ayyangar.
2. R.R. Diwakar was Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting at this time.

distribution. Naturally, we can only distribute it directly in West Bengal and Assam. But if we have the leaflets ready soon, we can send it to Liaquat Ali Khan and suggest that the leaflet or something like it might be widely distributed in East Bengal. We can offer to cooperate in this, if desired.

I hope, therefore, that this leaflet will be prepared soon. It should not take more than two or three hours. Presumably it will be prepared in English first and immediately translated into Bengali and Urdu. The translation should be well done. The Urdu one should be Urdu and not any other mixture. If necessary, you can get some one from the Jamia to revise the translation. They are very good at writing simple Urdu or Hindustani. If I get the English draft by tomorrow afternoon, I shall immediately send a copy of it by air to Liaquat Ali.

I am also attracted by the idea that we should send a competent newspaperman to Calcutta and West Bengal. He should have a certain measure of freedom to meet newspapermen there and others and if possible, to help in influencing proper publicity etc. All this requires not only a particular type of newspaper ability but also a certain tact and personal knowledge of newspapermen concerned. I think Sahni³ would be well at this kind of work. He has wide experience and acquaintance and a way of getting on with people. I understand that his name was suggested. I entirely approve of that suggestion.

Please do not hesitate to ask me for any help that you need. This work is of first priority at present and I attach great importance to it and I am prepared to give as much time as needed. As you know, Dutt,⁴ Additional Secretary of External Affairs, has been specially put in charge of this Bengal problem and the Agreement and what flows from it. I hope your Ministry will keep in touch with him, both to keep him informed and to take as much help from him as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. J.N. Sahni (1900-1986); Editor, *The Hindustan Times*, 1926-1933, *National Call*, 1933-1946, *Indian News Chronicle*, 1946-1949; thereafter he wrote articles for newspapers which were syndicated through Press News Features; author of several books.

4. S. Dutt.

24. Hope of Better Relations¹

I appeal to all Indians, irrespective of party affiliations, to work wholeheartedly for implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement.

The only alternative to the Agreement is war, which will not only destroy both India and Pakistan but is sure to engulf a good part of the world.

1. Speech at a public meeting, New Delhi, 13 April 1950. From *National Herald*, 14 April 1950.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

The country is on the verge of a precipice and any wrong step taken at this stage will prove disastrous.

The Government are entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the welfare and safety of millions of people and will not, therefore, countenance any loose talk about war which is often indulged in.

This is the time for us to unite on all issues of major importance, irrespective of political differences. By working jointly on such issues like the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, we will demonstrate our strength and solidarity to the world.

I regret that a certain section of the people is conducting itself more with a view to doing well in the forthcoming elections than supporting what is in the best interests of the country.

During my recent tour of America² and in my speech before the United Nations General Assembly,³ I had presented India's viewpoint on the question of war. I told them in unequivocal terms that wars always complicate and never simplify or solve problems. Such a bold stand has raised India's prestige and, therefore, any attempt to sabotage a constructive effort at peace such as the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, will not only weaken India but discredit her before the eyes of the world.

No intelligent or patriotic man would like his country to be engulfed in war with all the horrors and destruction involved in the use of modern weapons such as the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb. But such extreme measures have often to be resorted to when a country's honour and freedom are threatened. India at present is not entirely free from danger—external or internal. It is, therefore, but proper that she should maintain a modern army, navy and an air force. But for the danger, I would have preferred to save the vast expenditure being now incurred on the maintenance of the armed forces, for the development of the country's economy.

I deplore communal incidents recently in some parts of the United Provinces. Retaliation on innocent people for the wrong acts of others is not a civilised way of doing things. It is not proper for individuals to take the law into their own hands. If that is permitted and the law of the jungle allowed to prevail, there will be anarchy.

A section of the people of West Bengal have criticised the Indo-Pakistan Agreement. But is there any other way out of the difficulty?

The only course left to us was to arrive at this Agreement and, after having reached it, the only honest and proper course before us is to implement it with all the intelligence and force at our command.

I appeal to my critics to lend me their support in the working of the Agreement. The step that we have taken involves the country's future. And when the fate of

2. From 7 October to 14 November 1949.

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 13, p. 328.

millions is thus involved, it becomes the duty of every patriotic citizen to put up a united front leaving aside all rancour and controversy.

I feel confident that the Government of Pakistan will sincerely and honestly work for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Agreement. The removal of customs and other difficulties between East Bengal and West Bengal have already demonstrated the fact that the situation is gradually improving.

I am sure that the present Agreement will lead to the solution of other disputes. Evacuee property and the canal waters disputes are among the outstanding issues which may be tackled as time passes.

Many a storm has of late swept our country, and many a time we embarked on the stormy seas and rowed safely across. This time too we are making a similar attempt and are confident of success.

The Father of the Nation taught us to face our difficulties boldly. His philosophy was that of courage and fortitude and not of escapism and defeat.

I urge the people to develop an attitude of fearlessness, for there is no other way of defending our hard-won freedom, and solving the manifold problems facing the country.

25. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

April 14, 1950

My dear Mr President,

I do not yet know finally whether Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Shri K.C. Neogy will resign or withdraw their resignations. We shall know definitely tomorrow. In the event of their not resigning, nothing more need be done at present. In the event of their resigning, I do not propose to suggest other names for appointments in their places at present. But the portfolios will be divided up among existing Ministers till further arrangements are made.

You will remember our suggestion that Shri Rajagopalachari might be our Central Minister in Bengal. Taking into consideration his own views on the subject, we have decided not to press him to accept this. Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta day after tomorrow and he will consult Dr Roy about a suitable person for appointment as Central Minister for Bengal. If necessary, we shall send Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar for ten days or so there to function as Central Minister and to help in making the necessary preliminary arrangements.

1. J.N. Collection.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

It is our intention to appoint Shri Rajagopalachari as Ambassador-at-large. When he is well enough, we shall ask him to pay a visit to East and West Bengal and Assam and spend some little time there. He will have no special responsibility, but will be there to advise our Central Minister and others. How long he stays there will depend upon circumstances. At a later stage we might request him, as such Ambassador-at-large, to visit the United Kingdom and the U.S.A.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

26. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 14, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I have received your note of yesterday's date. I have not seen your letter to Vallabhbhai.² But he has told me about it and we have discussed the matter. In all the circumstances perhaps it is best that you should not be one of our Central Ministers, but I shall hold you to your other suggestion, that is that you should be our Ambassador-at-large. That will not be confined to Bengal. It will be a continuing process. To begin with, you could go to Bengal, East and West, and perhaps Assam at your leisure and advise our Minister there as well as others without undertaking the definite responsibility of that Minister. Later you could go to England and the U.S.A.

I hope I have your permission to announce this fact of our appointing you as our Ambassador-at-large. I shall not mention at this stage your possible visit to England or U.S.A. Vallabhbhai is going to Calcutta day after tomorrow for a few days. Probably he will fix up some suitable Bengali to be our Minister for those parts. If necessary, Gopalaswami will go a little later for a few days.

We shall expect you here in about a week's time, when I hope your eyes will have recovered completely.

Vallabhbhai has been a brick during these days. We had a Party meeting this evening and he made a very moving appeal.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In his letter to Vallabhbhai Patel dated 11 April 1950, Rajagopalachari expressed satisfaction at the relationship between him and Nehru. "I think all that has happened recently has, along with much misfortune, given a good opportunity to people to understand you and your unqualified bond with Jawaharlal very fully and correctly."

27. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
April 14, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

We have been thinking of how to give proper publicity to the Agreement arrived at between us. We are trying to use the press and radio to this end. I have no doubt that you will do so in Pakistan also. We hope to produce a film about the Agreement. It will be a short one and we shall send you a copy.

Apart from some leaflets and pamphlets, it is proposed to issue a four-page leaflet in Bengali, Hindi and Urdu (that is separately in each) for wide distribution in West Bengal, Assam, U.P., etc. This leaflet will give some relevant parts of the Agreement which are of particular interest to the people concerned and brief extracts from your statements and speeches as well as mine. We want to distribute this on a big scale. We hope the pamphlet as produced will be such that you would consider it suitable for distribution in East Pakistan also. In any event I shall send you a copy of it in English, so that you might judge. We should like some such pamphlet to reach the Hindu minority in East Bengal and of course the majority also. Probably the easiest way to distribute it is by air. I have no doubt that the East Pakistan Government could make necessary arrangements. If any cooperation from us is desired in this respect, we shall gladly offer it.²

There is one matter to which I should like to draw your special attention. We have about 3000 officers and men serving in our Defence Forces whose families are in East Pakistan. Naturally these people are very anxious about their families. It is possible that some of them may have come over or might be in the process of coming over. It would be greatly appreciated if you would allow us to send a small mission consisting of six persons, two commissioned officers, two J.C.Os., and two other ranks, who might go to East Bengal to make enquiries about these families and bring back news about them. This will create satisfaction to the people concerned.³

While you were here, I mentioned to you the question of exchange of prisoners of war taken in Kashmir. This has been pending for a long time. We nearly came

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Liaquat Ali replied on 18 April that the Pakistani press had been carrying almost daily articles and features about the Agreement. The East Bengal Government was producing a pamphlet in English, Bengali and Urdu on the same lines for distribution in East Bengal and other parts of Pakistan.

3. Liaquat Ali had written that in Pakistan also, the officers and men of the Armed Services who had relations in West Bengal, U.P., Bombay, Madras and other parts of India, had been very anxious about the welfare and whereabouts of their families. "I am considering what the best method is of allaying the anxiety felt on both sides and shall write to you about this later."

to an agreement about an exchange about an year ago.⁴ This agreement however did not finally materialise, because your Government and ours did not agree in regard to one matter. Pakistan suggested that the exchange should be on the basis of man for man. We suggested that all of them should be exchanged. The number involved is, I believe, about 600 prisoners in Pakistan and about 150 prisoners with us. I hope that, in the altered circumstances of today, this exchange can take place in accordance with international conventions regarding such exchanges.⁵

I can assure you that we are doing and shall do our utmost to give full effect to the Agreement arrived at. Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta day after tomorrow morning. West Bengal, as you know, is in a highly emotional state of mind after the experiences it has gone through. Sardar Patel has, however, in spite of his ill-health, decided to go there to explain the situation to the people and to get their full cooperation in implementing our Agreement.⁶

There has been some delay on both our part and your part in appointing the Central Ministers. I hope, however, that we shall be in a position to inform you of our choice soon. Meanwhile, if necessary, we are prepared to send one of our existing Ministers to Bengal till such time as the new appointment is made.

Apart from this, I might inform you that we are considering the appointment of Shri C. Rajagopalachari as Ambassador-at-large. The first duty we might assign to him would be to go to Bengal etc. He will have no special business allotted to him. He would simply advise our Central Minister, our Provincial Ministries and others.⁷ He can stay there as long as he likes. He is not well at present and has had serious trouble with his eyes. But he is recovering and may be able to come to Delhi within ten days or so.

I sent you a telegram about my sending my Deputy Minister, Dr B.V. Keskar, to Dacca.⁸ I have had no reply from you yet. The object of sending him was that he might personally explain to our Deputy High Commissioner there and his staff the full implications of our Agreement. He might also perhaps visit some of the camps and collections of Hindus there and explain this Agreement to them in the

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol.11, pp.118-119.

5. Liaquat Ali had replied that the matter of exchange of prisoners was under urgent examination. "I hope to discuss the whole question of Kashmir with you when you visit Karachi and to settle all incidental issues at the same time."

6. Liaquat Ali wished Patel all success and said that his goodwill visit to West Bengal despite his indifferent health was a tribute to his courage and high sense of responsibility.

7. About the contemplated appointment of Rajagopalachari as Ambassador-at-large, Liaquat Ali wrote it was for Nehru to decide. "My own feeling is that we should do nothing which may tend to cut across the work of the Central Ministers and impair their responsibility under the Agreement."

8. See *ante*, p.26. Liaquat Ali had received the telegram on 13 April and replied on 15 April agreeing to the proposal.

hope that this would bring some satisfaction and they might be induced to stay in East Bengal.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

28. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
April 14, 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

I have just received your note of today's date.²

I think you should certainly come to the Party meeting. I do not wish your resignation to be a matter for discussion there, but certainly you can make a statement to explain your viewpoint.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mookerjee had again pressed for the acceptance of his resignation with effect from 15 April. "I do not know if I should attend the Party meeting this afternoon. The resignation should be accepted before the Party meeting is held so that this may not form a subject matter of discussion there. Would it not be proper for me to make a brief statement, not in justification of my resignation but for the purpose of conveying my deep thanks to the Party for the confidence that I have so long enjoyed at its hands?"

29. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
April 14, 1950

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of today's date.² At this evening's Party meeting Vallabhbhai made a very moving appeal to Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. He had written that after his talks with Mookerjee and Neogy he found it difficult to dislodge them from the position they had taken. They were worried by the incidents after the Agreement had been published. Neogy had sent him a copy of Saha's telegram.



WITH VALLABHBHAI PATEL AT PALAM AIRPORT BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR KARACHI, 26 APRIL 1950



WITH LIAQUAT ALI KHAN, KARACHI, 26 APRIL 1950



WITH LIAQUAT ALI KHAN AND BEGUM LIAQUAT ALI AT STATE BANQUET, KARACHI, 27 APRIL 1950



AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY MUSLIM CITIZENS OF WEST BENGAL, CALCUTTA, 24 JUNE 1950

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

The former was present, but Neogy was not well enough to come. As a result of this appeal, I am told that Dr Mookerjee is giving earnest thought to the matter again. We shall know tomorrow their final decision.

It is a little difficult to check up on Dr Meghnad Saha's message to Neogy.³ I received it also. Our information does not quite fit in with it and the opinion of Dutt, our Additional Secretary, who is in charge of this matter, is that Meghnad Saha's message was somewhat exaggerated or it related to some previous occurrence.

Generally speaking, there is little doubt that the Pakistan Government is going all out to implement the Agreement. All the information we have received is to this end. There was probably three or four days delay in instructions being issued. But now they have definitely been issued, as Dr Roy informed us. You may have noticed the complete change in tone of the *Dawn* newspaper.

Dr Saha's statement that we did not protest about the death of the medical student is completely wrong. We made an energetic protest to the Pakistan Government and the West Bengal Government did likewise to the East Bengal Government. This was done repeatedly. I discussed this matter also with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. A certain difficulty arose, because the area where this student was working was disputed territory.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Meghnad Saha wired that on 12 April refugees crossing Benapole on 11 April were severely beaten and were deprived of their valuables by Ansars and customs police. Thousands of refugees had been stranded at Barisal and Burhanganj. One hundred steamers were required for repatriation. The Chittagong Mail proceeding from Kushtia was attacked and looted on 11 April. Pakistan officials accompanied by Indian officials were touring West Bengal and Assam and preparing records, but no reciprocal enquiries had been started in East Bengal.

30. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

Today I received your letters of the 14th April.² Your argument has convinced

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Rajagopalachari wrote: "...We shall lose much unless you give me an independent and higher position to work from instead of equating me with the minister from Pakistan. You have to devise some definite scheme for utilising me in this work other than appointing me a minister in terms of the Agreement. ...B.C. Roy's objections should not stand in the way of Dr Ghosh being appointed to this post. If you and Sardar do not think of Ghosh as feasible then you have to think of Mr Neogy and not Dr Shyama Prasad."

me, as it has convinced Vallabhbhai. Indeed I have already written to you on this subject. We shall expect you as soon as you can come here and it is understood that you will then become our Ambassador-at-large. When you are well enough and ready for it, you will pay a visit to Bengal for a relatively short period or as long as you like. Later we may think of your paying a visit to the United Kingdom and to the U.S.A. I am giving a hint to Archie Nye.

Neither Vallabhbhai nor I have been convinced about Prafulla Ghosh being appointed Minister. Apart from the fact that he is very unpopular at present and his appointment would almost be an affront to Bengal opinion, he just cannot get along with Bidhan Roy, who will object to it violently. What Prafulla Ghosh should do is to go to East Bengal and stay there. Vallabhbhai wants a number of fairly well-known families from East Bengal to return there.

As Vallabhbhai is going to Calcutta, I have asked him to settle, in consultation with Bidhan Roy, many of the outstanding matters.

I might give you my programme. I am going with Rajendra Babu on the 21st morning to Dhanbad in Bihar for the opening of the Fuel Research Institute. We also visit the Sindri Fertilizer Factory and the Damodar Valley Works. We return on the 24th forenoon. I shall be here on the 25th. Probably I shall go to Karachi for two days, the 26th and 27th, returning to Delhi on the 28th. Liaquat Ali Khan has invited me. The dates are unsuitable, but there is no help for it, as Liaquat Ali is leaving for the U.S. on the 28th or 29th.

Vallabhbhai intends coming back to Delhi on the 21st, but he may be delayed.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

31. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

I have received your letter of today's date.² I am sorry that you have finally

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mookerjee had expressed his inability to withdraw his resignation. During his talks with Neogy the previous evening, Neogy felt very strongly that impending trade talks should not be finalised or implemented by Cabinet for two months. During this period the Government should satisfy itself that the political Agreement was being implemented by Pakistan. Meanwhile, all possible steps should be taken to requisition the raw jute stocks in India for making available to the mills. During this period topmost priority should be given to recovery of abducted women. He referred to about 50 women having been abducted in East Bengal apart from the border incidents.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

decided not to reconsider your decision. You know how I regret this decision of yours. I have no alternative, therefore, but to recommend to the President to accept your resignation as from today. For the present, charge might be handed over to me.

At the conclusion of our close cooperation as Members of the Cabinet for more than two and a half years, allow me to express my gratitude to you. I hope that there will be many occasions for our cooperation in various fields in future.

We are taking necessary action in regard to the complaints that reach us. The particular complaint that you refer to about women having been abducted was contained in a police report which came sometime ago and relates to some incidents which took place towards the end of March.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

32. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Syama Prasad,

I am glad to learn from Satya Narayan Sinha that you have decided not to make any statement in Parliament today.² It was because of your desire to make the statement today that you had pressed me to accept your resignation. I felt that I had no alternative but to accede to your wishes in this matter. Of course, I could not accept your resignation formally as that was the business of the President. All I could do was to send it on to the President with my recommendation. Now that you have decided to postpone this for a few days, the question of acceptance of your resignation today does not arise and I am informing the President accordingly.

I understand that you intend making the statement on the 19th of this month on your return from Bombay.

I am glad that your resignation and your statement will not take place just when Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta. I shall be glad if you will please confirm to me your desire to make the statement on the 19th so that I can inform the Speaker in good time. You will naturally continue as Minister till then.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. He also wrote on similar lines to K.C. Neogy.

2. Mookerjee also wrote to Nehru on 15 April that at the request of Patel he had agreed to make his statement in Parliament not on 15 April but on 19 April on his return from Bombay.

33. To K.C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Neogy,

Syama Prasad Mookerjee has informed me that after full consideration you have decided not to withdraw your resignation.² I am sorry to learn this and regret that we should part company after two and a half years of close cooperation in the Government. You know how sorry I am that you are leaving us. However, there is no choice left to me now but to recommend to the President to accept your resignation. For the present, charge of your Ministry might be handed over to me.

I should like to express my gratitude to you for all you have done in the course of the last two and a half years in Government. I need not repeat how I have appreciated your work. I hope that we shall have many opportunities of cooperating in future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Neogy replied on 15 April: "It has caused me great pain to have to part company with you. Believe me that it was your personal goodwill and support that enabled me to steer through many depressing and discouraging circumstances during the last two years and a half. I have been disillusioned about men and things during this period, but not for a moment did I have occasion to doubt your profound sincerity of purpose and high principle. It is all the more painful, therefore, for me to have to hurt your feelings on an issue where I felt that I could not compromise with my conscience. I have no objection to postpone formal action on my letter of resignation till the 19th."

34. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

Nan dear,

We move from crisis to crisis here. Anyway it is certain now that Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy are leaving us. Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta tomorrow morning to soothe the injured feelings of the Bengalis. They work themselves up into a terrific passion.

1. J.N. Collection.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

We intend appointing Rajaji as a kind of Ambassador-at-large for some indefinite period. First of all, we shall send him to Bengal etc. At a later date he may visit the U.K. and afterwards the U.S.A. He is not very well at present and has had trouble with his eyes. But I hope he will recover soon and come to Delhi. We shall then discuss his future programme. Much will of course depend on developments in Bengal and India.

You will have full notice of his visit to the U.S.A., if this materialises. Remember his age and habits. He is not to be rushed about. He should be given an opportunity of quiet talks with some prominent people.

With love from,
Jawahar

35. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

Thank you for your telegram inviting me to Karachi.² I have sent you a telegraphic reply. I have every intention of going to Karachi, but I confess that it is not easy to fit in dates which are suitable both to you and me. Normally the proper time for me to visit you would have been sometime in May. But that is out of the question, as you are leaving for the U.S. I have to go to Bihar for three big functions from the 21st April to the 24th. We are having the opening ceremony by the President of one of our large scientific institutes—the Fuel Research Institute at Dhanbad. I am also visiting the Sindri Fertilizer Factory and the Damodar Valley Works. I return to Delhi about mid-day on the 24th. On the 25th there is an important conference here, which I must attend. This is a planning conference and people will be coming from all over India for it. The conference will indeed last at least two days. I must attend at least one day.

This means that I cannot leave Delhi before the 26th morning at the earliest. As you are leaving Karachi on the 28th, there is not much time left. At the most I could go on the 26th morning for two days.

I should have preferred going somewhat later from various points of view. The Agreement we have arrived would have had some little time to function, and I hope

1. J.N. Collection.
2. On 14 April, Liaquat Ali invited Nehru to Karachi before his U.S. visit which was to begin on 28 April.

would have yielded satisfactory results. That would have created a suitable atmosphere. However, I leave it to you as to when I should come to Karachi. If you desire me to come on the 26th for a couple of days, I shall do so.

You will no doubt realise that while our Agreement has been largely welcomed in India, we are having a difficult time in West Bengal. People in West Bengal have suffered a serious nervous shock during the last few months and it is not easy to get over it. We have to proceed with care and gentleness to deal with this situation and to show results as rapidly as possible. It is these results that will ultimately soothe people's wounded feelings. Sardar Patel is going early tomorrow morning to Calcutta to meet people there and to help in getting their cooperation.

Results can be measured in various ways. The immediate test is freedom from harassment and trouble at customs posts and at the border.³ This kind of thing is a continuous irritant, and if we put an end to it, there will be a feeling of relief all round. Ultimately, however the test of success of our Agreement is the stoppage of the migrations and, later, a reverse process setting in. I am glad to notice that the departure of Muslims from Calcutta and West Bengal has greatly lessened. This is also very noticeable in the U.P. I am told that the atmosphere in the U.P. has shown a marked improvement since our Agreement.⁴

The exodus of Hindus from East Bengal, however, continues and we are informed that large numbers of them are collected at various river stations and other places. I watch the daily figures anxiously to find out how far this exodus is being affected. I do not expect a sudden change. But some change should be noticeable.

It is clear that if we are to expect the Hindus to remain in East Bengal, or for those who had come away to go back, it is necessary for leading and prominent Hindu citizens of East Bengal to go back. Only then can a feeling of confidence be created in the rank and file. Sardar Patel is firmly of this opinion and it is his intention to suggest this in Calcutta.

A complaint often made by prominent Hindu migrants is that their houses have been requisitioned and they had nowhere to go to. This is a fairly old complaint. Even when they had several houses, all of them were requisitioned and none was left for them to live in. They were thus compelled to leave. If it is possible to derequisition houses of people who go back, it would help greatly in this process of people returning to their old homes. If any one has several houses, at least one

3. Liaquat Ali replied on 20 April that he had sent Nehru a copy of the instructions issued by the Pakistan Government to ensure freedom from harassment and proper observance of the terms of the Agreement and was hopeful that these instructions would have the desired effect. "I trust also that efforts on your side to stop harassment will be equally successful."
4. Liaquat Ali had written that the exodus from both the countries still continued and a large number of refugees were coming to West Pakistan. He agreed with Nehru that stoppage of migrations was the first test of the success of the Agreement and the next would be to get the refugees back to their homes.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

of them should be left for him to live in. Probably, to begin with, he will go back by himself and a little later he may bring his family. I suggest, therefore, for your consideration that houses of people returning might be made available to them to live in. It is hardly possible to expect them to return if they have no living room.⁵

Another matter, to which I drew your attention when you were here, is the arrest of a number of prominent citizens in East Bengal.⁶ Naturally, I cannot say what, if any, evidence there is against them. But we all know that in times of trouble and upheaval, not much evidence is required for arrest and often enough, the vital elements of a community are arrested. There is little doubt that these arrests have gone a long way to make Hindus in East Bengal feel that there is no room left for them there, when the tallest of them can be so removed. I mentioned one particular case to you, that of Satin Sen,⁷ who is known to all of us.⁸ I hope you will consider these matters and I have no doubt that the release of some of these people will have a powerful effect on public opinion in West Bengal.

I received your telegram about Keskar. Unfortunately there was some error in transmission and I could not quite make out what you said. But, in any event, I have decided not to send him just yet, as Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta and it is likely that our Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca will pay a visit to Calcutta.

I wrote to you yesterday about a leaflet which we propose to issue in large numbers in Bengali, Urdu and Hindi. I enclose a copy of this leaflet. You will see at the top an indication that there should be a half-tone block of you and me shaking hands. I do not like this, as this business of shaking hands in pictures is rather cheap. I am suggesting that they might give two pictures at the top, separately, one of you and one of me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Liaquat Ali had written that he had spoken to Nurul Amin, premier of East Bengal, about the need for derequisitioning houses of people returning to their homes, though it might not be free from some difficulty. "We must, however, adhere as strictly as possible to the principle that an evacuee who comes back must have a place to live in."
6. After talking to Nurul Amin, Liaquat Ali assured Nehru that there was no intention whatever to harass or victimise innocent persons.
7. Satindra Nath Sen (1894-1955); social worker and leading lawyer of Barisal; imprisoned several times during the freedom struggle; elected to the Legislative Assembly of United Bengal, 1946; remained in Pakistan after partition; arrested in the language movement in East Bengal in 1954 and died there under mysterious circumstances.
8. Liaquat Ali wrote that the arrest of Satin Sen followed a specific allegation of criminal offence and the case against him, if established, was triable in an ordinary court. However, he had asked Nurul Amin to look into this case and send him a report. He would then see what could be done.

36. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I have just received your letter of the 14th April. As you know, Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta tomorrow. I am also sending S. Dutt along with him and all these matters can be discussed with them by you and decisions can be taken on the spot.

I should not bother very much about the Islamic State because in the body of the Agreement the equality of citizenship and equal rights in regard to every matter have been precisely stated. I could not expect Liaquat Ali to repudiate a resolution of his Constituent Assembly by private agreement with me. Therefore we had that detailed Clause A which goes into every possible matter.

I have written and telegraphed to Liaquat Ali Khan about implementing the Agreement in full and the relaxation of customs checking, etc. As far as I can make out, the Pakistan Government is serious enough in the matter and have issued instructions accordingly, but minor officials apparently continue to misbehave. I have therefore suggested to Liaquat Ali to send senior officials to some of the important points.

I think it would be a good thing if the Quakers help the refugees, especially at the customs checking centres.

It is a little difficult for us to ask that houses that have been requisitioned in the past two years should be derequisitioned except in the case of a person who possesses more than one house. Apart from the practical difficulties involved in doing this and apart from the fact that we ourselves, under stress of circumstances, have requisitioned many houses, we have to remember that some cities have grown enormously during the last two-three years. Also that it is difficult in these circumstances for a single individual sometimes to occupy a large house.

I shall however take up this matter again.

I raised the question of Satin Sen's and others' arrests with Liaquat Ali Khan and he said he would enquire into it.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Copies were sent to Vallabhbhai Patel and S. Dutt.

37. To C.R. Attlee¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Attlee,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th March.² I am also grateful to you for the message you sent me through the U.K. High Commissioner here, on the conclusion of the Agreement with Liaquat Ali Khan.

It is certainly a considerable gain for us to have concluded this Agreement. But that is only one hurdle and the Bengal situation continues to be tense.³ Our Agreement has had a good welcome in most parts of India. Sentiment in Bengal, however, is opposed to it. People there have undergone great sufferings and have worked themselves up to a pitch of excitement. My Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel, is going to Calcutta tomorrow to meet the people there and deal with the situation. So far as we are concerned, we are determined to implement fully the Agreement arrived at. Probably I shall visit Karachi towards the end of this month.

I appreciate and understand what you say about the situation in India producing a certain effect in the U.K. and the Commonwealth.⁴ We are all so closely knit together in the world that anything that happens in one country produces its reactions in the others.

I was deeply grieved to learn of Laski's death. I entirely agree with you about his services to the cause of Indian freedom.⁵

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Attlee had thanked Nehru for sending a full account of the situation in India and Pakistan after the conclusion of the Agreement. He feared that some incident might precipitate trouble which would even affect world conditions incalculably.
3. Attlee had written: "I always was apprehensive as to how the Bengal situation would develop because the division cut across what had become an economic entity and also across what had become, despite differences of creed, almost a distinctive nationalist grouping."
4. Attlee had written that the Labour policy towards India had made a very strong appeal to the majority of people there and had gained strength in other parts of the Commonwealth and Empire.
5. Attlee wrote that Laski stimulated many young minds "...there was nothing to which he brought greater devotion than the cause of Indian freedom."

38. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

We have received following telegram from the West Bengal Government:

Begins: Report shows that even up to 13th customs police and Ansars at Benapole and Khulna were taking away valuables. Complaints from Darsana that on same day indecent searches continued and ornaments and cash taken away by land customs officer without granting receipt. Searches were made by Police and Ansars after putting out lights of the train. Ends.

I would like to draw your particular attention to this matter and trust that your Government will take immediate steps² to put an end to such happenings as they come in the way of implementation of Agreement and lead to public excitement. It sometimes happens that subordinate officials act irresponsibly and do not carry out instructions issued to them. It is desirable therefore that senior responsible officers might be sent to the places mentioned above.

1. New Delhi, 15 April 1950. File No. 57/94/50-Poll. M.H.A.
2. Liaquat Ali replied on 19 April that the Collector of Customs in Chittagong had been ordered to proceed immediately to Benapole, Khulna and Darsana to investigate these complaints and award exemplary punishment to the guilty. Other senior officers had also been instructed to proceed.

39. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1950

My dear Krishna,

We have been passing through difficult times and I have not been able to write to you. Nor indeed can I write much now. After a great deal of discussion and argument, Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy have finally decided to resign.

Sardar Patel is going to Calcutta tomorrow morning. The situation in West Bengal is none too good. That is from the point of view of reactions to our Agreement. I hope his visit will do good. He has been very helpful in this crisis.

I want to tell you of an idea that has been working in my mind. Sometime back Archibald Nye suggested that Rajaji should go to the U.K., as the guest of

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

the British Government. On considering this proposal, we came to a somewhat different conclusion. Our intention is to appoint Rajaji as a kind of an Ambassador-at-large. He might go first to Bengal etc., for some time just to advise our people there. He will have no special assignment. Later he might visit, as such Ambassador-at-large, the U.K. and the U.S.A.

Nothing definite has been settled, nor can it be settled for some little time and much depends upon the Bengal situation. Rajaji is not well at present and he has had a great deal of trouble with his eyes. But he is improving and he may come to Delhi in about a week's time....

Yours,
Jawaharlal

40. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
16 April, 1950

My dear Prakasa,

...As a matter of fact we have been suggesting to the Army that our soldiers should be definitely used for civil productive duties in peace time. That is the tendency in other countries. In the new China it has been definitely laid down that the army during peace time will be employed in factories and fields. Our own conception of an army is derived from the small professional force of the United Kingdom in the old days. Even our army customs derive from the British. While some of these customs are good, some do not fit in India at all. Nathu Singh is very brave and all that. But his conception of the world has little to do with reality.

Do not worry about me. I shall carry on and, if I may say so, without undue optimism and with an adequate measure of humility, make good. If I do not make good, well then, we shall put up with that and the world will go on minus some of us. It is good to have some kind of a historical perspective which lessens the burden of the present.

All kinds of horrors have happened and you have witnessed some of them. But the really terrible thing is the complete degradation of all of us or most of us. How can we human beings do what they have done, and even if they do them in a moment of passion, how can they justify them, as we go on doing? What

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

troubles me most is the narrow, bigoted outlook that has grown in India and has invaded Congress circles. If the sea loses its saltiness, wherewith shall it be salted?

Our province pains me most, partly because of personal association, partly because of my pride in it. Congress work has completely gone to pieces and our friend, Purushottam Das Tandon, goes about talking about Hindu culture and telling Muslims to adopt it. I confess I do not know what exactly this Hindu culture is, about which Tandon talks. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that all my conceptions of the basic Hindu culture are violated by the modern protagonists of Hindu culture.

Generally speaking, I would say that Pakistan, both the Government and the people, are behaving better in regard to our Agreement, than many of our own people or the press. *Dawn* has undergone a sea-change for the better. There is a discipline there, which is strangely lacking here.

People have talked loosely of war or of exchange of populations or of other equally dangerous remedies, if they can be called remedies. It is astonishing how far sensible people can go without trying to understand the consequences of their thought or action. I am convinced that if once we lose hold of the essential thing for which the Congress stood in regard to communalism, we shall go to pieces completely. Our society is such that once it is shaken up, this process will continue disrupting us throughout the entire fabric.

People talk of foreign propaganda, as if this consists of fine speeches delivered outside. Foreigners judge us by our actions here and what we say and do. There are plenty of foreign correspondents here and the picture they see is not pleasant or agreeable.

Yet, in spite of all this, one has a measure of faith in the future and one carries on.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

41. To F.R. Roy Bucher¹

New Delhi
April 16, 1950

My dear Roy,

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd April. It is good to have news of you and Maureen.

1. J.N. Collection, Extracts.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

We have had a heavy time here. But at last we have crossed one major hurdle. Many other hurdles remain. I suppose that is the fate of all of us who live in these troubled times....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

42. Telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram dated April 16th² in answer to my telegram No. 21056. I agree with you that in no event should force be used to settle any border dispute. Present status quo should be maintained and matter should be considered by respective District Magistrates. I am immediately communicating this to West Bengal Government and I hope that strict orders to this effect will be issued on these lines by all authorities concerned.

2. Regarding paragraph two of your telegram,³ I am referring this to West Bengal Government.⁴

1. New Delhi, 16 April 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Liaquat Ali had written that the best way of stopping petty border conflicts and skirmishes was to issue strict instructions to all officers on East and West Bengal, Assam and Tripura borders that status quo must be maintained, force must not be used to settle any dispute and District Magistrates should be contacted in the event of dispute.
3. He alleged that on 28 March, armed volunteers trespassed into two East Bengal enclaves—Mustafi and Moshaldanga—in Cooch Behar and attacked and drove away the Muslims into East Bengal. A joint enquiry was not yet agreed to by Cooch Behar and permission was denied to pass through Cooch Behar territory to visit these enclaves.
4. In continuation of this, Nehru sent another telegram to Liaquat Ali on 21 April (not printed) after receiving reports from East Bengal Government about border disputes and incidents in enclaves in Cooch Behar.

43. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
April 18, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have received your letter of the 18th April this evening. From all accounts, your

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

visit, as I expected, is producing excellent results. I am writing to you rather briefly now, as I wish to catch the night mail.

I saw Rajendra Babu this evening. Neogy was there also by chance. Rajendra Babu was trying to induce Neogy not to resign. He said that he would make a last effort to prevent Syama Prasad from resigning. I told him to go ahead with it certainly, and I would be happy if neither of them resigned. I am afraid that things have gone too far for Syama Babu to withdraw his resignation.

Tomorrow morning I am answering a short notice question about what has been done to implement the Agreement. I shall give more or less a factual statement, which will indicate that a good deal of implementation has taken place and that conditions have improved. Presumably, immediately after this, Syama Prasad will make his statement.²

I shall in any event miss you, when you return, as I shall have gone off to Bihar with the President. I agree with you that it would be worthwhile your extending your stay by a day or two in Calcutta, if you think this necessary.

I have decided finally to go to Karachi for two days, the 26th and 27th.

I wonder if some use is being made of military officers in dealing with the refugees. I am told that arrangements at stations and transit camps etc., are still difficult. I imagine that a few military officers would be very helpful in these arrangements at these places. They might even be put in charge of camps, where necessary, under a senior commandant, Nikhil Sen.³ But in any event at stations and such like places, they would be helpful. I spoke to Cariappa about this and he said that he would issue instructions to General Roy⁴ to offer his help where needed in this respect. Please mention this to Bidhan Roy.

I am very sorry to learn of the continuing differences among Congressmen and the lack of cooperation that they are showing. I just do not know what one can do about it, if even you do not succeed at this moment of crisis.

I have a letter from Rajaji. He says that since you are away and I shall be away, there is no point in his coming here before I return from Karachi. I am suggesting to him to come here about the 26th or 27th, when you certainly will be here.

There is little doubt in my mind that there is a growing appreciation in the country about the value of the Agreement. Even those who were very critical are

2. Mookerjee gave as reasons for his resignation that previous agreements with Pakistan had been violated by Pakistan and that any agreement without sanction could offer no solution. The Indo-Pakistan Agreement side-tracked the "cardinal issue" that Pakistan was an Islamic State and India was exactly where she was prior to the present Agreement. The Agreement had re-opened the problem of a Muslim minority in India, "thus seeking to revive those disruptive forces that created Pakistan itself."
3. Nikhil Sen had earlier worked with the U.N.H.C.R. and was a consultant to the Government of India for settlement of refugees.
4. G.O.C. of Calcutta, Maj-Gen. S.B.S. Roy, was also in charge of the Army supporting the civil authorities.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

toning down their criticism now. I asked some senior army officers and they told me that the feeling in the army was definitely in favour of the Agreement.

I agree with you about the derequisitioning of houses in East Bengal. I have written to Liaquat Ali about it and I shall personally speak to him on this subject.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

44. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 18, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

...You have a very high opinion of our Agreement.² Without perhaps sharing it, I do agree it is a remarkable achievement. Gradually people are realising its importance and value. It may really be a turning point. Vallabhbhai has done good work in Calcutta and some slight change is coming over Bengal opinion also.

Although I am not announcing anything about you publicly, I have told some people like the U.K. High Commissioner that we intend making you our Ambassador-at-large and you might visit the U.K. later.

When I go to Karachi, I shall discuss with Liaquat Ali and the Governor-General of Pakistan about your proposal for a joint tour of the President and the G.G.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. In his letter of 17 April C. Rajagopalachari wrote: "This Agreement is a historic achievement, the like of which, indeed, has not happened anywhere in the world. Can anyone point out that two nations anywhere after passing through so much bitterness and conflict came to an agreement such as you have signed along with Liaquat without the intervention or pressure of any foreign power or mediator."

45. The Follow-up Steps¹

The Agreement referred to was signed 11 days ago. The Government of India took immediate steps to implement this Agreement. The two States specially concerned,

1. Reply to a short notice question about steps taken by the Governments of India and Pakistan to implement the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 19 April 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*. Vol. III, Part I, 1950, 18th and 19th April, 1950, pp. 1666-1668.

namely, West Bengal and Assam, were requested to take steps to implement the Agreement in so far as it affected them. The Chief Ministers of all other States as well as Chief Commissioners were also addressed by the Prime Minister on this subject and their full cooperation was sought.

The Ministry of Finance issued instructions on the 10th April 1950 to the customs authorities to relax the customs restrictions as envisaged in the Agreement and to show all courtesy and consideration and avoid any form of harassment to the migrants. Liaison officers at some customs posts have been appointed and the appointment of others is under consideration. The Government of Pakistan are also reported to have issued similar instructions to their customs officers in the matter of relaxation of customs restrictions as applicable to migrants and have strictly warned their customs officers that any person found violating these instructions would be severely dealt with. The Government of Pakistan have also stated that they have ordered that their new instructions should be enforced with retrospective effect, so that any goods previously withheld by the customs authorities, under the old regulations, would be returned to the owners concerned in accordance with the revised instructions.

The Government of West Bengal have fixed April 24th as the date for the elections of representatives of the minority and majority communities for their Minority Commissions. The Government of East Bengal have fixed April 21st for their election for this purpose.

The Government of West Bengal have prepared draft legislation to give effect to the recommendations contained in the Agreement for the safeguarding of the properties of the migrants. They have sent this draft to the East Bengal Government, so that there might be uniformity in this matter.

The Government of India will appoint a Central Minister for the Bengal and Assam area in the near future. It is also proposed to appoint a minority representative to the Cabinet of West Bengal soon.

The Government of West Bengal have asked the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court to appoint a Judge of the High Court for the Enquiry Commission envisaged in the Agreement. They have also ordered all their district officers to deal with immovable properties left by migrants in accordance with the Agreement.

The Government of India's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting have drawn up a detailed procedure for ensuring the implementation of the Agreement in so far as they are concerned. It is also proposed to arrange for an early meeting in Delhi of the Indo-Pakistan Information Consultative Committee, which was set up in pursuance of the Delhi Agreement of December 1948.

The press in India and Pakistan have, as a whole, clearly indicated their determination to help in implementing the Agreement, and their general approach to Indo-Pakistan issues has changed greatly for the better. It is proposed to hold a joint meeting of the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference and the Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference in Delhi early in May. The Sind Editors' Conference

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

have laid down a certain code which would govern the conduct of the press in the matter of reporting incidents, commenting, featuring news, etc., with a view to creating the proper atmosphere for the restoration of goodwill and amity between the two countries.

The number of migrants from one country to another has gone down considerably. The number of Muslims who were leaving West Bengal for East Pakistan had risen to a peak figure of about 10,000 a day. This has gone down to 1,200. Muslims going from other parts of India to West Pakistan have practically stopped doing so.

The number of Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal had risen to the peak figure of over 20,000 a day. This has now gone down to 9,000 to 11,000 a day.

It should be remembered that many migrants who are coming now had no choice left, as they had sold their properties and had congregated at various railway and river stations and thus could not go back to their homes. It is largely such people who are coming over from East Pakistan to West Bengal or going from West Bengal to East Pakistan. There are still considerable numbers of people congregated at some of these stations, like Narayanganj, waiting to be transported. I have no recent figures of migrations from and to Assam or Tripura. Thus it may be said that the exodus has very definitely diminished in volume and at present is largely confined to those who were already awaiting transport. It is reported that most of these transit camps are not being filled now by fresh migrants.

Generally, travel conditions have improved, although conditions in transit camps are not good and enough transport is not always available. We have arranged for special ships for this purpose. There is no harassment now of people coming through regular customs posts. But migrants who cross the border on foot at odd places are liable to harassment by private individuals.

Steps are being taken for the recovery of abducted women.

Border incidents have decreased and arrangement has been arrived at between the two Governments of West Bengal and East Pakistan that in regard to any disputed territory the status quo should be maintained. Any dispute or incident should immediately be referred to the two District Magistrates on either side of the border.

The Chief Secretaries of the Governments of West Bengal, East Bengal and Assam and the Chief Commissioner of Tripura are meeting in a conference at Calcutta on the 21st and 22nd April to consider further steps to be taken to implement the Agreement.²

2. It was decided at the conference to post liaison officers at important customs stations, and to remove customs restrictions on personal effects and household goods of migrants. They were advised to deposit cash and jewellery in reliable banks and to follow authorized routes only.

Relief and rehabilitation work is progressing.

The Deputy Prime Minister is in Calcutta at present for the purpose of co-operating, on behalf of the Central Government, with the Government of West Bengal, in implementing the Agreement to the full and helping in restoring normal conditions. His visit has already borne good fruit.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has invited me to pay a visit to him in Karachi to discuss these and other matters further. I have accepted the invitation and I propose to go there on the 26th April for two days.

I think I may say that the results obtained from the Agreement even during this brief period of 11 days have been satisfactory.

46. To P.C. Ghosh¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1950

My dear Prafulla Babu,

You have been having a hard time in Calcutta, but I am sure that your good work has borne fruit. It seems to me that this Bengal situation and the Agreement between India and Pakistan are of the highest importance from the point of view of our entire future. Therefore, we have to go all out to make this a success. Success ultimately means the creation of satisfactory conditions to live in for the minorities. Personally, I am convinced that if we function rightly, we can make Pakistan function rightly also. That Liaquat Ali Khan is sincere, I have no doubt, for the simple reason that there is no other way for him at the present moment. Sincerity therefore is an obvious virtue in the present state of affairs. But whatever the measure of sincerity in Pakistan, it is clear to me that from the point of view of both principle and expediency, it is essential for us to go full steam ahead.

I think on the whole we have done fairly good during the last ten days and we are likely to do better in the future. This does not mean a facile optimism. It is a hard struggle, specially hard, because we have to move people's minds and hearts, people who are thoroughly demoralised and full of fear and anger. I think we can do it, if we try hard enough.

The essence of the problem is Hindus going back to East Bengal and staying in there and Muslims coming back to West Bengal and staying there. How can we get the Hindus to go back? No one expects all the millions who have come to go back. But if even a certain proportion of them went back, it would turn the tide. It thus becomes necessary for us to give the lead in this business, and the lead can only be given by prominent Congressmen connected with East Bengal.

1. J.N. Collection.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

You know that I have long thought that your presence in East Bengal would make a great difference. In existing circumstances this is of even greater importance. I feel therefore that it would be a great thing if you deliberately went back to East Bengal and remained there for some considerable time. That gesture of yours would produce a greater impression than all our speeches and statements.

If you go, some other leading Congressmen might also go and this group would change the whole atmosphere of East Bengal. It would be perfectly in keeping with the old Congress tradition and Babu's ways. Many of us have tried to solve a difficulty by coming away from it. That was not Babu's way. So I feel convinced that leading Congressmen should make a point of going back to East Bengal and sitting there. They would give hope to millions of people who are still there.

As I have said at the beginning of this letter, I think that this Agreement is of vital importance and might be called historic in some ways. If we are brave and strong enough to take advantage of it and turn the tide, we shall not only solve many an intricate problem and save millions of people but would gain strength and credit in the world. Therefore, we have to take every possible step in every direction to make this a success. I can think of no single step of greater value than the announcement that you have decided to go to East Bengal to be followed by announcements of other Congress leaders doing likewise.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

47. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1950

My dear Bidhan,
Your letter of the 17th April.

As suggested by you, Gopaldaswami will not go to Calcutta for the present. I had only thought of his going there before Vallabhbhai had decided to visit Calcutta. In view of Vallabhbhai's visit, the question does not immediately arise.

About Rajaji, I am a little surprised that you should suggest that because of tension amongst the Hindus, he should not go to Calcutta.² I could understand that he should not be appointed as Central Minister or the like. But it is rather

1. J.N. Collection.

2. B.C. Roy had written that Rajagopalachari's role in 1943-44 was still remembered and tension among the Hindus was great. He did not think Rajagopalachari's visit to East and West Bengal at this stage would be of great help.

extraordinary that a man, who is respected all over India as a very wise person and one who has been Head of the State and Governor of Bengal, should be asked not to go to Calcutta, because some Hindus will not approve of it. If he went there, he would only meet people privately and talk to them in his own way and not deliver public addresses. It seems to me a strange approach and rather a weak reaction to what some communalist Hindus might or might not think. It is equally possible for them to object to my going to Calcutta, because they do not like something that I have said or done. The question of anyone's going or not going is unimportant. What is important is the way we react to communalist elements.

I am writing to Liaquat Ali again about the derequisitioning of houses. I shall of course speak to him about this when I meet him. I am also writing to him about the offer of the Quakers to work at different customs stations. I shall also mention to him about the cases of warrants that you refer to.

Dr Marti of the International Red Cross is here and has given us a report of what he saw in East and West Bengal.³ He has proposed to his headquarters at Geneva the establishment of three medical aid units to work in refugee camps in West and East Bengal. He has recommended that a sum of two million Swiss francs be allotted by the Red Cross for medical stores etc., in this connection. The idea is that a team of nine Red Cross doctors, who are at present in the Middle East, should come to India. The expenses of this team as well as of the medical stores will be principally met by the Red Cross. But he wants us to pay their fare to and from India. This will amount to about Rs 25,000/- to 30,000/- by air. I think the offer is a good one and we should agree to pay this sum to them. We shall be getting in exchange the services of some competent doctors and a large quantity of medical stores.

You will have seen my reply to a short notice question in Parliament today. There was one matter about which I did not know much. This was the question of recovery of abducted women. As you will remember, this is an item in the Agreement and we have to set up machinery for it. I hope you have done so. Private social workers can help in this a great deal. But our experience in the Punjab suggests that some official machinery is very necessary. That machinery should take advantage of private social workers.

I should not bother, if I were you, about the Islamic State business.⁴ I think we should take Liaquat Ali's sincerity in this matter for granted and personally I am convinced of it, quite apart from his statement. He is not the type at all, who thinks in terms of a religious State. There is no doubt that there are people in Pakistan

3. At the request of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Dr R. Marti was sent to survey the situation in the two Bengals and evaluate the extent of the problem of organising relief.
4. Roy had written that equality of citizenship and conferment of equal rights to every citizen were stated in the previous agreement but had not been implemented. "Therefore people have begun to question the sincerity of the statement by Liaquat Ali on this occasion also."

who do think that way, just as there are people here who think in terms of a communal State. We should accept Liaquat Ali's statement and see that it is implemented. Doubting and challenging it does not help us.

Yours,
Jawahar

48. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

As I have informed you, I shall be reaching Karachi on the 26th at about mid-day. My daughter will accompany me as well as a small party. I am looking forward to this visit. I should like to return on the 28th morning.

I am going out of Delhi early day after tomorrow morning. I shall be touring about in certain parts of Bihar and will be somewhat out of touch with developments for three days.

I had your telegram about the Muslim exodus from the U.P. and Central India. As I replied to you, we have taken action all along the line about this and we are keeping in touch with happenings there.² My own information is that the exodus is practically stopped and that many persons who had left their homes are going back to them.

I am glad to notice that the Muslim exodus from West Bengal has also gone down very greatly. From about 10,000 a day it is now 1500 or less. Presently I think it will practically stop. The number of Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal has also gone down, though it is still considerable and is within the region of 10,000 a day. Most of these, I take it, are people who had already left their homes and were at river stations. They had disposed of all they had and so they had nowhere to go back to.

Sardar Patel is in Calcutta and his visit has had a very good effect there. He is impressing upon some leading Hindu citizens of East Pakistan, who had come to Calcutta, to go back. He hopes to succeed. When the leaders go back, a powerful impression would be created in the others. But he again draws my attention to one

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See also *post*, pp.267-269.

fact which comes in the way. I have written to you about it previously. People who want to go back say they will have nowhere to live in, as their houses had been requisitioned. Indeed sometimes several houses belonging to the same family have all been requisitioned. If a person or his family are to go back, then he must have a house to live in. If he has several houses, others can be requisitioned. But one suitable house should be given to him for his family. It is possible that he may go back by himself to begin with and later take his family. Unless this is done, it will be difficult to induce people to go back. So far as West Bengal is concerned, I am informed by the Chief Minister there that, even under stress of circumstances, he has not requisitioned any house which was either wholly or partly occupied. He is perfectly prepared to derequisition any house which has been occupied or to find alternative accommodation. This matter appears to be important in the context of changing the psychological atmosphere and inducing the people to return. I hope you will give thought to it. Some step in this direction will prove very helpful.

The Friends Unit or the Quakers have offered to send some of their workers to the different customs stations. Naturally they ask for permission and some kind of recognition of their work by the Governments of West Bengal and East Bengal. We have gladly given them this permission and recognition. I hope that the East Pakistan Government will do likewise. As you know, they are good people and are very helpful on such occasions.

Dr Marti of the International Red Cross has given us a report of what he saw at various refugee camps in East and West Bengal. Conditions, he tells us, are pretty bad. He is prepared to undertake medical aid there on a fairly considerable scale on behalf of the Red Cross. I believe he has proposed to his headquarters in Geneva to allot a large sum of money for this purpose. He intends sending a team of nine people from the Middle East to East and West Bengal. He has suggested that we might pay the fare of these people from the Middle East and back. The other expenditure would be charged to the Red Cross. I think it is a good suggestion, which we might accept. Probably he will speak to you about it directly.

Conditions at the customs posts have improved considerably, since instructions were sent there on behalf of East Pakistan and West Bengal Governments. But we still get reports of trouble at odd places in the frontier. I hope that you will have instructions issued to the District Magistrates to prevent this kind of thing happening.

I wrote to you about some prominent Hindu citizens of East Pakistan having been arrested during the recent troubles. There are some others who came away and against whom it is apprehended that warrants of arrest might be issued. This naturally comes in the way of not only their returning but others also returning. I would earnestly request you to have this matter looked into. Perhaps a declaration

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

could be made that all these cases are being considered and warrants of arrest against people who have come away might be withdrawn to enable them to go back.³

A short notice question was put to me in Parliament here today about the implementation of our Agreement. I gave an answer⁴ which you will no doubt see. I think that good progress has been made in this respect and the atmosphere is certainly growing more and more favourable. I hope we shall be able to keep this up and achieve substantial results. For my part, I can assure you that we shall do our utmost. Sardar Patel is working hard in Calcutta to this end and has achieved substantial results.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Citing the case of Dr J.R. Dhar of Jessore, B.C. Roy had written to Nehru on 17 April 1950 that he came away in spite of his desire to stay on because he was threatened with arrest. It was Roy's suggestion about the declaration which Nehru had put forward to Liaquat Ali.
4. See *ante*, pp.55-58.

49. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
April 20, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

...When I suggested our asking Shri Rajagopalachari to function as our Ambassador-at-large, it was not my intention that he should in any sense lessen the responsibilities of the Central Ministers. As a matter of fact, such an appointment, if it takes place, had little to do with Bengal. I had thought, however, that it would be a good thing, if he went to Bengal etc., sometime or other for a short while. At present, as I wrote to you he is not well. When he gets well, he might come here after a week or so and then we shall discuss various matters with him.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. About Rajagopalachari's appointment, Liaquat Ali had written on 18 April that it might strengthen Nehru's hands in dealing with the situation in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura but he felt that nothing should be done which might tend to cut across the work of the Central Ministers.

50. The Futility of War¹

The time has come for speaking frankly. I cannot understand how those who call themselves followers of Mahatma Gandhi and declare themselves as Congressmen criticize the Agreement and talk in terms of armed intervention. Mahatma Gandhi never wished ill even of his enemies and he was always prepared for compromise, though not on fundamental matters of principle. Mahatma Gandhi's path is not the path of war. The Mahatma never refused to meet British rulers, yet I find critics who find fault with me for meeting Mr Liaquat Ali and who are of the opinion that I should not have met him at all. It shows that the lessons of Mahatma Gandhi or of past communal disturbances have not been learnt.

There is a section of people who, whether they intentionally mean it or not, want to lead the country to ruin. There are people who talk of attacking Pakistan. War is not a matter of a joke. It does not mean that while armies fight, those who instigate war can follow its course leisurely in their homes. War will affect the nation as a whole, and every family. This does not mean, however, that if the security of the country is threatened, it will not be defended. It will be defended with all the forces at the country's command, but the country will go to war unless compelled.

Three months ago a storm blew over Bengal, the impact of which was felt all over India. Socialists, communists and communalists went to the people and offered their solution. What was forgotten by them was that nothing, such as socialist kisan mazdoor raj, could be achieved unless people learnt lessons of civilized ways of life and humanity. It is no use indulging in tall talk while indulging in beastly acts such as took place in East and West Bengal and Assam.

I regret the way in which many people whom I admire gave way to hysteria recently and started talking of war against Pakistan. Every individual country's or nation's mettle is tested in times of stress and trial. If they become hysterical in such a trial they cannot help the cause they seek to espouse.

I regret to say that many people failed when the test came. What happened three months back made us depressed and angry. That sense of frustration and anger is human and understandable. But the problem cannot be tackled in anger. We cannot forsake civilised modes of human conduct if we want to be called civilised.

I can realise a man giving way to righteous anger. But I cannot understand the mentality which prompts anyone to seek revenge at his own place against innocent men for offences committed thousands of miles away. This is nothing but sheer cowardice.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Jharia, 21 April 1950. From *National Herald*, 23 April 1950.

And what is the result of such an action? If we want to take some strong action against the wrongdoer we cannot even do that as our hands are tied by such deeds.

A large section of people has liked the Agreement, and I believe even those who do not like it, if they consider the matter coolly, will find that it is the only way out except war which could have led to the country's ruin. Critics of the Agreement, I maintain, have not been able so far to suggest any other alternative solution.

It appears to me that we have lost confidence in ourselves—that confidence and courage which we had when we had to fight against the alien rulers. We should not lose our heads and start raising a hue and cry, when faced with a serious situation, if we want to solve the problem.

Both Pakistan and India have reached a point beyond which lay ruin. The pact was arrived at to turn our face against that path of ruin. The path has borne some fruit. It has at least removed the sense of fear. I do not want to say that the problem has been solved but the way for it has been cleared. Some express their scepticism by saying cynically that they will see how the pact works. It is an attitude that is neither feminine nor masculine but something between the two.

The question before you is if you believe the Agreement is good, you should make your best efforts to implement it. We have given our word of honour to implement it and as honourable persons we should abide by it.

People, I believe, can help in creating the right kind of atmosphere for its implementation. I want you to appreciate the difficulties of the people of Bengal and to sympathise with them. I think the Congressmen of East Bengal should not have left it. I want them to go back and create confidence in the people there.

I know that elections will be held shortly. But I warn those who want to fish in troubled waters that if they pursue their present policy, many things may happen in between which would lead not only to their own ruin but also to the country's ruin.

We should remember that those who are raising the war cry and spreading communal hatred are the people who did not take part in the struggle for freedom, and followed the same communal policy as the Muslim League, which led to the country's partition. If Pakistan does a wrong, the answer to it cannot be given by committing another wrong here. Pakistan was based on certain principles accepted by the Muslim League. India has a different Constitution under which a secular conception of the State has been accepted. The people must either accept the Constitution or change it on communal lines if they so desire. I believe that that way lies the ruin for the country. It will lead to further fragmentation of the country.

India has achieved freedom, but the India of the people's dreams is yet to be born. Faced with grave problems arising out of the partition, the Government has been forced to drop or suspend many development projects.

Capitalists have also harassed the Government as a result of which there has been an increase in prices. Controls were lifted in response to popular demand. The result is a sharp increase in prices. A few mint money while the masses suffer.

Unless the Government are convinced that lifting controls will not cause much harm, the Government cannot lift them.

Then there are anti-social elements like blackmarketeers, profiteers and hoarders. It has been alleged that I have said that I will hang blackmarketeers, and many have asked how many blackmarketeers have I hanged since I became Prime Minister. What I had said actually was something different. I had said that those blackmarketeers who had been responsible for the Bengal famine should be hanged.²

Action has been taken against many blackmarketeers but the trouble is that some manage to wriggle out due to intricacies of the law. The Constitution guaranteed fundamental rights, which gave protection to honest people but sometimes dishonest people also escape the clutches of the law because of those rights. The same is the case with tax evaders. The Government are, however, determined not to accept defeat. I am confident that a way out will be found.

Communalists and blackmarketeers and such other anti-social elements are smaller enemies of the country and their success will weaken the country and make it an easy prey to bigger enemies.

It is, therefore, necessary that people should strengthen the hands of the Government in dealing with such elements by cooperating with the Government. Peace is essential for the progress of the country.

The people have reposed confidence in me so long though I have not fully justified their expectations. I am determined, however, to serve them to the best of my capacity and to endeavour to take the country to the path of progress in my own way so long as I remain in office.

2. See *Selected Works*, (first series), Vol. 14, pp. 19-20.

51. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1950

Nan dear,

...I am going to Karachi day after tomorrow for two days. I understand that the Pakistan people or Government are arranging to give me a big welcome. I must

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

say that since the Agreement, the Pakistan Government has gone all out to implement it, and the way the tone of the Pakistan press has changed for the better, is remarkable. They show far greater discipline than our people do. As you must have heard, a temporary trade agreement has also been arrived at between India and Pakistan. So things are generally easing up. But the big hurdle of Kashmir remains and I do not myself see any way of resolving it yet. Dixon will be coming here in two or three weeks' time.

There are many reasons for Pakistan suddenly becoming friendly. One of them certainly is the realisation that things had gone too far and there was no room left for parleying. This, I think, rather frightened them and wisely they decided to make a strong attempt to come to terms.² This of course is not in any way to their discredit. On our side there has been a general appreciation of the Agreement. But West Bengal continues to be sullen. Sardar Patel went there for a few days and did a fine job of work. If he takes up something, he puts his heart into it and his visit to Calcutta undoubtedly did good. He can influence many people, whom I cannot influence...

Yours,
Jawahar

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit had written that Pakistan had been exploring the possibilities of engaging a regular publicity firm to work for them and their embassy was trying to model Liaquat Ali's visit on Nehru's trip to the U.S.A. in 1949.

52. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
April 24th, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

On my return to Delhi today from Bihar, I have received your two letters of April 20th² and 22nd.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. B.C. Roy had discussed several issues in this letter: S.P. Mookerjee's resignation and the impact of his return to Bengal, status of minorities and central ministers as envisaged in the Agreement, amendment regarding immoveable property, return of refugees and Congressmen to Pakistan, acquisition of wastelands in West Bengal and private candidates for university examinations.

You refer to the clause in the Agreement about immoveable property being returned to the owner if he returns by the 31st December. I have no doubt that this is Government's responsibility. It may take a little time to give back the identical property, but it has to be done. The proviso that if Government finds it impossible to return the property they will take steps to rehabilitate the original owner, really refers to a case of the property having been burnt or destroyed. There may be some other exceptions where it is really difficult to get their property, but these exceptions should be rare. Those persons who are prepared to go back should certainly demand their property back. I can very well understand their inability to go back till they have a house to live in, etc.³

I have today sent you a copy of a letter I have received from Liaquat Ali Khan in which he says that he has asked Nurul Amin to do his best to derequisition some of the houses he had previously requisitioned. He also mentioned in this letter that the cases of leading Hindu citizens who had been arrested are being re-examined. Satin Sen, I see, has been released on bail.

I entirely agree with you that we should try to induce leading Congressmen to go back and should help them in this process if necessary. Whether the Working Committee can make a rule about them, I cannot say, but the matter should certainly be placed before the Committee.⁴

It is clear that anyhow we have to rehabilitate a large number of persons. There can be no doubt that the great majority of them will not go back. Indeed, from the very beginning we thought in terms of rehabilitation. It was for this purpose that I sent S.K. Dey there. I am glad to find from your letter that he is getting on well there with your officers and that it has been finally decided to set up a model township.

When I referred in my fortnightly letter to refugee students appearing in university examinations, I was thinking specially of a large number of them in Delhi who attend evening classes and many of whom have some gainful occupation in the day time.

It does not much matter what the concept of an Islamic State is. I have read a great deal about this and also written about it, in another context of course. The main thing is that it is desirable for us to take Liaquat Ali Khan at his word and to press for it. It is a fact of course, as you say, that there are large numbers of

3. Roy had written that in the Agreement one clause relating to immoveable property held Government responsible for rehabilitating a person if his property could not be returned. While rehabilitating a small cultivator was not difficult, the "question of rehabilitating a professional man, a doctor, a lawyer, a trader, a carpenter, a businessman is a very much bigger proposition; similarly the question of rehabilitating a landholder is also a very big proposition."
4. Roy had written that about 150 members of the B.P.C.C. representing various constituencies of East Bengal suggested that the Working Committee should make some rules regarding their holding of positions in West Bengal and their return to East Bengal.

people, *Maulvis*, *Maulanas* and the like, who are very bigoted and reactionary. It may not be easy to control them. Personally I have to face today exceedingly reactionary and bigoted Hindus who object to my way of life, because they think I am not sufficiently Hindu in regard to it. My language is objected to because it is Hindustani and not pure Hindi. My clothes are objected to, and generally my way of life. If these people had their way, neither you nor I would have a tolerable existence.

I do not think your reference to Islamic history is quite correct. The Arabs were famous for their extreme tolerance and broadmindedness. Compared to the other creeds of the day, in those countries, they were far superior in these respects. From Baghdad to Spain, they had a reputation for tolerance and a philosophic outlook which was anything but Islam. The Muslims who came to India in later years were the more backward Turks or the like from Central Asia, who were not very cultured. As a matter of fact Babar was extremely cultured, broadminded and tolerant.

The fact of the matter is that present-day Hindus and Muslims in India, by and large, are culturally exceedingly backward. This has little to do with their religion, though it has much to do with their social practices. In addition to this, the Hindu social code has made them isolationists and not good mixers. The result is that the Hindu, like the Jew, rather stands out in the world and does not easily get on with others. This has nothing to do with his fine religion or philosophy. The same person under a better environment would improve tremendously. When the environment goes bad, he collapses and has not got the strength of character to overcome that environment.

Anyway, we have to live with and deal with the people who surround us, Hindu or Muslim, and make the best of them.

Yours,
Jawahar

53. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1950

My dear Krishna,

On my return to Delhi today, I received your personal letter of the 14th April. I have been wandering about with the President in parts of Bihar. The principal purpose of our visit was to open the Fuel Research Institute, which is one of our

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

national laboratories for scientific research. We have been putting up very fine laboratories and this is the third of the kind. Two or three more are to follow in the course of the year. This is certainly some achievement.

We visited the Sindri Fertilizer Factory, which looked very impressive. It is a big thing, and then we wandered about the Damodar Valley. I was on the whole pleased with the spirit of enthusiastic work that I found there. It is always rather inspiring to see thousands of people at work on a big undertaking.

The Agreement has certainly worked a remarkable change both in India and Pakistan.² The tone of the Pakistan press changed overnight completely. The Indian press has been generally favourable, but there still continues a good deal of criticism. West Bengal continues to be sullen. Some of the Hindi papers in the rest of India are also pretty bad in this respect. If you ever see the *Free Press Journal* of Bombay, you will see that it has completely gone off its head.

Sardar Patel's visit to Calcutta has done a lot of good.³ It had produced not only a deep impression in Calcutta, but perhaps even more so in Pakistan. As you know, he is by no means popular in Pakistan and he has not hesitated in the past to express his dislike of people in Pakistan. In spite of this, having come to the conclusion that this Agreement had to be pushed through and implemented, he has gone all out to do it. He has shown that whatever his personal prejudices might be, he has the capacity to do big things and to rise to the occasion.

After the Agreement, has come the trade agreement,⁴ which, though small in its own way, nevertheless helps in creating a good atmosphere and opening the door to trade. It is quite possible that the door might be opened still further after another week or two.

All this is to the good. On the whole the Agreement is being implemented, though the exodus still continues. It is less than it was. Before the Agreement large numbers of people had collected at various railway and river stations, having sold all their belongings for a sum. These people have nowhere to go back to and they are bound to come.

I am going to Karachi day after tomorrow for a couple of days and no doubt we shall discuss Kashmir. But I am afraid there is little chance of an agreement at this stage.

2. The Agreement worked satisfactorily—mass migrations in Bengal ceased, some of the Hindus went back to East Bengal, some Muslims returned to India and a trade pact was concluded.
3. Patel went to Calcutta in April and met Ministers, officials and editors.
4. On 21 April 1950, the Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement was signed in Karachi. This enabled India to supply essential commodities in exchange for four million maunds of raw jute. Transactions would take place in Indian rupees for which a separate account was to be maintained by the State Bank of Pakistan with the Reserve Bank of India. This agreement was to remain in force up to 31 July 1950.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

The reports of my physical condition that have reached you must be wrong, as I am keeping quite well.

I have almost decided to go to Indonesia early in June. I am thinking of going by ship, that is in our cruiser, probably accompanied by some destroyers. Our Naval Squadron had planned such a cruise in South East Asia and I thought it would be a good thing if I went with them. This will be good for me and good for our sailors. Indira intends accompanying me. I shall probably spend about a week in Java and then return by air via Singapore and Rangoon. Altogether I might be away from India for two or three weeks. We intend taking ship at Cochin. I might spend a couple of days before sailing there and I might even visit Trivandrum.

Laski's death was very sad. I do not quite know how old he was, but he looked young and vigorous and one expected him to live for many many years.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

54. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 1996 of April 24th. I am informed that at the recent Chief Secretaries' Conference held in Calcutta it was agreed that trains proceeding from our side to the Pakistan border will carry Muslim evacuees as far as the border. It was also agreed that the Governments concerned will take strict steps to ensure that volunteers from one community have nothing to do with the evacuees of the other community. These arrangements are being enforced with immediate effect. We have also heard allegations similar to those mentioned by you of harassment of non-Muslim evacuees in East Bengal on their way to India. I hope that under the new arrangements these allegations will cease. I also understand that General Managers of East India and East Bengal Railways are considering restoration of through train services as before the recent disturbances.

1. New Delhi, 25 April 1950. File No. 1(7) B.L./50, M.E.A.

55. To Achyut Patwardhan¹

New Delhi
25 April 1950

My dear Achyut,

My attention has been drawn to the issue of *Janata* of 16 April which contains on pages 1 and 2 an article by a political correspondent from Bombay.² I have read this article with astonishment, distress and great resentment. Some of our newspapers and periodicals have developed a habit of publishing something as news which has absolutely no foundation in fact. It is open to a newspaper to have any views, though I hope that even in the expression of views there is no malice. But surely it is not to be tolerated when absolute falsehoods are given publicity.

The article in *Janata*, to which I have referred, contains a number of statements which are completely false and which indeed have no basis in fact whatever. There are so many of these that I can hardly make a list of them here. I would say, however, that the references to Sardar Patel are wholly misconceived and without foundation. It is astonishing that any person with the least bit of political sense should believe what is written there. The central point of this article appears to be that Sardar Patel called a meeting of Congress members after Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's departure for Karachi. This is completely untrue. I might inform you that at every stage in the course of the talks with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and before and after, the Cabinet was kept fully informed and it was with their consent and approval that I took every step. Sardar Patel, in particular, was in close touch with day-to-day developments and there was no difference between us on this issue. Since the Agreement was signed, Sardar Patel has done more to get it implemented than anyone else. Your paper has been grossly unfair to him in this article and has done a grave disservice to the country by giving publicity to such a farrago of nonsense.

I believe that in a subsequent number of *Janata* a small contradiction appears of some odd fact mentioned in this article. Surely that is not only not enough but is to add insult to injury. It means that but for that fact everything else contained in this article is correct, which it is not.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 148-149.
2. The article stated that after Liaquat Ali's departure, Vallabhbhai Patel had called a meeting of Congress M.Ps and expressed his opposition to the pact and to Nehru's handling of the situation. It was also alleged that Patel had links with the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. and had favoured arresting Liaquat Ali when he was in Delhi.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

I suggest to you that the least that you can do is to express an open and handsome apology to Sardar Patel and me for this article.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. As Achut Patwardhan, Editor of *Janata*, was away, the Acting Editor, Rohit Dave, replied to Nehru on 27 April 1950: "We agree that we owe an open and handsome apology to Sardar Patel and you for the publication of the article. We did it at the first opportunity by publishing our regrets in the next issue of *Janata*. In this, we definitely stated that in that article there were several inconsistencies and absurdities, which cannot be true. Evidently this has not satisfied you. We, therefore, hereby express our profound regrets and apology for the publication of the article. We can only assure you that there was no malice or desire to spread false news behind it. The publication though inexcusable was really inadvertent."

56. Rumours in Periodicals¹

I regret that some periodicals should frequently distort truth in an effort to run down political opponents.

I suppose it is legitimate game to try to run down political opponents. None of us can object to that, though we may regret the malice and ill-will that sometimes accompany this criticism. But it is quite another matter when facts are twisted and something that never happened is given out as a fact. It has been my misfortune to see this presentation of falsehood and distortion of truth frequently in a number of periodicals. I have refrained from taking much notice of this kind of thing, though I have regretted deeply the lowering of tone and the vulgarity of some of these publications. But this is not a personal matter and has to be judged from the public point of view. Frequent references are made to Sardar Patel and me, sometimes to my sister who is Ambassador in Washington, sometimes to other colleagues of mine serving the State in various capacities. I have been astonished at the farrago of nonsense and malicious misrepresentation that have appeared.

Recently, in an issue of the weekly *Janata* of Bombay dated April 16 an article appeared on the front page, which purports to give an account of various happenings in Delhi in connection with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's visit. In this article particular

1. Statement to the press, 26 April 1950. *National Herald*, 27 April 1950.

mention is made of Sardar Patel and what he is reported to have said and done. The whole story is completely false and without foundation and I am amazed that such baseless and irresponsible stuff should be published anywhere.

I should like to say here that every step that was taken in regard to my conversations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan was done after full and constant consultation with the Cabinet and with their approval. In particular, Sardar Patel was in frequent consultation with me and we acted in full unison in this matter. I am deeply grateful to him for all he has done at a moment of crisis and difficulty. No person has worked harder for the full implementation of the Agreement than Sardar Patel.

It is with some reluctance that I am issuing this statement to the press, because I dislike entering into such controversies. But I feel that it would be grossly unfair to my colleagues and to the country if I remained silent on this occasion.

57. Cable to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

Had long talk with Liaquat Ali Khan about various matters. Continuing today. He spoke to me about Biswas.² Said he had no personal knowledge of him, but many friends whom he had consulted did not react favourably to his name and thought that his appointment would not help in implementation of Agreement. According to his information Biswas had Hindu Mahasabha background and his son associated with Mahasabha or Minority Committee agitation. He hopes that we might be able to choose a Congressman or someone with Congress background. He mentioned that in selecting his own Minister he had asked Hindu members of Pakistan Constituent Assembly. It was on their recommendation that he chose Malik who was very friendly to minorities and anxious to implement fully Agreement.

2. In view of this and also other criticisms from Congress circles which I mentioned to you, it might be desirable to reconsider name.

3. Conversation thus far on other matters fairly satisfactory.

1. Karachi, 27 April 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. C.C. Biswas (1888-1960); Barrister of Calcutta; member, Legislative Assembly, 1930-37; Judge, Calcutta High Court, 1937-48; Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, 1949-50; Union Minister of State for Minority Affairs, 1950-52; Union Minister for Law, 1952-57.

58. Record of Talks with Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I

1. Prime Minister of Pakistan referred to the request made by the Defence Ministry of India for a small mission to visit East Pakistan to see families of soldiers serving in the Defence Forces of India. He said that he was agreeable to this, provided they went in plain clothes. Also that similar facilities should be given to a small Pakistan mission to visit families of their soldiers in India. Arrangements for protection etc. should be made. It would be desirable for someone to accompany them.

2. Derequisitioning of houses in East Bengal: Recent comers will, of course, get back their houses. In regard to old migrants too Pakistan Government was anxious to help to the best of their ability, but they have had to face great difficulties owing to lack of accommodation, more especially in Dacca and Chittagong. They were prepared, however, to say that where a person owned more than one house, and all these have been requisitioned, he would be given back one house to live in. Other cases of hardship will also be enquired into. Houses so provided would be for personal use. The matter will be enquired into further, and every effort would be made to provide for people who may be going back to East Pakistan. But at this stage no definite promises can be given.

3. Exchange of war prisoners: Prime Minister of Pakistan said that he was agreeable to a full exchange. It was understood that prisoners from the "Azad" forces and tribesmen would also be included in this exchange.

4. Unattached women and children: There were at present about 150 at the Gurukul Camp in Pakistan and 159 at the Ambore Camp in Pakistan. There was no objection to their transfer to India.

About 130 women and children from Poonch and Baltistan have already been sent to Lahore on their way to India.

Prime Minister of Pakistan said that apparently some Muslim women and children were detained in Amritsar Camp on the ground that they would be kept there till their relatives were discovered. This was not sufficient reason for their being kept and they should be sent to Lahore.

1. Three notes of Nehru of his talks with Liaquat Ali Khan on 26 and 27 April 1950 at Karachi. 27 April 1950. J.N. Collection.

5. Trade Agreement: Prime Minister of Pakistan said that he felt that our delegation had been unreasonable about coal. This had previously been tied up with jute. Now, it was tied up with cotton. Pakistan had asked that if full supply could not be given now at least enough coal should be given for East Bengal for running of trains etc. This will improve conditions there and facilitate trade and help in refugee traffic.

He said that India had insisted on their internal price for cotton. Pakistan was prepared to agree to this, provided the cloth supplied to them was also at India's internal price. Nevertheless, the Indian delegation did not agree.

He realised that there was a dispute about the exchange ratio and, therefore, the trade arrangements had been on a barter basis. We should avoid doing anything which resulted in commitments about exchange. It was possible, however, otherwise to come to an agreement.

6. It was agreed that strict injunctions should be issued to officials to prevent harassment of migrants or any members of minority communities. Prime Minister of Pakistan said that he had made it clear to officials that in future their work will be judged not so much by their administrative duties, but by their treatment of minorities and the extent to which they could implement the Agreement.

7. Exodus: The continuation of this exodus from East Bengal was discussed and latest figures were given by Prime Minister, India, to Prime Minister, Pakistan. Telegrams from the Deputy High Commissioner for India in Dacca were read out showing that there were considerable numbers of intending migrants collected at various places. Prime Minister, Pakistan, expressed his surprise at this information, as he had been informed that there were none or very few people left in camps of this kind.

Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his concern at the continuing exodus from U.P. etc., to West Pakistan. Prime Minister of India pointed out a report that invitations were being issued to artisans and others to come to Pakistan. Prime Minister of Pakistan said that individuals may have done so, but the Government certainly did not encourage this. In any event, it was agreed that every effort should be made to discourage exodus or migration from any part of Pakistan or India to the other country.

8. Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his regret and concern at the continuing attitude of the press in West Bengal which was not favourable to Agreement, while the press in Pakistan had behaved very well.

9. Section B (v) and (vi) of Agreement was discussed. In regard to this separate paper will be prepared.

10. The problem of evacuee property in West Pakistan and India (that is apart from Bengal) was also discussed. Prime Minister of India said that they should try to apply, in so far as possible, principles laid down in the Agreement regarding Bengal and Assam to other parts of India and Pakistan. It may not be possible to apply these fully, but much could be done. Prime Minister of Pakistan agreed

generally, but felt that there would be considerable difficulties, more especially in regard to land in West Pakistan. In any event, it should be possible to arrange for the exchange and sale of urban property.

It would be desirable to hold a conference of representatives of the two countries to consider these matters fully. The evacuee property laws ought to be changed and, in any event, a date fixed beyond which they should not be applied. The present position was unnatural. This matter is further being discussed by the Secretaries.

11. Various Sind matters were discussed. It was decided to have a separate note prepared in regard to them.

II

Further points discussed between the Prime Ministers

Various matters relating to the position of the minorities in Sind were discussed. Prime Minister of India pointed out that in effect a vast majority of the Hindus in Sind had left Sind and only about forty or fifty thousand now remained, apart from a certain number of Scheduled Castes people. There was a widespread impression in India that these Hindus had been squeezed out of Sind by governmental policy, and their properties had been taken possession of. Now, only a relatively small number remained, but even they had the feeling that they were not welcome here and that they were being pushed out.

The first question that arose was as to whether the Pakistan Government wanted the Hindus to stay on here or not, and secondly whether they were prepared to have some Hindus to return here. If it was their definite policy to have the Hindus stay on here, then conditions should be created here to enable them to do so. They must feel that these conditions had been created. If the Pakistan Government wished to do so, he had no doubt that necessary steps would be taken to produce that feeling in the minds of the minorities here. This question was important enough before, but since the Agreement of April 8th it has become even more important. We have turned a corner and we were trying to retrace our steps somewhat. It appeared essential, therefore, that minorities in Sind should also have a feeling of this change having taken place.

There were many complaints, general and individual. Among these the important general ones were as follows:-

(1) The Custodian had passed orders in about 300 cases that the people concerned were not evacuees. The matter was then referred, under the rules, to the Pakistan Government, and had been pending there for several months. No

final orders had been passed and apparently fresh enquiries had been instituted. This procedure and delay, even after the decision of the Custodian, was highly undesirable and productive of uncertainty.

(2) Hindus wanting to go to India on temporary visits in order to visit relatives or attend marriage and like ceremonies cannot get the "no-objection" certificate. They have to wait for months till the occasion for their going disappears. Or if they go without a "no-objection" certificate, they automatically become evacuees. This action is a kind of pressure to deprive these Hindus of their property here. There is no reason why "no-objection" certificates should not be granted with speed in such cases.

(3) Documents for transfer of property, that is sale etc., were not even accepted for registration pending the production of income tax clearance certificate. It often takes months for such a certificate to be obtained. In India such documents can be executed without waiting, although effect may not be given to them till later. Indefinite waiting even before acceptance for registration is exceedingly inconvenient and harmful.

(4) The question of the Swami Narayan Temple and property adjoining it was considered. It was pointed out that full facts had been given in a recent letter sent by Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar to the Pakistan Government. This temple and property is not only important in itself, but has become symbolic as something representing the minorities here and their properties. If anything is done to this temple and property, it means that no member of the minority community or his property or any religious endowment is safe. This will have a very bad effect.

It had been stated that a committee of Hindus had been appointed to look after this, but they had not taken too much interest in this. This statement was contradicted. The committee was never consulted and ultimately it was wound up by the Administrator.

Even now encroachments on the temple are taking place. Walls are broken down and shops extended inside. In a very recent case a man occupying a flat in the temple building for eleven years, which he used partly for business and partly for residence, was suddenly given three days' notice to quit. This notice expires today. It is evident that this kind of thing produces a great deal of consternation in the minds of the minorities.

The first step that is suggested is that no further encroachment of any kind be made on the temple property. Even if some flat or room there is vacant, it should remain so in charge of a committee of the minority community and should not be given or rented out to anyone else. The present position should therefore be for the moment stabilised. The next thing will be to deal with past encroachments.

(5) Prime Minister of India mentioned the case of the closed districts in West Punjab and the Frontier Province. He suggested that these should be opened out for the purpose of recovering abducted women. According to our information these districts being closed had been utilised for the purpose of keeping abducted

women there. Prime Minister of Pakistan said that he would enquire into this matter and wanted to know the procedure and the details of recovery work.

(6) The notes on evacuee property prepared by India's Rehabilitation Minister were given to Prime Minister of Pakistan.

(7) In regard to various questions, specially relating to property and other matters affecting minorities, it was suggested that some kind of machinery should be set up to deal with complaints with speed and efficiency. At the present moment, there was not only delay, but even the Custodian's orders were not carried out. The High Commissioner in India should not directly and normally concern himself with such matters. But in the peculiar circumstances now prevailing, he had drawn the attention of the Pakistan Government to some of them. It would facilitate matters if some special officer was appointed for Sind by the Pakistan Government, or a small committee, to deal with such matters, so that there would be no delay in disposing of them. India's High Commissioner would, of course, give such help as he could.

The question of temples or religious endowments in Sind was also referred to. It appeared that a large number of these temples had been sealed or taken possession of either by the Government or the refugees.

III

Among other matters discussed between the Prime Ministers were:-

(1) Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his apprehension in regard to the appointment of Shri C.C. Biswas as Minister. He said he did not know him himself, but he had Hindu Mahasabha background and his son is also connected with either the Hindu Mahasabha or the Minority Rights Committee. His appointment would not be welcomed by many people and would not produce the effect of serious implementation of the Agreement which we so much desired to produce. In selecting Dr Malik² as Minister, the Pakistan Prime Minister said that he had consulted Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly and it was on their recommendation that he chose him. He thought that he was a good man who will get on well with the minority.

(2) Prime Minister of India mentioned to Prime Minister of Pakistan the possibility of appointing Dr Sen of Dacca as Deputy High Commissioner. Dr Sen's name was also mentioned to the Governor-General. The initials could not be remembered. But if the same person was discussed, the Governor-General thought

2. A.M. Malik (b. 1905); Physician and politician from East Bengal; Minister, East Bengal, 1947-48; Pakistan Minister for Minority Affairs, 1950-52 and of Labour and Health, 1949-55.

that he was a very good man. Prime Minister of India pointed out that it was unusual to appoint a person, who was thus far a Pakistani citizen, to this office, but there had been exceptions of course. Prime Minister of Pakistan said that if the man was good, he would have no objection.

(3) Prime Minister of Pakistan referred to people in the Pakistan Defence Forces who have opted for Pakistan, although their families continued to remain in India. Some of these had been demobilised now and they wanted to go back to India and settle down there permanently. Apparently, this matter was referred to India, but India Government did not agree. Prime Minister of India said that he knew nothing about this, but would enquire.

(4) The question of Kashmir was discussed, without any progress being made.

(5) Prime Minister of Pakistan laid stress on the concentration of Indian Army formations near the Pakistan frontier in the West. He said that it would be highly desirable if some of these troops could be removed, as otherwise there was a constant feeling of apprehension, and a concentration of Pakistan troops on the other side.

(6) Prime Minister of India saw some leading newspapers' editors. They complained that sections of the Indian press had not yet changed their tone to any noticeable extent in regard to the Agreement. There was a certain danger of an adverse reaction on the irresponsible sections of the Pakistan press, if this continued. So far as they were concerned, they were going all out to create a better atmosphere between India and Pakistan towards implementation of the Agreement. They would welcome any criticism or any lapses on their part to be pointed out to them.

They pointed out that several Pakistan newspapers, including *Dawn* and *Civil & Military Gazette* were under ban by Provincial Governments of India, although the Central Government in Delhi had lifted some of the old bans. They suggested that these bans should be lifted now. Among the papers they mentioned were *Dawn*, *Civil & Military Gazette*, *Jang* and *Anjam* of Karachi and *Nawa-e-Waqt* and *Zamindar* of Lahore.

They said that full accreditation facilities should be granted for correspondents of one country in the other plus, where necessary, security arrangements. There was an imperative need for exchange of correct news between India and Pakistan and the best arrangement would be for the P.T.I. of India and the E.N.T. of Pakistan to exchange news on the teleprinter system, and also to exchange correspondents. They wanted E.N.T. correspondents at Delhi, Calcutta, Lucknow and Bombay. I told them that we entirely agreed with the need for exchange of correct news and exchange of correspondents. They will be going to Delhi soon and they should fix this up with our newspaper editors and the P.T.I.

(7) The South Africa issue was briefly discussed with Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan. He expressed his agreement with the attitude we intended to take up.

59. Hope of Unravelling Many Knots¹

I am very grateful to the Government and people of Pakistan for their friendly welcome and more particularly to the Prime Minister of Pakistan with whom I have had frank and friendly talks about many matters. I hope that we shall gradually unravel the many knots that had been created in the past.

Of course, I do not like some of the incidents as they are happening here or there. But generally speaking I am quite satisfied with the manner in which the Agreement is being sought to be implemented.

I express my gratitude to the press in Pakistan for the warm welcome accorded to me. I do not know when the next meeting between the two Prime Ministers will take place.

Question: Are you completely satisfied with the progress made so far in implementing the Agreement?

Jawaharlal Nehru: How can there be any completeness about it? I think generally I am satisfied. I hope that the appointment of a Central Minister to ensure proper implementation of the Agreement will take place very soon and certain names are under consideration.

Q: How about tackling the Kashmir problem?

JN: What a big question!

Q: Is there a possibility of Muslims in India joining the Congress with a view to taking an increasing part in public affairs and influencing elections?

JN: Obviously, they form a part of a large number of votes and can play an important part in influencing elections.

Q: Did your talks cover foreign policy?

JN: Not particularly, the discussion included everything in general.

1. Talk with press correspondents at Karachi airport, 28 April 1950. From *National Herald*, 29 April 1950.

60. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
April 30, 1950

My dear Dickie,

I have received three letters from you dated the 8th,² 18th³ and 19th April. Also the copy of a letter which you have sent.⁴ Thank you for all these.

Very slowly we are trying to unravel the many knots that come in our way. The process is slow and while we undo one knot, another is sometimes formed. It is true that my meeting Liaquat Ali Khan in Delhi and Karachi has certainly led to a tremendous easing of the tension between the two countries. But the big exodus from East Bengal continues, although things are quiet. People have been shaken up very much and have little faith left. Then there are many other problems in regard to Pakistan and our own internal problems. Fortunately, Rajaji is here for the present and is very helpful....

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Mountbatten had written that he had been horrified at the background picture his wife had painted for him after her return from Delhi. He added that the goodwill of every right-thinking man in the civilised world was on Nehru's side.
3. He felt that the continuation of the Nehru-Patel partnership "to keep India on a safe and peaceful path was absolutely essential," and had also written to Patel saying the same.
4. Mountbatten had enclosed a copy of his letter to Patel dated 16 April 1950 reminding him of his support to Nehru overcoming all pressures during the critical times of partition and Mahatma Gandhi's assassination.

61. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 1, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

...The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that in this matter of implementing the Agreement and generally dealing with the present situation, we have to adopt full-blooded measures and do our work with complete faith and assurance. No

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

half-hearted attitude is good at any time in important matters. Certainly in a matter of this kind it is no good at all. All the world has realised the significance of this Agreement. It is something much more than any of the old Inter-Dominion agreements. To talk of its success or failure itself is almost beside the point. To sit on the fence and wait for things to happen or for others to do them, is to injure ourselves and our cause and not the opposite party. In politics, as in life, a firm and strong attitude is the only thing that counts and pays. Anything short of that weakens us and discredits us.

It is from this point of view that I consider every step that we should take, whether it is the appointment of somebody or the general attitude we should take up in public or in private. The kind of attitude that some of our opponents in this business, such as Syama Prasad Mookerjee, have taken up is, to my mind, completely wrong and futile. It may appear a little clever, but it is essentially immature and infantile. But the other attitude of a moderate acquiescence with doubts and reservations is even worse, because it is neither here nor there. It is the attitude of little men who dare not take a step and therefore move neither forward nor backward. In a dynamic situation to stand still and wait and see is the opposite of wisdom. If a thing has to be done, it is to be done with one's full heart and soul and with the conviction that it will be done despite everything. I am quite sure it can be done and that it will be done. Indeed, whether it is done exactly in the way we would like it to be done or not, it is clear that the situation has changed completely and we cannot go back to where we were.

From all the reports I have had and from what I saw myself in Pakistan, I have no doubt at all that the Pakistan leaders are going all out to implement this Agreement. However crooked they may have been in the past, they have enough wisdom and understanding to mould themselves to changing events and not to remain stuck between various courses of action. I have just received the report of our newspapermen's delegation which went to Dacca.² That report fully confirms my own impression in regard to the great change that has come over the Pakistan leaders and even their senior officials, who are doing their utmost to implement the Agreement. They comment very favourably on this and express their regret at the attitude of the Calcutta press. I must confess that I am deeply disappointed at this attitude. I am used to opposition and I can understand an emotional reaction to events. But responsible newspapers should have some understanding of events. I see none at all in the Calcutta press. The style of writing

2. B. Shiva Rao, Tushar Kanti Ghosh, Durga Das and J.N. Sahni went to Dacca and met the Governor, the Chief Minister and his Cabinet colleagues, senior officials and members of the East Bengal press. The East Bengal authorities claimed that the pact was being implemented satisfactorily and conditions were rapidly returning to normal. Any insecurity among the Hindus was due to a fear complex which could be removed only after the Hindu leaders of East Bengal returned and settled down.

is as in the old British days and all the changes that have come over the world and in India have not affected them.

Personally my own reaction to all this is a strong one and that is to go out in the market place and to have my say and meet my opponents much more than half-way. If people want battle, I am prepared to give it to them on any plane. That is my emotional reaction. But apart from that, I think that is the correct practical attitude to take up. Of course all this must be done in a friendly way without offence. But it must be made as clear as daylight that our attitude is strong and unbending and we shall follow our course with all the strength in us. There is no other course to follow and I have yet to know of anyone who puts forward any tolerably reasonable alternative.

I know that you are dealing with the situation with firmness and ability and I have little to tell you. But, as I talked to you the other day, I want to place before you exactly how I feel, and I should like you to tell others how I feel. I may perhaps feel a little more strongly or express myself a little more strongly also. But more or less others here feel the same way. My own impression is that people in West Bengal today are not correctly represented by the Calcutta press. Those people, or many of them, take a much more sensible view of the situation. Our newspapermen who went to Dacca told me that the Hindus they met there were far less excited than many people they met in Calcutta.

I hope to speak to Biswas in this strain tomorrow evening as soon as he comes here and I hope that I shall have an adequate response.

I am rather surprised that no mention is made in the newspapers about the number of Hindus going to East Bengal. This is a very important factor and whenever I have mentioned it here, people are surprised and gratified. I think daily publicity should be given to this fact. We shall arrange for adequate publicity here and in foreign countries. Please, therefore, issue instructions for these facts to be published from day to day. This, of course, is an important aspect of the case. But even more relatively unimportant matters, if they help us, should be marshalled and publicised. We should attack on all fronts. At present, owing to the tone of the Calcutta press, the publicity seems to be all on the other side and often enough it is not even true publicity. This kind of thing must be countered all the time. The press should be made to feel that they are acting wrongly.

I realise that we have to deal with a rather excited frame of mind and one should be gentle and careful with it. But too much gentleness may become weakness and therefore harmful and people may doubt if we are serious at all in what we say or do. They should realise that we are deadly serious and mean what we say and are going to do it, come what may.

I wanted to ask you when you were here about Mridula Sarabhai. I suppose you have seldom time to see her, though it would be a very good thing if you did see her occasionally. You know her well and so I need not say much. She

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

often makes mistakes and upsets people. But I know of no braver person, man or woman, in India and I would sooner have her by my side in a critical and riotous situation than a battalion of soldiers. I have seen her face angry crowds without flinching and tame them. I know of instances in the later days of 1947 when she controlled single-handed a most dangerous situation which might have led to large-scale murder. Her energy, faith and enthusiasm are something amazing. Indeed it is because of this energy that she sometimes goes wrong and irritates people. On several occasions during the upheavals in north India, she went all by herself in dangerous areas of Pakistan. The Pakistan Government, who were in a sense responsible for her security, were thoroughly frightened by her fearless exploits and she built a reputation for us there which was surprising. A person like this

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

Some months ago Parliament here passed resolutions about our attitude to communal bodies. It said clearly that we should not recognise them in any way or encourage them, because to do so is indirectly to encourage communalism and reactionary elements. I think that might well be kept in view.

I am told that Syama Prasad Mookerjee might be made Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University. I have no doubt that he has the normal qualifications as an educationist and one who has been intimately associated with Calcutta University. But in the present context of things, this is likely to encourage Hindu Mahasabha and other communal elements in West Bengal. It may well have a bad effect on student psychology. We have today to give first place to the particular situation that has arisen in East and West Bengal which led to the Agreement of 8th April. To encourage people who are opposed to that Agreement is to strengthen these opposing forces in the political field and thus to work against our own declared policy. It will be considered as such by large numbers of people and they will imagine that we are not serious in what we are doing.

The other day there was some kind of a raid accompanied by bomb throwing on the Khulna border. It is stated that J.P. Mitter's² men had something to do with this. I do not know. I am also told that J.P. Mitter goes about proclaiming that he will organise raids on Pakistan. If he and his colleagues say this, then something should be done about it. Toleration of open defiance of this type will encourage mischief-making elements as well as discredit our name.

It is my intention to announce the names of our new Council of Ministers on the 6th of this month. That list will include C.C. Biswas's name. At a convenient date soon after, Biswas should come here for his swearing-in ceremony. Meanwhile, he can go ahead organising his office and work. He will of course keep in touch with your Government. But he has to be always in direct contact with our Ministry of External Affairs.

Yours,
Jawahar

2. Jyoti Prakash Mitter (b. 1904); Professor and Principal of Commercial College, Delhi University, 1927-30; joined Calcutta Bar, 1931; Judge, High Court, Calcutta, 1949.

64. To P.C. Ghosh¹

New Delhi
3 May, 1950

My dear Prafulla Babu,

I did not reply to your letter of the 23rd April because you were away in Madras.

1. J.N. Collection.

I was glad to receive your letter and to know that there is much in common between you and me in the way we look at this problem. I realise that many people are not likely to go back to East Pakistan for some time. Nevertheless, a beginning has to be made, an example has to be set, and we cannot wait for the tide to turn till we take action. Any action that we take will itself help in stemming the exodus, if not so much in turning the tide. I believe quite a number of Hindus have gone back and are going back.

I thought that Sardar's radio speech was very good.² So far as Pakistan is concerned, it had a very favourable reception there and indeed many people spoke to me about it in Karachi with great approval. I hardly think that people going back because of Sardar's appeal will be considered as playing a game and thus distrusted by the Muslims.

I agree with you that it would be an excellent thing if outstanding all-India leaders, believing in Bapu's programme and principles, go to East Bengal. It was because of this that I suggested your going. I would have gladly gone there and indeed I thought of doing so at one time. But that could not be done till I left the Prime Ministership. I was on the point of doing so, but was pressed not to.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Patel had appealed for cooperation in the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement.

65. On Talks with Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have seen Mr Mohammad Ali's letter² to you dated the 29th April...

2. The question of disabilities of Muslims in India was referred to by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.³ There is no question of disabilities, but it is true that for

1. Note to S. Dutt, New Delhi, 3 May 1950. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Referring to Nehru's notes of conversation Mohammad Ali had written on Liaquat Ali's behalf that these notes of Nehru were not minutes of the meetings; they neither covered all the subjects nor were complete. For Nehru's notes, see *ante*, pp. 75-80.
3. Mohammad Ali had written that the question of the disabilities which the Muslims of India were suffering came up during these talks and "your Prime Minister referred to the efforts made by Pandit Pant and a number of other Congress leaders to create conditions which would stop their migration to Pakistan."

a few days during the Holi festival there were regrettable incidents in some parts of the U.P. and a considerable exodus followed. I assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan that we were trying, both as a Government and as Congress organisation, to remove all sense of apprehension from the minds of the Muslims here and I am glad to say that we had largely succeeded. The exodus had continued, however, because of the widespread impression in the U.P. that people were invited to go to Pakistan and could earn big wages there, that townships were being built and artisans and others were specially required. In fact numerous personal invitations were received. It was widely believed, with what truth I do not know, that the Pakistan Radio had issued this invitation. I mentioned this matter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and he promised to have a contradiction issued by Radio and in the press.

3. The question of Kashmir was also discussed.⁴

4. Regarding the sending of several missions to contact families of Pakistan soldiers in India, I stated that I would convey this to our Defence Ministry. There could be no objection to this, but several missions at the same time might be difficult to organise, and I think it will be better for the two Defence Ministries to contact each other on this subject.

5. Regarding the repatriation of members of Pakistan armed forces who had opted for Pakistan but who wished on release to settle in India, I said that the matter will be referred to our Defence Ministry. I knew nothing about it.⁵

6. It is certainly correct to assume that the same facilities for derequisitioning and return of houses would be extended to migrants who returned to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. I do not understand what "old migrants" means. The clause in the Agreement will be applied.⁶

7. It is true that I agreed that many Muslim women and children from Kashmir who were detained in Amritsar and other camps in India would be sent to Pakistan. Only Amritsar was mentioned to me. We shall be glad to have any particulars so that we can take action.⁷

8. While it may not be possible to apply the provisions of the Delhi Agreement in their entirety to other parts of India and Pakistan, I suggested that the general principle might be applied as far as possible. In regard to this matter the Pakistan

4. Mohammad Ali had written that the Kashmir problem was discussed at a considerable length between the two Prime Ministers.
5. Mohammad Ali had written that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had raised this matter. This had previously been refused and it was very hard on these men whose homes were in India. "P.M. India agreed to look into this question."
6. Mohammad Ali had written that it was assumed that the same facilities for derequisitioning and return of houses would be extended to old migrants who return to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura.
7. Ali had written that Nehru had agreed that Muslim women and children from Kashmir who were detained in Amritsar or other camps in India would be sent to Pakistan.

Government will be addressed soon by the Government of India and it would be desirable to hold a conference soon after.⁸

9. The canal waters question was not discussed by me with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, but I entirely agree that it is a question which should be settled as early as possible.⁹ I do not myself see any particular bearing of this question on evacuee property. Even the bearing that it might have would be on agricultural land, but even that need not come in the way of a settlement of either of these questions.¹⁰

I think you might reply to Mr Mohammad Ali on the above lines. If you like you can even send him a copy of this note.

I hope you are proceeding with the preparation of the note on evacuee property. I hope also that you have taken action about the Amritsar camp of Muslim women and referred some of the matters mentioned above to the Defence Ministry.

One thing I did not mention in my note yesterday.¹¹ Mr Mohammad Ali has said that I referred to the concentration of Indian forces on the border of West Pakistan and added that I had said that they included certain extra forces which we proposed to withdraw as soon as arrangements for their transport could be made. This statement is not quite correct. What I said was that we had decided on our new dispositions of forces long before the recent crisis had risen in Bengal and for general reasons. Their departure had undoubtedly been expedited a little because of recent events. Now that they had gone there it was difficult to shift them about suddenly. But gradually as occasions arise, a part of them may be shifted for the sake of convenience.

8. Ali had written that Liaquat Ali did not think it possible to apply the provisions of the Delhi Agreement to other parts of India and Pakistan. It was desirable to hold a conference to discuss such matters.
9. Ali had written that "the settlement of the canal waters question has so vital a bearing on the evacuee property problem that it is essential to settle that question as early as possible."
10. He also agreed that the evacuee property laws ought to be changed and a date fixed beyond which they should not apply and it should be possible to arrange the exchange and sale of urban property.
11. This paragraph was added on 4 May 1950.

66. The Role of the Press in Settling Differences¹

Friends, I suppose I must address you in English. Well, it has become almost a practice for us to be bilingual on occasions and for me to speak a little in English and a little in Hindustani.

1. Speech at the joint session of Pakistan and Indian Newspaper Editors' Conference, New Delhi, 4 May 1950. P.I.B.

Well, gentlemen, I am happy for this opportunity of meeting you, the representatives of the press in India and Pakistan. This is, in the context of things, a rather remarkable occasion when editors from Pakistan and India are meeting to confer together.² Whatever we may think about the virtues or the failings of the press, it is obvious that it plays a most important part in our lives, in moulding peoples' minds and thoughts and thereby, if not directly, but certainly indirectly, in affecting Government policies. Therefore, when we have to deal with any major problem it is important that the press should—if I may say so with all humility—give the right lead. We have developed a fairly widespread and effective press both in India and Pakistan. Perhaps it is not as good as it might be, though it is fast improving. When I say it is not as good as it might be, what I mean is that it has not adjusted itself to the changed independent conditions of the two countries. Of course, that is always a difficult time to adjust oneself, whether for a Government, or an independent party, or for the press.

In India, and I am sure that must happen in Pakistan equally, many people while talking that our countries are independent, do not quite live up to that in their minds. Old habits of thought which grew up when we were under British rule persist and old suspicions and old ways of looking at things still continue. Many of the editorials which I read today might well have been written about ten years ago—regardless of the fact that India and Pakistan are independent countries. Editorials, say, in regard to our foreign policy and domestic policy, are far too much governed by our old mental habits and suspicions. Naturally we are all governed by our old habits and reactions. But we have not adapted ourselves to the new scheme of things.

Now this applies as much to political parties as it applies to the press. Take for instance the great organisation in which I have had the honour of working for the greater part of my life—the Indian National Congress. Now for twenty or thirty years we functioned as a party, or something more than a party, in opposition to the British rule. We carried out big movements here and ultimately, if I may so, we succeeded on the political plane in achieving freedom. All that thirty years' experience was one of opposition, of struggle, of fighting, of looking at the picture from the point of view of a semi-revolutionary organisation which sometimes became fully revolutionary. We trained up our people in methods of action. They were more or less peaceful: nevertheless they were effective and revolutionary. Of course, we trained up large numbers of people who could deal with masses of men and who would not be frightened. But that was not exactly the training that was subsequently required in running a government, in running a constructive machinery of the State. So we come up against this difficulty that all our training has been of a particular type which was good, because it built up character and strength and all that, but nevertheless which was deficient in some way. Our old

2. Over 60 editors from India and Pakistan attended the two-day conference to promote Indo-Pakistan friendship.

habit of thought still persists and the average man in the street cannot fully and wholly realise that it is his Government, it is part of him. So people treat the present Government more or less in the way they treated the British Government. That is what I call a carry-over from the old days.

People treat international problems more or less as we treated them before we became independent. Our international outlook in the old days was fundamentally—I am using one word—anti-imperialist and the British Empire in India was the big symbol of imperialism and our attitude one of anti-imperialism. Of course, our attitude now too continues to be one of anti-imperialism in the world stage. Nevertheless, I do find often enough that the old and rather limited viewpoint still governs our attitude towards world problem.

I am mentioning this to you because it affects the press perhaps even more than it affects the average man in the street, because in such matters the press gives the lead which gradually sinks into people's minds. A person forms his opinion in regard to distant occurrences by the news as presented in the press. Very few individuals are competent enough to know the facts or form an opinion. They are naturally guided by what is said by the press. That is the general observation I should like to place before you.

You know very well that the last two and a half years since India and Pakistan achieved independence have been very abnormal years and in many ways very bad years for us, bad in the sense of continuous conflict, of continuous suspicion or in fact major upheavals. Obviously the press is not responsible for the major upheavals. As to who is responsible, historians will give a verdict. But the fact remains that we have been contending all this time not only against physical effects of occurrences and incidents, but rather some intangible, but very visible effects. We have been working with a background of fear and of sometimes hatred and suspicion. There is a desire to cause injury to the other party, even though that injury may react on ourselves and cause injury to us. That obviously is a very bad atmosphere for any country to live in and that atmosphere, if it becomes a continuing one, poisons not only the relations between the two countries, but it also poisons the lives of the two countries. We have only partly escaped from it now.

Some recent events and more especially the talks which I had with the Prime Minister of Pakistan have resulted in an Agreement which has produced a very marked change in that atmosphere. This was immediately reflected to a large extent in the press of the two countries. That is rather a remarkable occurrence. I have often sat down and thought about it—as to how it took place. If we analyse the Agreement, we may not like some clauses of it. But the fact of the matter is that the real importance is not in the Agreement, but something outside that Agreement—the fact that there was an Agreement, an Agreement of the right type.

It is clear that that reaction represents a certain urge and a desire in people's minds. Large numbers of people were rather afraid of what was happening and wanted an escape, a way of putting an end to this business. They were frustrated.

They would not do anything—no individual could do anything when millions are moved by passion and fear. But as soon as a way was found, you find a powerful reaction which shows that essentially the basic feelings and urges of the people of India and Pakistan are against the continuance of this poisonous atmosphere and a desire to catch hold of anything that brings some security and peace of mind to them. In spite of that we have not obviously solved our problems. What is more we are not going to solve them suddenly. Nevertheless the fact that there is a very healthy desire in the minds of the people is itself a most hopeful sign.

Now the first thing that we should be clear about in our minds is what exactly are our aims. Speaking as the Prime Minister of this country, I should say that our domestic aim is the elimination of poverty and the economic advancement of the people. In this matter not only Pakistan and India but the other countries of Asia are alike, in the sense that our view of world conditions is dominated by the primary urge of supplying the primary necessities of our people.

In Europe or in America there are many problems. Europe has suffered very greatly in the last war and many countries were reduced to a state of utter ruin at the end of the war. Nevertheless, the problems that come up before Europe are not as a rule essentially the problems of fulfilling the primary necessities, that is food, clothing, shelter, etc. The problems before Asia are the problems of these primary necessities first of all before we talk about other things. When we talk about international affairs in India or Pakistan—certainly we will play a part, but the fact is that our first problem is to feed our people, to clothe them, to shelter them, to give them a little education, etc.

These problems normally speaking were solved by Europe sometime ago. Now when that problem is solved more or less then people have time and energy to devote themselves to other problems and in other countries. For instance, take what is called 'power politics'. Power politics have existed in the world ever since organised nations existed. There have been power politics in varying scales and now that the essential needs are largely satisfied these people's minds move to different spheres and their minds grow bigger, whether in the imperialist plane or in any other plane.

Europe and America having passed the first stage are likely to be involved much more in the second stage, while we in Asia are intimately concerned with the first stage of fulfilling the primary necessities. The second stage will come; we cannot avoid it; we are thinking about it. We are not quite so excited about the second stage as the people in America and Europe might be. But there is a common thing between us, Pakistan and India; but apart from that common factor when we come up to other factors, we have to face this tremendous basic mental conflict that has arisen between India and Pakistan.

Now what about it? Let us forget the present day and let us look ten years or twenty years ahead and unless we have a somewhat clear picture of what we are aiming at, we will simply be drifting about and will not know where we are

going. We should go on aiming at something; we may be pushed about or be forced beyond our control. Nevertheless, we as a Government, we as a people or the press must have some general, even though a vague, idea of what we are going to do, apart from domestic or economic improvement. Therefore, are we going to encourage a continuous conflict between us, India and Pakistan? Are we looking forward to such a stage when conflict is inevitable and we ought to prepare for it or do we imagine conflict is not inevitable, that conflict is disastrous and that should be avoided?

True as a Prime Minister, I take every precaution to protect my country, to ensure that my country may not be attacked or is placed in a difficult position or aggression may not take place. Every Government has got to do that. No doubt the Government of Pakistan has also to do that. That is admitted. But do you think that conflict is inevitable? Today some people think that a third world war is inevitable and they prepare for it. They do not like war; most people of the world do not want war; nevertheless, by pressure of circumstances they talk about and prepare for it, a terrible preparation of armaments, and fear spreads all over. Are we going to take it in the nature of things that a conflict between India and Pakistan is inevitable, whatever the consequences?

It is a very serious thing and if we have it in our minds, then inevitably all our actions and all our thoughts will be governed by that and we can never really get out of it because something that we may do in India will react in Pakistan and something that they do in Pakistan will react here, and the smallest incidents which otherwise are petty incidents assume a certain significance; they become parts of a larger picture.

One of the big things that gentlemen of the newspaper world will realise is that Asia after 300 years or so has turned the corner. No country in Asia is strong enough in the economic sense, or in any sense, to pose as a great power. Sometimes people talk as if India is a big power, and although we are not, we are potentially big, not really big, but we are potentially great though not really great. It is all tall talk. We have got rid of certain encumbrances such as oppression. We have got the road clear more or less, provided we do not shatter ourselves by getting into other quarrels among ourselves, internal or external. Every country in Asia is today passing through that stage of transition. India and Pakistan, their geographical position is such that they cannot help playing an important role. India and Pakistan, together following more or less a common policy obviously make a big difference today. If India and Pakistan follow a contrary policy, opposed to each other, they will be neutralizing each other obviously and cannot play that role elsewhere, so that any commonsense approach to the problem shows that a continuance of conflict or this atmosphere of conflict between India and Pakistan can only do great harm to them.

It may be that this may disable them for a generation to make up with the other progress which is so necessary and which might enable them to play a larger role

in Asian affairs and in world affairs. That seems to be logically quite correct. It is true, I think, that India and Pakistan, geographically, historically, culturally, economically and in a hundred ways are so connected that in the natural course we should cooperate with each other in the fullest measure. We should try to develop common politics in regard to external matters, in regard possibly to defence matters and in many other things; we should come closer together in regard to these policies and cooperate together; that should be the natural course.

I am perfectly convinced in my own mind that unless some catastrophe should overwhelm us, that is bound to be inevitable. Because of our very close contacts, we cannot be indifferent to each other. We can either be almost more than friends or we can become bitter against each other and become more than enemies.

Individual or group contacts, when they break, produce bitter hostility and great bitterness. What has happened here? It seems to me inevitable from the recent course of events, that a closer contact is to come about because it is to the advantage of both. I speak of sheer opportunism and not idealism at all. Therefore, I say it is quite inevitable that India and Pakistan should not merely be two countries but two friendly countries, the two countries are far more closely alike to each other than any other countries are. How is that to happen I do not know, but everything points to that end; and in spite of all the terrible experiences we have had during the last two and a half years and more recently, every approach of logic and reasonable talk leads to this, and every other approach contrary to this leads one to something which is very dangerous for Pakistan and for India and which practically nullifies our efforts and wipes us out. I suppose it may take a generation for us to make good. This conflict and wasteful effort will wipe us from the face of the earth. The natural consequence is that we should try our utmost to develop that friendliness and not do something which seems to be contrary to the whole course of history and modern currents in the world.

Ultimately we cannot go against the currents of history. I am so sure of the desire of our people that I have arrived at this conclusion. Though we may have been partitioned and we may have been divorced from each other, our own historical, cultural and other contacts, geographic, economic and every other, are so fundamentally great, despite everything that happened, and despite all that passion and prejudice, and in spite of even gross inhumanity and killing, that ultimately the basic principles will survive. These are the things that keep us together unless, of course, India and Pakistan are terribly backward countries culturally, and if that is so then it is only talk and nothing else as we then have no cultural standards to maintain so that we talk a great deal about national culture, Muslim culture and Hindu culture, but those who talk like that know the least about it.

We have completed now two and a half years or so as an independent nation. We have just now faced a very difficult, critical and painful situation—I refer to West and East Bengal and Assam and partly elsewhere, and as I said in another place we just managed to save ourselves falling from the edge of a precipice and

we are turning away in a different direction. As I said looking at the results achieved, let me say the turning away was remarkable. It is true that many evils and terrible evils continue. It is true that problems are not solved by merely looking in the other direction. It is true that millions of people have been uprooted and suffered. All that has happened is true, and it is no good just trying to be over-optimistic. I am talking about the point of view, if you like, of sheer opportunism, for a practical objective approach to these problems and not to be swept away by the passion of the moment realising that there is passion.

I arrive at these conclusions now; we have gone through these painful experiences, and even now tens of thousands of people are going through these painful experiences. The exodus is continuing and those who have remained behind have not obviously got rid of the fear that oppresses them. How are we to meet the situation?

There can be three ways of meeting it. One is to think that this kind of thing will happen and nothing will stop it. We simply go from one disaster to another as the culmination of the Greek tragedy. We cannot prevent it; therefore we simply accept it. The other way is, since reason and logic point in one direction, we must try our best, on the faith that we will succeed, not minimising the dangers, but considering them, nevertheless realising that we must go in a particular direction, that is the direction of peace and cooperation and removal of the fear in the minds of millions of people. There is a third way. It is good to have peace and cooperation; but we do not see it anywhere, not much of it. We do not think this attempt will succeed at all. We are prepared to see how it functions. We will watch, wait and see.

I confess that, constituted as I am, I dislike intensely this kind of negative, passive approach, the third one. I can quite understand full-blooded opposition: we cannot have peace: why talk about it? I disagree with them. But I can understand that. But I cannot understand the weak approach, when powerful forces are working, for us to wait, and see and watch. If it happens, well and good; if it does not happen, we cannot help it; we suspect it would not happen. This is a weak approach. This is not the approach which a strong nation or a strong man takes in regard to problems. Therefore, I think it is an approach which takes you nowhere.

I personally arrive at the conclusion that we should have a strong approach, a positive approach, a constructive approach, an approach which has behind it, in spite of every difficulty, a large measure of faith and confidence. If I have that confidence, if you have that confidence, it will spread to millions of other people. I am no prophet, I am no astrologer to say what the future will be. But, I can govern my actions to a large extent and I do not see why I should doubt and be pushed about. If I consider my policy to be right, I propose to follow it to the best of my ability and strength. Having had a fair measure of experience for 30 or 35 years of my life, not so much of governmental ways of working, but of mass feeling, how the masses feel and move, I am not afraid of the masses. I have always had a large measure of faith and confidence in the masses of people, whoever they

are. If I have put my confidence in them, they have been good enough to react by placing their confidence in me. Therefore, I approach this problem, not with doubt, not idealistically, not weakly, but having come to this logical opportunist conclusion.

How are we to go about it? We have to approach it both with regard to the basic thing, the general atmosphere, how far we can change that atmosphere, because that is very important, and secondly how far we can implement the various parts. With regard to the basic feeling, let us take East Bengal. The minority community, the Hindus in East Bengal, are obviously frightened for their lives. They feel they have no security of life. Therefore, they do feel like coming away, and I can understand that.

That applies to the minority community in West Bengal and we might also say that a large number of Muslims have gone away from the U.P. and Rajasthan. I entirely understand this because they are frightened. Maybe, the fear was not justified, but the fact is, we have to face this fear complex. Fear is a terrible thing; it is the worst thing; it is infectious. How are we to get rid of this fear? I do not mind if people want to go from one country to another. But let them not go driven by fear; let them not go because life is insecure and they do not know what the morrow will bring. How are we to remove the fear? The Government at the top and the large number of officials can do a lot. But, obviously, the press can do a great deal. Until this fear goes, this problem is not solved.

For the last two and a half years, what is happening? You found the tremendous upheaval in the Punjab in August 1947; first in West Punjab and then in other areas terrible things happened. Vast massacres took place; you saw elemental forces at work. No Government could create or control it. That particular upheaval stopped; nevertheless, fear continued. You saw exodus of population continuing in Sind and East Bengal, not because any major incident happened there, not because there was any killing, but still because of fear. Sometimes, there might have been economic pressure. Gradually things were settling down when this Bengal situation happened.

Again, we see this big scale exodus on both sides and again fear at work. Another thing is, it goes on a large scale. There is no end to it yet, not only in Bengal, but elsewhere also. That is an impossible situation. So we have to instil confidence in the minorities. We have to make the majority feel that it is not only their responsibility, it is not only their duty, it is not only for their good name and credit that they have to do it, but from the point of view of the narrowest opportunism, they have to do it. Otherwise, everybody suffers.

The large numbers of refugees, and evacuees who have been pushed out of their homes, all must have sympathy. When they go to new place, and when they cannot get anything, they try, but failing they have a feeling of taking some kind of revenge on others. This spreads. I think we must first of all come to the conclusion that every effort must be made to prevent any forces working which spread this

fear which pushed out the minorities from where they were: whether in any part of East Pakistan or India or West Pakistan.

Many things have happened, including the evacuee laws. Normally speaking, all these Acts are justified; but we have to consider them in the peculiar context of today. Next, the increasing fear in the minds of the minority communities. It affects the whole atmosphere. If people feel that they can go back to their homes—I do not suppose it is reasonable that the millions who have come should go back—it may be a considerable number may still go back—yet absolute freedom and conditions of security must be created. That is very essential.

Firstly, as I said, a major change in atmosphere is necessary: not minimising the incidents—I do not wish to suppress facts; I do not wish to distort facts; but nevertheless you can always put it in a way so as not to inflame the public mind, but put it in the particular context that such and such facts are there. Every single factor that frightens the minority community should be analysed as far as possible to remove the fear. If the economic conditions affect them, you must analyse them. If the housing conditions affect them, you should analyse them. You are asking the migrants to go back. Obviously, when they go back, they must have their houses. We must give back their houses. All these matters should be considered all over India, Pakistan, Eastern Pakistan, Western Pakistan, Sind, etc. The problem is not confined to the Punjab. In other parts of the country as are affected, these small things have happened. There is the working of the permit system and so many other things. These should all be examined.

As I said, this evacuee property problem somehow affects people even more vitally. Personally, if I may say so, I have never had any strong feeling about property. In fact, generally speaking, I dislike the system of property or too much of property for an individual. But I do see people attach more importance to property than even to their lives. Where property questions are involved, they become more excited than when problems of life and death are involved. Therefore, if we could deal with these property questions in a reasonable way, if we could deal with them in an equitable way, that would go a long way to solve many of our problems.

Take another problem, the canal waters. It is a problem which is eminently suitable for adjustment by both the parties. If we solve our problems by adjustment, if we could try our best to remove the fear, to make the majority feel that it is its duty to protect minorities in its own interest and remove fear from the minds of the minorities and remove all these little things that have happened which are pinpricks, I think you will find the situation change radically. If we are honest, we must remove not only fear, obsession of fear but also the other difficulties. This involves the happiness of a vast number of people and it will become a question of a good name for India and Pakistan; their future is involved and if this is not solved troubles go on adding.

Well, I have ventured to place before you my ideas frankly and I hope that you, who through your newspapers wield such a great deal of influence, will throw

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

your influence in solving the problems and removing the sense of insecurity. I should just like to say a word to the people of India and Pakistan. Big things are happening in the world and big things may happen. A month ago, there was a mounting tension between India and Pakistan, with the possibility of a conflict. This frightened the world in the sense that everything that might spread to other parts of the world is frightening it; and then India and Pakistan ceased to have much value in the world affairs since they were wrapped up in their own conflicts. Immediately this Agreement was arrived at, it sent up hopes very high, and immediately the world saw that we were capable of not being swept away and keeping ourselves away from any further disaster.

Viewed in that context, immediately we became much more important than when we were tied up with our own difficulties. So we have to work this to the advantage of both India and Pakistan. There are certain things where Pakistan can in some ways help India and similarly India can help Pakistan and there is nothing that comes in the way of India or Pakistan to help each other.

I hope your talks will lead to the removal of such difficulties between India and Pakistan. We should have correspondents of newspapers going from one country to another and the difficulties that have arisen in this way should be removed; it doesn't matter if bad news comes. All possible obstructions should be removed, and I hope also some machinery will be evolved for newspapermen of both countries to meet each other, to discuss their problems jointly, and finally create the proper atmosphere which is so essential.³

3. C.R. Srinivasan, President of A.I.N.E.C., reminded the editors of their responsibilities in creating mutual faith and trust in the two countries. P.A.M. Rashidi, his Pakistani counterpart, made a 14-point proposal to achieve the objective of Indo-Pakistan friendship. They agreed not to do propaganda against either country or publish matter inciting war or suggesting its inevitability. A joint committee of ten editors—five each from India and Pakistan—was set up to deal with problems relating to the press in the two countries.

67. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 5, 1950

My dear Bidhan,
Thank you for your letter of the 4th May.

You will notice that we are issuing the names of the new Council of Ministers today and C.C. Biswas has been included as a Minister of State. As there is much

1. J.N. Collection.

misapprehension, I wish to repeat that a Minister of State has full powers and authority of a Cabinet Minister. The only difference is that he does not attend Cabinet meetings except on special occasions. Biswas should come here for the oath-taking ceremony in the course of a few days.

The Indo-Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference here has proved a success and I think they will help greatly in improving the tone of the press everywhere. The Pakistani editors have impressed people here very much with their enthusiasm for implementing the Agreement. Even Tushar Kanti Ghosh was somewhat swept away by the pervading enthusiasm. He complained, however, of the *Hindusthan Standard*.

About Mridula, I know her failings very well and, as I wrote to you, she is sometimes apt to be very irritating. But there is no worker in India to come up to her. She is quite unique in her own way. If you can keep in touch with her, you could guide her. She should certainly go to East Bengal, but I think she might be of great use in West Bengal also.²

Yours,
Jawahar

2. See also *post*, pp.167-169.

68. Forging of Goodwill and Reconciliation¹

I had an interview with the whole lot of the Pakistani editors here this morning. Subsequently, I had a private interview with Mr Rashidi,² President of the P.N.E.C.

2. It is evident that the Pakistani editors have been powerfully affected by their visit to Delhi. Their old conceptions have changed and they are going back full of the determination to preach peace and cooperation. I have no doubt about the sincerity of their present feeling. Most of them came from West Pakistan, and they

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, 7 May 1950. File No. 43(118)/50-PMS.
2. Pir Ali Muhammed Rashidi (b.1915); journalist and politician; editor of prominent Pakistani newspapers, 1929-53; Secretary, All India Muslim League, 1939-41; President, All India Pakistan Newspapers Editors' Conference, 1948-53; Chairman, Joint Indo-Pakistan Press Committee, 1949-51; Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, 1955-56.

met large numbers of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan. These meetings were not only cordial but something more. They wept more or less on each other's shoulders and expressed a keen desire to go back to the old times. That is not possible. But anyhow it shows what the feelings of the people are. At the Sikh Gurdwara too their reception was an emotional one.

3. Apart from general discussions and apart from the arrangements made between the newspaper editors about correspondents and exchange of information etc. some points were particularly raised. The idea was that we should encourage more and more contacts between India and Pakistan in every possible way so that people should get to know each other and not be fed by false propaganda. In order to do this, it was suggested that short films should be prepared by us here, as well as by Pakistan on the other side, depicting life in India and more particularly, Muslim life here (and Hindu life in Pakistan). The point was that most people in Pakistan believe that there are hardly any Muslims left in Delhi or many other places and such as live in India carry on their lives under terror. I think this matter should be investigated and our Films Division should try to make some good films of this kind. They might, for instance, have a short film of the Jama Masjid in Delhi. The building itself should be shown as a famous monument and then prayers on normal occasions and special days and the general life round about. Some other famous mosques and other buildings might also be shown. On the occasion of Muslim fairs, I think it should be possible to make some good short films out of this. The approach should not be too obvious or propagandist and it should not be entirely confined to Muslim life as that would indicate living their lives quite separately.

4. The second point raised by them was that visitors should be encouraged in every way from the other country and that there should be exchanges of deputations of all kinds. In other words, the more people from Pakistan come to India or from India go to Pakistan the better. They will see things for themselves and report back. Their coming and going will produce normality. If they want, they can come not only in deputations but privately as tourists or to see their relatives and friends. This means a great relaxation of the permit system. Probably it need not make any radical change in it, because these permits would be temporary. Ultimately, of course, it should be desirable to put an end to the permit system. But for the moment a fairly liberal relaxation might be enough.

5. As a matter of fact, when there is a large exodus of Muslims from India to Pakistan and the permit system has failed in regard to them, the importance of this permit system becomes very much less. There might be some importance from the military and police points of view of keeping out spies and undesirable persons; probably the spies and the undesirables manage to come in anyhow. In any event I think this question of the further application of the permit system should be closely examined by the parties concerned. Some days ago the Ministry of Rehabilitation wrote to me suggesting that the issue of permits be handed over

by them to the Ministry of Home Affairs, as it was more or less a police matter now. I told them to postpone this matter for some little time so that we might give it fuller consideration in view of developments. That fuller consideration should now be given from the point of view stated above. I suggest that the matter might be considered at an official level, first by External Affairs, Home, Defence and Rehabilitation. Later the Ministers concerned might be consulted and more especially Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Once our minds are clear we might inform Pakistan as to what we intend doing. Indeed we could take action unilaterally and inform Pakistan instead of carrying on a lengthy correspondence. Some such step would have a very good effect on popular psychology.

6. Another point that was emphasised by the Pakistani editors related to mosques, temples, gurdwaras, etc., that is, places of religious worship. The sooner all these are restored for the original purpose, the better. They told me frankly that in Pakistan many temples and gurdwaras had become homes of refugees and they were trying their best to get them released. If this attempt was made on both sides, it would have a good effect. I think we might pay some special attention to this also.

7. I have already spoken to you and to others about the consideration of the evacuee law position. I hope steps are being taken in this matter. It is proposed to have a conference between the two countries within the next fortnight. I met Mr Shahabuddin³ yesterday and told him that I was eager for some step forward to be taken before I went to Indonesia. He said he would immediately consult his colleagues in Karachi and let us know in two or three days' time about a suitable date. Meanwhile, we must be ready with our definite proposals. I think that the Ministry of Rehabilitation is considering this matter. As soon as their proposals are ready, we might have a small conference to consider them.

3. Khwaja Shahabuddin was Minister for Interior in the Government of Pakistan.

69. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 7, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

The enclosed telegram from Foreign, Karachi, has, I suppose, been conveyed to your Government. I think there is force in the argument and it will not be in keeping

1. J.N. Collection.

with the spirit of the Agreement, if workers are given such a short notice to return. Conditions had been peculiar and this can hardly be treated as a normal strike, when people sit at home. Even if they desire to return, it takes some time.

Apart from this, if we are to produce or go rapidly towards producing normality, it is desirable for a fair number of these workers to return and join their work. I hope that your Government will relax this provision and make it known that Muslim workers can return and join their work.

The Joint Conference of Newspaper Editors from India and Pakistan, which has just been held here, has been in some ways a remarkable success. There can be no doubt that the Pakistani editors, and most of them represented newspapers which had taken a lead in propaganda against India, were powerfully influenced. Indeed some of the scenes witnessed were rather remarkable. The Hindu and Sikh refugees from the Punjab and Sind were feted as long-lost brothers and they wept on each other's shoulders. I have no doubt at all that the tone of the Pakistani press, certainly in West Pakistan, will continue to be good. Tushar Kanti Ghosh was ultimately carried away a little himself by the prevailing enthusiasm and, to a lesser extent, so was the representative of the *Hindusthan Standard* and others from Bengal. All this is to the good.

The various appointments that the Pakistan Government has made in regard to the carrying out of the Agreement, have been made rather carefully and they seem to have paid particular attention to choosing men who are in favour of the Agreement and likely to be fully cooperative. This is a very good sign and definitely indicates their desire to work this Agreement to the full. I hope that on our side the same desire will be equally evident. Apart from Ministers, much depends on officials and the officials should appreciate this to the full.

The experience of the last two or three years has convinced me that an even greater responsibility than I had thought rests on our officials in giving a certain tone not only to the administration but even to public opinion in regard to these communal matters. I have watched carefully in U.P. and elsewhere and have invariably found that, where the men in charge are sound and competent and have clear ideas, there has been no trouble. In other places, where the officials were themselves somewhat communally inclined, trouble occurred. That trouble was often enough put down swiftly or it took long to deal with. There is the law and order situation by itself, and an efficient district magistrate or policeman will no doubt deal with it swiftly, if any difficulty arises. But what is much more necessary is for him to prevent a situation arising which he has to deal with in that way. It is there that real competence and clarity of ideas comes in. My experience has shown that a good head of the district supported by reliable assistants can prevent such a situation arising. If it arises, it shows that there has been something lacking in the way he has dealt with the situation. Often enough, it is not so much the fault of the officials concerned, because they themselves are not clear as to what they should do or they have no clear directions. They may have directions about

just maintaining law and order when trouble occurs. But the real guidance should be ideological also as to how to prevent extreme communal elements from making mischief. I hope that, now that the situation has improved somewhat, this approach will be made by Ministers and officials alike. A half-hearted approach or a doubtful one leads us nowhere.

It seems to me that the recent figures of exodus definitely show that a considerable number of Hindus, including many women and children, are going back to Pakistan. The latest report which I received yesterday gives the figure at 3,766 Hindus who went to Pakistan on the 4th and 5th of May. This figure included, it is stated, 437 elderly women, 75 young women, and 178 children. These figures are significant and I think full publicity should be given to these facts. I find that there is a strong tendency even in our Intelligence reports to interpret facts in a particular way and try to explain them away. For instance, it was first stated that people were going back just to dispose of their properties and to return. No doubt, this was true in a large number of cases. Then, when women were mentioned as returning, some other explanation had to be found. So instead of reporting facts, even Intelligence people try to colour them as much as possible. This is unfortunate and the result is that we cannot accept their reports as objective statements.

Yours,
Jawahar

70. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
May 9, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have your letter of the 8th May about the U.P.A. report from America regarding American supply of arms for Pakistan.² We have already formally protested to the American Ambassador here and he has assured us that there is going to be no such supply of arms. He has forwarded our protest to the State Department in America.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Press reports had stated that the United States was planning to give arms aid to Pakistan. Patel thought that this report "ill accords with their professions of friendship and the spirit of the Agreement...the least we should do is to make unmistakably clear to the Americans that we would regard any aid to Pakistan as an unfriendly act to us."

Yesterday I sent a brief message to Liaquat Ali Khan through our Embassy in Washington, pointing out that his speeches and even more so the speeches³ of Begam Liaquat Ali⁴ were not only not in harmony with the spirit of the Agreement, but were likely to create ill-will.

I think we had better leave it at this and make no public reference to these matters. As a matter of fact some of the Pakistani editors who were here expressed their regret at some things that Liaquat Ali Khan had said in America. They said that they would write about this in their newspapers.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. While addressing Congress on 4 May 1950, Liaquat Ali referred to "that perpetual fear of the majority from which Pakistan has delivered millions of Muslims." He said at the National Press Club at Washington: "Pakistan came about because hundred million Muslims found themselves in minority in British India and were convinced that under majority rule of Hindus their culture was in danger of effacement..." He also mentioned their low economic position.
4. On 4 May 1950, Begum Liaquat Ali said at Sulgrave Club, Washington, that a hundred million Muslims achieved freedom after the partition. "Unfortunately only sixty per cent of this achieved complete independence and other forty per cent remained slaves in India." She also referred to the massacres, refugee influx and abduction of women.

71. Functions of the Central Ministers for Minorities¹

The Central Ministers, appointed on behalf of the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, have to function in a dual capacity. They are Ministers of their respective Governments with the full authority attached to such Ministers. They are also, in a sense, diplomats, each dealing with the other country. The problems they will have to face are delicate and difficult. They will naturally be in constant touch with their Governments. But the whole point of appointing them will lose significance, if they function merely as some kind of agency to communicate with their Central Governments. They will have to exercise their own discretion and take frequent decisions. If the two jointly take a decision, this will go a long way and it is hardly likely that either of their Governments will disagree.

1. Note to C.C. Biswas, New Delhi, 10 May 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. A great deal depends upon the way of approach. There is the normal governmental approach when an international conference takes place. There is also the normal diplomatic approach when an ambassador conveys the views of his Government. Neither is adequate, so far as these Central Ministers are concerned. Any attitude of strict governmental routine or a lawyer-like approach with the desire to make points will not yield results and is, therefore, not desirable. What is to be aimed at is results and not merely justifications of the position we take up. Therefore, an attempt should be made, right at the beginning, for the two Central Ministers to deal with each other in a friendly informal way with the intention of having joint decisions as far as possible. Much will depend on the way this association begins. Therefore, right at the beginning, there should be a friendly talk, stress being laid not on procedure and protocol, but on the desire of each party to bring about the full implementation of the Agreement and better relations between India and Pakistan. Naturally no important or vital point could be conceded merely for the sake of Agreement. But the approach should be friendly and cooperative, aiming at Agreement wherever possible. Further the approach should be informal and not tied down to strict routine methods. An attempt should be made at adjustments wherever possible.

3. Ministers should remember that their relationship is secret. If one Minister talks publicly about confidential matters discussed by them, then there will be no confidence in each other in future. Therefore any propaganda or publicity as to what happens between the Ministers should be avoided. Statements to the press must also be avoided, unless they are joint statements.

4. In fact, we should aim at joint working in every way, and not at separate positions being taken up which cannot be reconciled to each other.

5. The two Ministers function, in a sense, both in India and Pakistan, that is in West Bengal, East Bengal, Assam and Tripura. They function for both the minorities and the majorities. To some extent, inevitably, each Minister will be concerned with a particular minority and a particular majority. But it would be better for both of them to think in terms of both minorities and majorities in all the provinces. Each Minister should not merely become an advocate for a particular minority or majority. This approach is likely to lead to a consideration of the full problem, to adjustments and to agreements, as to the course to be adopted. The Ministers will naturally be in intimate touch with officials of both countries. They should try to impress upon them their own cooperative approach to this problem, so that the officials may react accordingly. The Ministers will also be in touch with non-official groups, organisations and workers. There are a number of relief organisations at work. Some of them may be good. Others may try to exploit the situation for a particular group. As far as possible, the Ministers should avoid too close association with what might be considered communal organisations, because their outlook is different and even if they mean well, they are not likely to aim at cooperative action. Whoever they may work with, it must be clearly understood

that that person is pledged to secrecy and will not rush to the press or otherwise disclose what the Ministers are doing.

6. The Ministers will naturally keep in touch with their High Commissioners and with their provincial Governments. Thus our Ministers will keep in touch with our Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca and with the provincial Governments of West Bengal and Assam. Our Deputy High Commissioner should be fully cooperative with the work of the Central Ministers and follow the general line indicated above. He must realise that while he should be a vigilant guardian of India's interests, he has to work to bring about an atmosphere of cooperation and not an atmosphere of conflict.

7. There are bound to be deplorable incidents. When such incidents occur, they must be enquired into fully, and ways and means found to prevent them. Important facts should not be suppressed, but they must not be given publicity in a manner which adds to the tension or makes the situation more difficult.

8. These general considerations apply to the Minority Commissions in the provinces also. Their approach to the problem should be generally as indicated above.

9. This note is written keeping both Central Ministers in view. Obviously it is meant for our Central Minister, so that he can follow the policy indicated and induce his colleague, the Pakistan Central Minister, to do likewise. From all accounts the Pakistan Central Minister is cooperative and friendly in approach and it should not be difficult to function with him in the way indicated. The first thing is to gain the confidence of each other.

10. There are many relief committees, but in West Bengal today the largest organisation is the Bengal branch of the United Council for Relief and Welfare to which most other relief organisations are affiliated. The Governor of West Bengal is the President of this branch. It would be desirable to keep in touch with the U.C.R.W. and the Governor. Indeed the Central Ministers, whenever they visit any of the provincial headquarters, should keep in touch with the Governors as of course with the Chief Ministers and the Minority Commissions.

11. Our Central Minister will naturally have an office in Calcutta. That office itself will be based in the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi. As it is envisaged however that the two Ministers should function together, it would be undesirable for each to function from separate offices in Calcutta and Dacca. To some extent, and as far as possible, the offices in Calcutta and Dacca might be jointly used by both Central Ministers. In fact every approach should be made to have this joint working wherever possible.

72. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
May 15, 1950

My dear Krishna,

...I might mention that Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches in the U.S. have created a very bad impression here. The reports we have got privately confirm this impression even more. The Begum's speeches have been vicious. There have been many references in his speeches about obtaining arms from the U.S. and indeed it was reported that Dean Acheson is in favour of it. We have made it clear to the U.S. Ambassador here that any such arms deal with Pakistan would be considered very unfriendly to us and would be very unfair. He has assured us that so far as he knows, there will be no such deal with Pakistan.

Liaquat Ali Khan has even said that his chief fear is India and consequently, the arms he requires can only be meant to be used against India, if such an opportunity arises....

Love,

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

73. To Kailas Nath Katju¹

New Delhi
May 15, 1950

My dear Kailas Nath,

... I have been closely following the figures of people coming from and going to East Bengal. I think the number of Hindus returning to East Bengal is very significant and this figure is going up. An analysis of these figures is also interesting, as they contain large numbers of women and children. The attempt to explain all this away by the Bengal newspapers is not very intelligent and logical.

It is true that there has been some slight improvement in the Calcutta press. But I have seen many cuttings which are not at all satisfactory. I think continued

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

attempts should be made to point out to them that this attitude will be no good to anybody. So far as I am concerned, this question is priority No. 1, and I shall persist to it with all my strength.

The exodus of Muslims from the U.P. has continued, although it shows some signs of abating. This exodus should have a lesson for us. It is clear that just as the Hindus of East Bengal have been thoroughly frightened and have lost all sense of security, the Muslims of several districts in the U.P. have done likewise. I have no doubt that just as the East Bengal Government must shoulder this responsibility, so also must our Government shoulder it in the U.P. It is not a question of big incidents and law and order methods, but of a continuous and insidious propaganda against the minority community which has made them lose all their confidence. I am afraid our good friend, Purushottam Das Tandon, is partly responsible for this state of affairs in the U.P. It has long seemed to me that he has been preaching something which is directly opposed to all Congress policies, and yet he is the President of the U.P.P.C.C....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

74. To Lester B. Pearson¹

New Delhi
May 19th, 1950

My dear Pearson,

Many thanks for your letter of the 13th April which your High Commissioner handed to me some days ago.² I am grateful to you for all the good things that you have said about me. It was a great relief and joy to me to arrive at the recent Agreement between India and Pakistan. The Agreement itself, important as it was, was nothing very much, but in the context of things it assumed a great significance and did represent a certain turning of the corner in our relations. We have a hard way to go and there are numerous hurdles in the way. But I feel that we are likely to progress, even though somewhat slowly, in the right direction.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Lester Pearson, the Foreign Minister of Canada, had congratulated Nehru on reaching the Agreement with Pakistan and handling in a wise and statesmanlike way a situation which had explosive potentialities. He hoped that India and Pakistan would now be able to reach agreement with U.N. assistance over Kashmir and other problems as well.

The partition of India was something infinitely more than a political division. It was a psychological break of an integrated personality. If you apply the parallel of individuals who, because of some shock, develop split personalities and have all their mental equilibrium shaken up, then perhaps you will understand the terrific impact of this partition on the people of both India and Pakistan. It is with this background that subsequent events have taken place, and unless one understands that background somewhat, it is difficult to appreciate the inner significance of those events.

The odd thing is that India and Pakistan quarrel because they are intimately alike to each other in mind and spirit. Some time or other we are bound to find a new equilibrium where this essential unity of spirit finds place. Meanwhile, we have to go through, painfully and laboriously, all the consequences of the physical and mental shock and upsets that we have suffered.

We in India, and I am sure people in Pakistan also, realise this better than any outsider can do; and yet an evil fate has pursued us, or to put it in another way, the inevitable consequences of wrong thinking and wrong action. Neither of our two countries can injure the other without injuring itself. On a smaller scale we reproduce the world drama. I earnestly hope, however, that we shall make progress in the right direction and gradually settle the outstanding disputes between us, including that of Kashmir.

Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. Mediator, is due in Delhi on the 27th of this month and I am looking forward to meeting him.³ Three days later, I am going away to Indonesia. I shall visit Indonesia, Singapore and Burma and shall be away for three weeks. I hope that Sir Owen Dixon's visit here and his work will take us a long way towards settling the problem of Kashmir.

I hope that you and Mrs Pearson will visit us in India again in the not distant future. Whenever you may come, you will have a very friendly welcome.

I am glad to learn that you have found time to speak about Asian problems to Canadian audiences. Canada is already playing an important part in world affairs, and it is fitting that not only its Government but its people also should take a progressively keener interest in Asian problems.

With the warmest greetings and good wishes to Mrs Pearson and you,

I am,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Pearson had written that he had a very high regard for Owen Dixon and thought that a wise decision was made in appointing him.

75. To Zafrullah Khan¹

New Delhi
May 20th, 1950

Dear Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan,

I have only today received your letter of May 15th 1950.²

I entirely agree with you that it is essential that the press, both in India and Pakistan, should have created a favourable atmosphere for the full implementation of the Agreement of April 8th and for the betterment of Indo-Pakistan relations. There has, I believe, been a very marked improvement in the tone of the press generally all over India. Even in Calcutta and West Bengal, I think, there has been a noticeable change. But I entirely agree with you that some of the newspapers in West Bengal still continue to write in a way which I consider undesirable. I know that every effort has been made and continues to be made by the West Bengal Government to improve the tone of the press in Calcutta. We have to face the difficulty that in view of our new Constitution, the courts do not approve of many kinds of action that used to be taken previously against the press. Our Supreme Court as well as many of our High Courts are continually dealing with those constitutional points in which the question of some law or ordinance being *ultra vires* or not in terms of the Constitution is considered.

There is another aspect of this case in regard to the press. We are anxious to improve the whole atmosphere of West Bengal. It has, to a considerable extent, improved from what it used to be. Whether that general atmosphere will be improved by any particular action that we may take or not is a matter for careful consideration in each instance. In any event, I wish to assure you that we are very much alive to this matter. The Government of West Bengal has, I believe, actually taken action in regard to some newspapers and will no doubt take such other action as may be considered necessary and desirable.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Zafrullah Khan had alleged that in spite of the meetings of A.I.N.E.C. and P.N.E.C. and the Indo-Pakistan Information Consultative Committee for assisting the implementation of the Delhi Agreement, there had been no improvement in the tone of the West Bengal press which indulged in inciting the Hindus, ridiculing the Delhi Agreement, doubting the *bona fides* of the East Bengal and Pakistan Governments and carrying on anti-Pakistan propaganda.

76. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 20th, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I enclose a copy of a letter from Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister, Pakistan, and a copy of my reply to him.² I must confess that the articles that continue to appear in some of the Calcutta newspapers are neither in accord with the letter or spirit of the April 8th Agreement, nor in the best of taste. I am sure you and your Government are taking every necessary step in this matter as this attitude of the press does not redound to our credit and does injury to the cause we have at heart.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See preceding item.

77. Restrained Optimism¹

Question: What were the reasons for the resignation of Dr John Matthai from the Cabinet?

Jawaharlal Nehru: His going away is the result of many factors. As I said last evening, it has not only been for Dr Matthai but also very advantageous to us to have Dr Matthai in the Cabinet as Finance Minister during this difficult period and we are all exceedingly sorry that he should leave us. I have no doubt that we shall profit by his advice in many ways. You do not expect me to go into our private details in such matters.

1. Proceedings of a press conference, New Delhi, 22 May 1950. File No. 43 (102)/50-PMS. Extracts.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

Q: A report was published in the *New York Times*² and also in many Indian newspapers that the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement was the result of American pressure or persuasion and that report has not been contradicted by the Government of India on the American Government.

JN: I think I remember the report you refer to. So far as I can recollect, it was contradicted. Anyhow a very large part of it was completely without foundation and so far as American or any other pressure was concerned, or even a hint of pressure in the matter or any reference to it in that connection by any foreign country, I am not aware of it. I have no doubt, of course, that America or any other country might have been very much interested in such matters. Being interested is a different matter from trying to persuade any country to do this or that.

Q: Was there any persuasion or pressure?

JN: I am telling you there was not even a hint of it. We discussed those matters frequently and generally but on that particular occasion there was not even any discussion that I can remember.

Q: The Pakistan Prime Minister has insisted in many of his speeches in the United States about the differences in the way of life of the Hindus and the Muslims, which was the origin for the creation of Pakistan. On the face of that assertion is it still possible to believe that the minorities in East Bengal will be given adequate protection?

JN: I do not think there is any real connection between the two. There might be, of course, but not necessarily. What Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has said may represent his viewpoint. I differ from him completely on that issue. Not that there are no differences: there are plenty of differences in India and in Pakistan. There are differences as you all know, between the way of life of, let us say, a Punjabi and a man from Madras or from Bengal. There are provincial differences, territorial differences, religious differences. Of course, all those differences are present. India is a country of enormous variety. However, the point is whether those differences come in the way of joint political life or even to a large extent of joint cultural life. I do not think they do. It depends how you approach the question.

It is not a question so much of emphasising the differences but rather of your whole approach to these questions. May be that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's philosophical approach is different from mine. I believe it is. But, practically speaking, if the

2. It was reported that U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, when apprised of the gravity of the situation by Pakistani leaders, flew to New Delhi to consult Loy Henderson and pressed for compromise talks. The result was the discussions between Nehru and Liaquat Ali.

Pakistan Government aims at complete political and other aspects of life developing together for Hindus, Muslims and others, that particular philosophical approach need not come in the way. I do not think myself that in the modern world it is a realistic approach and ultimately it is not what I say or what Mr Liaquat Ali Khan says about the philosophical approach that counts but reality will count.

Q: Would you care to give a review of the working of the Indo-Pakistan Minorities Agreement up to date?

JN: It is difficult to give a review but I think, looking at it completely objectively, one can adopt a tone of restrained optimism in regard to it. One thing is quite obvious, that the fact of that Agreement and the immediate consequences of that Agreement produced a great deal of relief all over the country and more particularly in East and West Bengal, Assam, etc.—relief from tension, relief from fear, relief from some danger or some catastrophe happening—so that the lifting of that fear itself from millions of minds is something to be thankful for.

Then we had said that one of the big tests would be the exodus. We had pointed out even then that it would be wrong to expect a sudden stopping of this exodus, partly because large numbers of people had already left their homes and had been uprooted and were waiting at various concentrations, etc., and partly because all kinds of economic and other reasons had worked too. Well, the exodus continued. First it showed signs of decline, then it went up a little and then again it has shown signs of a fairly considerable decline too. But then a new feature came in—the return of the minorities to the places where they came from before they had migrated—that is the Hindus who had come from East Bengal to West Bengal, many of them, started returning and many Muslims who had gone from West Bengal to East Bengal started returning.

Now it has often been said that these people who are returning are really going back to fetch their goods and chattels while the going is good and they will really come back again. I suppose quite a number of them feel that way. Nevertheless, it is significant, if you analyse the figures, you will see that on the one hand, taking the Hindus first, that the number coming from East Bengal to West Bengal has progressively declined, slowly but progressively, and the number of Hindus going back is progressively but slowly going up. If you further analyse those figures of the Hindus going back to East Bengal, you will find that a good number of them are women and children. Suppose about 6,000 people go back, probably 2,000 or more are women and children. Normally speaking, women and children would not go back, if some member of the family had just gone to bring his goods and chattels. It shows first of all a lessening of the fear complex and secondly, if not a final decision, at any rate a desire on their part to go and look at things and settle down there if possible.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

As I was coming here this morning I saw the figures in the papers for the 20th and 21st May. The number of Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal was 7,549 and the number of Hindus returning from West Bengal to East Bengal was 6,296. That is to say the figure of those coming away from East Pakistan is going down and the figure of those going to East Bengal is going up and the difference is about 1,250. The gap is being reduced. These are the figures for the 24 hours from 6 a.m. on the 20th May to 6 a.m. on the 21st May.

The figure of Muslims going away from West Bengal to East Bengal is 3,301 within the same 24 hours and the number of Muslims coming from East Bengal back to West Bengal is 3,287. It is about fourteen less. These figures of course vary from day to day. If you look at the graph which we have prepared you can see the figure of the exodus coming down gradually and the figure of people returning to their original homes going up gradually, so that I think these particular figures are definitely encouraging. We cannot say definitely how things may take shape. There are many other factors. One thing is quite clear that it is incorrect to talk at the present moment of a one-way traffic as I find Dr Mookerjee has said in this morning's papers.

You will remember that there was an exodus from the U.P. of Muslims, from parts of Rajasthan and round about. It was a considerable exodus and gradually it went down and then it tended to go up. There has been talk of the Pakistan Government sealing that border. If they so wish, they have a right to seal their border, but we pointed out to them that these questions, as in the case of the two Bengals, have to be dealt with on the psychological plane. As a matter of fact what happened was this. The moment the rumour spread that the border was going to be sealed, immediately there was a rush of people to go before it was sealed, because they felt that they may not have a chance to go later. The number increased because of that particular rumour. But the fact is that the number of people going was progressively going down or being reduced.

There was also another case behind it. The people who have been going from the U.P. are more or less working classes, artisans, metal workers and landless labour and rumours spread among them that wages in Pakistan were high, that work was easily obtainable and therefore things might be better there for them. So there was this big tendency for people to go, which tendency is much less now and presumably it will stop.

Another thing I might remind you, namely that our Government and the U.P. Government have decided and announced that they will apply the Bengal pact to the U.P. in so far as the return of these migrants is concerned.

Those people who have gone since the 1st March when this exodus started, can all come back despite the permit system and the evacuee property law, etc. They can come back and take possession of their properties, land or houses and we are making arrangements for that.

Q: Is there a date by which they can return or will it be whenever they want to come? I thought it was fixed as 31st of December.

JN: If there is any date it can only be the 31st. It cannot be indefinite. It is long enough.

Q: Does it apply only to the U.P. Government?

JN: It applies to Rajasthan; it applies to Delhi; it applies to this area, I might say. For the rest when you talk about the Indo-Pakistan Agreement the real thing that you have to examine apart from specific data of exodus etc. is, shall I say, the 'mental climate' on this issue. There is no doubt that the 'mental climate' has been on the whole very good on both sides. It is also true that there are people who do not cooperate, who sometimes criticise and condemn, but generally speaking this 'mental climate' has been good and as many of you gentlemen know the joint meeting of the newspaper editors here in Delhi helped greatly in producing that 'mental climate'. Sometime early next month, I believe the Joint Consultative Committee of the Information and Broadcasting Ministries on either side is going to meet in Dacca. My own belief is that certainly the Governments on both sides, i.e. both the Central Government and the provincial Governments, that is to say, the provincial Governments of West Bengal and of East Bengal and of Assam as well as the Central Governments are trying their utmost to implement this Agreement and to cooperate in this task.

Q: I just want to know whether your attention has been drawn to the wholesome condemnation of Mr Rashidi's speeches here in the Pakistan press.

JN: Yes. I have seen it. The condemnation has been about the statement of his in which he said that he found that more or less the two cultures had no basic difference. That is what he is reported to have said and that of course, being something which rather hit at the basic philosophy to which I referred right at the beginning about the two entirely different cultural outlooks, has given rise to that criticism. It is nothing to do with either the Indo-Pakistan Agreement or anything else. For my part I have said, and I said at some length in another place yesterday or the day before, that I hold rather definite and strong views about this culture business and the first item of this view is that most people who talk about culture do not know anything about it.

Q: Do these migration figures that you have quoted include any entries of refugees from East Bengal on foot?

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

JN: The figures I have quoted are taken from this morning's papers. They are not from any secret information I have received.

Q: Are they official?

JN: Official papers I just saw as I was coming here. But they presumably refer entirely to railway traffic and not to foot traffic.

Q: According to our reports during the last two weeks daily from 5,000 to 6,000 people have been going to East Bengal. These were found in reports from our own sources, May I know how many of them have been rehabilitated either in their houses or elsewhere?

JN: We do get reports. I do not think I could give you any clear answer to that. I have no doubt that both Governments are trying hard to rehabilitate them. The Chief Secretaries meet etc. It is not such an automatic process. For instance, take the West Bengal Government. They put the refugees in some of the evacuated houses on the explicit understanding that they will have to go when the other people came. They gave lands also to refugees to till lands that had been evacuated also on the explicit understanding that they will have to go when the other people came. Take the question of land. If a man is on it, it is rather difficult to push him out. It is the middle of a process. The West Bengal Government have some kind of arrangement. As soon as the crop is harvested, they put them back. Meanwhile, they will make some other arrangement; some temporary or provisional arrangements are made as people come back. While they take them back, where there is some difficulty it takes a long time, because it is not merely a question of Government decree. You have to explain it and get round large numbers of people and not merely do it through police and army methods.

Q: Are you aware that a large number of Hindus have found sanctuary in communist pockets in Mymensingh district of East Bengal in preference to migrating to West Bengal? In other words, communism gets preference to communalism.

Q: Yes.

JN: No doubt there are communist pockets there, but I was not aware of what you have said, namely that large numbers of Hindus have found refuge. This is the first time I have heard it.

Q: Did the West Bengal Government or the Chief Minister at any stage during or before or after the Agreement give an indication of the eventual number of refugees who might come to West Bengal from East Bengal as a result of the present disturbances that have gone on?

JN: People are all the time guessing at these figures. It is sheer guess work. Some of the figures mentioned seem to me—as far as I remember Dr Mookerjee has mentioned since partition four and a half millions—an exaggerated figure, a very much exaggerated figure, but again I cannot be accurate. I should imagine that at the outside it would be three millions since the partition and roughly about half of them have come now in the last three or four months and the previous half had come before that period.

Q: According to the figures given in Parliament by the Rehabilitation Minister, our impression was that before these present disturbances the number of refugees who had come to the Indian Union from different provinces would be about 18 lakhs and the present exodus figures since the 7th February according to official figures would be about 18 lakhs.

JN: The figure 18 lakhs was a guess. I think the actual figures previously obtained look to us 11 or 12 lakhs. These figures were not complete by any means. You can allow for another two or three lakhs and make it 15 or 16 lakhs. The later figures were 12 lakhs. I knew many more had come. We may roughly say it was 15 or 16 lakhs.

Q: A United Press of America message quoted in today's papers states that in South Amboy in a recent explosion of munitions, most of the munition was Pakistan bound.³ Formerly also, the Pakistan Prime Minister had stated in his speeches in America that Pakistan wanted arms to defend herself. May I know if these reports are not bound to create some misunderstanding among us who may apprehend that Pakistan is arming herself to the teeth for enforcing a military decision on Kashmir?

JN: You are referring to the report of the speeches or the report of the explosion?

Q: And also the statement of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan that India was a possible aggressor.

JN: I think Mr Liaquat Ali Khan denied that subsequently. He did. He said that he had been misreported or misrepresented as having said that India was a possible aggressor.

3. Munitions bound for Pakistan exploded in South Amboy, New Jersey, on 19 May 1950, killing 30 persons.

Q: What about the explosion?

JN: There is no doubt about that, that the material that has exploded—it has been openly stated by the State Department, by the Pakistan Embassy and by everybody—that this consisted of small arms, chiefly I understand mines, land mines, what are called anti-personal, anti-tank mines, presumably for defensive purposes, or whatever it might be.

Q: How many tanks?

JN: I cannot give much more detailed information on the subject except that we are told thus far that it was a private purchase, not a State-organised thing, that it was a private purchase for which no doubt some kind of export licence which might be necessary had been obtained, that it was what is called small arms, mines and the like. Naturally, a great deal of talk of purchase of arms is not conducive to having a peaceful atmosphere in people's minds.

Q: I would like to ask two questions about reshuffling:

(1) would it be possible for you to tell us what is the policy underlying the reshuffling, in so far as you want to confine your choice only to Congressmen;

(2) whether Government of India is aware of the resentment that is being felt in the Punjab that in spite of the fact that they have a population of 12 million, so far, not one Punjabi has been selected for any posts in the Government of India, not even for the Rehabilitation Ministry.

JN: The Government of India is not particularly aware of any resentment in the Punjab on this issue. I should say that there is not any widespread resentment; of course, there may be some resentment in some people's minds; I am not aware of any widespread resentment. Secondly, we do not proceed to form Cabinets on a provincial basis. It is an utterly wrong principle. We cannot, in fact, do it, because we have now provinces or States whose number, I cannot exactly remember, is about 20, 22, or 23 and they seem to increase daily. It would not be possible to do that at all without introducing something that is as bad as communalism, provincialism in Cabinet-making. Obviously one tries to represent the various parts of the country as such because they have different problems and those problems should be represented.

In regard to the Rehabilitation Ministry, I should have personally thought that the Rehabilitation Ministry should fully cooperate with the displaced persons and organisations; but generally speaking, would be much better not to have a displaced person because the displaced persons are themselves concerned with it, and

displaced persons belong to various groups, Punjab,—Punjab is a very big group—Sind, Bengal, etc., and there is, I regret to say, a certain emphasis by one group on its own side and by another group on its own. For instance, the Bengal friends have long felt that the Rehabilitation Ministry thinks only about Punjab and Sind, Punjab specially, and not so much about Bengal, which is not true, I hope. But, they have that feeling. So these difficulties arise.

You talk about the general policy. The general policy is not certainly to exclude non-Congressmen, or prominent persons who are not in the Congress; undoubtedly not. But, the fact remains that I am in the Cabinet; I am the Prime Minister. I was asked to become not a Prime Minister to begin with, but something else and then subsequently, Prime Minister, because of my position in the Congress. Three years and eight and half months ago, Lord Wavell invited me—he invited me because I was the President of the Congress then—in that representative capacity. More or less in that capacity I have continued. If tomorrow the Congress Working Committee asks me to resign, I resign that day; I do not wait for anybody else's permission or consultation. So that, I am there to represent the Congress and the Congress policy, not in the narrow sense of the word, but in its broad principles and broad sense. If I find at any time that I cannot generally represent that or carry it through, within limitations of course, then I have no business to be there and some other Prime Minister and some other Cabinet should be formed. When I say Congress policy, I do not mean any detailed policy, but broad approaches to particular questions. The Working Committee has not interfered with the working of Government in the least. They have laid stress on particular aspects of economic policy or communal policy or the like which flow from the Congress principles. That is all. If I do not follow that, I have no place there. The Cabinet, whoever may be the members, must particularly represent that policy; not in details. In forming the Cabinet, we have tried to get the best people available—Congressmen or non-Congressmen within the ambit of that general policy.

Q: Is it true that you propose to give up the Ministry of External Affairs?

JN: I proposed to give it up almost as soon as I took it on three and a half years ago. The position remains the same as it was previously.

My proposal to give it up continues, but not in the immediate future.

You know that Mr Rajagopalachari has agreed to come. Now it was no small matter for him to agree to allow himself to be harnessed in the day to day work of Government, for a variety of reasons including his health which is none too good. But at my earnest insistence he agreed and I am very grateful to him. Now we look upon him as one of our not only elder statesmen, but one of our top-most elder statesmen possessing a good deal of ripe wisdom, who would be helpful and

useful to us in advising us. We want him with us. Now once he is in the Cabinet it is always possible, in consultation with him and with other colleagues, to shift or change portfolios. There is no great difficulty about that. But my own idea about Mr Rajagopalachari has been that he should correspond rather to what in England is called the Lord President of the Council. We have no such title here. The Lord President of the Council in England is almost always a very senior and respected person on whom no heavy portfolio is cast, but who may and who does help in everything. He is normally chairman of important committees and is entrusted with special work. He has to do quite a good deal of work nevertheless, but he does not take on the routine work of heavy portfolios. How far that fits in here I do not know. Take, for instance, the very important committee—the Economic Committee of the Cabinet—which really surveys the whole field of administration. Now a man of Mr Rajagopalachari's position, if he is chairman of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, which surveys a great part of governmental activity, can give plenty of time to it. Other Ministers are busy with their portfolios and cannot give much concentrated attention.

As I said, he is in the Cabinet and it is for us to consider among ourselves what he feels like doing and what is generally to the public advantage.

Q: A couple of months back Parliament passed an Act the object of which was to throw out, as it was stated, about five lakhs of Muslims who had entered Assam illegally. Does that Act stand, or has it lapsed?

JN: I do not think there is anything in the Act about five lakhs of Muslims. In fact, if I remember correctly the word "Muslim" is not in the Act at all. The term used there is "undesirable immigrant" which may include anybody. Remember that Assam is at the present moment, from certain points of view, our most important province, though it may be a small one. It is not only a border province, but its borders are international. There are at least three countries involved—China, Burma and Pakistan—and all kinds of undesirable immigrants may come in from any border. Unfortunately, our minds are so full of a particular problem—the Indo-Pakistan problem—that we tend to interpret everything in terms of that problem. The Act has a wide scope and may include any undesirable immigrant from any foreign country round about. Certainly it applies to Pakistan also. But you will notice—I speak from memory—I do not think there is any reference in the Act either to Pakistan or to Muslims. Reference was made in the speeches during the course of the Bill to the figure of 500,000. I do not know where this figure was got from. I am not quite sure whether the figure of 500,000 immigrants from Pakistan did not refer to both Hindus and Muslims who had come from Pakistan.

This problem in Assam, some of you may remember, is at least fifty years old, if not more. I remember writing something about it fifteen years back.⁴ At that

4. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 8, pp.492-499.

time there was no partition. It was then a question of the population of the thickly populated district of Mymensingh migrating to the thickly populated districts of Assam and taking possession of land there. Of course the Assamese did not like that. So the problem is a pre-partition one which has been complicated by the partition. There is of course a natural desire on the part of the Assam Government to push out the new-comers whom they consider to be undesirable. But these figures of 500,000, etc. were paper figures and without any foundation. From enquiries made we find that after the passing of the Act and the signing of the Agreement only three notices were issued. As to whether action was ultimately taken to push out the immigrants, I do not know.

Then came the Indo-Pakistan Agreement and naturally we told the Assamese Government to go slow and not enforce that provision of the Act, unless there were special reasons for it. That is the present position.

Q: How is it that no Bengalee has been given a Ministership in the Cabinet?

JN: Please note that Ministers of State have Cabinet ranks. Now we have in this, as in some other matters, followed the British parallel. They have in England a number of Members of the Cabinet, they have a number of Ministers of State of Cabinet rank who are entitled to attend Cabinet meetings, but who do not normally attend them, unless special subjects come up or they are invited. So Cabinet rank is common between all of them. For instance, take the case of our new Minister, Mr Biswas, who was appointed under the terms of the Agreement. He has Cabinet rank, he is entitled to attend Cabinet meetings, but obviously he cannot attend normal meetings, because he will be in Calcutta. Another matter is that a Cabinet Minister has to deal not only with his own portfolio, but as a Minister of the Cabinet he is responsible for every other portfolio which comes up, every major policy or subject that comes up, before the Cabinet. He has to give a lot of time therefore, apart from his own portfolio, to the other questions before Government. A Minister of State is supposed to concentrate on his own portfolio and its ramifications and need not give so much time to the other subjects that come up, except when his consultation is required.

Q: Are you going to provide other such Ministers?

JN: At the present moment there is no intention but we may change our mind a little later.

Q: There has been a lot of talk about recognising the Israeli Government but nothing has materialised out of these talks unlike the decision with regard to the Bao Dai regime.

JN: With regard to Israel, we are on good friendly terms with them. The only question is that formal recognition involves largely an exchange of envoys, etc., which we are not prepared to do at the present moment. Otherwise the fact is obvious. No one ignores it.

The other question of Indo-China is completely different. We came deliberately to the conclusion that we should not recognise either of the two Governments in Indo-China—i.e. Bao Dai's or Ho Chi Minh's so long as it is not clear as to which Government prevails there or what happens there. Our recognition in regard to each would have been rather a paper recognition. We can do nothing in the matter and we do not wish to interfere in the matter; and so why give a paper recognition which we cannot follow up in any way.

Generally speaking, our outlook is to keep out of other people's troubles. We have troubles of our own. We have no desire at all to pose as a people who are guardians or want to do something elsewhere in the world. Naturally, we are interested in the world, but we have enough work of our own to do in our own country and so we try not to interfere outside our country, except when we have to express an opinion at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Q: Consistent with the neutrality you referred to, if the British send arms to Vietnam, will you allow their ships and planes to be refuelled in your airports and ports?

JN: I do not think there is any probability of that happening. Secondly, the necessity of that is not likely to arise, because we do not come in the way at all. So far as ships are concerned, they would not come to an Indian port at all. Thirdly, when such a contingency arises, we shall have to consider it.

Q: In view of the fact that you have been repeating that India is neutral, do you think your participation in the Sydney Conference,⁵ in the manner in which it has been reported, is in keeping with that neutrality, viz., your contribution to the Fund which is to be created for help to the economically backward countries of South East Asia?

JN: I do not see anything opposed in that to our general policy. The Sydney Conference has decided to help South East Asian countries. Among the South East Asian countries is India herself. We are not merely helpers of others but to be

5. Representatives of seven Commonwealth workers who met in Sydney in May 1950 decided to give aid to South and South East Asia for development in successive stages covering six years. They also decided to recommend a Commonwealth technical assistance of £ 8 million for this area for three years.

helped by ourselves, or by others or jointly. What it has decided is that any two countries in this area may make the arrangement bilaterally. So if it is a question of say Indonesia, or any other country, we will have bilateral arrangement as between India and Indonesia. How does that come in the way of any difficulties?

Q: Because Mr Spender is at the head of such a bloc.

JN: It does not matter. You have to go according to the policy agreed upon and not by someone else's speech about that policy.

Q: What is the progress made in regard to our talks with the French Government about their French settlements in India and about the Portuguese territories in India. There seems to be a stalemate about these talks. It has been dragging on for sometime.

JN: The progress made may be roughly described as nil, but talks are continuing.

Q: Will there be any concession on the part of India as a starting point when the whole Kashmir question is going to be reopened with Sir Owen Dixon's impending visit to this country?

JN: First of all, we are rather fortunate or unfortunate inheritors of a certain approach to questions, well, since Gandhiji's time. I do not mean to say that we follow his advice completely. I wish we did. But, nevertheless, we are powerfully influenced thereby. His method was that in regard to any major question, you must not talk tall. You must say what you consider the basic minimum, more or less, apart from details, and you must hold to it. That was his attitude always with regard to any problem. Now in regard to Kashmir, in our extreme desire to settle it peacefully, we made proposals from time to time and we made what may be called concessions, small basic concessions from time to time in the hope that we could have it settled. Now, in the present position there is not much room left for giving up any of the points we stand for. They are, roughly, the basic points, and I just do not see how we can give up any single one of them.

Q: For example, there are the northern areas?

JN: I can't discuss details like this.

Q: In a week's time you will be going to Indonesia.⁶ Do you hope to create some sort of bloc for the liberation of the colonial countries?

6. Nehru went on a tour of Indonesia, Singapore and Burma from 7 to 23 June 1950.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

JN: No, you need not hope at all. We propose to create no bloc, firstly because that is not our policy, secondly because it is not practical, and, thirdly, India and Indonesia calling themselves a bloc! It has no meaning at all to anybody. These things are only done, if I may say so, by certain organisations who have no great responsibility in carrying out any definite policy, passing resolutions on the subject which have no meaning at all in reality.

Q: India being a part of the Commonwealth, could the British Government call upon you to provide some soldiers to fight in Malaya, and would you do it just as they have asked Australia to do?

JN: This is a very extraordinary question, which entirely misunderstands even the Dominion relationship quite apart from our being a Republic. It is unthinkable. In the Dominion relationship for one of the countries of the Commonwealth to call upon another to offer soldiers, it is quite unthinkable. We have gone beyond that; we are not a Dominion, we are a Republic. I do not know what the British Government may have said or done to Australia, but so far as I know they have done nothing. It is Australia that offered its help—it was not asked to.⁷

Q: Is there no defence arrangement in the Commonwealth? If there was none, why did General Cariappa go to England?

JN: He will go anywhere if invited, to Russia or the United States.

Q: If I might return to the Bengal question, would you very kindly indicate the broad principles about the rehabilitation of the vast numbers of people who have come, and about relief to the people who are in camps now? Doles and other reliefs have been stopped and there was one case of suicide for want of food.

JN: We would like people to go back to their original homes, and as I told you, quite a large number are going back. Nevertheless, we recognise that in all probability vast numbers will not go back, and therefore they will have to be rehabilitated here and we are developing our schemes on rehabilitation in Bengal on a fairly large scale. In this matter, the neighbouring provinces like Bihar, Orissa, Assam—Assam, of course, has direct problems of its own because large numbers have gone straight to Assam—but Bihar and Orissa have cooperated fully in receiving refugees from East Bengal. And I am telling you not my own opinion in this matter but Dr Roy's, the Chief Minister of Bengal's opinion, that he was exceedingly gratified at the cooperation of the Bihar Government and the

7. Australia offered to provide transport planes and air crew to assist in the operations in Malaya.

Orissa Government in regard to reception and looking after of refugees. Now, we are planning on a big scale and there are very many ways of doing it. Quite a fair number have been absorbed in the villages by being allotted per village, say, five families or ten families, and quite a fair number have been absorbed in this way. Otherwise, we are trying to erect townships and other extensions to existing townships. The general principle we started with was, no doles except for the first week or ten days or so; no doles when even if what might be called proper economic employment was not available. That is to say, we would give a dole when the person did some work, even though that work might be a bit useless work, even though it might consist of digging for a while without any good being done. The point was that we wanted to develop the habit of work, and not the other habit of no work and a dole which is psychologically very bad. It is not so much a question of saving money but because we have got a good deal of experience here in the Punjab and round about here where the long term doles have had a very bad effect psychologically speaking. But we cannot stop doles unless we offer work instead, that is true. The work may not be to the liking of the person; it may be some kind of work to which he is not accustomed, but, nevertheless, some work which may not be economic work, but some thing of course. Large numbers are engaged in looking after camps, and those who are refugees themselves, if they are doctors they are doctoring; if they are teachers they are teaching. All that is done as far as possible. But, of course, that principle of no dole after a week or so could not be very strictly applied.

Q: Dixon is coming in a few days, and you would be having talks with him. Are you in a position to give this country a categorical assurance that in your anxiety to reach a peaceful settlement on the Kashmir issue you would not directly or in any way agree to the partition of Kashmir?

JN: I am prepared to give no categorical assurance of any kind whatsoever, because ultimately the matter has to be decided by the people of Kashmir and not by my categorical assurances.

Q: Could you tell us what will be the position of Gurkha soldiers under the new Indo-Nepalese treaty. Will India not be responsible for transferring them to British units? I am asking this question, because Gurkha units are recruited in British units through Indian recruitment officers.

JN: Let us get this clear. The Indian Army has Gurkha regiments by arrangement with the Nepalese Government. Some three years ago or so, the British Government wanted to come to an agreement with the Nepal Government—both being independent countries—for supply of some Gurkha troops. We did not come into the picture at all. We came into the picture only in one way, namely, that those

Gurkha troops have to travel via India to wherever they have to go. Otherwise, apart from transit facilities, we had no business. Our part was only allowing or not allowing transit facilities to Gurkhas, not in uniform, but as civilians. There was a great deal of talk two or three years ago and consultations and all that, and at the desire of both Nepal Government and the U.K. Government, we agreed to give them those transit facilities. That is all that has been done so far as we are concerned. There are, as a matter of fact, some other—call it 'conditions' or something else—that we attached, that on no account should these Gurkhas be used against India. Apart from that it was none of our concern.

Q: I am not so sure about your statement because I am told that India is called upon to pay a regular quota of so many thousand Gurkha soldiers every year and it was from the Indian quota that those British units were supplied.

JN: No. During the War, the Gurkha regiments had become part of the Indian Army and we were disbanding and demobilising them after the War, and out of those whom we had demobilised, the British took over some by arrangement with the Nepal Government.

Q: Is there any understanding with the Nepalese Government with regard to military affairs and foreign relations? Is it a fact that as far as possible, it has been agreed that the policy of the two Governments in these respects would be as close as possible?

JN: As you know, recently there were negotiations and a certain treaty of friendship—and now a treaty of trade—were agreed to, though they have not been absolutely finalised or signed yet. They will come out soon enough. There are generally treaties of eternal friendship, subject to that eternal friendship being terminated at a year's notice or some such thing: As for foreign policy if it is said that the foreign policy of one independent country would be subject to that of the other, it means that they are giving up their independence. If we said that, it would reduce the status of Nepal to something like that of Bhutan, which is very different. But obviously, we are greatly interested in what might be termed the foreign policy of Nepal, and we made it perfectly clear that we are very greatly interested in it—whether you call it the military policy or the foreign policy—and they have recognised our interest in it, and if any such question arises we shall discuss it.⁸

8. Mohan Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana, during his visit to India in February 1950, had discussed the final draft of treaties on "mutual recognition of independence and sovereignty, mutual consultation in case of a threat to the security of either Government, and facilities for the free export and import of Nepalese goods through India." It was signed on 31 July 1950.

Q: Suppose Nepal asked you about Gurkha soldiers being sent to Malaya to participate in the colonial war, what would be your advice?

JN: It was to oblige the Nepalese Government that we agreed to this. It is not as if we asked them. One of the main sources of income for the Nepalese Government is these Gurkha soldiers serving abroad. Their economy flounders if the Indian or British Army dismisses the Gurkha troops. So they are very anxious for these persons to serve and because they asked us, we obliged them by saying that we will allow transport facilities to them, not in groups, not in uniform, but in a civilian way, as individuals.

Q: Has there been communist infiltration round about Nepal?

JN: Not in that way. But I suppose there are a few communists going about here and there. We have attempted to advise the Nepalese Government continuously and persistently as to the necessity of basic reforms in their administrative and economic structure, and we have been told that they pay the most earnest attention to our advice, but it does not seem to bear fruit.

Q: What would be your attitude to the political parties inside Nepal?

JN: We do not interfere internally in a foreign government. We have our sympathy, but we do not interfere.

Q: Do you know that the Nepal Congress and other political parties are operating from the Indian side of the border?

JN: Our policy is that constitutional agitation in India is permitted. No violent agitation is permitted.

Q: A sober paper of Delhi has struck a note of dissatisfaction that there is no person below the age of 50 in the Cabinet. Have you no fascination for young and energetic people?

JN: When I was round about twenty, I thought that a man who was thirty was quite out of date. When I came round to thirty, I changed my opinion and decided that forty was more or less the limit. At the present moment the limit in my opinion is far above seventy.

Q: About the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, you have yourself said that it was actuated by a certain sense of urgency and on its implementation depend several

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

other facts. Are we to take it that this sense of urgency is going to be extended to the solution of other problems also?

JN: Certainly yes. The other factors, apart from Kashmir, are in the main evacuee property and canal waters. So far as the latter problem is concerned, technicians on both sides have met and laid down a certain programme of enquiry, because basically the canal waters question is not so much a political question as an engineering question. Our approach is that both countries should profit fully by the canal waters. If existing supplies are not enough, then we have been advised by our engineers that it is quite easy in the course of the next two or three years to develop those supplies and may be, build a few canals here and there, so that neither country would suffer instead of haggling about as to who should have the insufficient supply. This is what our engineers are examining now. In fact, even today it would not be correct to say that there is insufficient supply. It is enough, except in a year of scarcity when it may become insufficient. We want to provide even for years of scarcity. We want to provide for the development of East Punjab. East Punjab in the old days was rather neglected and it was going to be taken up when the partition came. So naturally we want to develop East Punjab, but we do not wish to do so deliberately to the injury of West Punjab. I think on the 5th of May 1948 an agreement was arrived between us and the Pakistan Government and on the basis of that agreement, without giving up the legal position of either country and without any other commitment on this issue, we agreed that we should try to use these waters to the advantage of both countries, keeping in mind that East Punjab has got to develop and the East Punjab Government and the Government of India said that in developing East Punjab we may be taking more waters than we now take, so we shall allow sufficient time, some years, if necessary, for an adjustment, so that further supplies should be explored. What is happening today is that the technicians and engineers on both sides are considering how to use the waters on both sides in the whole river valley basin. We are, therefore, progressing on that matter, though perhaps not quite so fast. It is a complicated enquiry. In regard to evacuee property also, we have been discussing this matter. It was proposed to have a conference, but largely for personal reasons—the dates had to suit the convenience of some persons who wanted to participate—it had to be postponed. Khwaja Shahabuddin went away to the Frontier Province and he was unavailable to us for some days. And now, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar who is intimately connected with this matter has been unwell. For these reasons the conference was postponed. Also, before we had a formal conference, we wanted to decide certain matters informally, if possible. It makes it easier for the conference. We are discussing these matters and in regard to a number of questions there is broad agreement. I feel hopeful that sometime in the month of June a conference will be held and these agreements will be formally agreed to.

Q: What about Pakistan devaluing her rupee?

JN: I can say nothing about it. So far as we are concerned, we stay out. In regard to Pakistan, the matter is before the International Monetary Fund. When they will come to a decision I do not know.

Q: The British financial experts have been saying that India is going to cancel the devaluation.

JN: There is no such question before us.⁹

Q: Last month there was a report that in Jullundur an officers' training camp is being run by the R.S.S., and the pattern of training given there is semi-military, which you have been condemning all these years. Are you conscious of these nefarious activities?

JN: I am not aware of this particular instance. In so far as the activities are concerned, I am not aware of any particularly aggressive activities of the R.S.S. during the last few months or so. It is not so much a question of activity, except when they come out in the open, but rather it is a question of the whole approach and basis of thought. At the present moment, in India there are many problems, but one may say that there are two basic problems: (1) generally speaking, the economic policy, which covers a multitude of other questions, and (2) generally speaking, our attitude to communalism. I am leaving out for the moment, Indo-Pakistan relations which are important of course, and which are partly governed by our general attitude, apart from individual problems which are political. Political problems are dealt with on the political plane, but political problems in regard to Pakistan are coloured by the communal approach. In Pakistan there has been in the past a particular basis. Their basic policy has been what might be termed 'communal'. Openly so. They may tone it down and they are toning it down, because apart from ideological reasons they are finding it practically difficult for them. So the Government there is trying its very best to tone down that policy, although perhaps in their public utterances they may sometimes even stress that aspect. But so far as we in India are concerned, we have to be perfectly clear as to what our policy on the communal plane should be. According to our Constitution and even

9. To the suggestion that the Government should revalue the rupee and restore it to its old par value, the Finance Minister had made it clear that such a measure would not be in the interests of the country. A 15 per cent revaluation might create a deficit in the balance of payments to the extent of 50 crores and a 30 per cent revaluation might bring about a deficit of Rs. 135 crores. At the existing rate, India would probably be able to balance her export and import accounts.

otherwise theoretically, we have declared what is called a 'secular state'. A secular state is nothing novel. We have secular states in the world—most of them are secular in that sense of the word. It simply means a state which might be called more or less a modern state. But apart from the Constitution, the basic policy of the Congress has been very definite and precise in regard to communal questions. We may have, by pressure of events, done something here and there and we may have even, because of something that Pakistan has done, reacted to it in a particular way. Today we have to be clear in our own minds whether that old Congress approach to this communal issue holds good or whether it has to be varied. Now, the approach of the R.S.S., Hindu Mahasabha and others, quite apart from any activities which may be nefarious or not—their whole mental outlook is diametrically opposed to the approach of the Congress in the past and I hope in the present. That is the real mental conflict which takes shape in activities. So far as we are concerned, our Government has declared that we will generally follow the Congress approach which does not mean—I should like to make it perfectly clear—a surrender to either communal prejudice or what is called 'appeasement' and the like. It is an approach. That is all. Nobody would have called Mahatma Gandhi a person who surrendered on any principle he held. He was absolutely firm as a rock in regard to his principles, but his approach, nevertheless, was always a friendly approach even towards the enemy, even to British imperialism. He fought all his life, but he fought with a smile and was always prepared for a friendly handshake. Now, it is rather difficult perhaps to keep these two things together, that is to say, firmness on principle and no surrender to wrongful act and yet a friendly approach which always helps in bringing about a compromise and a settlement and does not make that compromise impossible or difficult. It is therefore a question of that type of approach for a Government, for an organisation or for the press. This pact of 8th April between India and Pakistan says some things which I believe are good and even helpful and which have brought relief to large numbers of people in India and Pakistan, but fundamentally what it does is that it lays stress on this kind of a friendly approach to the problem, which may yield good results. We want to stick to that friendly approach—non-communal approach—without surrendering anything at all on any vital issue.

Before ending this conference, I wish to say that our Ambassador in Peking has presented his credentials to the Chinese Government¹⁰ and we have received the speeches delivered on that occasion by him¹¹ and by the President of the

10. K.M. Panikkar, formerly ambassador to the Nationalist Government at Nanking, was appointed ambassador to the People's Republic of China in Peking. He presented his credentials on 20 May 1950.

11. Panikkar had said: "It is the desire of my Government and their firm intention to work for the establishment of close and friendly relations with the Government of China, based on respect of each other's sovereignty."

Chinese Republic.¹² These will be issued to the press probably in the course of today or tomorrow. The talks both with the President and the Foreign Minister of China were friendly. Each expressed a strong desire for cooperation and maintenance of peace in Asia and the world.

12. Mao Zedong spoke about a common boundary, close relations in history and culture, long and courageous struggles in recent centuries of the two countries leading to "a profound understanding, sympathy and concern... The formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India... will prove to be a great contribution to the lasting peace of Asia and the world."

78. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 23, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd May in which you refer to Zafrullah Khan's letter.

You are perfectly right in saying that incidents continue to happen in East Bengal and this gives a handle to the press. It seems to me that many of these incidents in East Bengal, as possibly also some incidents in West Bengal, are largely due to breakdown of normal social conditions. They are not directly communal, although the communal element no doubt plays a part. Owing to the weakening of East Bengal's economy theft and dacoity and the rest are becoming common.

While there are plenty of happenings to which we must take exception, I do not think that it is these incidents that are important in themselves. No one wants to suppress the truth and in any event, any attempt at suppression usually fails. But there is a way of dealing with truthful stories. There is a way of using them to incite people or demoralise them or, on the other hand, to try to put an end to them. I have been reading the Calcutta newspapers fairly carefully and I get the impression, odd as it may seem, that they like all stories of incidents, because they fit in with their own approach to the problem and with the objective that they may have in their minds.

1. J.N. Collection.

The whole attitude of the Calcutta press has distressed me greatly, because it is so juvenile and immature. I would not say this to them. They would simply feel irritated. But I am saying this to you, as I want to tell you my reaction.

What exactly is the Calcutta press aiming at, additional sales and some kind of cheap popularity? Perhaps. But what else in the political domain? Apparently they look forward to a breakdown of our Agreement with Pakistan. What then do they expect? A little clear thinking, which unfortunately they lack, should at least help them to think out of the various possible consequences. As far as I can make out, they think consciously or subconsciously that the only way to deal with East Bengal is to conquer it and suppress it. Something has come in their way, namely the Agreement, and this has irritated them. To some extent, they put up with it at least verbally, but always without grace or without real acceptance of it or of its consequences. In their minds and hearts they feel that the only way is the old way, that is conflict and suppression of Pakistan. Therefore, they can only hope for the failure of the Agreement to be followed up by what they call strong action. Inevitably this comes out in all their writings in some form or other, however much they disguise it.

More or less, I suppose, this is Syama Prasad Mookerjee's thinking also. I have read a speech recently delivered and a poorer and more illogical utterance I have seldom seen. Do these people realise that we are not merely shouting in an agitational way against a Government that we dislike, but that we are up against certain very hard realities of the situation, which it is impossible to ignore? Do they realise that their talk of strong action will result in something which will be exceedingly unpleasant for them as for the country? Do they appreciate that, whether they like it or not, this Agreement with Pakistan has made a tremendous difference not only for the present but in the future and to talk about its failure has no particular meaning in the old context.

I do not know what India may have in store for her. I hope for the best and prepare for the worst. But all the intelligence and intuition I possess rebels against the attitude of the Calcutta press and it grieves me that Bengal should be served in this way. It is a way not of strength but of weakness, not of calm reason but of sloppy sentimentality, not of appreciation of realities, but of living in a land of fancy and dreams.

It is not what is said or written that matters very much, but the whole background to it, the whole approach to it and the entire mental climate governing it.

I suppose you know that the exodus from the U.P. has continued to western Pakistan. In fact today very large numbers of Muslim refugees are gathered at various railway stations right upto the Sind frontier and we just cannot transport enough of them. Pakistan has threatened to close the border, which they are perfectly entitled to do. Some entirely uninformed criticism has been made of this on the ground that it is an infringement of the Agreement. The Agreement does not apply to that border at all, which has all along been governed by the permit system. All that Pakistan says is that it will enforce the permit system.

We have tried our utmost, both governmentally as well as through the Congress, to stop this exodus of Muslims from the U.P. There have been no major incidents for at least two and a half months. Nevertheless, the exodus has continued and I believe about 200,000 Muslims have already gone to western Pakistan, chiefly from the U.P. Why is this so? You see, working here in the U.P., exactly the same process of squeezing out people, which worked in East Pakistan. Or if they were not exactly the same, they had the same result.

We have to be clear in our own minds about our basic approach to this problem. There is the political approach and if on the political plane, we come into conflict with Pakistan, we face it. But the real question is whether we think on communal lines, according to the Hindu Mahasabha, or on non-communal lines, according to the old Congress way of thinking. It is no good for anyone to call a Hindu in Pakistan a communalist. Of course he is, to some extent, because of circumstances. In the same way it is not much good calling a Muslim in India a communalist, because circumstances continually force him to feel that way. The problem is how the majorities behave and what lead is given to them by their leaders and by the press. I find that the Calcutta press, or most of it, is functioning in a completely communal way and they have lost all sense of balance or proportion. Their objective is communal and so inevitably, their ways and methods tend to become communal.

I am convinced that that way lies disaster for India, not so much disaster from Pakistan but internal disaster and disruption and a breaking up of any unity that we may have in the country today.

I have written to you frankly how I feel. Do not imagine that all this depresses me very much or makes me despair. Nothing of the kind. I am convinced that we shall pull through in spite of all obstacles and difficulties, simply because there is no other way and I cannot imagine India going under.

In one of your letters you mentioned that you had spent four lakhs of rupees on relief of Muslims in Calcutta and that the Rehabilitation Ministry wanted your Government to bear the burden of 75% of this sum. I am looking into this matter. I shall see that you do not have to bear this burden. It is at least as important for you to give relief and protection to the Muslims in West Bengal, who have suffered, as it is to help the Hindu refugees from East Bengal. I hope that this will continue to be done as effectively as possible. We must remember that the prevailing public sentiment being what it is, practically none of the relief organisations and private individuals think of the Muslim evacuees and sufferers in West Bengal, and so they have little public help and can only be helped by governmental agency. They are our charge and our reputation depends upon how we deal with this charge.

Yours,
Jawahar

79. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 23, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I have received your letters in regard to complaints and other such like matters. I hope you are forwarding these papers to C.C. Biswas. The whole purpose of these Central Ministers is to deal with all kinds of complaints on the spot and quickly.

Regarding the reinstatement of Muslim migrants coming back to Calcutta and West Bengal you have suggested that these cases should be referred to the Minorities Commission. It is obvious that you cannot reinstate a person merely because he demands it. Some kind of enquiry has to be made to make sure that he is a right person. At the same time that enquiry has to be quick and summary. Otherwise, the purpose of this arrangement will not be met. I do not think the Minorities Commission can do this. It is outside the scope of its work, and if it enters into these detailed enquiries, there will be no end to it and the Minorities Commission would be bogged up completely and would have no time left for its more important duties. I think, therefore, that the enquiry should be conducted by some special officer appointed on your behalf. He may be a police officer or some other, and he should be instructed to have a summary enquiry in each case and decide quickly.

As you know, I am leaving Delhi on the 31st morning on my way to Indonesia. I shall be away from India for about three weeks or a little more. On my way back I shall come to Calcutta from Rangoon by air, probably round-about the 23rd or 24th June. I shall then naturally spend a day or so just to meet you. I have felt, however, that, in view of my long absence, it would be a good thing if you and I could have a talk to clear up certain matters that have arisen. I would welcome, therefore, your visit to Delhi for a day or so before the end of this month, if you could manage it.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

80. Note on Talks with Ghulam Mohammad¹

Mr Ghulam Mohammad, Finance Minister of Pakistan, came to lunch with me today and stayed for about an hour and three quarters. I did not mention any political subject and for a considerable time we talked about other matters, chiefly related to old times in the U.P. He then mentioned that he was going to Dacca in order to see the implementation of the Indo-Pak Agreement. He said that he was surprised that neither the East Bengal Government nor the West Bengal Government had yet appointed the Minorities Minister provided for by the Agreement. I was myself a little surprised to hear this because I was under the impression that the West Bengal Government had already appointed him. Dr Roy had told me some weeks ago that he had chosen the man to be appointed.

Mr Ghulam Mohammad asked me if I had anything special to say to him in regard to Bengal. I said that numerous incidents were still happening in East Bengal and the Ansars were often involved in them. This was creating a bad impression and a check must be put on the Ansars. Further that requisitioning of houses had taken place on a large scale in East Bengal and it was difficult for the owners of these houses to stay there or to return unless the houses were derequisitioned. This was a matter to which considerable importance was attached.

He then referred to the West Bengal Government suggesting that there should be an enquiry by the Minorities Commission before possession was given to the returning migrants. He said this was not contemplated by the Agreement and would rather defeat the purpose of it by delaying matters. I said that I would myself prefer a more summary method of enquiry.

He referred to refugees having been settled temporarily on the land and cultivating it. How were the returning migrants to be restored their lands? I replied that it was clear that a person who had actually cultivated the land and worked upon it could not be thrown out till harvest time. That would be unfair and would give rise to trouble. He seemed to agree with me, but asked what about people who had themselves cultivated the land and sown, etc. and then had gone away who were now returning. It would then be a question of timing as to what the old cultivator had done and what the new man had done.

We referred to the rigidity of officials when they meet in conferences and mentioned the recent Railway Conference which failed to achieve any substantial results because of the difficulty of adjusting the exchange ratio. He said that they had gone very far to meet our viewpoint, but unfortunately our people had not agreed. I said I was a little surprised to learn this as my own impression was that the Pakistan officials were agreeable to accept one of our proposals but their Government vetoed it. Mr Ghulam Mohammad immediately said that it would be far better for some informal talks between Ministers before a formal official

1. New Delhi, 24 May 1950. J.N. Collection.

conference took place. That would yield more fruitful results and the possibility of failure, which was bad, would be avoided. I agreed with him.

He said that this exchange ratio business was creating difficulties all over the place, and till this was settled some of our other problems would also be held up. I agreed with him and asked him when he expected it to be settled. He said that it is in the hands of the International Monetary Fund and they were taking their own time over it. They should decide by August next or perhaps even in July. Anyhow Pakistan did not wish to delay matters.

He referred to defence expenditure which was very heavy, and which could be greatly reduced on both sides if we came to common agreements about various matters. At present there was no doubt that the people of Pakistan were full of fear of an invasion or aggression from India. Possibly there was a slight fear in India. Anyway there was this fear which resulted in continuous arming. I referred to the recent arms explosion in the United States and pointed out that this constant effort to buy arms, etc. abroad was not conducive to the removal of the fear he had mentioned or to peaceful relations. Further that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches had often referred to this purchase of arms. He did not say much about Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches except to say that he had made many friendly references to me. As a matter of fact I said that there was an embargo on the purchase of arms in the United States, and their munition, etc. which had recently blown up had been purchased thirteen months ago before the embargo was announced. I then referred to the evacuee property question and said that probably this was an issue which affected public opinion almost more than any other. Large numbers of people were personally involved in it. And if this was even partly settled, this could make a great difference. He agreed and said that he saw no reason why we should not go a long way to settle it in regard to urban property. Rural property was a little more complicated and could be taken up later.

He referred to the canal waters dispute also and said that Mohammad Ali was coming here soon and would like to have a brief talk with me about it. I said I was agreeable to this. Further I said that I really did not see any great difficulty in solving this canal waters dispute if we proceeded on reasonable lines.

As is usual with Mr Ghulam Mohammad, immediately he criticised strongly minor officials in Pakistan who did not carry out the Government's policy and thus created trouble. He criticised some more important persons by name. Then he said that it was amazing what a change had been brought about in the outlook of two old sinners, Shahabuddin, the Minister for Rehabilitation and Altaf Hussain,² the Editor of *Dawn*, both of whom from being troublemakers in the past

2. Altaf Hussain (1900-1968); Director of Public Information, Government of Bengal, 1939; Press Adviser to the Government of India, 1943; Editor, *Dawn*, 1945-65; Minister for Industries and Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan, 1965-68; founded Pakistan Newspapers Editors' Conference and was its President for a number of years.

had now become great advocates of friendly relations between India and Pakistan. As for Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, his mental approach to problems and to everything in life was that of an Oudh taluqdar. He was cautious in his approach and suspicious but having come to a conclusion he stuck to it. There was no doubt that he was anxious to carry through fully the Agreement that we have arrived at. And not only that but to follow it up in other ways also.

81. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
May 29, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

The Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 8th April 1950 expressed the hope that migrants would return to their original homes. Certain provisions were agreed to about the return of their lands and properties if they went back by the end of this year. At the same time travel to and fro between East and West Bengal and Assam was made easier. As a result of this, a certain number, which is progressively increasing, of migrants from East Bengal are returning. At the same time the exodus from East Bengal is also continuing. We hope that gradually the latter will lessen and the return of migrants will increase. This will of course depend on many factors.

In any event, it is quite certain that all those people who have come away from East Bengal, or even a majority of them, are hardly likely to go back. What then are we to do about them? Are we to wait till the end of December to find out who is going back and who is not and meanwhile, support these people by some kind of relief or work and make no attempt to rehabilitate them? That seems to me to be a wrong policy from every point of view. Because this would result in large numbers of people, many of whom will inevitably stay in India, being kept in a state of uncertainty. Also it will result in heavy expenditure without any permanent result or rehabilitation and we shall have to spend more money on rehabilitation later on.

It is true that if we start rehabilitating migrants, the chances of their return grow less. There is undoubtedly this difficulty. In the balance I think that it would be very unwise to leave them in a state of suspense for many months and spend a lot of money on them without adequate results. Thus we should try to rehabilitate people as well and as fast as we can. With the best will in the world we can only

1. File No. 29(209)/50-PMS. Also published in G. Parthasarathi (ed) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol.2, pp. 106-107.

rehabilitate a relatively small number of those who have come. So that ultimately it will not probably come in the way of the return of many of the migrants. Therefore, it is desirable to proceed with our schemes of rehabilitation and to settle as many people as possible. This applies to West Bengal and Assam primarily. It applies also to the States of Bihar and Orissa as well as Madras, which have generously offered their cooperation in receiving these migrants and thus relieving somewhat the burden on the more affected States.

I trust that your Government will view this problem in this way and encourage and facilitate the rehabilitation of these people, not waiting till the end of December 1950.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

82. A New Picture of Asia¹

I returned from a Far Eastern tour only a few hours ago today. During this tour I visited several countries of Asia and met their leaders and people. A new picture of Asia was viewed by me and I tried to understand it. A new age was being born, a very big change was taking place. After several centuries of bondage, Asian countries have taken a new stand. Big countries have come to their own. There is nothing to worry about it. But there are dangers as well as great expectations.

I was thinking of the future happenings of Asia, specially in India, and more specially after we had attained our independence. We know of the troubles we have to face now. Naturally, we wanted to settle our own affairs before we meddled in the affairs of others. But even then, owing to the interdependence of the modern world, we get involved in other people's affairs, specially in those of the Asian countries, who are our neighbours. As you know, I have visited recently Indonesia, Malaya and Burma.

Now returning to my own country, I have to devote my mind to our local affairs—our quarrels and troubles. But after viewing the big problems of the world, I felt that how nice it would have been if we had no internal troubles. We could

1. Speech at a reception given by Muslim citizens of West Bengal in Calcutta, 24 June 1950. From *National Herald*, 26 June 1950.

then consolidate our strength and contribute our mite to the solution of problems. It is, therefore, necessary that we keep away from petty quarrels and raise our country in the eyes of the world.

During our struggle for independence our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, had raised us up and had even made small men like us somewhat great. Our country attained a great name in the world, and it was through Gandhiji that we attained this greatness. The outside world may not know anything of India, but they know her Gandhi.

Ultimately, we attained independence, then came the problem of implementing some of the fundamental principles enunciated by Gandhiji. When we consider the bigger problems facing the world we are reminded of our Gandhiji.

Sometimes I get the opportunity of going out of the country. Then I can have an objective view of India from outside and judge her through others' eyes. It is then that I understand her better. This time when I was in Indonesia, I was also constantly thinking of our problems and viewing them from afar. I was getting perplexed when I thought that we could raise ourselves considerably by following a particular path but we have failed to do so owing to some peculiar troubles. But after all, there are certain fundamental principles which are right and we are sure to gain if we can follow them. History at least has this lesson for us. This lesson we have got from Gandhiji that we must follow that right path and the right methods. Our means must be as good as the end. Gandhiji never admitted that the end justified the means.

Those who have studied science found that there are certain definite results under particular scientific situations. Gandhiji had gone a long way in following the correct path. We could not go so far but the little we did raised our country considerably. Unfortunately, we are now forgetting Gandhiji's path. But I still think that the vast majority of our people want Gandhiji's path to be followed. We must be clear about it—whether we want to follow Gandhiji or not. We may commit mistakes but we must realise that if we move away from the path shown by Gandhiji we shall lose and the country will go down.

You have praised me a lot in your address.² I know you love me and so you have used hyperboles regarding me and my activities. You have referred to the Delhi Agreement signed about two months and a half ago. Some have opposed it, others have supported it, and others again have supported it in a half-hearted manner. I feel that all that we wanted has not yet been done. But I have no doubt that considerable progress has been made in the implementation of the Agreement. I have no hesitation in saying that the results on the whole have been good. The question before us is which way do we want to go. If we want to follow the path of Gandhiji we have to do it.

2. Syed Badruddja, M.L.A. read out the welcome address.

You have said that some communal organisations are putting hindrances so far as the Agreement is concerned. You know that communal organisations have always been following a certain path which we of the Congress have always opposed. Now the question is how to help the implementation of the Agreement? I am willing to look into the complaints, but the fundamental question is which way we want to go. Most of the questions with which we are confronted betray a different state of mind from ours. I am also aware that a lot of our co-workers who have long struggled for independence, are now feeling in a different way. This is specially the case in Bengal. Therefore, our main difficulty is that we can fight external enemies, but if our own mind is not clear we are in trouble. We fall into a vicious circle. This, of course, is not peculiar to our country. In fact, this is the general situation in the world today.

We have to perform our duties and what is proper. We may of course persuade others and try to convert them. We must not lose patience in spite of obstacles. We have no doubt that the troubles through which we have already passed have given us extra strength to bear any future calamity. We must realise our responsibilities since we attained our independence after long years of bondage.

It is the duty of all citizens to take proper care of all places of worship to whichever religion they may belong. I can assure on behalf of the Government of India that all mosques in India will be looked after.

83. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

The developing situation in Korea is likely to have far-reaching consequences. Those consequences will no doubt affect our country too and the problems we have to face here such as the Bengal problem. How exactly Bengal might be affected, I cannot say. I am merely pointing this out to you because now of all times, we have to pull ourselves together and show certain discipline.

I am more convinced than ever that the attitude of the Calcutta press as well as the activities of Syama Prasad Mookerjee are doing us a very great deal of harm. That is the general impression more especially among foreign observers. Recently a goodwill mission went to western Pakistan from Delhi and the Punjab.² This

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The goodwill mission from 4 June 1950 for two weeks was sponsored by the Central *basar* (rehabilitation) committee.

mission contained some Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. It was a non-official affair. It had a most wonderful reception all over the Punjab and Sind. They addressed vast gatherings and there was much talk of goodwill and embracing each other, etc. Ever since the partition, there has never been anything like it. So far as the evacuee property is concerned, we have also gone a step forward and there is some possibility of further steps forward soon.

I am not in touch with the East Bengal press. But, generally speaking, the western Pakistan press has behaved and is behaving very well. It is proposed in western Pakistan to send a goodwill mission to India. They intend touring about the Punjab, U.P., and both Bengals. Probably this will take place in August. Before that a smaller mission is coming to Delhi. I am wondering what kind of reception they will have in various parts of India and more especially in West Bengal. When Malik and Biswas went to Agartala, Malik was shouted down and not allowed to speak. So also Shankarrao Deo was shouted down in Calcutta itself. The result of all this is that we do not put up a good front at all before the outside public. We talk about the communalism of Pakistan and the Muslim and about an Islamic State, and much that we say is true. But, in practice, foreigners see more obvious instances of communalism in India such as in the press and in other matters. The result is that our theoretical arguments fail to carry weight when the practice is so different.

Yours,
Jawahar

84. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your letter of July 7th.

I have myself noticed with great concern the increase in numbers of Hindu migrants from East Bengal. I do not know the explanation. Perhaps most of these persons, who are returning now, are those who had gone back previously and having disposed of their properties, can return now.

It is also, I think, true in a large measure that conditions in East Bengal are very far from normal. We get daily reports of incidents and it is difficult to verify

1. J.N. Collection.

them. But the impression is certainly produced that numerous incidents continue to occur, more especially in Barisal district. As Satin Sen has said, there is a new wave of crime. This appears to be a mixture of ordinary crime with what might be called communal crime, or to put it differently, the communal situation being taken advantage of for criminal purposes.

When Ghulam Mohammad was here, I gave a list of incidents that had occurred in East Bengal and had been reported to us. Sometime back I think another list was sent to the Pakistan Government and we are trying to keep this up. The real persons who should be informed of all this are the two Central Ministers. I hope that this practice would be followed. I see that Sen has probably been doing this.

I have little doubt that when I meet Liaquat Ali Khan, he will present me with some kind of a charge-sheet against West Bengal, more especially against the newspapers, to show that we have not kept the Agreement. It is desirable that we should have as authentic a record of incidents and lapses on the East Bengal side as possible. My difficulty is that every vague report given by a refugee is probably included in a list without any verification. If a few such cases are disproved, then the whole list is condemned. On the other hand, it is very difficult to verify such cases in a large area.

As you say, the Korean situation, with all its international complications, has diverted attention, even of people in Bengal, to outside matters. The fact of the matter is that we are living during times of tremendous social upset and upheaval. This takes various forms in different parts of Asia. But everywhere it is upsetting. Owing to the partition, resulting from the intense communalism of the Muslim League, much of our urge for change has turned into communal channels. The Muslim League was the child or parent, as you will, of a doctrine of hatred, bigotry and violence. Pakistan as a State inherits that, though I have little doubt that gradually they will outgrow it, unless other things happen meanwhile. We have become infected by them to a large extent and now the evil of each side feeds the other. If we could have been more or less free from this, we could have easily dealt with Pakistan in a variety of ways, including military, if necessary.

So far as Pakistan policy is concerned, it has a certain simplicity, although that simplicity may be based on evil premises. I have little doubt that anything so based must come to grief in the end. But, meanwhile, it may yield dividends. Our policy is not simple. It is not clearly right and it is not clearly wrong or based on evil as in the case of Pakistan. So while we struggle between opposing tendencies, we cannot utilise our strength to the best advantage, nor do we impress the foreigner. It is not so much a question of governmental policies as the confusion in people's minds. That confusion leads to confusion in action. The purely negative and communal attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha and the like seems to me completely futile and dangerous. There is absolutely no virtue in it except the advantage of rousing people's passions for the moment. India as constituted can never function

in the manner that Pakistan has functioned or may function in future. In trying to do so, we shall fall between two stools.

In my press conference in Calcutta, I tried to make a distinction between the national conflict between the two nations, India and Pakistan, and the communal conflict between the two. It would be easy for us to face the national conflict with all our strength and to win through. But we are weakened on the national plane (much more than Pakistan is weakened) by the communal element that comes into it, that is to say when the two-nation theory begins to function within our respective territories. That theory, being the basis of Pakistan, does not weaken it much; it weakens us, because it is contradictory to all we stand for. Indeed the extent to which we submit to it constitutes a victory for Pakistan.

I am greatly concerned about happenings in East Bengal and yet ultimately it is the human material that counts and not so much governmental action. Anyhow all this seems to me to be a tragic part of a mighty drama that is taking place in Asia. What is happening in Korea will have far-reaching consequences all over Asia and the world. This thing is not going to end soon and it may spread.

I have sent you with my last fortnightly letter some messages from Panikkar from Peking.² I am greatly interested in the development of the new China. It is fascinating. I have just had fresh news from Panikkar and this evening I was reading two articles in the London *Times* from their special correspondent in Peking. (These were in the issues of June 28th and 29th.)³ I see in China a dynamism and a crusading spirit and at the same time a tremendous realism at work, for the Chinese are ultimately realists. It is admitted by every foreign observer, including those most hostile to communism and the new Government in China, that nepotism and corruption and indiscipline have been wiped out in China. There is hardly any State terrorism and the Government is largely tolerant even to those who disagree with it, unless they oppose it with vigour. For the moment the Chinese people have been won over by the present Government and they are working hard to make good.

Why is it that we are so full of corruption and indiscipline and petty faction? There is something rotten about the present state of India, in spite of all our efforts and hard work. Is this our fault? If not, whose fault is it? The whole of India is

2. Three reports from Panikkar dated 26 May, 15 June and 24 June 1950 dealt with China's relations with other countries, social reforms relating to marriage laws, education, technical works etc., land reforms and Mao's eight-point programme of retaining "rich peasants economy," and mass literacy.
3. The two-part article "China in Evolution" traced the growth of the Chinese Communist Party, discussed China's relations with Russia, her foreign policy and related problems and praised communist rule which had remedied most of the worst evils of Kuomintang rule. It also dealt with taxation, status of merchants, support of intellectuals, the clan system and social structure, reconstruction and industrialization, land reforms and the simple lifestyle of leaders.

SEQUEL TO THE INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT

affected by it. But, to some extent, these tendencies are most obvious in West Bengal and East Punjab, because these two provinces were most shaken up in recent years.

We have lost something, the spirit that moves, and unless we recapture that spirit, all our labour will yield little profit.

Yours,
Jawahar

85. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
July 9, 1950

My dear Gopichandji,

I enclose some papers which have been given to me. These relate to a number of Muslims in East Punjab as well as in P.E.P.S.U. who, under pressure of events during the disturbances in 1947, were forced to renounce their faith and become either Hindus or Sikhs. The pressure being removed now, they want to declare themselves Muslims again and function as such. The Government of course does not come in the way. But I suppose their neighbours object.

On general principle we are opposed to this business of forced conversions and we are laying great stress in East Bengal that such conversions cannot be recognised. Indeed, in the Indo-Pakistan pact of April 8th, 1950, it is specially stated that forced conversions shall not be recognised and every conversion during a period of disturbance will be considered a forced conversion. Having laid down this principle, we have to follow it not only in Bengal but elsewhere. In any event we guarantee freedom of religion etc., in our Constitution.

I am drawing your attention to this matter so that you might be able to take such steps as you consider suitable. The first step should really be friendly talks with the Hindus and Sikhs of those places and explanation to them that this is our policy and this is part of our Agreement and we have to give effect to it. Further that it will be to their advantage also if this is done, as these Muslims converts will feel grateful for the facilities offered them to revert to their old faith and will thus be better citizens and better neighbours. In any event this is a duty we owe to them and ourselves and we cannot run away from a duty and a promise. Where necessary, we should be able to give them protection.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(209)/50-PMS.

86. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 14, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

You know that we have been repeatedly asking the East Pakistan Government to release the large number of Hindus arrested on flimsy charges. I do not know what the position is in West Bengal in regard to Muslims who have been arrested. I was wondering if you could not help in the release of the Hindus in East Bengal by releasing Muslims in West Bengal except those, of course, who are accused of some definite crime. The test might be violence. It is possible that something of this kind that is done here might be followed on the other side too. In any event it is better to concentrate on the real evil-doers and to release those who are not guilty of any serious crime of violence.

We have also been asking for the return of guns and licences to Hindus in East Bengal. That would apply to West Bengal and Muslims there also. It might be worthwhile applying these principles on both sides.

We have stated that in regard to Muslim migrants who come back, they will be given their lands immediately after the present harvest is over. Meanwhile, they will be given some kind of accommodation, etc. I suppose some preparatory work will have to be done to make the change-over peaceful and effective. If we ask the present temporary holders suddenly to leave their lands there will be trouble. I hope therefore that these people are made clearly to understand that they will have to leave at the end of the harvest.

I hope your new Minister, Dr Ahmed,² is functioning well and that you have given him adequate and responsible work. I do not quite understand a press note issued by the West Bengal Government. This said that while Dr Ahmed was Minister in charge of Relief and Rehabilitation, complaints arising out of the disturbances, etc. should be addressed to the Minority Commission and not to Dr Ahmed. The Minority Commission has no executive functions or executive machinery. What then can it do about any complaints received? Only a Minister can deal with these matters.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Rafiuddin Ahmed (b. 1890); founder and Principal, Calcutta Dental College and Hospital; member, West Bengal Legislative Assembly; Minister in the West Bengal Government, 1950-1962; Author of *Students' Handbook of Operative Dentistry*.

87. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
27 July 1950

My dear Krishna,


...If even a person with a thick skin, like me, feels upset at many things that are happening, I can well understand how you must be feeling, and yet, after some rather difficult days, I pulled myself together and came to the conclusion that there was no point in my getting excited because things did not happen as I wanted them to. Our activities are pre-determined to such an extent by circumstances that this business of free will is largely wishful thinking. The world goes its way and if it wants to be damned or to commit suicide, it will do so, despite you and me and others who may wish to stop this. There are far too many mad and bad and petty people about. It does not help to worry about them.

I asked you some time ago to write to me frankly your own views about recent developments. I want as much light as I can have so that, within my limitations, I can at least try to function to my satisfaction. Our world here is limited and there is so much shouting and vulgarity and I feel disgusted with it all and life generally. So do write to me personally. Events move fast and nobody appears to control them.

Love,

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extract.



1. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1950

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I returned this morning from my brief tour with the President of the Bihar Coal Fields and the Damodar Valley Works. I have been wanting to write to you for some days past. Indeed I have very much wanted to see you and have a talk. But these days have been very full and occupied for me and there has been enough of trouble to face here of various kinds. I asked Kachru² to write to you that I felt it was very necessary for us to meet. Sometime early in May I should like you to come here for a few days, so that we might have leisurely talks before Dixon arrives.³ It is my intention also to pay a brief visit to Srinagar, though I cannot say yet what date that is likely to be. I am afraid, for the first ten days of May, I am pretty fully occupied. Anyhow, I shall try to find two days at least for Srinagar. But I hope that you will come here in any event.

It is obviously necessary that we should have full discussions before Dixon arrives. I do not know when he will come. It might be any time about the middle of May or a little later. I have no particular difficulty in my mind as to what attitude we should take up with Dixon. It should be a firm and clear attitude, as we have done in the past. So far as I know, he is a first-class man and he will expect frankness on our part. I do not see why we should make any material variation from our past attitude.

I am going to Karachi day after tomorrow for two days. I have no doubt that Liaquat Ali Khan will discuss Kashmir with me. What he is going to say, I do not know. But I do not think these talks will lead anywhere. So far as I am concerned, I shall tell him frankly that, while I am perfectly prepared to discuss the subject in its basic essentials, it is not possible for me to deal with it without constant consultation with you and your colleagues, who bear the first responsibility.

I shall return from Karachi on the 28th mid-day. After that I shall remain here for some days, probably till the 10th May. There is a great deal to be done here. I am longing to visit Kashmir again. It is such a long time since I was there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. D.N. Kachru

3. Owen Dixon arrived in Delhi on 27 May.

2. Propaganda by "Azad" Kashmir Radio¹

I am receiving information that the "Azad" Kashmir Radio continues to pour out poison of the most indecent kind with unflinching regularity. The Kashmir Radio was also not too good previously and indulged in indecency occasionally. But since the Agreement, they have toned down at our request. But the "Azad" Kashmir Radio goes on in the old way. I think that we should draw pointed attention of the Pakistan Government to this. I might mention that I spoke specially to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan about "Azad" Radio, when he was in Delhi and gave him a bundle of monitored reports.

1. Note to S. Dutt, Additional Secretary, 9 May 1950. File No.4(66)-BL/50, M.E.A.

3. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
29 May 1950

My dear Gopalaswami,

...I have had two talks with Dixon and Bajpai has met him also. He is seeing Sardar Patel as I write this. Our talks largely consisted of my trying to give him a background of the situation. He listened. All that he was saying was that he was very glad to have this background which helped him to understand, but naturally he would have to proceed more or less in terms of the Security Council's Resolution appointing him.² He did not attach much importance to the labours of the Commission. He will be going to Karachi from here for four or five days and from there to Kashmir for perhaps ten days or so. Then he will go back to Karachi when Liaquat Ali Khan comes. He seemed to be anxious that some kind of a meeting between Liaquat Ali and me should be arranged, possibly with him also being present. We told him that we were agreeable to this but such a meeting at an early stage is not likely to lead to anything useful. He then suggested that Bajpai and Zafrullah should meet. That too was not encouraged by us.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. The resolution of the Security Council dated 14 March 1950 had called on India and Pakistan to prepare and implement the demilitarization of Kashmir within five months. Owen Dixon was to negotiate demilitarization on the basis of the McNaughton proposals which India had rejected.

Dixon is evidently not going to linger over this business, and I think that he will come to some conclusions fairly soon after meeting Liaquat Ali and me again, i.e. round about early July.

I am leaving for Indonesia early day after tomorrow morning. I hope that your stay in Ooty will do you a lot of good and you will come back fit and strong for more work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

4. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
30 May 1950

My dear Bakshi,

So you did not come here after all. Anyhow Dhar² will tell you about things here. Dixon has been a patient listener to my talk and has not said much except that he wants to finish his work as soon as possible and not to linger over it. He will be going to Srinagar in about a week's time. Treat him with every courtesy and consideration, but do not organise large parties for him.

I have been rather distressed to read reports of what Sadiq³ is supposed to have said at a May Day meeting in Srinagar.⁴ It is not particularly wise to go on cursing Anglo-American imperialism or of displaying Soviet flags and having Soviet slogans. Apart from this, the report of the speech said that he objected to my interfering in Kashmir also. Altogether that report produces a very bad impression and injures our cause in Kashmir. I have spoken to D.P. Dhar about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Durga Prasad Dhar (1918-1975); Deputy Home Minister, Kashmir Government, 1948-57; Minister in Kashmir Government, 1961-68; Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. 1969-71; Chairman, Policy Planning Committee, Ministry of External Affairs, August 1971-July 1972; Union Minister of Planning and Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 1972-74; member, Rajya Sabha, 1972-75.

3. G.M. Sadiq was Development Minister in Kashmir Government at this time.

4. In 1950, Sadiq organised demonstrations in Srinagar in favour of the Stockholm Peace Congress.

5. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
4 July, 1950

My dear Bakshi,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th July, which was brought to me this evening together with a letter from Shaikh Saheb. I am sending him a reply, a copy of which I enclose.

I am very sorry to learn of your ill-health. In view of this, I could not possibly advise you to take a long journey against your doctor's advice.

I have little to add to what I have written to Shaikh Saheb. I am distressed, as you will no doubt notice from my letter to him. This distress is chiefly due to the attitude adopted towards us. If this is the way we are to behave to each other, then we shall all have to think anew. Anyhow, I feel rather helpless and can offer you no advice in the circumstances.

I hope you will get well soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

6. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
4 July, 1950

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

Your letter of July 3rd was handed to me this evening. I am going very early tomorrow morning to Dehra Dun for a day to see Sardar Patel. I have not met him since my return from Indonesia. I shall return to Delhi on the 6th July. I am therefore writing this letter in some haste, as I want it to be taken back to you.

Your letter to me is brief enough and hardly requires any reply. But you have enclosed with it a copy of a letter from you to Vishnu Sahay², which deals with

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs, Government of India.

certain orders relating to *Jagirdari* and *Zamindari*.³ You have not expressed a wish for any comments by me on these questions and it is clear from your letter to Vishnu Sahay that you desire none. In the circumstances, I do not know if it is proper for me to discuss this matter.

I had asked you and Bakshi to come here principally because the developments in Korea are full of significance and dangerous implications. I think that they affect Kashmir problems also or may affect them in the near future. I thought it necessary for us to discuss this matter fully. You could not come here because of Ramzan and when I was informed that Bakshi was ill and had been told not to travel, I had no alternative but to say that he should not imperil his health by this journey.

Since you have been good enough to send me a copy of your letter to Vishnu Sahay, I shall give my first reactions to it. I knew nothing of this problem till a few days ago after my return from Indonesia. I knew of course that it was your programme to put an end to the *Jagirdari* and *Zamindari* systems and I entirely agreed with you, but I did not know that you were tackling them immediately and the manner of doing so. I was anxious to find out from you directly exactly how you proposed to set about it. In this, as in most other things, a very great deal depends upon the manner and methods adopted. You know that we have given a great deal of thought to this matter in various provinces here and have learnt something from our mistakes as well as successes. I know something also of how this problem has been tackled in other countries, for instance in the Balkan countries of Europe, which were bent on abolishing landlordism. I have followed what has happened in China and only recently we were informed that Mao Tse-tung had somewhat varied his policy because of his own experience and the conditions prevailing in China.

I mention all this to indicate that in a matter of this kind one likes to profit by the experience of others. I do not know sufficiently about your proposals and cannot therefore give any satisfactory opinion. But I do know that they may have far-reaching results, both good and bad. They would affect of course some of our provinces. They may affect the present situation in Kashmir vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United Nations. Because of these consequences, it seemed to me desirable that there should be a full consideration of this matter, and I was surprised to learn that you had practically committed yourself without any reference to us. I asked

3. Shaikh Abdullah wanted to take over 40 *jagirs* comprising more than 500 acres without paying any compensation and legislation to this effect was placed before the Sadar-i-Riyasat for his approval. The Government of India pointed out that since the payment of compensation had been accepted by all States, such legislation in Kashmir State would have repercussions elsewhere. Shaikh Abdullah was requested to come to Delhi for discussions before anything was done. But he did not come and held that it was a matter entirely for the State to decide and the Central Government had nothing to do with it. The matter had been kept pending for some time since Nehru was away in Indonesia.

Maulana, who had been in Kashmir recently, if he knew anything about it and he said that he did not and was himself surprised.

You take objection to the Government of India interfering in this matter and point out that the three subjects of accession do not include such matters of domestic policy.⁴ You are perfectly right in saying that this is not a question which can come within the scope of those three subjects. But I was not aware that mutual discussions on any subject were ruled out, unless they related to defence or foreign affairs or communications. I suppose we have discussed many matters in the past which, strictly speaking, do not come within those subjects. Indeed, I have a recollection that this particular matter of *Jagirdari* and *Zamindari* was also discussed about a year ago or more.

My own relations with you, as well as those of some of our colleagues like Maulana and Gopalaswami Ayyangar, have not been confined to the formal relations of Ministers of the Government of India. We were under the impression that there were closer bonds between us because by and large we had common objectives and there was mutual respect and friendship. If, however, you think that we should consider our problems on the official level only, then I have little further to say, except that my interest greatly lessens. I have no desire to interfere against your wishes, and events can take their course, good or bad. I do not remember taking any action in regard to Kashmir without consulting you fully. I think I told you once before that if there was any vital difference of opinion between you and me, then I would prefer to drop out.

You refer to the Yuvaraj⁵ and remind us of the constitutional principle that he should act strictly as the constitutional head of the State. What a constitutional head does or does not do, varies in different States. But anyhow this question does not arise here. The Yuvaraj is a young boy shouldering a burden and a heavy responsibility and if he is worried about anything and asks his friends for advice, surely he is not to blame. He went to mutual friends, whom you also occasionally confer with.

4. When the Constitution of India was promulgated on 26 January 1950, the President simultaneously issued an order under Article 370, defining the jurisdiction of the Union Parliament and the provisions of the Constitution applicable to Kashmir State. While parts of the Constitution relating to subjects like Defence, External Affairs, Communications and Foreign Trade were fully applied to the State, other subjects like Commerce, Audit, Judiciary, Elections and Finance were applied with modifications. The provisions of the Constitution relating to Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles were specifically not applied to the State.
5. Dr Karan Singh.

The question is not primarily about the abolition of *Jagirdari* and *Zamindari*.⁶ We are all agreed about that. The real question that arises is what relations, if any, should subsist between the Government of India and your Government. Further, what relations should subsist between you and me and some of us here. That is a matter of some importance, both from our personal point of view and that of Kashmir. I greatly regret that you should have taken up a position which indicates that you do not attach any value to any friendly advice that we might give and indeed, consider it as improper interference, of which you take a very grave view. If that is so, personally I have nothing further to say. I have not thought of Kashmir or of you in that way and so I am rather at a loss how to act when the very foundation of my thought and action has been shaken up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

6. On 13 July 1950, the Kashmir Government introduced the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, 1950, which made individual holding of more than 20 acres illegal; the rest was to be transferred to peasant tillers who would become peasant proprietors paying their land revenue directly to the Government. The residue of the uncultivated land beyond 23 acres was to be transferred to the State, which would operate cooperative farms with landless labourers.

7. To Owen Dixon¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

Dear Sir Owen,

I thank you for your letter of the 6th July which arrived yesterday. As Bajpai told Ambassador Colban, I shall be willing to meet Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in Delhi on or after the 19th July.² I should, however, like to emphasise again that, unless there are some preparatory talks between you and us before I meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the tripartite conference² that you have in view is not likely to yield

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Owen Dixon did not leave for the record any document about the day-to-day activities. He reported to the U.N. on 15 December 1950, that he proposed during the tripartite conference, partly because of Indian insistence that Pakistan be declared an aggressor and partly because he himself saw in the tribal incursions and the advance of Pakistan troops into Kashmir territory an act contrary to international law and that Pakistan troops be withdrawn. This was followed by a request to both sides to demilitarize the territory to a minimum of forces consistent with law and order. The Prime Minister of Pakistan agreed to withdraw the Pakistan army. The plan for demilitarization was rejected by India.

satisfactory results. I realise, of course, that if before the conference, you hold preparatory talks with us, you may have to extend a similar courtesy to the Government of Pakistan. For our part, we shall have no objection to that. Nor should this procedure involve a postponement of the conference of the two Prime Ministers that you desire.

I hope that you have found your stay in Kashmir both interesting and agreeable.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Dixon's plan proposed making the Plebiscite Administrator the head of the plebiscite area. He was to be helped by non-officials and was to be authorized to exclude troops of any description from the area. India was unable to accept these proposals because they also aimed at curbing India's sovereign rights in Kashmir territory. The U.N. mediator in his final report stated that the only possible solution of the problem would be partition of the State.

PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

1. To Mohanlal Saksena¹

New Delhi
April 9, 1950

My dear Mohanlal,²

Yesterday I sent you a note about the Jammu camps.³ I have had reports about them, which were first-hand, and these were not at all satisfactory. I have had a feeling that somehow these camps suffer from not being fully considered as anybody's responsibility. Of course, they are our responsibility, but the Kashmir Government comes into the picture too. They do not do anything in the matter because they say that the Central Government has taken over charge.

Then again there is the question of the future of these people there. Many of them, I understand, refuse to be rehabilitated on the ground that they are waiting for the solution of the Kashmir problem. That is not a sensible position to take up and we cannot possibly carry on camps like this indefinitely till the Kashmir problem is resolved. In any event, there should be no camp at all without work. That has been our policy, but apparently this has not been applied to the Jammu camps. I do not know all the facts and perhaps you can correct me. Anyhow, the matter should be taken in hand. I wrote to you yesterday also about the unsatisfactory reports regarding the administration of the camps. These reports are supported by the Kashmir Government. The mere fact that the Kashmir Government does not approve of the administration is in itself enough for some change to be made. Any successful attempt to run camps or at rehabilitation in Jammu or Kashmir must necessarily depend upon the cooperation of the Kashmir Government....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Saksena was the Minister for Rehabilitation at this time.

3. Note not printed. Nehru had written that he had heard that in some camps in Jammu diseases were spreading. People were carrying on business from there and dispersal and rehabilitation of people was prevented on the ground that the Kashmir question had not been settled. The Kashmir Government could not interfere as the camps were under the Central Government. He also mentioned that Kashmiri refugees were coming back to India from "Azad" Kashmir and the border districts of West Punjab.

2. To Mohanlal Saksena¹

New Delhi
April 11, 1950

My dear Mohanlal,

I have often had the feeling, and I have expressed it to you, that we have become too rigid and legalistic in dealing with the evacuee problem. Also in regard to permits for Pakistan. Numerous cases come to my notice where I think manifest injustice is being done.

However that may be, the Agreement between us and Pakistan is a fact of primary importance and it is very necessary that we should be careful in future in regard to both these matters and not be rigid. We are passing through a critical time and large numbers of Muslims are leaving the U.P. and Delhi for West Pakistan. We must go very slow, therefore, with anything which might help this exodus. Our reputation and our degree of success in implementing the Agreement depends upon this. Will you please inform all your officers as well as your provincial representatives and custodians? If you think it necessary, I am prepared to put this matter before Cabinet.

This might be borne in mind in regard to the Evacuee Properties Bill. That is to say care should be taken what is to be in the Bill and what is said about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

3. Telegram to Gopinath Bardoloi¹

In view of urgent importance of making arrangements for jute and rice cultivation in lands vacated by Muslims in Goalpara, I suggested to you that Hindu refugees in Cachar might be sent there for this purpose immediately.² It is of most vital importance that these lands be cultivated during coming season.

1. New Delhi, 11 April 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt.I, p. 167.

I understand also that while large numbers of Hindus have come to Cachar, not many Muslims have left that district. At the same time vast numbers of Muslims have left Goalpara and not many Hindus have come there direct. This is additional reason for sending some Hindu refugees from Cachar to Goalpara for agricultural purposes.

Please telegraph immediately what steps are being taken.³

3. Bardoloi replied on 14 April that nearly 60,000 refugees were already in Goalpara and more were going daily.

4. To Mohanlal Saksena¹

New Delhi
April 14, 1950

My dear Mohanlal,

I am gravely disturbed by the possible consequences of the Evacuee Property Bill which is under discussion in Parliament.² For the moment I am not thinking of the other matters that were raised on previous occasions, although these are important. I am rather thinking of its general political effect after the Agreement. There can be no doubt that the Agreement calls upon us to create conditions which will give perfect security to minorities. This security must obviously include security of property.

What is the effect of this bill on security of property? In the past it has produced a widespread feeling of insecurity. Partly this was due to the law and partly to the way it was enforced. Many cases came to my notice when there was manifest injustice done and the injustice could not be rectified because, I was told, the law said so. There were other cases also of what I considered injustice due to very rigid and what appeared to me to be an unreasonable interpretation of the law. As a result, there was this widespread feeling of insecurity in regard to property, and even those who did not apparently come within the scope of the Ordinance, share this feeling of insecurity.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Since the Ordinance for administration of evacuee property, promulgated on 18 October 1949, was to expire in April 1950, a draft Bill on the administration of evacuee property was introduced in the Indian Parliament. This Bill sought to define an evacuee and provided that no property should be declared evacuee property without previous notice to persons concerned and the holding of preliminary enquiries.

This was the state of affairs previously. Now we have to deal with a new situation created by the Agreement, when we have undertaken to remove all causes of insecurity and to prevent people from living in India under a sense of fear and insecurity. We know that during the past few weeks large numbers of people in India have, under stress of circumstances, decided to leave for Pakistan and many have actually left. There is no doubt that these people did not want to go originally and it was only the new circumstances and new pressures and fears that have induced them to go. We have tried to stop this by this Agreement and by the propaganda we intend carrying on.

Just at this moment comes your Evacuee Property Bill with certain clauses which are so vague that they bring in their scope any person who may have some business dealings or private dealings with people in Pakistan.³ Normally both domestic and international law are opposed to this kind of interference. It is true that we are dealing with a very special state of affairs. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to set aside normal rules completely and to produce this sense of insecurity which this Bill is bound to produce. This will undoubtedly encourage the exodus and thus defeat the objects of the Agreement.

In a conflict between two countries, it sometimes happens that one country retaliates against the citizens of the other country because of something done to its own citizens in that other country. Here we have a curious state of affairs. We try to punish people who in law and effect are our citizens, but who we suspect might perhaps transfer their allegiance. I suppose this kind of thing is very unusual and without any precedent for it. Still, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, one has to do something to prevent large scale transfers of property. In doing so, however, very great care is to be taken that our case, in any particular instance, is foolproof and cannot be challenged. In effect, so much vagueness has crept in that the Custodian or his representative can exercise his discretion in a large number of matters.

Then, there is also the curious point that a person may be punished now for something that he did previously, i.e. before October 1949 or some such date, which he was completely entitled to do then. All this offends against my sense of equity and law, and what is more against my sense of the spirit of our Agreement recently arrived at.

I have great doubts about the validity of some of the provisions in the Evacuee Property Act from the point of view of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is quite likely that they may be challenged in the courts.

3. This Bill defined an evacuee as a person who left India on account of civil disturbances on or after 1 March 1947, or who was now resident in Pakistan, or who after 14 August 1947 acquired by allotment or by unlawful occupation any property treated as evacuee property in Pakistan.

In any event, I want you to be very careful in taking any such proceedings which might be challenged or which might be said to be against the spirit of the Agreement. I want you to make this perfectly clear to your Chief Custodian and all his assistants here or in the States. The matter is of considerable political importance and therefore I want to be kept in touch with every development in it. Please ask your Custodian-General to report to you before taking any action so that you may consult me whenever necessary. In particular the next month or two are very delicate and we have to watch our steps carefully.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
April 16, 1950

My dear Gopichandji,

I enclose a note from our Ministry of Rehabilitation about the quasi-permanent allotment of evacuee land in the Punjab and P.E.P.S.U.² This note gives certain figures and information which are disturbing. I do not know how far you accept these figures.

For some time past I have felt that the approach to rehabilitation in East Punjab has been one of compensating people and not rehabilitating them.³ We are not solving any problem and perhaps we are adding to our future problems. I am sending this note to you for your earnest consideration as I feel that we are going in a wrong direction completely.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 29(20)/47-PMS.
2. In this note of 27 March 1950, it was said that the Hindus and Sikhs had left 47.55 lakh acres of cultivated land and 14.53 lakh acres of uncultivated land in West Punjab. The evacuee land available in Punjab and P.E.P.S.U. was 38.69 lakh acres of cultivated land and 8.66 lakh acres of uncultivated land.
3. The quasi-permanent scheme aimed at giving land to everyone who had owned land in West Punjab irrespective of the fact whether agriculture was their main source of income or not. Its primary object was compensation and not rehabilitation. It did not tackle the problem of rural rehabilitation and gave no clue of the extent to which it would solve the problem.

6. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
April 18, 1950

My dear Gopichandji,

Thank you for your letter of April 15th.

In this letter you refer to the sufferings of dispossessed tillers of the soil. I am entirely in sympathy with them. Indeed I sympathise with them far more than landowners who have received some compensation in land, while the actual tillers remain as they were. It might be possible to find land somewhere in Madhya Bharat or elsewhere. This matter should be investigated through our Rehabilitation Ministry.

I realise you have had a very difficult problem to deal with in regard to allotments. I do not understand however the point of allotting an acre or so and allowing the right of mortgage or sale.

I have often written to you about the ejectment of tenants. Information continues to reach me that this process is in full swing, more especially in Hissar, Ferozepur and Ambala (Jagadhari Tehsil). I understand that about 6000 families are actually under notice of ejectment and all these are old tenants and not displaced persons. In Ambala they appear to be Harijans and some reports state that these Harijans are being subjected to a good deal of oppression. Apparently this ejectment is being done in anticipation of some *zamindari* abolition legislation.

For years past we fought in the U.P. against such ejectment of tenants and ultimately we stopped it, even before we became members of Governments. It seems odd that now that we are in authority, we cannot stop ejectments.

Then there is the case of displaced persons who are tenants and to whom land was given temporarily and who are now being ejected. I suppose these are the persons you refer to. They may have to be ejected, but in any event they have to be provided for. What do you intend doing about them? I fear you may have a good deal of trouble.

A third type of case appears to be the old tenants of Muslim landlords, such as Mamdot, who have been in possession for a long time and are, practically speaking, more than ordinary tenants, although the zamindars refused them their occupancy rights. I think you said sometime ago that you were intending to have legislation to prevent ejectment. I do not know what has happened about this matter. These ejectments will certainly help the communist cause definitely and it will be difficult for us to justify them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

7. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 7, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

In one of your recent letters you referred to Mridula Sarabhai and said that you had given her a hint to go and work in East Bengal. It is of course a good thing for her to work in East Bengal. But what I gathered from your letter was that you do not like her to function in West Bengal.² I confess that this has troubled me somewhat, because if one of our outstanding workers, on whom Gandhiji relied greatly and for whom I have the highest opinion in spite of her failings, cannot function in West Bengal, then there is something wrong about the official machinery there. It is natural for officials, even good officials, not to like interference with their work. None of us likes that. But the essence of democratic functioning is that there should be continuous public impact on official work. The essence of our working should be that those who believe in the Congress ideology should be encouraged. There are far too many persons, including many who wear the garb of the Congress, who have drifted from everything that the Congress stood for. It becomes even more important therefore that Congress workers with faith in our old ideology should function and help in creating a suitable atmosphere. Mridula Sarabhai belongs to our topmost rank of workers and she has made a place for herself by sheer hard work which is unique. She has been a member and General Secretary of the Congress Working Committee. She has performed wonders occasionally in critical situations. But what is more, she has worked terribly hard throughout these three years without respite and in spite of bad health. In Delhi she came into some kind of conflict with our officials. We dealt with the matter in a friendly way and gradually her relations with the officials became fairly good and they helped each other a good deal. She may go wrong in a hundred petty things, but she is so fundamentally right in the main thing that the net result of her work has always been good. Other people may be right in the little things of life, but are basically wrong about the important things.

We are relying, more than ever, on our governmental apparatus. That of course is inevitable. But no government, not even an autocratic government and certainly not a democratic one, can function without popular support. Behind that popular support must be some ideology. Otherwise it has no meaning and is governed by momentary passion. The only ideology that we can hold on to, as far as I can see,

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Roy replied on 10 May that Mridula Sarabhai's approach was defective in that she was inclined to impress people with her position and influence in Congress circles and browbeat Government officials.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU


is the Congress ideology. Opposite to it is the communal ideology on the one hand and the communist on the other. So far as the communists are concerned, we are more or less at war with them. If we make compromises with the communal ideology, we uproot ourselves and not only go in a wrong direction but gradually fade away. Thus it becomes essential in dealing with a situation to be perfectly clear in our minds about the ideology we are pursuing and to make this clear to others, who are instruments of our work.³

I do hope that you will give Mridula an opportunity of meeting you from time to time.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Roy wrote that Mridula's ideology could well be termed as 'communal'. She would con-





AT NATIONAL FUEL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DHANBAD, 22 APRIL 1950

grossly exaggerated. Frightened people and refugees are the worst of witnesses. Every person who is missing for a little while is reported as being dead or abducted. The report is honest enough but has no real basis in fact except that the person was missing for a while. Knowing that many of these reports are likely to be untrue, we could not allow them to go unchecked and so whenever a report came, we had some machinery to check it immediately.

In the case of abducted women we had very great difficulties to contend against and very large numbers were involved. We have gradually developed a machinery to deal with this, which has produced satisfactory results. The machinery could only function when there was complete cooperation between local authorities, the police and social workers. Unfortunately we found in many places in the Punjab, Patiala, etc., that local officials were themselves involved in this abduction business. In the Pakistan side this was even more so.

Sometimes it happens in the case of abduction that swift action brings immediate results, while any delay means losing trace of the girl. Hence action had to be taken without adequate data often enough and without anything really having happened.

I am sure that if you kept in touch with Mridula and advised her as to what she should do and listened to her, there would be little difficulty.

I notice from the Intelligence report for the 9/10th May that the figures of incoming and outgoing Hindus between East and West Bengal are as follows:

Hindus coming into West Bengal	— 9,371
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Hindus going from West Bengal to East Bengal via Bongaon & Ranaghat	— 6,831
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An analysis of those going away is given:

Males	— 4,829
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Elderly women	— 1,135
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Young women	— 107
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Children	— 760
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A further analysis is given of the districts they went to.

It seems to me that this report does definitely indicate that a considerable number of Hindus including women and children are going back to East Bengal.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

9. To Kailas Nath Katju¹

New Delhi
May 24, 1950

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Dr B.C Roy about the education of refugee boys and girls.² I think in this matter you could help a great deal, partly by advice and taking interest in it and partly by financial help out of the funds at your disposal. I do not think that you can give large sums for large numbers of people or for any big educational scheme. That must be left to Government. But you could help in two ways. If any more or less private or non-official effort is made under good auspices for such education you could give some kind of a grant to it to carry on for the time being. Secondly, you could give specific help

10. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 24, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I have just had a long talk with Lakshmi Kanta Maitra who reported to me his experiences during his tour of the border areas of West Bengal. He gave me interesting information.

On one thing he laid great stress and that was the plight of the student refugees, boys and girls. I have no doubt that you have this in mind. Personally I have long felt from the earliest stages of this refugee problem in 1947, that our primary duty was to the boys and girls and children among the refugees. They form the next generation and apart from that if they go wrong and become vagrants or worse we create a terrible problem for the future. Therefore, I think that very special attention, may be by special committees or special officers, should be paid to this question of their education. Education here is always thought of in terms of preparation for an examination. I do not know how we can get out of this idea. To some extent we have to submit to it, but there is no reason why we should not rebel against that idea also to some extent.

It seems to me quite wrong to push these young boys and girls into the overcrowded Calcutta schools and colleges. As a matter of fact you talk about dispersal of the existing number at Calcutta. Therefore, the only course left open is to start some temporary arrangements for education away from Calcutta. The education thus given should include a good deal of physical culture, some manual or technical training, and generally should be a balanced one. It may not be high grade from the literacy point of view.

I believe our Ministry of Rehabilitation has agreed to help you in the dispersal of students. I am free to confess (and I do so with all apologies to our Ministries of Education and Rehabilitation in Delhi) that we have not made a good job here of the education of the vast number of young refugees who came from western Pakistan. I hope that this lack of success is not repeated in Bengal. The only thing to do is to start right from the beginning in a big and comprehensive way and not to leave it to routine methods.

All this involves money of course. But I think money is not so important as people think. What it requires is a number of intelligent organisers and teachers who can think in terms of producing a productive community.²

1. File No. 29(96)/50-PMS.

2. Several measures were taken up for education of refugees e.g. waiving of formalities in the procedure, introduction of special regulations to enable students to appear for examinations conducted by universities and the Boards of Education in India, provision of grants and stipends.

This is rather an unnecessary letter because I am sure you have all this in mind. Nevertheless, I thought I might also write to you.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

11. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
May 25, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

... The permit system was originally introduced to stop an onrush of people from Pakistan to India. Subsequently it was used for security reasons to keep out undesirables. In the present instance of Nisar Ahmed, it is being used to extern a person whom we consider undesirable.² It seems to me that this extension has really no relation to the idea governing the permit system and therefore cannot be justified from that point of view. There are large numbers of people in India who are undoubtedly undesirable from the moral point of view or from the political. There are plenty of Muslims who had played an important and objectionable part in the Muslim League agitation of previous days. We can hardly take action against them because we dislike them or disapprove of their previous activities. It seems to me that we are mixing up two things and two ideas and that is a risky business in law as well as otherwise. We can proceed against Nisar Ahmed in any way we like if he has committed an offence. We may even intern him under the Preventive Laws if there is sufficient justification. But how can we say that he has lost his Indian nationality because he went to Pakistan before the permit system was introduced and then came back, or because he committed some crimes in his youth or because he was an aggressive Muslim Leaguer in his later days? He is just one of the many undesirables in India and has to be treated as such and punished when occasion arises.

This case is an individual one of course. But it raises rather vital issues in regard to the permit system. It has often been said, and there are many cases to justify

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Nisar Ahmed of Jodhpur had been a member of the Muslim League. He went to Pakistan before the permit system was introduced and returned to India on a temporary permit. The Ministry of States thought he was an undesirable person and should not be allowed to remain in India.

it, as I know from personal investigation, that the permit system has been abused.³ It is bad for our reputation for such charges to be brought against us and for us not to be able to rebut them. It is because of this wider implication of this case that I have spent some time over it and am now taking your time.

Normally, such a case would have deserved some attention. But in the existing state of affairs, when there is a widespread impression of fear in the minds of Muslims in the U.P. and in Delhi and Rajasthan, leading to a big-scale exodus, such a case assumes an even greater importance. We cannot go about telling people of the past history of Nisar Ahmed. And even if we did so, the question still remains as to what that has got to do with this business of the permit. Few people know about this past history, but many know about this as a permit case which has been apparently unjustly treated. In view of all these considerations I feel it deserving of your attention. I think it has a certain significance in the public mind and will have repercussions.

I told H.V.R. Iengar that in view of the warrant being non-bailable, the normal procedure should take its course. I presume therefore that Nisar Ahmed would be sent under arrest to Jodhpur or wherever his case is. I hope that bail would be allowed to him there, because in cases like this it does not seem proper to me to refuse bail. Whatever his past, the man has been a well-known citizen of Jodhpur, receiving till recently or now a monthly stipend from the State for running a dispensary and partly for himself. Obviously he cannot run away and if he does run away he does not do harm; he solves us the problem.

It is not clear to me how we can push out a person who, from all the evidence at our disposal, is a permanent resident of India and has his domicile here. Pakistan may well refuse to take him, or taking him may make a fuss about his case. We can hardly argue on the basis of past history. I shall therefore be grateful if you will consider this matter.

We had information a day or two ago of large numbers of Muslims collecting at Phulera and Ramner railway junctions with a view to going to Pakistan. Ramner is the border station between Jodhpur and Sind. In fact some kind of a law and order situation was feared. I believe that additional police was sent there. But we were specially asked by the Rajasthan people to send some persons from the U.P. to induce these Muslims to go back to their homes. We informed the U.P. Government and I believe they have taken some steps. The fact is that even now this exodus is continuing and the latest report that I have received from north-west U.P. is of a widespread sense of fear among the Muslims there inducing them to depart.

3. Maulana Azad had referred to Nehru various cases where the permit system had been applied in a wrong way. On 25 May, Nehru instructed his office to examine eight such cases.

You have heard of the proposal of Pakistan to close the border to these people. I think this was a very unwise move on their part and this actually accelerated the exodus for the time being. I noticed in a telegram of yours that you considered this closing of the border as possibly being a breach of our Agreement. I do not think it is a breach and that is the legal opinion here too though I consider it a very wrong step to take. All that the Pakistan Government propose to do is to admit people only with permits. That is exactly what we are doing in the north and west. The Agreement in so far as people coming and going to Pakistan and India are concerned applies only to eastern Pakistan, West Bengal and Assam.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

12. The Faridabad Development Board¹

I have just come back from a visit to Faridabad and I am jotting down some of my impressions.

2. I went to Faridabad after a long interval and I was glad to notice the great progress that has been made there. I think all the people concerned with this deserve congratulations. I found a spirit prevailing there of getting things done as rapidly as possible. We have got not only a number of officials there from the Central and East Punjab Governments as well as the Commandant of the Camp from the Army but also a number of non-official workers of distinction, who are giving their time and energy to this task. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to these non-official workers of distinction, who are giving their time and energy to this task and who have brought in a human and social outlook to our work and thus given it a certain content which is so important. The development of education on basic lines and the organisation of industrial cooperatives are both of significance. The arrival at Faridabad of a peace workers unit from Europe is also very welcome not only for the work they do but because of the spirit they bring with them. It is always to be remembered that the whole conception of Faridabad is one of

1. Note, New Delhi, 26 May 1950. File No. 29(197)/50-PMS.

cooperative effort and not merely one of building up a township. It becomes necessary therefore to lay stress on this cooperative aspect all the time, to increase it, and to associate the residents, both psychologically and practically, in the building up of this township. They must have a sensation of participating fully in this endeavour, of sharing in it, and of building something for themselves. I suggest, therefore, that every attempt be made to increase this cooperative aspect not only in the township but in the camp. In regard to work as well as in regard to the numerous complaints that are bound to come, we should associate representatives of the residents. It is not possible for us to put an end to the complaints or to give everything that people want. Sometimes we ought to be in a position to satisfy the complaints. But in any event, if this work is done through representatives of the residents and everything explained to them, the burden is shared and the people generally will understand our difficulties. The point is that the approach should not be the normal official approach to building or camp problems, but a cooperative approach with which more and more people are associated.

3. In regard to the work being done, I received some complaints about lack of work or not enough work for people who are willing to work. This seemed to me a matter of better organisation and coordination. On the one hand, building work has to proceed as rapidly as possible in order to complete houses etc. before the monsoon. On the other hand, people who wish to work may be idle. This ought to be remedied by proper coordination and by dealing with representatives of the workers themselves. Officers will of course have direct contacts with the workers and may have liaison officers to assist them. But something more is necessary, something more than individual contacts. That perhaps can be provided by some kind of work committees of workers who would represent the others. The liaison officer could keep in contact with them and get suggestions from them and try to meet them as far as possible.

4. Another complaint was that sometimes owing to lack of materials, steel, etc., work is stopped for a number of days in some cooperatives. This too is essentially due to some lack of coordination. There should be planning so that all the materials coming regularly are distributed.

5. With the coming of the monsoon some of the building operations may have to stop. What then is going to be done afterwards in regard to work? This is important, because we cannot possibly stop much of the work and at the same time not give rations. Not giving of rations can only be justified if work is offered. Therefore, immediate thought should be given to the other kinds of work and activity which these people may have to do after building operations slow down.

6. A number of women complained to me of the stoppage of their rations. I found that the rule was that if there is an earning member of the family, free rations are not given to his dependents. This rule is a sound one and has to be followed. But care should be taken that it does not lead to injustice and suffering. For instance, if there are a large number of dependents or many children, then a single person

may not earn enough at present to supply them with food. This case should be gone into with the help of the Advisory Committee.

7. The work of boring wells has been going on but very slowly. Even when the wells are bored, pumps are not available and the wells remain sealed up for a considerable time. This requires planning and the ordering of necessary equipment in time. The rotary rig at work at Faridabad is urgently required elsewhere. It should therefore complete its work in Faridabad rapidly.

8. Some of the older houses built have only got one kitchen and even this is inside the living room or near it, and yet those little houses are meant to be occupied by two families. It is hardly possible to expect both families to use one kitchen which is situated inside one living room. I understand that it is fairly easy to supply another kitchen and the engineer is prepared to do it without any marked additional cost. This might be attended to.

9. It has been proposed that some senior students from Delhi should go to Faridabad and work there for sometime. This is a good idea. I would suggest that these students should work there just like others. In addition, they could do a good deal of social education work. They might well follow the example of the workers of the peace unit.

10. While a large number of people in the camp are from the Frontier Province speaking Pushto, it is clear that their education has to be in Hindi. But it would be a good gesture and a desirable one if some arrangements could be made for teaching Pushto to the children. Some people from the camp itself may be selected to teach Pushto.

11. While it is true that we have to follow some general rules in regard to all our camps and townships etc., it is equally true that Faridabad stands a little apart from others, because of the association of a number of prominent people with it. The President² himself was Chairman of the Board from its inception. Therefore, special attention has to be paid to Faridabad, as it becomes progressively an example for others. For this purpose occasionally additional expenditure has also to be incurred. I am glad that Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru has accepted the Chairmanship of the Board.

2. Rajendra Prasad.

13. Evacuee Laws¹

From time to time my attention has been drawn to individual cases where it was

1. Note to the Minister of Rehabilitation, New Delhi, 29 May 1950. J.N. Collection.

alleged that injustice had been done to persons who had been declared either evacuees or intending evacuees, or whose cases went on intermittently without a final decision. Complaints of a general nature have also been made to the effect that the way the evacuee property law was being applied, both in Delhi and in other States, was unjust and harassing. On making enquiries, I found frequently that the complaints were justified.

2. Apart from injustice done to individuals, considerable harm resulted in producing a sense of insecurity in the minds of large numbers of persons. From the political point of view, injurious results followed and a certain discredit attached to our governmental procedure. There was a fairly widespread impression that the evacuee property laws were not being administered as they were meant to be and that the way they were being applied led to their becoming an engine of oppression. I had a growing sense that there was some truth in these complaints and allegations, and I myself came across instances which justified this assumption.

3. I have now received a large number of further complaints. They have been made to me, not only on behalf of the individuals concerned, but even more so to show that the whole administration of evacuee property laws is highly unsatisfactory. I have considered many of these cases and my P.P.S., has gone carefully through them. This consideration has led me to the belief that there is something radically wrong about the way these laws are being given effect to. I do not propose to take up each individual case separately, but I would request the Minister for Rehabilitation to consider these cases individually and separately. He can have the assistance of my P.P.S., Shri Dharma Vira, who has been studying these papers and files and who has attached notes to many of them.

4. While I am concerned with justice being done to each individual concerned, I am even more concerned with an overhaul of the administration of these laws, because it appears that the present methods employed certainly do not lead to justice or to the carrying out of the wishes of those who made the law. This matter is of high importance. The Supreme Court protects the liberties of the individuals and has declared even laws of Parliament as *ultra vires* because, in its opinion, they offended some fundamental right laid down in the Constitution and there is no obvious relief to a person who might consider himself unjustly treated. Not only is there little scope of relief to that person but, as we know, his example spreads a sense of fear and insecurity in the minds of large numbers of others, who might not be directly affected. Political and social consequences follow and indeed have followed.

5. These cases, involving some basic freedoms of the individual and his right to citizenship and property, are dealt with not by the normal processes of the law but by special procedures and by persons, in the first instance, who certainly cannot normally be considered to have the training or mental aptitude to deal with such important matters.

6. In looking through these files and papers, I get the impression that the Assistant Custodian functions more of a prosecutor than a judge. He is at pains

to find out how he can hold the person concerned guilty of some offence. The orders given do not read like judicial orders and seldom contain an objective and impartial survey.

7. Another odd feature is that the burden of proof is cast on the unhappy person who is charged with infringement of the evacuee laws. This is normally supposed to be opposed to all canons of justice.

8. Again, there is often tremendous delay in dealing with these cases and nothing could be more harassing than this delay.

9. Cases have come up before me in which a person has been declared a non-evacuee on numerous occasions, and yet he is again asked to show cause why he should not be declared an evacuee.

10. I have seen a case, where the District Judge orders possession, but the Custodian does not restore it. I have also seen a case where a person is declared a non-evacuee and yet his property is seized by the Custodian.

11. There are also cases where a person is punished for something that he had done previous to the law coming into effect, when he was perfectly entitled in law to do it.

12. Again, rent has been charged for a lengthy previous period, although it is shown that the man had paid the rent in good faith to the evacuee owner or his agent.

13. I have mentioned some points that have struck me. The effect on my mind is that the application of these laws is in the nature sometimes of a continuous victimisation, that there is seldom any finality in the proceedings and that they are sometimes inquisitorial.

14. Although the evacuee property laws deal with property as such, the effect of their application may well be the deprivation of citizenship or nationality and this is a serious matter.

15. It seems to me that the Assistant Custodians have either no conception of the law as it is and of the intentions of Government or they are incompetent to discharge their functions. In either event, the result is bad and leads to miscarriages of justice and discredit of the Government.

16. Therefore this whole question of the application of the evacuee laws should be gone into thoroughly. Not only should justice be done to individuals concerned but what is far more important, a method should be evolved, which prevents future miscarriages of justice. This method should include clear and specific directions. In addition to this, the work of the Assistant Custodians as well as others should be examined carefully so that those who have proved themselves unfit for this work should be removed and replaced by more competent and more reliable persons.

17. This would have been necessary in any event. In view, however, of the Indo-Pakistan Pact of 8th April 1950 and the possibility of talks between the two Governments about revision of the evacuee property laws, this has become doubly important and urgent.

18. I would, therefore, request the Minister for Rehabilitation to consider this matter with some care and thoroughness and take necessary steps to put an end to the wrong practices and wrong approach, that have so far governed the application of the law.

19. On my return from Indonesia, I should like a full report on this subject so that, if it is necessary, further action may be taken.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

I. Perspectives

1. The Meaning of Culture¹

I have come here with pleasure and yet with a great deal of confusion in my mind. The pleasure is that I have always looked forward to furthering the cause of cultural association of India with not only the neighbouring countries to the East and West, but with the wider world outside. It is not merely a question of wanting such cultural association, or considering it good, but rather one of the necessities of the situation which compel one to do it or else the result is infinitely worse. I earnestly hope that the formation of this Indian Council of Cultural Relations will lead to a better understanding between our people and the peoples of other countries.

Having said that, let me state quite frankly the confusion that arises in my mind. All kinds of questions crop up, rather basic questions, questions which arise from what one sees going on in the world around us. We talk of understanding each other, nations, individuals and groups, and it seems an obvious thing that people should try to understand each other and to learn from one another. Yet, whether we look through the pages of history or study current events, I sometimes find that people who know each other most quarrel most. Countries which are next door to each other in Europe or in Asia somehow rub each other up most and while knowing each other very thoroughly, that knowledge itself does not lead to greater cooperation or friendship. So what is wrong about our method or this procedure? That is not a new thing. Even the long pages of history show that. Has there been something wrong in individual nations or in the approach to this question or something else that has not worked as it should have done? Then again, we talk about cultural relations and immediately the question arises in my mind what exactly is this thing culture about which people talk so much. I remember when I was younger in years reading about German *kultur* and of the German people of those days trying to spread it by conquest and otherwise, and there was a big war to spread this *kultur* and to resist it. Every country and every individual seems to have a peculiar idea of culture and so when there is talk about cultural relations, while in theory that is very good, actually what happens is that those peculiar ideas come into conflict and instead of leading to friendship they lead to more estrangements. It is a basic question—what is culture? And I am certainly not competent to give you a definition of it because I have not found it. At any rate, I do not know.

One can see each nation, each separate civilisation developing its own culture, and civilisation having some roots in generations past, hundreds and thousands

1. Speech at the inauguration of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 9 April 1950. File No. 40(86)/49-PMS.

of years past, and being intimately moulded by that initial conception which started the civilisation going along its long path. One sees that conception affected by other conceptions, action and inter-action between slightly varying conceptions. There is, I suppose, no so-called culture in the world which is absolutely pristine and pure and unaffected by any other culture. It simply cannot happen, just as no person can say that he belongs one hundred per cent to a particular racial type, because in the course of hundreds and thousands of years changes and mixtures have occurred more or less.

So culture will get a little mixed up and the basic element of a particular national culture possibly remaining dominant and yet its being affected by and affecting other cultures. If that kind of thing goes on peacefully there is no harm in it. But it leads often enough to conflicts. It leads sometimes to a fear on the part of one group of what they consider their culture being rather overwhelmed by an outside or alien influence and then drawing themselves into a shell which isolates them, which prevents other thoughts and their ideas going out. That is an unhealthy situation because in any matter, and much more so in what might be called a cultural matter, stagnation is the worst. Culture, if it has any value must have a certain depth, but it must also have a certain dynamic character. After all culture depends on a vast number of factors. If we leave out what might be called, perhaps the basic mould that was given to it in the early stages of a nation's or a people's growth, it is affected by geography, by climate, by all kinds of events that have happened. The culture of Arabia is intimately governed by the geography and the deserts of Arabia. It grew up in that. Obviously the culture of India in the old days was affected greatly, as we see it in our literature, by the Himalayan mountains and the forests and the great rivers and other things in India. It was a natural growth from the soil. The two may mix together and produce a happy combination as they often did in various domains of culture, architecture, music, literature, etc. But where there is an attempt to impose something on the other which does not naturally grow or which does not naturally mould itself, without uprooting itself, then comes conflict. Then unfortunately something also comes which is basically opposed to my mind, to all idea of culture. And that is the isolation of the mind, the deliberate shutting up of the mind to other influences. My own view of India's history is that we can almost measure the growth and the advance of India and the decline of India from the point of view of when India had her mind open to the outside world and when it wanted to close it up. The more it closed it up the more it became static. Life, whether of the individual or of a group or a nation or of a society, is essentially a dynamic, changing, growing thing. Whatever stops that dynamic idea of growth injures it and makes it deteriorate.

If I may with all respect say so and without meaning any ill to any person, we have had great religions and they have had an enormous effect on humanity. Yet those very religions, in the measure that they made the mind of man static, dogmatic and bigoted have had an evil effect according to my thinking. The things

they said may be good, but the effect of saying anything and adding on to it that there you stop as the last word has been said, makes society static and therefore it stops the growth of culture.

How are you to balance these two essential factors? One is that the human being, individual or race or nation, must necessarily have a certain depth and a certain root somewhere. Otherwise if the individual is just superficial, he may be outwardly cultured in that superficial sense, but does not count for much. A race or a group does not count for much unless it has roots in the past, which past after all is the accumulation of generations of experience and some type of wisdom. It is essential that you have that. Otherwise you become just pale copies of something else which has no real meaning to you as an individual or as a group. On the other hand one cannot live in the roots alone. The roots even wither unless they come out in the sun and the free air and then the roots give you the sustenance, and they branch out and flower. And then one might say that you have achieved balance. It is very difficult to balance because some people think a great deal about the flowers and the leaves in the branches, forgetting that they only flourish because there is a stout root behind them. Others think so much of the roots that no flowers or leaves or branches are left, only a thick stem somewhere. So how is one to balance that and which part of it is real culture and which is not?

Does culture mean some inner growth of the person? Of course, it must. Does it mean the capacity to understand the other person? I suppose so. Does it mean the capacity to make yourself understood by the other person? I suppose so. It means all that. A person, who cannot understand another's viewpoint, is to that extent limited in mind and culture because nobody, barring may be some very extraordinary human beings, can presume to have the fullest knowledge and wisdom; the other party or the other group may also have some inkling of knowledge or wisdom or truth and if we shut our minds to that, then we not only deprive ourselves of it, but we cultivate an attitude of mind which I would beg to say is opposed to that of a cultured man, because the cultured mind, having roots in itself, should have its doors and windows open, imbibing other things. It should have the capacity to understand the other's viewpoint fully even though it cannot agree with it always. It may sometimes agree, sometimes not. The question of agreement or disagreement only arises when you understand a thing. Otherwise it is a blind negation which is not a cultured approach to any question.

I may use another word, say, science. What is the scientific approach to life's problems—one of examining everything, of seeking truth by trial and error, by experiment, never saying that this thing must be so, but trying to understand why it is so and if one is convinced of it, accepting it, and the moment some other proof comes, changing one's notions, to have an open mind, not a mind which is floating about with every gust of wind, nevertheless an open mind trying to imbibe the truth wherever one finds that. If that is culture, how far is it represented in

the modern world and in the nations of today? Obviously, if it was represented more than it is, many of our problems, national and international, would be far easier of solution.

Almost every country in the world thinks that it has some special dispensation from Providence, that it is of the chosen people or race and others may be good or bad but secondary, somewhat inferior human beings. It is extraordinary how this human feeling persists in all nations without any exception, whether of the East or of the West. The nations of the East are strongly entrenched in their own ideas and convictions and sometimes in their own sense of superiority in regard to certain matters in life. Anyhow in the course of the last two or three hundred years they got many knocks on the head and they were humiliated and they were debased, they were exploited. And so, in spite of sometimes thinking that they were rather superior in many ways, they were forced to admit in other ways that they could be knocked about and be exploited. To some extent this knocking about process brought a sense of realism. There was a slight attempt to escape from that realism. Oh, yes, it was said, may be we are not so advanced in the material things of life, in the technical things, in the superficial things; nevertheless, we are superior in the essential things, in the spiritual things, in moral values. I have no doubt that spiritual things and moral values are more important ultimately than other things, but the way one finds escape in the thought that one is spiritually superior simply because one happens to be in the material and physical sense inferior is surprising and is not easy to follow. It is a mere way of escape from really finding out the causes of one's deterioration.

Nationalism, of course, is a curious phenomenon which at a certain stage in a country's history gives life and growth and strength and unity; and at the same time it has a tendency to limit one because one thinks of one's country as something rather out of proportion with the rest of the world. The perspective changes, and one is continuously thinking of one's own struggles and virtues and failings to the exclusion of other thoughts with the result that the very same thing, that is nationalism, which is the symbol of growth for a people becomes a symbol of stopping that growth of the mind. Sometimes, again, nationalism when it becomes successful goes on spreading in an aggressive way and it becomes internationally a danger.

So whatever line of thought you follow, you arrive at the conclusion that you must find a certain balance between these things. Otherwise something that was good turns into evil. Culture that is essentially good looked at from a wrong point of view becomes essentially not only static but aggressive and something breeding conflict and hatred. How you are to find a balance, I do not know. And perhaps that is the problem of today apart from the great political and economic problems of the age, because behind it there seems to be a tremendous conflict in the spirit of man today, some search for something which it cannot find. They go to economic theories and those economic theories have an undoubted importance because it

is just folly to talk of culture or even to talk of God, when human beings starve and die. The first thing that one has to do is to provide the normal essentials of life to human beings before you can talk about anything else and there economics comes in, and human beings today are not in a mood to put up with this suffering and starvation and inequality when they see that the burden is not equally shared. Others profit while they only have to bear the burden.

So inevitably we have to deal with these problems economically and in other ways, but I do think that behind it all there is this tremendous psychological problem and question in the minds of people. It may be that some people think about it consciously and deliberately, and others rather unconsciously and dimly, but there is this conflict in the spirit of man. How it will be resolved, I do not know. One thing that troubles me is this, that often enough people who understand each other more and more begin to quarrel more and more. Nevertheless, you cannot say from that that we should not try to understand each other because that will be completely limiting oneself and that is something which really cannot be done in the modern context of the world. Therefore, it becomes essential that we must try to understand each other in the right way. The right way is important. The right approach, the friendly approach, is important, because a friendly approach brings a friendly response. I have not a shadow of a doubt that it is a fundamental rule of human life that if the approach is good the response is good. If the approach is bad, the response is likely to be bad too. So if we approach our fellow human beings or other countries in the right way, not in any sense of surrendering anything that we consider of essential value to truth or to our own genius, but nevertheless in a friendly way with our minds and hearts open and prepared to accept whatever good comes to them, then that will lead not only to understanding, but the right type of understanding.

So I shall leave you to your own labours and to determine what is culture and what is wisdom. We grow in learning, in knowledge, in experience, till we have such an enormous accumulation of them that it becomes impossible to know exactly what we know. We are overwhelmed by this and at the same time somehow or other one has a feeling that all those put together do not necessarily represent a growth in wisdom of the human race. I have a feeling that it may be that some people who did not have all the advantages of modern life and modern science were wiser perhaps in the essentials than most of us are. Whether we shall be able, in later times, to combine all this knowledge and scientific growth and betterment of the human species with true wisdom or not, I do not know. It is a race between various forces. I am reminded of a famous Greek poet, the saying of a very wise man:

What else is Wisdom? What of man's endeavour,
Or God's high grace, So lovely and so great?

To stand from fear set free, to breathe and wait,
To hold a hand uplifted over Hate,
And shall not Loveliness be loved for ever?²

2. *The Bacchae* by Euripides (translated by Gilbert Murray)

2. The Spirit of Science¹

In the course of less than four months, we have put up, and declared open or rather wished to declare open three national laboratories,² and I suppose, before this year is out, some more national laboratories will also be started. This is a great venture, testifying to the faith, which our scientists and our government, I hope, have in science. Of course, the putting up of fine and attractive buildings certainly does some service to science, I suppose, but nevertheless, buildings do not make science as Dr Raman³ has often reminded us. It is human beings who make science, not brick and mortar, but buildings help the human beings to work efficiently and with proper equipment. Therefore, it is desirable to have these fine laboratories, so that trained persons may work there, and persons may be trained for future work.

Now, why do we put up these laboratories, these research institutes and the like? Of course, every one says, to advance the cause of science. Why so? You, Sir,⁴ referred to the spirit of science. I wonder exactly what that spirit is, or whether we have the same ideas about that spirit or whether many of us differ? Is science, as is often supposed, a handmaid to industry? Certainly, it wants to help industry. Why? Because it wants to create, help in creating greater wealth, for the nation, for the people. It wants to increase, to have better living conditions for the people, greater opportunities of growth and so on and so forth. That I suppose, will be agreed to. But there is something more about it, I think, than this. What ultimately does science represent? I suppose, the active principle of science is discovery. Discovery, I said. You Sir,⁵ just referred to scientists declaring war on nature. May I put it in a different way, that we seek the cooperation of nature, we seek to uncover the secrets of nature, to understand them and to utilize them,

1. Speech at the opening of National Fuel Research Institute, Digwadih, Dhanbad, 22 April 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

2. Nehru inaugurated the National Chemical Laboratory at Pune on 3 January 1950 and the National Physical Laboratory at New Delhi on 21 January 1950.

3. C.V. Raman.

4 & 5. Rajendra Prasad, the President of India.

for the benefit of humanity. Anyway the active principle of science is discovery. Now, what is, if I may say so, the active principle of any social framework of society? Normally it is conservatism, of remaining where we are, of not changing, of carrying on, no doubt with improvement, no doubt, adding to it something or other. But, nevertheless, it is the principle of continuity, rather than of change. So we come up against a certain inherent conflict, between that principle of society, which is one of continuity and of conservatism and the principle of science, which is of discovery, which brings about change, and which challenges that continuity. So, with the result, that the scientific worker, although he is praised and patted on the back, is nevertheless, not wholly approved of, because he comes and upsets the status quo.

And we see, that, normally speaking, science seldom really has the facilities that it deserves, except when some misfortune comes to a country in the shape of war. Then everything has to be set aside and science has its way for an evil purpose, nevertheless, it has its way. Now it is interesting to see this apparently inherent conflict between the normal conservatism of a static society and the normal revolutionary tendency of the scientists' discoveries, which changes often enough the basis of that society, because it changes living conditions, changes conditions governing human life, human survival and the rest. Now, I take it that most people who talk glibly of science, including our great industrialists, think of science as a kind of handmaiden to make their work easier. Well, so it is of course, it does make their work easier. Something which adds to the wealth of the nation, something which betters conditions. All that science does do. But surely science is something more than that, and the history of science shows that it does not just merely better the old but it sometimes upsets the old. It not only merely adds new truths to old, but sometimes the new truth it discovers, disintegrates some part of the old truth, and thereby upsets not only the way of men's thinking, but the way of their lives too. So it is not merely a question of repeating the old in better ways, adding to the old, but creating something that is new. That is new to human consciousness.

Now, if we pursue this line of thought, then what exactly does the spirit of science mean? It means not only accepting the fresh truths that science may bring, not only improving the old but to be prepared to upset the old, if it goes against that spirit. To accept the new, to accept the disintegration of the old, not to be tied down to something that is old, because it is old, not to be tied down to a social fabric, or an industrial fabric, or an economic fabric, simply because you have carried on with it, although it goes contrary to the spirit of science, or to a new discovery of science. It means all that. Now most countries, whatever they may say, normally do not like to change. The human being is essentially a conservative animal. He dislikes change. He is used to certain ways of life, and any person trying to change them, meets with his disapproval. Nevertheless, change comes and people have to adapt themselves to it as they have, in the past. Now all countries, as I said, are normally conservative. But I imagine that our country, India, is more than

normally conservative, and it is, therefore, that I have ventured to place these thoughts before you, because there is a curious hiatus, I find in people's thinking, if I may say so, in even scientists' thinking, who praise science and practise science in the laboratory, but who discard the ways of science and the methods of approach of science and the spirit of science in everything else that they might do in life, and they become completely unscientific about it.

Now, if you approach science in that way, it no doubt does some good, it will always do some good. It teaches us new ways of doing things. It improves, may be, our conditions of industry or life. but the basic thing that science should do is to teach us to think straight and to act straight, and not to be afraid of anything, of discarding anything or accepting anything provided we have sufficient reason to do so. I should like our country to understand that, to appreciate that idea more because our country in a sense, in the realms of thought, has been singularly free in the past and it has not hesitated to look down the deep well of truth whatever it might contain. Nevertheless, with a mind so free in social practice, it encumbered itself so much that it came in the way of its growth, and it comes in the way of its growth today, in a hundred ways; our customs, our ways of looking at things, the little things that govern our lives, which have no real importance. But nevertheless they come in our way, and now that we have attained independence, naturally, there is a resurgence of all kinds of new forces, good and bad. Good forces, of course, are let loose by a sense of freedom. But also a number of rather narrowing forces, which narrow our minds, narrow our outlooks, which under the guise of what people call culture, really mean a restriction of culture and a denial of any kind of real culture, because culture is a widening of the mind and of the spirit. Culture is never a narrowing of the mind or a restriction of the spirit of a man or of a country.

Therefore, if we look at science in the real way, and if we think of these research institutes and laboratories in a fundamental sense, then these are somethings more than just finding out little ways of improving things. How they should be done, of course, they have to do that. But they have to gradually affect our minds, the minds not only of those who work here, the young men and young women who might work here, but the minds of others too, and the minds of the rising generation more especially, so that the nation may grow up, imbibing the spirit of science and be prepared to accept a new truth, even though it has to discard something of the old in doing so. Only then, will this approach to science bear true fruit.

In order to attach importance, because we attach importance to these research institutes, we have ventured to ask you, Sir, Mr President, to take the trouble to come all the way here, to open this, the third of our great national laboratories, and we are very grateful to you that you have taken the trouble to do so, and I am sure that your visit here, and the visit of so many distinguished scientists and

others will help in drawing people's attention to the value of science, not only its external applications and implications, but to the real value of it, that is, widening the spirit of man and thereby bettering humanity at large.

3. Freedom and Responsibility¹

...You have heard of socialism and communism and the like, and personally I have always felt a considerable attraction towards the socialist theory. But whether you have socialism or any other "ism" or capitalism, the basic thing is that you must produce wealth first before you can distribute it. People think too much in terms just of distribution but what will you distribute if you have not got anything to distribute? Therefore, production becomes important. Therefore, it becomes necessary when you consider the question of food in our country—and this State, as you know, is deficit in food,—it becomes important to increase our food supply, by intensive cultivation, by bringing more lands under cultivation and the like. There is a great deal of room by intensive cultivation to increase our food supply. And so also, in regard to industrial goods, we must produce the goods that we require and not rely on other countries. Therefore, production has become essential. We want to raise wages, we want to raise salaries, so as to raise standards of life. How are we to do that? How is your Travancore State to do it? After all it can only do it in so far as it has money in its possession to do it. How does it get money? It gets it from taxation, taxing you and all the people here. They can only tax up to a certain limit unless your income is more. So you see you get into a vicious circle. Ultimately it depends on how much the people of a State or of India produce. The more wealth they produce the more goes properly into distribution through salaries and wages and other ways. If people think that by not producing, by passing resolutions, they can increase the wealth of the country, that is sheer nonsense. It is true that people object, and rightly object, that if they produce a great deal, it goes, the profits go into wrong pockets; they accumulate; that is wrong. Therefore, it becomes necessary for proper distribution to be made, so that justice

1. Speech at a public meeting, Thiruvananthapuram, 1 June 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

may be done. But remember that the essential thing, and the first thing, is to produce. Now, I did not intend talking about production and distribution but somehow I got that into my mind as I was speaking to you.

But truly, at the present moment when we have solved the problem of political freedom, the other highly important problem of economic advances and economic freedom, comes up before us. After all, political freedom is a necessity by itself, but in reality it is the door to economic advance. If political freedom does not lead to economic freedom and advance, then it has not served its purpose properly. And the biggest problem that we have got to face today is the problem of economic advance of our people. We got our freedom at a difficult time when the world and our country were suffering from the effects of this great World War which had shaken up all countries, which had created inflation and all kinds of difficulties and which had destroyed a great deal of the world's goods. We had to face that. We had to face other problems. A big part of our country was cut off by partition. That gave a great shock to our system. We have had to face a good deficit, and we have had to import food. We have had to feed and clothe and rehabilitate seven or eight or nine millions of refugees, a tremendous number, just at the moment when we became free. Just look at the picture, the enormous burdens this country had to carry.

Well, we faced them with such courage and ability as we had, and if we have not solved those problems, at any rate, we have not surrendered to them and we have not collapsed and we have advanced some way, I think, towards their solution. But the way is hard and difficult and it is no good my making big promises to you, because those promises ultimately depend not on what I may do, or what the government may do, but they depend a great deal on what the people of this country will do and will not do. People seem to think that by government decrees and government laws a country changes. A country changes only by the hard work of vast numbers of people in that country, not a few only. Laws and decrees come in to help, to open the way to work, to make it easy for people to work, to see that they get back the worth of their work, to see that their labour is not wasted. But laws and decrees and resolutions by themselves do not go far unless they have the full cooperation of the people and the people themselves set their shoulders to the wheel. Therefore, when you criticise the government, whether it is the Travancore Government or the Government of India, you have every right to do so, do so by all means. I am not afraid of criticism and nobody should be afraid of criticism if it is healthy criticism. Malicious criticism has no value. Destructive criticism does not carry us very far; constructive criticism is always helpful. But however you criticise, remember this, that in the end, if we go for any very big undertaking—and what bigger undertaking can you have than the raising of the standards of living of three hundred and fifty million people. It is a terrific job, raising 1/5 of the human race. There is no bigger job on the earth's surface

today—so that when you undertake this big job, that job can only be done with any measure of success when those millions of people themselves put their shoulders to the wheel. There is a great deal that they can do and it is the duty of government not merely to do something itself but rather to make it easy for those people to help themselves. I confess to you that my Government has not shown the way to the people to do that very easily. We have exhorted them, certainly, we have asked them to do something, to produce more, but we have not shown any easier, very facile way for them to work in that direction. But in any event what you should understand is this, that whether you have a good government or a bad government, ultimately it depends on you, and on your labour; and the best of governments cannot deliver the goods unless the people themselves put their shoulders to the wheel.

...Now freedom brings many things, much good, but freedom also brings a great deal in the way of responsibility. A free people, unless they realise their responsibilities, unless they act up to them, they are liable to lose their freedom. I sometimes wonder whether the people of India, having attained their political freedom, recognise and realise what responsibilities they have to face. It has been said that it may be difficult to attain freedom, but sometimes it is more difficult to retain it, to keep it, because when you have won freedom, you become rather somnolent, you think you have done your job, and you forget that freedom can only be kept by eternal vigilance and people who forget that lesson lose their freedom. How did we get our freedom? What did Mahatmaji teach us? He taught us to forget our petty differences, whether they were provincial, whether they were communal, whether they were religious, to strive in a unified way for the unity of India, to bring about a certain equality in the country, to put an end to the curse of untouchability, and he taught us to work, whether it was cottage industry or *charkha* or whatever. Now, those lessons which were so important when we were struggling for our freedom, remain important today. When I see people forgetting them, losing themselves in their petty quarrels and squabbles, when I see communalism raising its head again, when I see this lack of discipline in the country, and provincialism coming to the fore again, then I wonder if we have not forgotten those main lessons that Mahatmaji taught us. And if we forget those lessons, I have not a shadow of a doubt, that we shall do so at our peril and our liberty and our freedom itself will be in danger. So it is time that we think again, what is the basis of our freedom? How can India be a great country? How can we build up this new India that we have hoped for, because it will not come up merely by itself. You and I and all of us in this country will have to work hard for it, to build it up and only then will we succeed.

Look at India today, this is a great country, which in spite of the partition, in spite of some rich and very precious parts of India going out of India, nevertheless, it is a very great country, a very large country, a country with an infinite of resources

of all kinds, all varieties, and a country with a human population very large—much too large, I wish it was smaller; nevertheless, a human population, which is intelligent, which is clever with its mind and its hands, which can take to anything whether it is the finest industry, the highly specialised industry, whether it is artisanship and do it with success. So we have the natural resources and we have the human resources. What comes in the way of our putting them together? Because if a country has natural resources and human resources then all that has to be done is to yoke them together and achieve certain big results. Yet somehow or other, we do not achieve those results as quickly as we want. Because we have some failings too, many failings, and among those failings, is a spirit of separatism, a fissiparous tendency, a tendency to faction and a lack of discipline. And so somehow, we do not achieve the big results that we aim at. We see countries like Germany and Japan, great countries, which in this War were completely defeated, completely humiliated and completely ruined. Yet the War ended only five years ago, and you see today a new Germany rising up and a new Japan rising up. Neither Germany nor Japan wails and groans and complains. They are disciplined folk. And having met with disaster and defeat, having followed a wrong policy, and having suffered because they followed a wrong policy, well, they have set their shoulders to the wheel again, quietly, silently, working for themselves and for their country and building it up. And now, four or five years later, if you look at their industrial output, in economic terms or any term, they are producing sometimes even more than they did before. Because they are working hard. Some Japanese specialists come to Delhi to teach our folk, the refugees and others, cottage industries and the like. They told us, “your people are very clever, but they are very lazy. They do not work.” Those Japanese themselves work all day from morning till evening, hard work, and they are used to it. But our people who work with them, they are quite good but compared to the Japanese, are found lazy. Well, if you and I are going to be lazy, then obviously we cannot expect much to happen. Somebody else is not going to work for us. We shall have to work and we shall have to work hard.

Work itself, working hard does harm to nobody. Work is bad if one works under compulsion and for somebody else's benefit. If you are in prison and you have to work under prison regulations, well, nobody would like it. But the same work, if you do out of your goodwill to benefit yourself and to benefit your country, becomes a pleasure. It is not work that is bad, but the approach to work and the conditions of work. But one thing is dead certain, that our country or any country, will only go ahead when people in large numbers work hard and produce. The second part is equally important, that what they produce should be utilized to the national advantage and not for the good of a few. That is a second part of this proposition.

So that, today, for instance, our primary problem, you might say, is the food problem because a nation must have enough food. If we do not have enough food,

we have to import food from abroad. That is bad enough. We have to send our money abroad. But, suppose, some difficulty comes, suppose a war occurs, and we cannot get food from abroad, what will we do then? It will be a terrible outlook for us. Therefore, if we really value our independence, it becomes essential for us to produce enough food, so that we might not go under in times of crisis. Therefore, we have given priority number one to food production and we have resolved that by the end of next year, 1951, we shall make our country self-sufficient in food. It may be that in doing so, many of us may have to change our food habits. In times of war, the last war, almost every warring country, like England, Germany, like every country in Europe, had to do without the food they were used to. Well, they did without them. Even today in England there are all kinds of restrictions on food. But the British people are a disciplined people. They do not shout. They put up with them. They take the food they get. But our people are so used to certain routines and habits that, if they do not get the exact things they have been used to eat, then they almost prefer starving to eating anything else. Now, we must have some flexibility about us, flexibility of mind, flexibility of body, flexibility, if I may say so, of your digestive organs. Otherwise, you suffer and the country suffers. And you must realise that we will do our utmost to produce more food. But if a particular variety of food is less in the country after a year and a half or so, then people will have to eat a little of some other variety.

Now, I said food is the primary problem. That is true. But really you cannot separate these things. Industrial growth is equally essential. You have got here in Travancore some hydro-electric power schemes. They are relatively small. We have got some enormous schemes, up in the north and east. Look at the map of India. You see this mighty chain of the Himalayas. A tremendous barrier, as if huge barriers were erected to separate India from the rest of Asia. Look at that Himalayan barrier. It is a source of tremendous power and energy provided we can utilize it. Great rivers flow down it, roaring torrents, full of tremendous energy and strength, if we can capture that strength and convert it into power and use that power for the public good. Well we have got some big schemes on, and those schemes will take four or five years to materialise, but we hope in the course of the next two or three years to get some benefit from them and much more benefit later, both in regard to food production and in regard to industrial growth and more power. Remember, power is essential today for industrial growth. You cannot grow in any direction without power. I am glad to know that, perhaps, in a year or two in Travancore and Cochin State you will have probably enough power and more than enough power than you can use. Today you can test a nation's growth by seeing how much power it possesses and can use, whether it is thermal power or hydro-electric power or whatever it may be. Some day will come, no doubt, I hope, that you may use here a great deal of atomic energy power. However, we have to wait for that for some time...

Now again look at this great country of ours. I came here yesterday, and I dashed down to Kanya Kumari—Cape Comorin and spent a night there. And although the gods were not very kind and it rained, nevertheless I was very happy to go there and it came to my mind, that here I am sitting at the southern tip of India, with a vast country above me, to the north of me, numerous provinces, States and the rest, mountains and rivers, and my mind went back to the northern limit of this country, which is Kashmir, nearly two thousand miles away. Ladakh and Kashmir are practically in the heart of Asia. Ladakh is almost across the Himalayan barrier on the other side. The lowest place in Ladakh is eleven thousand feet altitude. And I felt and I wondered, when I thought of India with its tremendous variety and diversity, here is India in Kashmir, with its amazing beauty of nature and its high mountains and glaciers and rich valleys, here is India in Ladakh, bare and barren, and almost an extension of Tibet, and here is India also, if you like, in Travancore, near the Equator, completely different. So, and in between, all the variety of this country, the diversity of it, and yet wherever you may go, the tremendous impress of its unity, which I found in Ladakh, which I found in Kashmir, which I find in Travancore or any other part of India that I go to. I myself, though born on the banks of the Jamuna and the Ganges in Allahabad, as you know my family hails from Kashmir, I feel very much at home in Kashmir when I go there, in the mountains and rivers and bleak glaciers. But when I come to Travancore, I feel at home here also. And so, I feel at home wherever I may go in India.

Now I want you to appreciate this conception of India, with its great diversity and its fundamental basic unity. That is one conception I want you to realize and appreciate, because I do not want personally, in any way even if I could, which I cannot, to put an end to this great variety and diversity of India. At the same time, while I do not wish to put an end to that, I realize more and more that at any time, and more especially today, we have to think in terms of the unity of India, and to discourage and stop any tendency, which comes in the way of that unity. The diversity of India is obvious enough. It is the beauty of India, this diversity. But in the world today, it is even more important for us to stress the unity of India. That basic unity has been shaken up tremendously by the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan. Well, that has been done. And we do not want it undone. Not only would we have not wanted it undone after it was done, but many things have happened since then, which make it still less desirable to undo it. Let us leave, therefore, Pakistan out of account, from this point of view. But it is true that the partition of India, apart from creating Pakistan, shook up the body and soul of India tremendously. It gave us tremendous nervous shocks. In the individual when enormous shock comes there may be a nervous breakdown, there may be neurosis, and ultimately there may be insanity when this is a terrible shock. So also in a nation and in a community, when great shocks like this come, they shake up the mind and spirit and soul of the nation. We have been shaken up, just as Pakistan is also shaken up, and horrible things happened after the partition.

not here, but in north India, terrible things, which none of us who has seen them can ever forget. But however horrible those things, we could not run away. At any rate, we had learnt that great lesson, we had imbibed that much courage from our master, the Mahatma. We did not run away. We faced things which broke our heart. Nevertheless, we worked on. So by this partition of India and what followed, India suffered a terrible shock. Because it was cutting up a living body. Well, we have survived that shock, but not completely yet, and the effects of that remain still in many ways, rather psychological and mental and the worst effect of it was this, that it has brought to the front many other separatist and fissiparous tendencies in the country. Many reactionary tendencies, which now try to speak in terms of nationalism, really seek to break up India as it is or seek to do things which will inevitably go to break up India or make it weak. Therefore, it has become necessary for me to remind you, and to remind the country all the time, that we have to be vigilant against these things. Because they do not come straight to you and talk in straight terms. They come by devious ways. They appeal sometimes to your religious sentiments, sometimes, may be, to your cultural sentiments, sometimes some other way, and without realizing where you are going, you are swept in a wrong direction. Therefore, it becomes important and essential that we should hold to that anchor, because I am convinced about this more than about anything else, that if we forget those basic things that Mahatmaji stood for, then we do not serve our nation, we weaken the country and we imperil our freedom, and what is more, the things that have made India great in the past, and that we hope will make her greater in future, those things slip by, and we become narrow-minded communalists working in our small grooves, or narrow-minded provincialists working in our provinces and States and forgetting the larger good of the country, and not realizing that our own limited good as an individual or as a State or as a province is so intimately connected with the larger good, that if the larger good suffers, we suffer, and our personal selves and families and States also suffer. As a matter of fact, I could go a step further and say that the world has become so closely knit up together, that if a deep injury is done to any part of the world it affects the whole world. If a great war occurs, well, the whole world suffers. That is true of the whole world, more and more, but after all, we are not responsible for the world. We cannot do very much if the world goes wrong. We try to do our little bit. We try to shape our foreign policy so that peace might be preserved in the world. We try to keep out of entanglements, power blocs and the like, because we think those entanglements, those power blocs may lead to war on a big scale. But after all, we are a new free country. We are an old country with newly acquired freedom, and though our potential strength is great, our actual strength is not so great. And let us not imagine that it is great. We are weak in the councils of the world, and we should know that, and work to make ourselves strong; work quietly, not by shouting. Therefore, we do what we can in world affairs, it does not amount to much, though it does amount to something, and it is quite possible at a moment

of crisis, we might make some slight difference. Our counsel counts for a little more in Asia, not because of our strength, military or financial, because we have neither financial strength nor military strength, but because our neighbour countries of Asia know that we have no design upon them. They can trust us, as we can trust them. So we take counsel together. So we affect each other.

You know that I am really here in Travancore today on my way to Indonesia, another great country, which has recently become free and which is facing terrible problems. Now why is Indonesia so friendly to India and why is India so friendly to Indonesia? For a variety of reasons. And we are more friendly to each other, if I may say so, than we are to any other country. We have nothing to gain from each other. We have no designs on each other. But somehow the course of our struggle for freedom, the knowledge of it in each other's minds brought us near each other, made us respect each other. There is, of course, a great deal in Indonesia which is common to us, and there is a great deal that they have taken from us, and the relics of which we find still there. However whether we affect world affairs or Asian affairs much or little depends on the future. But so far as our own affairs are concerned, if we cannot control our own affairs in India, then obviously we would suffer for it. We shall go to the wall. And it becomes of essential importance that we should understand this lesson of unity in India, unity and discipline. A united country even if it goes wrong, can retrace its steps and do right later. A disunited country even if it does right can do precious little. It goes to pieces. A disciplined country can go far, because its discipline itself is great strength. An undisciplined country again is a weak country. I repeat this again and again because the whole history of India teaches us this lesson that while we have had resources, while we have had ability, while we have had courage and the spirit of sacrifice, we have lacked unity and we have lacked discipline. And if we have not learnt that lesson yet, then all our ability and learning and even courage will not do much for us, because they will be wasted due to our indiscipline and lack of unity.

The first thing that came in the way of our lack of unity, which delayed our freedom for a long time, was the spirit of communalism. Now, unfortunately, many people who criticise Pakistan a great deal, who used to and still criticise communalism of the Muslim League, have now developed that communalism themselves. It is an extraordinary thing. That is a strange thing to happen; and all these communal movements that you see today in this country, whether it is the Hindu Mahasabha or the R.S.S., or other movements you may have in the South with which I am not so well acquainted; the whole thing amazingly enough is just a reflex of what the Muslim League did here. Well, we suffered enough from that thing. Are we going to put up with these new and objectionable growths in our country, which imperil our unity and weaken us? I want you to think of that. I hope not. Certainly, in so far as I have any strength in me, I propose to combat every shape and form of communalism.

I am not afraid of opposition in this country. I do not mind if thought-out opposition grows up in this country based on some theory, some practice, on some constructive schemes. I do not want India to be just millions of people saying "yes" to one thing, that is not the way intelligent human beings develop. But what I think is not good for a country, is just the spirit of faction by itself, the spirit of destruction or destructive criticism by itself, for that leads to nowhere. I want opposition. I feel stale and weak if I have not got somebody to fight. So I want opposition. It strengthens the country. It strengthens the party, and it is very weakening for a group or a party or for a country to feel that it has fought its last fight. No country ever does that.

What is the matter with us today? What is the matter with the Congress today, with most Congressmen? They think that, well, because they laboured for some years, because they went to prison a few times, therefore they need not do anything now and get a reward for their labours. Well, now that is a dangerous thing. First of all, in a labour of this kind, the reward is the labour itself, and no other reward. But apart from that, it is a most dangerous type of mind which becomes complacent, when dangers, perils threaten us all round. Tremendous things are happening in Asia, big changes, epoch-making changes, in fact the whole weight of current history is gradually shifting from Europe and America to Asia, and big things are likely to happen whether in war or whether in peace in Asia. So in this dynamic, changing revolutionary world, if we in India grow complacent, we are done for. We have to be wide awake. We have to be vigilant. We have to be disciplined, and we have to work our hardest.

Well, we have to work our hardest, how? In what direction? What are we to do about it? There comes in the question of economic policy. Now, I am not going to say much about economic policy, because it is a very big subject, and it is a very difficult subject. But I shall say this about it, that I am accused, may be rightly accused, by some of my old colleagues for having pretended to be a socialist in the past and having forgotten it, and having more or less sided with the capitalists. Well, it is very difficult to judge oneself, and it may be that I have gradually deteriorated. Nevertheless, I can only judge things with such mental capacity as I have got, and it seems to me that the first thing to do for a human being today, is to get rid of a dogmatic way of thinking. Whatever philosophy you may follow in life, it should teach you that life is a dynamic, continually changing thing. It is in a state of flux. Life in India today, the economic life, every type of life is changing. Now just to repeat some dogma, regardless of circumstances, does not seem to me a very intelligent thing to do. As a matter of fact, the socialism I learnt was this, that you cannot apply any single rule unthinkingly to any country, that you must take into consideration the objective and other conditions of that country and apply them, and see how far it can be applied. Let us get rid of slogans. Let us think precisely, what to do and how to do it. Let us for the moment not talk about capitalism and socialism even, although they are useful terms. We have

got to remove the poverty of this country. We have got to raise the level of our masses in every way. How are we to do it? What are the first necessities? Food, clothing, houses, yes; education, health, yes. How are we to do all this? Let us think in those terms and set about the business instead of sitting down and arguing some deep dogmatic truth of socialism or communism or capitalism or some other 'ism'. Study them by all means, but ultimately try to find out the problem we have, try to find out how to solve it in concrete terms, not in theoretical terms.

Now I am prepared to admit frankly, that during the last, well, two and a half years or more, since we have been functioning as an independent government, we have faced great dangers and I hope we have faced them bravely. But it is true that on the economic plane, we have worked rather spasmodically, because we have to face so many difficult situations from day to day, and we have not had, perhaps, the time or the opportunity to think about these matters in that constructive, planned way that we should have done. I am glad to say that we are now facing these problems through a Planning Commission, which recently came into existence and which consists of very eminent men devoted to this task. I am sure that with their help, the Government of India and the State Governments will find it easier to solve some of the problems that face us.

Now may I, it comes to my mind in this connection, say something about a matter which I read about in the newspapers today. You know that for the last three years or more we have had a very eminent son of Travancore in our Central Cabinet, Dr John Matthai, and whatever activity he indulged in, whatever portfolio he held, he distinguished himself considerably, not only because of his ability, but of his well-known integrity and earnestness. And so for these three years and more we have functioned together, and have, I hope both of us, a great deal of respect for each other and it was a matter of great regret for me that so far as the Cabinet is concerned, we have had to part company recently. It is a matter of equal regret for all of us in Delhi that his wife, Mrs Matthai,² who has made a tremendous name for herself in Delhi by her very great labours for the refugees and women and children, that she was going away. I am glad however that she has promised to come back to look after the women and children.

However, Dr Matthai, I find in today's papers, gave a statement to the press yesterday³, in which he has said something which requires some elucidation. It

2. Mrs Achamma Matthai helped the Government of India in rehabilitation of women from 1947 to 1950 and the Bombay Government from 1951 to 1952.

3. John Matthai said that owing to differences of opinion on certain fundamental principles and on matters of public policy, he had resigned from the Cabinet. "The next twelve months are going to be most crucial in the economic life of the country and it will not be in the interests of the country to embarrass the Government by making these differences public."

was not my wish nor my desire to go into this matter, but I felt, when I read this, and when I read some newspaper comments that it was not fair to the public to leave it in the dark. Normally, one does not talk about Cabinet matters and Cabinet secrets. But in a democracy, one must take the people into confidence, sometimes. Dr Matthai has said in his statement, I speak from memory, that he resigned from the Cabinet and from his Finance portfolio because of certain differences with the Prime Minister on important matters of policy. Further, he believes that in a Cabinet there should be joint responsibility and because, he felt, he could not agree to something that I and the rest of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister stood for, he found it difficult to continue. Now that statement, as it is, is perfectly correct. I have nothing further to say. But it does produce a certain difficulty and an embarrassing position not only for Dr Matthai, but for me and for our colleagues in the Cabinet to leave it at that. And people wonder what this matter is, about which there is a difference in policy. And sometimes they make the wildest and most incorrect guesses.

First of all, may I say, that I entirely believe, and we must believe, in the joint responsibility of the Cabinet, whether it is the Central Cabinet or a State or a provincial Cabinet. We have in our Constitution largely accepted the British practice in constitutional matters and that British practice is that of joint responsibility. Also it casts a special burden on the Prime Minister. That is to say, while every member of the Cabinet is jointly responsible in regard to major matters of policy, the Prime Minister is particularly responsible for them for the simple reason, because of his position and the way the office of the Prime Minister has grown in the United Kingdom. So I accept that entirely. In so far as I am concerned, I can inform you that we have functioned in our Central Cabinet on that assumption of joint responsibility. Sometimes the Cabinet has decided something with which I did not agree; sometimes other members did not agree, but because it was jointly decided we stood by it jointly. That is admitted.

Now, it is true that certain differences arose in regard to, not so much of policy, if I may say so, but the approach to policy between Dr Matthai and myself. And I have to be now a little frank with you and with the country, so that there might not be any misapprehension. That would be unfair to Dr Matthai and unfair to me. The differences were largely concerned with the appointment and the purpose of the Planning Commission. You know that I have long been connected with some kind of planning, and I have long felt that planning is absolutely essential for any country, much more so for our country at this stage. Apart from that, the Congress has repeatedly laid stress on the appointment of a planning commission. On several occasions in this Parliament and the last, I gave an assurance that a planning commission would be appointed. So I was not only in favour of it, but committed to it. Dr Matthai felt that the appointment of a planning commission at this stage was neither necessary nor desirable. Not that Dr Matthai is opposed to planning in general, but he said, at this stage of the country, it was not

necessary or desirable because he felt that our resources were limited. It is possible that by appointing a planning commission, we might produce an impression in people's minds that great things are going to be done. When we cannot do those great things, their hopes will be frustrated, and that would be a bad thing. Therefore, Dr Matthai felt that a planning commission will needlessly make people think in a wrong direction and raise hopes which we cannot fulfil. We should go slow and we should try to husband our resources as best as we can, and then later may think of bigger schemes. Now there is a great deal in that argument, which I appreciate and you will no doubt appreciate. Nevertheless, my line of thinking and the line of thinking of many of my colleagues is this, that we realize completely that our resources are limited but because our resources are limited today, there is all the more the reason why we should plan so that they may not be wasted, so that we may use them to the best advantage. That is my line of thinking, right or wrong. And there is this difficulty, not so much, in the particular policy we should follow—because it is for the Planning Commission to recommend a policy and it is for Government ultimately to accept it or not—but rather to the approach to that policy: whether we should appoint a Planning Commission to go thoroughly into this question or not. There was this difference, which I regretted greatly. I myself was a strong believer in the approach through a Planning Commission, but apart from my belief in it I stood committed to it, because the Congress was committed, because our party was committed, because I had as Prime Minister given assurances repeatedly in Parliament that we will appoint a planning commission. That was the main point of difference.

Now there is one thing, I might point out. In reading an article in a newspaper from Madras today, which dealt with this particular matter, there was some reference to this business of my being a kind of an autocrat or introducing authoritarian methods in the Government of India or in the Cabinet. Well, again, it is rather difficult to discuss about myself. But so far as I know, we have done nothing affecting that principle of joint responsibility of the Cabinet. There is no question of autocracy and authoritarianism. But I have stated in public or semi-public, that as I am chiefly responsible for what the Cabinet or the Government does, if on a major matter of policy, my Government decides against what I think right, then obviously it becomes difficult for me to carry on. Because mine will be the responsibility. Why am I there in Government? I am there basically because the Congress organization put me there. If tomorrow the Congress Working Committee or the All India Congress Committee say to me "come out", well, I would come out. I do not argue with anybody. If tomorrow the members of our party in Parliament tell me, "get out", well, I shall get out. And, of course, even without either of them telling me, if I feel like getting out, I shall get out. But the point is this, that in regard to major policies, whatever they may be, I cannot conscientiously remain there if I go counter to those basic policies for which the

Congress has stood. Of course, I do not think any government can follow in meticulous detail, any policy laid down in this way. I am not talking about details. I am talking of the major approaches to a problem. Suppose the Congress approach has been a non-communal one in regard to our general politics. Now if my Government, or if my party in Parliament there, adopts an attitude which is communal, and which is opposed to the Congress attitude, well, then if I continue as Prime Minister, I become responsible for it. I must go, if I am true to that Congress policy which I represented. Suppose in the same way that the Congress lays down the broad principles of an economic policy—I do not think it is fair for any details to be laid down because it depends on circumstances but the broad approach and the broad principles—if I cannot follow them what have I got to do? The first thing I have to do is to go back to the Congress Working Committee or the A.I.C.C. and tell them, these are my difficulties, I cannot follow your policy entirely because of this difficulty. Well, either they tell me, we appreciate your difficulties, we vary our policy, or they say no, difficulty or no difficulty, you have got to do it. Well, then I have to choose, I say, I cannot do it, I get out; or I try to carry on in spite of those difficulties.

Now in the present situation, you will remember that only recently the Congress Working Committee has been talking a great deal about the Planning Commission. It has got its own Planning Committee and this Planning Committee held a planning conference and they passed a number of resolutions and laid down a certain policy, which was generally approved by the Working Committee. Now, naturally I consider myself bound in essentials with that larger policy laid down by the Planning Committee adopted by the Working Committee. Well with this approach Dr Matthai was not in entire sympathy, and that was the difference of opinion.

...Now before I finish one or two words more. I want to make an appeal to the writers and the press and the readers of the press of Travancore. Travancore has, as I said, a highly literate population compared with the rest of India, and therefore, no doubt, newspapers have larger circulation or there are many of them, whichever it may be, and they no doubt influence opinion. Now it seems to me of the highest importance that newspapers in our country should be responsible. I do not object to a newspaper criticising or advocating any policy. But let it do so constructively and responsibly, and let it not indulge in personal invective. I say so because I am told there is a good deal of personal invective and all that kind of thing in some of the newspapers here. I am sorry to hear it. Because a free country must have a free press. That is essential. But a free press must necessarily be a responsible press and not act irresponsibly; otherwise it vitiates the freedom that you have got. So I hope those who run newspapers here, will pay some heed to what I have suggested, and the readers of newspapers will see to it that they do so....

4. The Kosi Project¹

I have read in the papers that the Kosi river is in flood again and has submerged a very large area of land. No doubt, a great deal of damage would be caused by this. It was to stop these recurrent floods in that area, as well as for other purposes, that the Kosi Project was envisaged.² It is a good scheme, but it is a very big and a very expensive scheme. Mr Khosla³ explained it to me the other day and told me of the various stages of this scheme. So far as I can remember, flood control did not come in at all during the first two stages. It was in the third stage that some results were to be achieved in preventing floods.

2. This seems to me a very slow way of proceeding. Meanwhile, year after year, large-scale damage will be done and we shall have to spend money in repairing it temporarily. In effect, therefore, we are suffering losses from year to year because of our delay in dealing with this problem. I realise completely that any big scheme must take time. Further, that our resources are strictly limited and we cannot splash about.

3. I was wondering if our engineers had given thought to some alternative scheme, or rather some additional way of approaching this problem. This need not take the place of the Kosi Project, but it would be something, if it is feasible, which could bring relief from floods, quite apart from the big scheme before us.

4. I am no engineer and can make no suggestions, but I have just been reading some reports from our Ambassador in Peking about the steps taken by the Government there to prevent floods. Floods in China have brought untold misery for long years. The Yellow River has come to be known as the 'Sorrow of China'. Apart from the Yellow River, there are other rivers also, which are a menace from this point of view. The Government of China is a new Government with practically no resources. The country has been in a state of war, civil or other, for a whole generation or more and has been devastated. China cannot get any help from other nations. Perhaps they might get some little help from the U.S.S.R., but it cannot be much.

5. In spite of all these difficulties, the Government of China is trying to control these floods. Commissions have been set up for the purpose and they are building

1. Note to the Minister for Works, Mines and Power, 12 July 1950, File No. 17(201)/50-PMS. A copy was sent to the Secretary, Planning Commission.
2. The Kosi project consisted of a 750 feet high dam across the Chatra gorge in Nepal to store 11 million-acre feet of water, a power plant and a barrage in Nepal across the Kosi for irrigating two to three million acres in Nepal and Bihar. At a cost of Rs. 100 crores, it was to be completed in ten years. On the three stage-project investigations were nearing completion at this time.
3. A.N. Khosla was the Chairman of the Central Water and Power Commission at this time.

dams, reservoirs, etc. What machinery they have or where they can get machinery from, I do not know. But I imagine that they have not got much. They appear to depend chiefly on a large labour force which consists partly of their army and of peasants recruited locally in each area with a supervisory corps of experts and engineers. The results obtained are said to be satisfactory.

6. What I would like our engineers to consider is how far it is possible, with the help of local labour under expert supervision, to deal with this flood problem, apart from building the huge Kosi dam. Can we not have channels or canals dug in or some dams erected in various places to direct the water in a particular direction and thus to lessen the danger of floods? This may not be an ideal way of dealing with the problem, but it might bring some immediate relief to large areas. It would give employment to large numbers of people. No foreign exchange would be needed. It is possible even to have some voluntary labour for it. I repeat that this is not in place of the Kosi dam scheme, but something apart from it which may be fitted into it as far as possible.

7. I have no idea if this suggestion of mine is feasible at all. I should like a report upon it.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. Planning

1. The Necessity for Planning¹

Mr Chairman² and Friends,

You, Mr Chairman, have been commendably businesslike. I hope I shall follow your example in talking about this subject which is so important and to which all of us have given a great deal of thought in the past. Ultimately whatever shape planning may take, first of all we should know exactly what we want and we should try to use our resources to the best possible advantage. Sometimes, it is said that because our resources are limited at the present moment, the necessity for planning does not arise. Well, it is immaterial, if I may say so, whether the resources are more or less. The necessity for planning is there always. If there are not much resources, we need planning so that we may not waste. We have a Planning Commission now which has started functioning and we have the Planning Committee appointed by the Working Committee of which Shri Pant is the Chairman. The Congress President has convened this conference of Chief Ministers or their representatives, the Provincial Congress Committee Presidents or their representatives.³ I think it was a happy idea to convene this conference in the particular way it has been done, because it becomes symbolic to some extent of our approach—the official approach as well as the popular approach being combined together. That creates certain difficulties no doubt. This conference may, for instance, decide and recommend some things which possibly the Government or the official Planning Commission may find difficult to give effect to later after full consideration of the subject. Certain difficulties may arise but I think they can be got over if we proceed wisely. But the main thing is that planning on any big scale is sometimes a much bigger thing than putting up say odd factories or even river valley schemes. They are parts of planning no doubt, but some people imagine that planning consists in doing these odd jobs which are very desirable and important. Planning does not consist of that. Planning consists of integrating and having an overall view

1. Speech at the inaugural session of the National Planning Conference, New Delhi, 25 April 1950. Text as published in *Our Immediate Programme* by the All India Congress Committee, New Delhi.
2. The Congress Working Committee had appointed the Planning Sub-Committee in January 1950 with G.B. Pant as its chairman.
3. The two-day conference was meant to attempt synthesis of popular and official approaches to the country's problems including raising of levels of production and employment and repair of the damage caused to the country's economy by the Second World War and by partition.

of the general conditions and then trying to progress all along the line giving certain priorities. I am afraid, in spite of a great deal of talk of planning, what we, as Government have done in the past—and I speak with diffidence about the Provincial Governments but I think possibly it may be true even of them—that we have tried to make good in many directions. Different Ministries naturally have been anxious to show results but they have not achieved that amount of coordination even within Government and much less between Governments or between the State Governments and the Centre. Certainly I may frankly confess that the Central Government have been doing some planning. Of course there is an overall picture, but not that concentrated and careful attempt to see the whole picture and try to fit everything into it. The time for this has come; in fact it came long ago. Anyhow we have made a beginning.

However well the Government functions in this respect, I don't think it is possible to give a clear effect to any big schemes without public support, without realisation and understanding by the public as to what is being done by and large and their support. That is most important and that is why it becomes essential that the main organization which represents the public viz., the Congress, should be particularly drawn into this picture. I am very happy that our National Planning Commission and the Congress Planning Committee are frequently considering this with each other and trying to understand each other and cooperate as much as they can in these initial stages. In fact at least one member is common to the two and he is the link between the two which is very necessary. Apart from the general public support, I think we have to create a feeling in the public of understanding what is being done.

I will give you a very minor instance that happened to me day before yesterday. I was going up and down the Damodar Valley⁴ and looking at the work that was being done there. It is always rather exciting to see a big construction project under way with hundreds of people building up something. Any building up is always exciting and it is exhilarating to see thousands of people working on the various dams etc. There were a few engineers at work and they were quite enthusiastic and they explained to me the various processes, and what they were doing. I was happy to see their enthusiasm. Then I asked them "Have you explained all this to the workers who are working there?" They all looked sheepishly at one another and said: "We have not tried to explain this to them." Then I went over to the workers and collected them and said: "What are you doing?" They said they were engaged in digging earth or whatever they were doing and I asked them "What does this lead to?" Their answers were very vague. They did not know. Of course, they were building something but they had no conception what it was. So I spoke

4. Eight dams and one barrage were being constructed on the Damodar river and its tributaries as a joint venture of the Bihar and West Bengal Governments.

to them for a little while and tried to explain to them briefly what the responsibility of the workers was—that although their work was very small they were in fact engaged in a very big undertaking which would convert the countryside into a prosperous place, provide employment for hundreds of thousands of workers, would prevent floods which destroy crops and their villages, bring more lands under crops, would provide hydro-electric power for their industry, etc., etc. All this I briefly tried to explain to them. Not that all were interested, but somehow there was some impact on their minds, and one or two asked questions. If I had more time I could have pursued the matter, but I did this more to point out to the engineers and other officials in charge that they should never forget this public approach aspect.

In the interest of the worker himself, if he is made to feel that he is engaged in some very big undertaking and is not merely working for Rs. 1/- or Rs. 1/8/-per day, he will take more interest in his work and he will work better. The people who actually work, the real people in the neighbourhood, should know all about it. Then you get more cooperation from them. So it is very important that whatever plans we make, whatever schemes we undertake, we should try to put them across to the people concerned, the people who work, the labourers as well as all others round about, as well as, ultimately, the whole country. They must know what they are doing, that they are taking part in a huge undertaking, a huge enterprise. It does raise the morale of the people. The worker should know that he is doing something big and not merely working to eke out a livelihood. One thing that we should learn from Russia is the way they energise the whole countryside for their various plans. Now, it is quite immaterial what their theory is, what their State structure is, but the fact is that whatever they do, build dams or anything, the whole country talks about it. One hears of the Dnieper dam.⁵ People talk about it. People discuss it. Everyday, or every few days, you hear, it has gone up by a few more inches. It is going up and up and up, and the morale of the state was raised by it. Now we cannot do that, although everybody appreciates the need for a public approach. Look at our newspapers. They are all full of news, mostly consisting of occurrences—a record of our troubles and conflicts. I am afraid they have got to be recorded but it is very important, both from the domestic and international points of view, to show what we are doing. So the first thing is this—take the people around into your confidence, and explain your activities to the workers. Make them have a sense of sharing in a big undertaking.

But, of course, for the moment you have met here, not perhaps to discuss that aspect, although it will be worthwhile to do because Government may be able to help in that, but essentially it is the job of the Congress Committees. They take it up and naturally they can coordinate, between the Government agency and

5. On the Dnieper river in the U.S.S.R., a 450,000 kw. hydro-electric station was being built at Kremenchug and a 250,000 kw plant at Dnieprodzerzhinsk.

the Congress. Therefore, it is essential that you all meet here and discuss the various aspects of planning which presumably, will mean certain questions of priority, may be certain questions of controls, and other such questions. Of course, you should have a clear idea of what you are going to do first and what next. Then you must have some kind of objective—may be in the vaguest terms—but you must have an objective. Merely saying that you are working for the good of the people is no good. Everybody talks about it, but some kind of objective is needed. You will have to state it in terms of what I call the actual theory, to start discussing the various approaches to the problem—the practical approaches. As I said right in the beginning, the representatives here, in this conference, will lend their weight to the decisions because they are men of experience and can sense public reactions. They know what the public feel. The public may or may not feel rightly about such complicated matters. Each will think in terms of his own land, or district or State, if you like. They cannot see the whole picture. Therefore what they may decide may not be right from the point of view of all-India planning. There is, I believe, a certain measure of waste of effort—overlapping of efforts, trying to do the same thing instead of doing new things—that ought to be avoided. Therefore, it would be necessary, to have this integrated all-India picture, in which all people concerned and all the organisations, Government and non-official, cooperate. While we are discussing planning, the Government of India's drawers and shelves are full of schemes, and, no doubt, each State Government has also its plans or schemes round about it, but, I have a premonition that we have not yet done what is essential, to see the whole scheme in relation to each other, in relation to things that could definitely be laid down, and then ruthlessly cut down what is secondary and concentrate on the primary objectives. Because, otherwise, all our energy is spread out and nothing really big is achieved. And that is what has happened. We have got so many excellent schemes. Every scheme is good, but then, you have to choose as to which you are going to do now, and not set about doing everything at the same time.

So it becomes necessary to consider very carefully the whole picture. Take even the question of controls, which is highly important from the public point of view. In having controls we may not perhaps be thinking at the time of what the consequences of a decision on a particular control may be on another control. It becomes an important matter and the average man will think of it in its isolation and not in regard to its consequences on other matters like cost of living index going up or how it affects inflation. Unless you consider the whole thing you can't decide and you cannot obviously, sitting at a conference like this, decide or consider the details. It can only be done by close application by a select body of men who can then present the whole picture and when it comes before the Government it can decide this way or that way. That is the whole object of the Planning Commission which has nothing to do with the day to day work of Government, which all of us have to do. We have to take up the question suddenly in the middle

of so many other matters and decide and we can't simply give that close thought to all the inter-related phenomena which the question deserves. Therefore a body of experts give their thought to these questions, see them in their entirety and make their recommendations to the Government. The Government will then know every aspect of the question and decide. I don't know how you are going to proceed here but however you may proceed, I am quite sure that the real fact that you have joined together here and are considering this matter will help us, and will help each one of you so that you may go back with this idea of planning on this scale as I have indicated, not in any isolated way of carrying out the schemes but an integrated way, trying to reach a particular objective and concentrate on important things which will form the foundation on which you can build. So your decisions will receive the most careful attention from the various Governments concerned, always, of course, bearing in mind that whether it is Government of the Planning Commission, they cannot finally commit themselves at this stage in a conference to any particular policy. They may pay the greatest attention to what you say and then look at the broad picture and make their own recommendations to the Governments.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

May 25, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You mentioned in your letter received yesterday, that Munshi has spoken to you about the Planning Commission and that you felt that the scope of the Planning Commission's work should be clearly defined.²

I do not know exactly what Munshi told you. As a matter of fact we have been trying to lay down rules for the purpose of defining the activities of the Planning Commission in its contacts with Ministries etc. For this purpose, I invited various

1. File No. 17(206)/56-66-PMS.
2. Patel had written from Bombay on 23 May that after talking to Munshi, he felt that the functions of the Planning Commission vis-a-vis the executive machinery of the Government had to be carefully defined if embarrassments and entanglements were to be avoided. The Planning Commission should not become a clog in the machinery and should remain in its proper sphere. Patel had noticed such a tendency in the past, especially the recent past.

Ministers and Munshi was also present. There was no difference of opinion whatever and certain rules etc. were laid down. Whenever necessity arises, these can be revised or varied.

The Members of the Planning Commission are anxious not to do anything which comes in the way of the work of any Ministry. All that they normally want is information and sometimes joint consultation about the matters before them. That was the purpose of the original resolution passed by the Cabinet in regard to the Planning Commission. Sometimes an important question may arise in day to day practice which might affect future planning. Then it becomes desirable to consider that from the point of view of the future.

The whole purpose of the Planning Commission is to facilitate work and not to come in the way. Otherwise, it would be worse than useless. My own experience of the past two and a half years has been that some kind of a Planning Commission is essential if we are to have any coordinated approach to our many problems. The last two months or so of the Planning Commission's work have impressed me with their ability to deal with this aspect of coordinated planning. It has been a very pleasant surprise to see how the five Members function as a team and bring their respective experiences into the common pool. They are getting on very well with the Ministries and there has been no trouble at all.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Patel replied on 26 May that his intention was not to complain but to emphasize the approach essential for avoiding conflicts and overlapping. He wrote that members of the Planning Commission "have been doing some good work, both as individuals and as a team, but I did feel that there is a danger of parallelism with the executive which had better be avoided."

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

III. Food

1. To Edwina Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1950

My dear Edwina,

I have just received your letter of 8th May from Malta with which you have enclosed correspondence from W.E. Celestin. I do not know who Mr Celestin is and what his pull is in the United States. It is very kind of him to make this suggestion.² But it is obvious that something more than such a suggestion is necessary before anything can be done.

When I was in the United States, there was a great deal of talk of our purchasing a million or so tons of wheat at a special rate or on deferred payment. I was indeed assured by Dean Acheson that this could be arranged, but ultimately the whole thing fell through as the terms demanded from us were difficult for us to accept.³ In fact there was practically no accommodation at all. I must confess that I was greatly surprised at this because there was a tremendous glut in America and we were actually paying for the wheat only rather gradually. Some Americans of position, including Henry Morgenthau,⁴ wrote in the press about it and said that the obvious thing was to give us wheat. Nevertheless, it had no great effect. I have no particular reason to think that any marked change has occurred in the attitude of the U.S. State Department or the others concerned.

While we asked for wheat, Liaquat Ali Khan is openly asking for arms, and what is more, for arms to be used against India, and it is reported in the press that he might get them. We pointed out gently this differential treatment to the American Ambassador here as well as to the people in Washington.

We are a poor people and there is plenty of distress in India. But I do not like the idea of anyone going to the United States on a begging mission from India. Certainly I would not like to associate you with this kind of thing even if you could find the time for it.

1. File No. 31(104)-50/PMS.

2. W.E. Celestin, an American friend of the Mountbattens, had written to Lady Mountbatten that she should come to Washington as official or special envoy of the distressed people of India or on behalf of a charitable organisation with government sanction.

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14, Part I, pp. 196-197, 237.

4. (1891-1967); Secretary of Treasury, U.S.A., 1934-45; played an important role at the Bretton Woods Conference.

I am writing to our Ambassador in Paris⁵ to get in touch with Mr Celestin. I am also informing Nan in Washington about it.

Thank you for the trouble you have taken.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

5. H.S. Malik.

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 13, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I have received your letter of the 12th July with a copy of your letter to Munshi. I am alarmed to learn of the food position in West Bengal. I shall speak to Munshi about it,² but whatever help we can give you I think we must try to induce people to change their habits slowly. It is dangerous for us to be subservient to a particular type of food which may not be available tomorrow. We live on the verge of a world war and no one knows what will happen. It may be that we would be cut off completely. We cannot rely upon others. Therefore it is necessary that we should always be ready for any emergency.

I have been informed by our Food Research Institute in South India that they have formed a very satisfactory mixture of rice with tapioca (tapioca in the shape of rice grains). There is 25% tapioca in the mixture. This is good from the nutrition point of view and cannot be distinguished from pure rice...

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Nehru wrote to Munshi, the Food Minister, that he should send to West Bengal whatever was possible, also foodstuffs other than rice. Munshi replied on 14 July that communal trouble and movement of population had interfered with the production and availability of food to some extent.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

IV. Social Issues

1. Fair Wages¹

Mr Speaker, may I, with your permission, make a brief statement to the House in regard to a Bill relating to Fair Wages,² which has been under the consideration of Government for some time and to which the Government and this House attach considerable importance. It was the intention of the Government to introduce this Bill during the current session of Parliament. My colleague, the Labour Minister, was anxious to do so and he tried his utmost to complete the preliminary stages of the preparation of the Bill in time for this, but I regret that this has not been possible. I hope, however, that this will not involve any ultimate delay in the passage of the measure through Parliament. The present session could not possibly have found time to discuss the measure and the most that could have been done was to introduce it during the last day or two of this session.

I should like to refer to the past history of this proposed Bill. A tripartite conference, consisting of representatives of Government, of employers and of employees, was convened in 1947.³ This conference passed what has since come to be known as the Industrial Truce Resolution. This resolution laid down the principle that in devising an equitable system of remuneration to capital as well as labour, provision should be made for the payment of fair wages to labour. Government accepted that resolution in their statement on industrial policy dated 6th April, 1948 and announced their intention to set up suitable machinery for its implementation. Accordingly, a Central Advisory Council was established for examining the various measures envisaged in the Industrial Truce Resolution. That Council was assisted in its study of fair wages by a small tripartite committee, which submitted a unanimous report in June 1949. Government thereupon consulted all parties interested in the matter, including the State Governments. After this consultation, a Fair Wages Bill, based on the recommendations of the Committee, was prepared. This Bill embodies generally the agreements arrived at, which Government had previously accepted. Although the main principles of the Bill represent a large measure of agreement, there are numerous details which require

1. Statement in Parliament, 18 April 1950. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. IV, Part II, 1950, pp. 2973-2974.
2. The Bill, based on the recommendations of the Government-sponsored Fair Wages Committee, suggested the appointment of State wage boards to determine wages depending on per capita productivity of labour, prevailing wage rates, level and distribution of the national income, the place of industry in the country's economy and capacity of an establishment to pay; (2) provision for setting up a central inspectorate to enforce the decision of the wage boards; (3) constitution of a central appellate board to hear appeals regarding disputes about determination and implementation of fair wages.
3. The Industries Conference held at Delhi in December 1947 had decided unanimously to observe a three-year truce in industry and to set up a machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes.

further examination by some of the Ministries concerned. Because of this it is not possible to introduce the Bill before Parliament adjourns on the 19th April. This examination is now taking place and it is the intention of Government to proceed with this measure as speedily as possible. They are aware of the importance that labour attaches to this. I would like to assure labour as well as this House that Government are committed to the principle of fair wages as recommended to them by the tripartite committee. As soon as the present examination is over and the Bill takes final shape, it will be published, so that the public may have an opportunity of examining it in full even before the next session of Parliament. This will enable rapid progress to be made at the next stage.

2. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
May 26, 1950

My dear Jayaprakash,

Please refer to your letter of May 12th in regard to the two Labour Bills² before Parliament. I sent your letter to the Labour Minister, who has taken the trouble to write at length about them to me. I shall not burden you with all that he has written, but he has specially asked me to request you to let us know what specific provisions in the Bills you take exception to and how you would like them to be modified. We would gladly examine each one of these points and if need be, invite you for a discussion about them.

We do not consider the draft Bills as final and we are always willing to consider any suggestions for alteration. Indeed the representatives of the Hind Mazdoor Sabha have participated in some of the conferences and no doubt will participate in others.

In these circumstances, do you think it is right to carry on a vehement propaganda against these Bills, calling them black Bills, and raise the plea of trade unionism in danger?³ Surely, it would be more helpful to all concerned, if specific points were raised and discussed instead of a blanket condemnation.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Labour Relations Bill covered labour-management relations in establishments working with more than ten employees and categories of employees except civil servants and defence personnel. Lightning strikes were disallowed also in establishments not coming under public utility services. The Trade Union Bill was intended to strengthen genuine trade unionism.

3. The Socialists opposed the two labour bills because they felt that their provisions denied the right to organise trade unions.

3. Zamindari Abolition¹

I am forwarding the letter received from the Chief Minister of Bihar together with the accompanying papers. It seems to me that, partly because of the Constitution and partly because of lawyers' opinions and High Court judgments, we have got into a bad tangle.² I am not lawyer enough to suggest a way out. But I am quite certain that unless we find a quick way out to deal with the agrarian problems in Bihar and elsewhere, we shall be in for serious trouble. Having for long proclaimed as a major point in our policy the abolition of the zamindari system and having repeatedly made attempts to do so and raised expectations high, we just cannot, either on moral or practical grounds or even on the basis of legal difficulty, stop this process or delay it.

I have long felt that this agrarian problem is far the most important of all our problems and the stability of any Government of India depends upon the manner of solving it. I feel therefore that it is not quite enough for us to accept with resignation the legal difficulties that are pointed out to us, but to find some way out fairly quickly which enables our State Governments to deal adequately with this problem of abolishing the zamindari system. If necessary, the matter might have to be put up before Parliament.

1. Note to the Home Minister, New Delhi, 25 July 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. The Bihar Land Reforms Bill was introduced in the State Assembly in December 1949 but was opposed by zamindar members. It was then sent to a 31-member Select Committee which submitted its report on 31 January 1950. It was passed in the Assembly in May 1950 and received the President's assent on 11 September 1950. But the Patna High Court held it unconstitutional on the ground that it transgressed Article 14 of the Constitution and was discriminatory in character. The Act could come into force only on 11 September 1952.

ADMINISTRATION

I. Resignation of John Matthai

1. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi
May 3, 1950

My dear Matthai,

...I met the President today and he told me that you felt that I had not treated you with propriety and you were consequently rather hurt about it. I am very sorry to learn this, because you are the last person whom I would like to hurt or to give an impression of any discourtesy on my part. When you wrote to me two or three months ago offering your resignation, I begged of you to carry on till the end of the Budget session at least when we could consider the matter. You were good enough to agree.² I had every hope that you would be able to continue after that and that such differences as existed between your views and mine on certain major items of policy would be toned down. I continued to notice, however, that the differences persisted and if anything, became slightly more intense. That did not lead me to respect you or like you any less, but it did distress me. Apart from my own personal opinions, which I hold strongly, I represent to some extent what is called the Congress viewpoint. In our Party as well as in Congress circles outside, this viewpoint was stressed more and more. I had to go through a period of considerable mental anguish and you will remember my talking in Cabinet one day about my retiring and devoting myself, in my personal capacity, to the work which I consider important. I was eager and anxious to give up the Prime Ministership, but some friends, whose opinion I value, advised me strongly against it. I myself felt that my retiring might have some unfortunate consequences. Ever since the Agreement of April 8th, my retiring has become even more difficult without upsetting many things. So I had to come to the regretful conclusion that for the present at least I must stay on.

Staying on meant furthering such policies as I believed in and as I was called upon to by Congress. These policies apparently went against your own way of thinking and so some kind of friction was likely. Even so I clung to the idea that you should stay on. At the same time this realisation grew upon me that it was neither fair to you nor to me not to realise that there were these major differences of approach. That made both of us unhappy. Also it came in the way of work. It further appeared to me that as a more precise political or economic policy was developed by the Congress, this would lead to greater friction in the future. I became

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. In December 1949, Matthai had wished to resign as he differed from Nehru on economic matters. Nehru requested him to continue till 26 January 1950. In March 1950 they had a long talk, when according to Matthai, Nehru had told him that their differences were not such as would prevent them working as colleagues and Nehru would like him for many reasons not to press his resignation.

gradually half-converted to the idea of your leaving the Cabinet, much as I disliked it. To the last I hoped that you might stay on. But what you said to me yesterday made me doubt this, because the differences between us were fairly deep in regard to the policy to be pursued. Hence when you put forward some arguments in favour of your not continuing in office, I could see that these were valid grounds and I told you so. It was only after our talk yesterday that I decided more or less finally.³

Cabinet formation has always to be done in a hurry and at the last moment. We were also rather pressed for time because of Sardar Patel's imminent departure for Bombay and the South. Something had to be done before he went away.

These were the grounds that moved me. There was the least question of any discourtesy to you. I would hate it if you thought so, because that would be entirely counter to my own feelings in the matter.

The real point is that our approaches had progressively widened. If they could have been bridged, it would have been an excellent thing. The matter is too important for personal reactions, yours or mine, and has to be considered only in the public context and more especially in the Congress context. I am Prime Minister simply because the Congress Party wants me to be there. The moment they do not want me, I shall inevitably get out of Government.

I have frankly placed the position, as I see it, before you. I hope you will understand and appreciate my action, even though you might not agree with it.

I should like to express again my deep gratitude to you for the heavy burdens you have carried with such ability during a period of great crisis in our country. Whether you were a Congressman or not, you were one of the most important members of the Cabinet to whose views we attached the greatest importance. Your going away will leave a gap which cannot be filled adequately.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Matthai agreed to Nehru's suggestion that his name would be included in the new Council of Ministers with the statement that "Dr. John Matthai expressed his wish not to continue in office, but he was requested to continue in his present office till the end of this month and he had kindly agreed."

2. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi

May 4, 1950

My dear Matthai,

Thank you for your letter of today's date.² I have read it with some distress. It has pained me that anything I had said or done should have hurt you and that you should think that I had not been fair or candid to you. I am afraid I have many failings, but during a fairly lengthy career, I do not remember ever having been accused of not being candid.³ You further say that this period of our association has resulted in each of us having diminished faith in the other. It is my misfortune that you should feel that way about me. But there is no question of my having any less faith than I had in your ability or integrity. It is true that I have felt for sometime past that our views in regard to certain important matters differ. Or, to put it differently, that our approach to these matters is different. This fact did not lead me to respect you any the less.

I shall deal with the second matter that you say hurt you. It surprises me that you should have thought that I would suggest something to you that was derogatory to your dignity or that I should have imagined that you would remain in Government for the the sake of a job and drawing a salary from it. Even a person totally lacking intelligence knows that you can any day earn much more and have a less troubled time than by remaining in Government. What I suggested in all good faith was that I hated the idea of not having you in Government and thus not having the benefit of your experience and advice. If your remaining as Finance Minister led to friction because of differing viewpoints, that friction need not arise in some other department of governmental activity. Perhaps it was a foolish thing to say on my part. But it was said merely with a desire, a selfish desire if you like, of prolonging our association in Government, if that was possible. I have often told you how much I valued it.

May I refer to some occurrences in the past few months? When you sent your resignation in December, I think I suggested to you that you should not press it. Later I had a long talk with you in the course of which we discussed many things. I do not remember exactly what I said. But my whole mind was agitated then at the turn events were taking. I did not know what the future would be, for I saw many developments in the country which were bound to influence that future. At the same time I was anxious to have you by me. Because of the value I attached

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Matthai had written about "the hurt" caused by Nehru's remark that he would prefer Matthai's leaving the Cabinet and his suggestion that he accept a less important ministry.

3. Matthai had written that Nehru had been "neither as fair nor as candid with me as I had a right to expect from you as a colleague."

to your work in Government, I realised and pointed out that there were differences of outlook in approach, but we should try to pull on together as far as we could. My own mind was thinking of the next few months and I think I mentioned to you then that reconstruction of Government would have to take place sooner or later. I did want you to continue in that new Government, but I did not know how things would shape themselves. In effect I thought we should carry on as we had done, but I hoped in a more friendly way, till the next stage arrived when we could reconsider this question.

My own mind was continually thinking of myself continuing or not in Government. I hinted at that on several occasions even in public. Once you will remember I spoke about it during a Cabinet meeting. I spoke frankly then and said that I had begun to feel more and more that the ideals I stood for and had worked for more than a generation were fading away. I was wondering how I could serve them better, in Government or outside, and I had nearly come to the decision that I should resign. This decision had gradually grown upon me and had finally been caused by events in East Bengal. It was my earnest desire then to go in a private capacity to East Bengal. Some friends dissuaded me from acting up to my own urges in this matter, and I myself felt that the consequences of my resignation might be harmful in the larger interests of the country. So I hesitated.⁴

On one or two occasions I spoke at Party meetings with some warmth and said that I was becoming more and more convinced that certain principles for which we had stood should be followed and that so long as I was Prime Minister, I thought it my duty to follow them in so far as I could. If those principles were not to be followed, then I had no business to be Prime Minister.

All this had little to do with you directly, but it indicated that I was passing through a state of great mental anguish and was feeling that our Government as a whole had strayed from what I considered the right path. This was partly on the communal issue and partly on the general economic issue.

Later other developments took place which entangled me more in the Bengal problem and led ultimately to my meeting Liaquat Ali Khan and the Agreement. It became manifestly impossible for me to seek escape from Government, unless Government or Parliament decided against those particular matters. At the same time I became even more convinced that the situation required a whole-hearted attempt to follow a certain policy and not merely a somewhat static acceptance of it. We had arrived at a turning point in our history in so far as Indo-Pakistan relations were concerned. Also the force of events was compelling us to develop more precisely our economic policy.

I have had a sensation for many months past that there was a growing estrangement between you and me. I did not quite know what this was due to, for

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt.I, pp. 47-49, 132-133.

differences in policy need not lead to estrangement between colleagues. I did not know quite what to do about it. I noticed often enough in Cabinet that you were rather heated and saying something in opposition to what I had said. I was pained, but did not quite know what I could do about it.

In spite of this, I valued your presence in the Government so much that I could not reconcile myself to your leaving it, though many doubts arose in my mind as to how far this collaboration would be fruitful. Four or five days, that is after my return from Karachi, I gave some concentrated thought to this matter of reconstruction of Government. Even then I thought that your presence in Government was necessary. But I was troubled as to what the future might be, because, as I envisaged it, that future should be one of a positive and determined policy, both in regard to Indo-Pakistan relations and economic policy. The latter was being considered by Congress committees also and I was largely in agreement with that. Some of your public speeches did not seem to me in keeping with that policy and I wondered what would happen in the future, when we had to take this matter up more definitely. It was rather absurd for the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister to say things in public which did not fit in with each other.

It was with some doubt in my mind that I broached this question to you a few days ago during our talk. You were very positive then about your disagreement with the recent Congress resolution on planning. Immediately this difficulty became a serious one to me and I saw no way out except that you should not continue as Finance Minister or I should not continue as Prime Minister. In fact, you yourself pointed out forcefully this contradiction and conflict.

I have been actively engaged in public affairs for thirty-five years. But this was not a normal politician's kind of work. It was more that of a missionary pursuing some ideal. Such strength as I have had was due to that and such weaknesses as I have also flowed from it. I have come in intimate contact with millions of people and derived comfort and understanding from them. It is natural, therefore, that I think much more of them than of special groups. During the last few months I have had a powerful urge to go back to the people and not spend more time in Government offices. Fate has conspired to prevent me from doing that for the present. But all my heart is there. If I remain in Government, it is always with this feeling of the people before me as well as what I have told them on innumerable occasions in the past.

The Congress policy in regard to any particular matter may be right or wrong. But the Congress approach has always been to the people at large and so a Congressman senses the reactions of these people perhaps more than individuals who have not come in that kind of touch with them. It is this that leads often to differences in understanding a situation or in finding remedies for it. It is this also that leads sometimes to revolutions and upsetting of existing things.

All these thoughts have been troubling me for months past and I have had a hard time. I did not quite know what I could have told you more than I had said

when we had our long talk in March last. I found that I could not succeed in explaining the background of my thought to you. I find that still further from your letter. Indeed this letter of yours indicates the measure of this estrangement that had grown up between you and me, which has even led you to impute certain motives or ideas to me which you would hardly have done, if you had had any faith in my bona fides. I am sorry for this.

I started long ago a phase of my life in a spirit also of high hope and exciting adventure. The governmental aspect of it has been a very minor element and a depressing one. But in spite of this depression, I still retained something of that hope and spirit of adventure. If I did not, life would have no meaning for me and my work would be profitless. Today I feel again a powerful urge to give all my strength and energy to the things that count in my mind. I am tired, but there is no way of escape, nor do I want to escape from the responsibilities that I have undertaken. I owe something to the people who have trusted me and to the leader under whose sheltering care I grew up.

With all good wishes to you and again my gratitude for all your kindness during these past three and a half years,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru


3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1950


My dear Krishna,

...You will have noticed that Matthai is leaving the Cabinet at the end of the month. We are trying to get Govind Ballabh Pant in his place, but I am not yet sure if he can come. I am distressed about Matthai, because I have liked him and admired him for his general ability and integrity. But for some odd reason he has gone further and further away from me during the last eight or nine months or more. On many important matters of policy he has differed from me and even in some relatively small matters he has been very stiff. Indeed he has sometimes been on the verge of discourtesy to me. The Finance Ministry and the Economic Committee of the Cabinet have functioned as independent units. Naturally, I have not approved of this. But, as we were always thinking of reorganisation, I allowed them to carry

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.



WITH C.V. RAMAN AND S.S. BHATNAGAR AT THE NATIONAL FUEL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DHANBAD, 22 APRIL 1950



BEING SWORN IN AS PRIME MINISTER BY PRESIDENT RAJENDRA PRASAD, 6 MAY 1950

on. Matthai speaks a different language now and certainly appears to have moved away from his original mooring. That is so in regard to economic matters. That is so also surprisingly in regard to the communal situation. During the recent crisis, he was practically at one with Syama Prasad Mookerjee.

It was becoming increasingly difficult for us to pull together, and yet I did not like to part with him. Some months ago he sent me his resignation. But I begged him not to press it, and in any event, to wait till the end of the Budget session. Meanwhile, many other things happened which created friction between us. Even so, I hesitated to part with him. When at last about ten days ago or so, I spoke to him rather frankly, but in a friendly manner, and pointed out these difficulties, he grew rather annoyed. He has gone about saying that I have not treated him fairly or candidly and have pushed him out. I have tried to explain to him in as gentle language as possible that there is no desire on my part to push him out, but circumstances had arisen which made it a little difficult for contrary policies to be pursued at the same time.

I quite understand what you have written about the U.K.'s difficulties and the increasing domination of the U.S.A. there. I do not think there is any present risk of such a thing happening in India. Nor is there any proposal to that effect. I do not know what has led you to imagine that we are very near accepting client status to the U.S.A. or indeed to accept American bounty in any form. As a matter of fact there is no bounty visible and even our advisers are generally against our going far in this direction.

Plenty of trouble continues in East and West Bengal. It is on a minor scale, but still it is bad. The exodus also continues, though it has slightly gone down. An encouraging sign is that a fair number of people are going back to their original homes. One rather extraordinary thing has happened here during the last few days and that was the joint meeting of the India and Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conferences. Literally these fire-eaters wept on each other's shoulders and became quite sloppy. How extraordinarily emotional our people are. They have sworn to behave well in future and I think they will try to do so. I enclose a copy of their joint statement.²

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Not printed.

4. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi
May 28, 1950

My dear Matthai,

Thank you for your letter. I am sorry you have decided to resign from Parliament. I think your presence there would have been of value and even your criticism will help.

I am returning to you your draft statement to the press.² I can hardly say anything about it, as it is for you to decide what you should say. The reference to differences in regard to important matters obviously leads to another question as to what these important matters are. There is likely to be speculation about them. I suppose that can hardly be avoided.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Matthai had enclosed for Nehru's approval a draft statement to the press referring to their differences in general terms.

5. To John Matthai¹

On Board INS *Delhi*
June 4, 1950

My dear Matthai,

The statement that you issued, in reply to my remarks at Trivandrum,² has been conveyed to me on board ship and I have read it with care.³ It was not my intention to enter into any controversy with you on the subject of your resignation. When asked about it at a press conference in Delhi, I avoided the subject. Then, however, certain newspapers in Madras, commenting on your first brief statement,

1. J.N. Collection.

2. At a public meeting at Thiruvananthapuram, Nehru had reacted to John Matthai's statement of 31 May which appeared in the newspapers of 1 June. See *ante*, pp. 200-203.

3. In the second statement Matthai had said the main reasons for his resignation were his attitude towards the Planning Commission, control of Governmental expenditure and his grave misgivings in regard to the Indo-Pakistan Agreement.

drew rather extraordinary conclusions, and asked for further explanations. I felt that something had to be said by me. I had also heard that it was rumoured in Bombay that the cause of your resignation was a difference of opinion in regard to the exchange ratio. I felt that all this was creating an undesirable confusion in the public mind and so I decided to say something in the course of my speech at Trivandrum. I hope that what I said there, though naturally not complete or detailed, did no injustice to your viewpoint.

Now that you have issued a longer statement and raised various viewpoints, it does seem to me necessary to deal with these matters in some greater detail. I do not propose to say anything myself till I return to Delhi. If the Deputy Prime Minister or the Planning Commission choose to say anything, it is open to them to do so.

I confess that, quite apart from any difference of opinion between you and me, I have regretted the tone of your statement and the assumption underlying it that I am guilty not only of wasteful expenditure but also of bartering away vital national interests, that I do not realise or appreciate that Government is a trustee of millions of human beings and am apparently prepared to sacrifice without adequate consideration and sufficient justification the interests of those committed to its charge.

These are serious charges coming from any person and most of all, from a colleague who has been intimately associated in a very responsible position in the working of Government. These charges do not merely refer to differences of opinion but to something deeper than that, and they make out that I am completely irresponsible and unfit to be put in the position I am. I had not myself realised that this was your opinion of me or of what I had done or not done. If that was your opinion, as appears from your statement, then it is clear that either you should have continued in Government or I. With such basic difference in approach not only in regard to policy but even in regard to your opinion of my personal *bona fides*, it was hardly possible for us to continue together in Government.

When you sent me your brief statement meant for the press, I did not realise all that lay behind it. Perhaps it would have been advisable, in the circumstances, if you could have indicated to me then or earlier what you felt about these matters. It may be that I might have been able to remove certain misconceptions.

So far as the Planning Commission is concerned, I shall not say much here except that I do not think you have been quite just to it in some ways. At no time has there been any question in the Planning Commission's mind or any other mind of that Commission functioning as a parallel Cabinet.⁴ You refer to the warrant

4. Matthai felt that the "Planning Commission tends to become a parallel Cabinet" leading to delay in arriving at decisions on immediate problems.

of precedence, salaries, etc.⁵ I would have been glad if you had drawn my attention to these matters at some earlier stage. Indeed I knew very little about them myself and it was only on the eve of my departure from Delhi that I enquired into the matter. As I have told you and the Cabinet on several occasions, I attach, in existing circumstances, very great importance to a Planning Commission. Apart from that, the Congress Working Committee had practically directed me to go ahead with such a Commission and if I myself disapproved of this direction, as I do not, the only alternative for me was to resign.⁶

You refer to the interference of the Planning Commission in the work of the Government and more particularly to its advice on cotton policy.⁷ I am sorry that you should have referred to something which was a Cabinet secret. Cabinet secrets are not normally discussed in public.⁸ Apart from this, I do not understand how it can be considered an interference with governmental working if we took the advice of any experts at our disposal. In fact the Cabinet's decision was different from the Economic Committee's original recommendation. The Economic Committee itself changed its recommendation on reconsideration. Are we to consider that full consideration and consultation with others is harmful to the national interests?

You refer to the ministries under my control disregarding the authority of the Standing Finance Committee and thus setting a bad example to other ministries.⁹ I do not know which ministries you refer to other than the External Affairs Ministry. I do not control any other ministry directly, unless it is the Scientific Research Department which is not a Ministry. You refer particularly to the recent decision

5. Matthai thought that Cabinet responsibility had been weakened by the members of the Planning Commission being given the same place in the Warrant of Precedence as Cabinet Ministers and their salaries and allowances being fixed in accordance with those of the Cabinet Ministers.
6. Matthai replied on 17 June that this was hardly relevant and if the Prime Minister was to be bound by the decision of "the party caucus in so important a matter to the extent you presume, there is an end to Parliamentary Government as one knows it."
7. Matthai had said that the issue of control of raw cotton was discussed at various stages with the Planning Commission resulting in serious delay in arriving at a decision and many compromises in the process, without meeting the real elements of the problem.
8. Matthai replied that one of his reasons for not making specific references was to keep Cabinet secrets. But the Cabinet decision about control of raw cotton had been published and ceased to be a secret.
9. Matthai had said that the greatest offenders in disregarding the Standing Finance Committee, which was the chief safeguard against extravagant public expenditure, were the Ministries under the immediate control of the Prime Minister.

about Dublin.¹⁰ Whatever the merits or demerits of that decision, this took place long after your decision to resign and therefore could not have influenced it. It is a small enough matter in which we are to balance certain important political considerations with a relatively small expenditure of money. You give this example as typical of many cases. I do not, for the moment, remember other cases coming either from External Affairs or the Department of Scientific Research, which in any way went against the decisions of the Standing Finance Committee. In any event you had not drawn my attention to any such cases previously and I did not even realise that you had such a general grievance against me or my Ministry. I should have thought that some reference to me at some stage or other was desirable before you made such a general charge. During the past year or more I have done everything I could to induce various Ministries and departments of Government, including the External Affairs Ministry, to reduce their expenditure. I shall be glad if you will let me know the particular instance when the External Affairs Ministry or the Scientific Research Department went against the wishes of the Standing Finance Committee. You must have some of these in mind, or else you would not have referred to them in your statement. I shall enquire into them.

You refer to the budgetary position being more difficult now than at the time you presented the budget. This undoubtedly is so. Is this not so because of certain new and heavy commitments in regard to the Defence Ministry?¹¹

The other point you refer to is your disapproval of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of last April.¹² While this Agreement was being considered, and indeed while the talks with the Pakistan Prime Minister were going on, we had almost daily Cabinet meetings, apart from meetings of the Cabinet Committee appointed for the purpose. I do not remember of a single instance during these meetings of your objecting to what was being done. Sometime previous to that, when we were considering the broader question and long before Liaquat Ali Khan had been asked to come to Delhi, you had generally expressed your opinion in favour of war. How far that was in keeping with our trusteeship for millions of human beings, opinions may differ. But at no time subsequently, while the talks were going on with Liaquat Ali

10. When it was decided that the High Commissioner in London would be the Ambassador in Ireland also, the Standing Finance Committee agreed only to the travelling expenditure of the High Commissioner as part of the economy campaign. Later the Cabinet agreed to provide building and staff to the embassy in Dublin not only without the approval of the Standing Finance Committee but against its recommendations.
11. Matthai had referred to the proposals, dropped the previous year on account of financial stringency, now being raised again although the budgetary position was more difficult at this time.
12. Matthai felt that "having committed ourselves to the pact we should give it a fair and honest trial. A policy of appeasement in these circumstances is, therefore, inevitable. But under the guise of appeasement it is extremely important that we should be careful not to barter away vital national interests."

Khan and drafts were being considered, did you protest against the policy adopted. I am surprised therefore that you should have now mentioned that you regarded the conclusion of the Agreement with grave misgivings. I take it that the only alternative to that was war and you preferred that. If that was so, it would have been right and proper for you to object at the right time.

This question of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement and the general policy to be pursued, is of the most vital consequence, and if you felt so strongly about it, as you appear to have done, and thought that we were sacrificing the interests of millions of persons who looked to us for guidance, then it was surely right for you to say so at the time and not allow us to think differently about your own opinion. So far as I am concerned, I have held clear opinions on the subject and expressed them publicly on numerous occasions and I have placed them before the Cabinet repeatedly for their approval.

In the course of the last year or two, I do not think I have interfered to the slightest degree with your conduct of our financial or economic policy. On some occasions, notably at the time of the last Budget, I felt unhappy about it and it seemed to me to go counter to the general policy we stood for. It inclined too much in favour of certain vested interests and higher income groups. Apart from writing a letter¹³ to you on the eve of the Budget, pointing out some of my apprehensions, I did not wish to interfere with your discretion because you were primarily responsible.

You refer to this controversy having been forced upon you. I hardly think that is a fair statement. Once you stated that there were vital differences of opinion between you and me, the public naturally was entitled to know what these differences were. I tried to say something in as friendly a way as possible, because of the wrong inferences that were drawn. Your reply to what I have said is not very friendly and evidently proceeds from a deep-seated feeling of resentment and irritation. In any event the matter, having been put before the public, has now to be dealt with in public. So far as I am concerned, I shall, when the time comes on my return, deal with questions of policy only and not deal with the personal equation, though I must express my regret at your referring to Cabinet proceedings in public.

There is unfortunately a personal equation also involved, which is evident enough from the tone of your statement. I have sensed for some months past a certain tension between you and me and sometimes the treatment you accorded me verged on discourtesy. Respecting you as I do, I did not say anything about it, although I was pained by it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, pp. 5-6.

6. Cable to Sri Prakasa¹

Your telegram.² I do not propose to answer Matthai publicly till I return. But in view of serious charges he has made raising basic issues of policy, matter must be gone into thoroughly later. I have been deeply pained by tone and content of his statement. Meanwhile, it is for Sardar Patel to deal with it.

1. On Board INS *Delhi*, 4 June 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Sri Prakasa had cabled on 4 June: "Unedifying press controversy over Matthai's resignation continues. Earnestly suggest desirability of your not writing further, Maulana has replied."

7. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

On Board INS *Delhi*
June 4, 1950

My dear Deshmukh,

I have today received the long statement issued by Matthai in reply to certain remarks I made at Trivandrum. I am sending a reply and I enclose a copy of it. Please show it to Gulzarilal Nanda also.

This morning I sent you a brief wireless message about this matter. It seems to me desirable that some brief statement should be made about the Planning Commission. I have suggested that you might consult the Deputy Prime Minister and then you and Nanda can issue such a statement. It should of course be factual and non-controversial. I do not propose to say anything in public till I return, unless some unforeseen development takes place.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

8. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

On Board INS *Delhi*
June 4, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

My peaceful holiday at sea has been disturbed by Dr Matthai's statement which he issued as a kind of an answer to what I said at Trivandrum. I had no desire to

1. J.N. Collection.

to enter into this controversy, but I found that all kinds of surmises and speculations were spreading because of his first brief statement.

Now Matthai has come out with something which displays a bitterness of mind which surprised me. I am not going to say anything in public about this matter till I return to Delhi. Obviously, however, it cannot be allowed to rest where it is. Meanwhile, I have written a long letter to Matthai, a copy of which I enclose. I have sent copies to Vallabhbhai and Deshmukh also.

I hope you are progressing at Ooty. We are having delightful weather and all the prophets have been falsified, who said that there would be heavy rain on the first two days. There has been no rain and the sea has been remarkably calm. Now we are approaching the Equator.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

9. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

On Board INS *Delhi*
June 4, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have today read the statement issued by Matthai. It has pained me considerably. I have sent you a brief message by wireless. It is for you to decide if you should say anything in reply, more especially in regard to the statement made by Matthai about the Indo-Pakistan Agreement.

I am writing a letter to Matthai and I enclose a copy of it.

I should have liked to have a full party meeting to consider this matter. If that is difficult, then the Executive Committee of the Party should meet. Also I think the Congress Working Committee.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

10. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

On Board INS *Delhi*

June 4, 1950

My dear Krishna,

On the eve of my departure from Delhi, I received your letter in which you referred to certain matters which you wished me to consider in the comparative quietness of my voyage. In particular you refer to the position of the Civil Service and the great influence they have on our national life.

There is something in what you say, but I feel that you have not got things in proper perspective. A day or two ago Dr John Matthai issued a statement which no doubt you must have seen or will see. I should like you to read it in full when the Indian newspapers reach you. By the time this letter reaches you, probably those papers will also reach you.

This statement of Matthai's is a very revealing document and it may convey to you in some measure the difficulties I have had to contend with. These difficulties were not from the Civil Service. You will notice that Matthai has made a major issue in his statement of the small expenditure on the Dublin Embassy. The Finance Ministry as such had no particular objection and when the matter was explained, they were agreeable. It was Matthai who objected to the last. I then placed this before the Cabinet and got their approval again in spite of Matthai's objection.

This is a small matter both financially and otherwise. But it indicates the kind of approach from Dr Matthai which I have had to face for many months. I have often differed with Sardar Patel, but I have never had arguments about petty matters with him. He is a big enough man not to insist on such petty matters. But Matthai appears to have developed a peculiar antipathy to what I do or say. Why I cannot imagine.

After his resignation I did not wish to say anything about it or to raise any controversy. Then he issued a brief statement in which he said that his resignation was due to vital differences of opinion between me and him. He left it at that. Immediately newspapers started commenting on this and making wild surmises. Thereupon I referred to it in my speech at Trivandrum in as friendly a way as possible and said that the differences were chiefly in connection with the appointment of the Planning Commission. Now Matthai has come out with his long and rather bitter statement.

First of all, he deals with the Planning Commission and delivers a broadside attack on every aspect of it. His facts are not quite correct. For the last one year I have been trying to get through this Planning Commission, partly because I was convinced that it was essential for us to have some such body and partly because the Congress organisation was committed and was demanding it.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

Matthai then refers to the wasteful expenditure of the External Affairs Ministry and gives as an example the recent Dublin matter. Of course, the Dublin episode had nothing to do with his resignation, as the resignation had preceded it. I cannot remember any other incident of this type and if there was one, it must have been a trivial one. Then Matthai takes up the Indo-Pakistan Agreement not in any particular detail but basically. When we were discussing this Agreement, he did not say a word of protest. Long before that he had generally expressed his opinion in favour of war with Pakistan. In fact his opinion was in line with Syama Prasad Mookerjee's in regard to our relations with Pakistan.

You will have some idea from all this what a vast difference in approach there has been between Matthai and me, even in regard to matters which were not directly his concern. I had not myself fully appreciated this till I read this statement of his. As a matter of fact, Matthai's general behaviour towards me has verged on discourtesy ever since I came back from America.

A civil service often behaves wrongly, but it can only do so when there are differences at the top. It is these differences that count. Otherwise it is not difficult to bring it in line with any policy we wish to pursue. It was time that some change took place in the composition of Cabinet. It is a pity that I am away from Delhi at this moment and rather out of touch with it. I hope however that our new Cabinet will be more homogeneous than the preceding one.

During the past year or more, the Economic Committee of the Cabinet of which I was not a member became practically a rival Cabinet. It grew accidentally. At first it dealt with some special matters. As we were considering the reorganisation of the whole governmental structure, I postponed any particular step regarding the Economic Committee. And so it expanded and became a law unto itself. Matthai evidently did not like at all anything happening which lessened the importance of the Economic Committee as he knew it. Now I am Chairman of the Economic Committee and then there is the Planning Commission.

You refer in your letter to the drift to war, to the new trends of imperialism based on the dollar and to the Russian power creating a huge monolithic structure in half the world. I realise all these trends. But I confess that I do not know what particular contribution we can make, apart from the negative attitude of keeping away. There is of course a certain positive aspect of this also which may not be apparent, but it is still there. For us to take any particular step forward appears to me to be risky. If you have anything particular in mind, you can suggest it.

Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to America and the way the State Department has reacted to it, is a clear indication of their general displeasure with India and their desire to boost up Pakistan. They have done so rather crudely and reactions in India have naturally been adverse to them. Our more or less friendly relations with China also irritate the United States very much.

There is no question, so far as I am concerned, of Radhakrishnan going away from Moscow. I shall try my utmost to keep him there. Even the Civil Service, if I may say so, wants him to stay on there.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

11. Cable to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

Your message just received.² I have not seen Maulana's statement.³ Regret he rejected your advice.

Matthai's statement insulting to me, derogatory to Cabinet, improper for ex-Cabinet Minister, inaccurate and full of bitterness. It is clear that this matter cannot rest where it is and public controversy cannot be avoided.⁴ But I propose to say nothing till my return, unless some new circumstance compels me.

So far as I remember, Matthai said no word against Agreement with Pakistan at any stage after talks with Liaquat Ali started.⁵ Before that he had expressed his opinion. I am amazed at impropriety of Matthai's behaviour.

1. On Board INS *Delhi*, 5 June 1950, J.N. Collection.
2. Patel informed Nehru on 5 June that Matthai's statement had created some adverse public reaction and that he himself would speak only when required.
3. Azad issued a statement in reply to Matthai, despite Patel's advice not to do so, saying that the Planning Commission had no executive powers and its functions had been clearly defined as that of an advisory body whose recommendations would be subject to Cabinet approval. The Prime Minister had always sided with the Finance Minister on the question of financial control. Regarding the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement Azad said that this was the first time he had heard that Matthai was opposed to it.
4. Patel thought that "but for Maulana's statement the matter would have blown over by the time you returned."
5. Patel had written that Matthai was critical of the policy on more than one occasion though he agreed eventually to give the Agreement a fair trial.

12. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

On Board *INS Delhi*

June 5, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I received your wireless message this morning and sent a reply to it. I have had no indication of what Maulana said in his statement, except what you have mentioned. I am sorry he was in a hurry to make a statement contrary to your advice.

For my part, as I have told you, I would rather remain silent from the public point of view till I return. But I have a feeling that some of the charges he has made do require, if not a reply, at least some kind of a response. However it is difficult for me to judge from here and you are the best judge.

What Matthai has said raises very important issues, both political and, to some extent, constitutional. There is a personal element also, though that might be ignored, except for the fact that even this has a certain larger connotation. I think it was very improper of him to refer, even though this was indirect, to Cabinet proceedings. However the main thing is the question of principle involved in the two principal matters raised by him, that is the Planning Commission and the Indo-Pakistan Pact. The Planning Commission is after all a domestic matter, the other has international significance. It seems to me that when these important questions are raised, we cannot allow them to pass. Regardless of what Matthai or any of us may think, the matter having been raised in this way, has to be decided clearly and emphatically. It is a great pity that Parliament is not in session and will not meet for some considerable time. It is difficult also for a Party meeting to take place. I am almost inclined to think that it would be worthwhile summoning a meeting of Parliament earlier than was at first intended, in order to clarify these matters. We cannot leave the country in a state of flux with controversies going on. Only Parliament can clearly decide.

We are a new Government and have no fixed conventions, except in so far as we follow British conventions. Matthai's statement raises the question of our developing certain fixed conventions so that irresponsible behaviour might be avoided.

Before we started on our voyage, everyone told us that the first two days would be rough, as we would encounter monsoon weather. As a matter of fact we have had lovely weather and there has been no rain at all. I have had a restful time, except for my spending much of it with the officers, petty officers, ratings, etc., and visiting various parts of the ship. Our crew consists of very bright young men, who would compare well with any other country's crew. You have yourself met them. The Commodore,² who captains the ship, has struck me as a good man.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Commodore Geoffrey Barnard, CBE, OBE.

This morning we had the usual ceremonies connected with the British Navy of crossing the Equator. Father Neptune is supposed to come on board and challenge the ship and then he awards various punishments. Neptune is now becoming Varuna. The ship's company thoroughly enjoyed the sport which chiefly consisted of a forcible ducking in a pond.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

13. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

On Board *INS Delhi*
June 5, 1950

Nan dear,

This is our third day on board ship. We were warned that the first two days would be rough because of the monsoon. As a matter of fact I had good weather in Cochin and ever since we have been very lucky. We have now passed the monsoon area and there is little chance of rough weather.

It has been very pleasant here and restful. Much of my time has been taken in visiting various parts of the ship and meeting officers, petty officers, ratings and others. This ship is crowded and the crew consists of about 750 persons. It is really difficult to fit them in and their living conditions are none too good. But they are a very bright lot of young men, which would do credit to any country. I have addressed them in batches every day. At every meal some officers join us by turn. Then the petty officers have invited me to their mess.

This morning we had the traditional ceremony, connected with the British Navy, of crossing the Equator. Father Neptune came on board with his consort and court and the officers and crew were charged before him for various offences and punished. The punishment normally consisted of a forcible ducking in a pool, clothes and all. Shridharani,² who is one of the newspapermen with us, was hurled into the pool, clothes, shoes and all. Previous to that they were supposed to be shaved by an enormous razor and scissors.

I was charged with the offence of working too hard, having too many telephones on my desk, and delivering too many long speeches—a charge to which I could only plead guilty. The sentence passed on me was to take a week's holiday on the sea every year, which was a light sentence.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Krishanlal Shridharani.

My peace has been disturbed by a controversy that is going on in Delhi. When I was in Trivandrum, Dr Matthai issued a statement in which he said that he had resigned because of basic differences of policy with me. He did not elaborate this. I had no desire to enter into any controversy. But I found that newspapers were making all kinds of guesses and surmises, mostly wrong. I felt I had to say something and so in my speech at Trivandrum I said that the main difference between us was in regard to the Planning Commission. I said so in a friendly way without entering into any controversy. To that Matthai replied in a long statement which has surprised and pained me. It is bitter and is a personal attack, in some ways, on me. Apart from the question of the Planning Commission, which he elaborates, he refers to his disagreement with me regarding the Indo-Pakistan Pact and talks about my following a policy of appeasement and betraying the interests of the millions of our country. Then he goes on to say that I have encouraged extravagance in public expenditure in my ministry, that is External Affairs. As an instance, he gives a recent decision to spend 1200 pounds over a small Embassy building in Dublin. The Irish Government were exceedingly anxious that we should have some physical office in Dublin and we felt we should not say no to them in view of their anxiety.

Matthai has raised important issues and what is Matthai's challenge to the whole approach we have made resulting in the Indo-Pakistan Pact. His attitude is in line with Syama Prasad Mookerjee's. It is amazing how communal and narrow-minded in outlook he has become. This will obviously encourage the communal elements in India greatly. Perhaps, in some ways, this is not so bad, as it brings it to a head. But it has interfered with my holiday and as soon as I get back, I shall have to face all this trouble.

Nevertheless I am greatly looking forward to my stay in Indonesia. I wish it would have been a little longer.

With love from
Jawahar

14. Cable to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

Thank you for your second telegram.² You are in authoritative position to judge and I shall take no action till my return and then in consultation with you and other colleagues in the Cabinet.

1. On Board, INS *Delhi*, 6 June 1950, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1949-50*, Vol. 10, p. 240.
2. See *ante*, p. 243, footnotes 2 and 3.

15. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi
June 27, 1950

My dear Matthai,

I received your letter of the 17th June on my return from my tour.²

It is not my intention to issue any public statement about the controversy which has been raised.³ If Parliament or our Party requires any explanation from me, I shall place it before them. Nor do I wish to continue this controversy in correspondence with you, because that also will serve little purpose. Your approach to this question is so highly personal and full of anger that it is hardly possible to consider it dispassionately or objectively.

There are however one or two matters about which I think I should say something. Your chief grievance appears to be that I treated you unfairly in suggesting to you to resign.⁴ What surprises me is that you should have cared to continue in a Cabinet of which I was the head, when your opinion about me is such as is expressed in your statement and your letter. If you have such a poor opinion of me personally and were so strongly opposed to the policies I wished to pursue, then there was not much common ground left for us to work together in a Cabinet. I had no idea that you felt this way, or else the matter might have been raised much earlier. It is true that I had a growing feeling of estrangement from you and of differences of opinion on a number of subjects. That troubled me greatly. But my affection and respect for you led me to wish that you should continue as a colleague in the Cabinet. This conflict continued in my mind for sometime. You will remember saying in Cabinet in regard to some matter that you thoroughly disagreed with me. Normally, a member of the Cabinet, who feels that way about his Prime Minister, has no further place in that Cabinet. Or else the Prime Minister goes. Nevertheless, I requested you to continue till such time as any major change took place. I was always thinking of the reconstruction of the Cabinet as provided for by the Constitution. Even then I was not sure that you should go. When in the course of our last conversation you made it perfectly clear to me that you disagreed completely with the Congress Working Committee's approach to the question of planning and the whole conception lying behind it, I realised that it would be unfair to you and unfair to me and the Cabinet for you

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Matthai wrote that he was not surprised by Nehru's letter of 4 June.

3. Matthai had written that "if your statement proceeds on the lines of your letter, I should have no alternative to making a counter-statement."

4. Matthai had written that Nehru had been discourteous by asking for his resignation in April without a single convincing explanation.

to be asked to continue. That would create embarrassment for you as well as for me all the time and possibly lead to some kind of crisis later. It seemed much better that this matter should be dealt with more normally in the course of the reconstruction of the Cabinet.

I was always under this impression, at any rate for some months past, that it was your desire to go and that it was because of consideration for me that you were staying on. I did not wish to impose this burden upon you and hence I made the suggestion I did to you. You know that in the month of March I had practically decided to resign myself and had informed the Cabinet of it. I am not sure if you were present at that meeting of the Cabinet, but the fact was well known. Such a decision was no light matter for me, but I was compelled to take it then because I felt that all the ideals I had stood for more than thirty years spent in public life were fading away and I began to feel that I could work for them better in a non-official capacity. Other events then took place resulting in the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8th and I felt in honour bound to continue to work that Agreement.

Perhaps you do not quite appreciate that some of us have spent our lives in the pursuit of certain ideals and have taken large risks in the course of that life and not cared very much for the consequences. If these ideals are imperilled, it is a matter of the greatest consequence to us.

You refer to my being bound by the decision of a party caucus and say that if this is so, it means an end to parliamentary government. Perhaps I also may claim some knowledge of parliamentary government and even more so of the Indian political background. If a party has gone to the country on the basis of a programme, its first duty is to follow that programme in so far as it can. Parliamentary government consists of certain policies and programmes, which the majority party has proclaimed, being given effect to. Parliamentary government, after the British model, also consists in the Prime Minister having a very special responsibility.

You refer to the statement I made in Trivandrum. I should like you to read it again and to find out if there is a single word in it which, even remotely, is discourteous or unbecoming or wrong. I had to say something then because I was asked questions. I could not very well remain silent. All kinds of insinuations were being made. Among them, that there was a difference of opinion between you and me about the exchange ratio of the rupee. I wanted to put an end to this mischievous talk and so I made that statement.

It is clear that in regard to some of the basic things for which I stand, and I hope my Government stands, you are of a contrary opinion. In addition to this, you hold an opinion about me which is, to say the least of it, not very complimentary to me. Obviously, in such circumstances, there was no room left for us to cooperate together in the Cabinet. My only regret is that this break should have happened with impropriety and should have set a bad example in our public life. We are a young nation trying to build up democratic and parliamentary conventions and

anything that hinders that healthy building up is unfortunate. There are bound to be differences of opinion, but it is a matter of distress to me that such differences should have affected our personal relations. For my part, I would rather forget recent happenings and remember the three years and more of pleasant companionship in the course of which we faced together many difficult situations. I shall always be grateful for that.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

16. To Asaf Ali¹

New Delhi
June 27, 1950

My dear Asaf,

I arrived here yesterday. Your letter reached me in Calcutta. Our tour was an extraordinarily interesting one and gave me an insight into conditions in these countries. Each one of these countries is full of intricate problems, sometimes much more difficult than ours.

I was surprised to read about the story of your trying to get Mahtab back. I had not heard of it and I am sure that Mahtab has not heard of it either. Do not trouble yourself about such malicious stories.

I met your new Chief Minister² in Calcutta for a brief while and had a talk with him. I rather liked him.

Your other Minister, Bariha³ told me that he had decided to resign and return to England with his wife. This does not seem to me a very wise move on his part and I tried to dissuade him. But he appears to have made up his mind. I told him to have a talk with his Chief Minister.

Whenever I go away from Delhi for sometime, some thing or other tends to go wrong here. On this occasion I had hardly left India, when Matthai came out

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nabakrushna Chaudhury.

3. Lall Ranjit Singh Bariha was the Minister for Tribal and Rural Welfare in Orissa.

with his statement attacking me with some virulence. Few things have surprised and distressed me so much as this amazing outburst from Matthai. For an old colleague whom I respected so much to behave in this manner, was a shock. You will appreciate from this the kind of atmosphere we live in.

I can quite understand your feeling rather tired of Orissa. I should myself like you to have a change. But it will take sometime to arrange this. At the present moment, after the Matthai controversy, I just do not want to make any changes anywhere.

Yours affectionally,
Jawaharlal

ADMINISTRATION

II. Reconstitution of the Cabinet

1. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
May 1, 1950

My dear Prakasa,²

...There is no doubt that the Pakistan people, or at any rate the top people there, are behaving very much better in regard to the Agreement than most of our people or newspapers. In West Bengal especially the attitude is still deplorable. Whatever harm this may do us in India, it is far more harmful for the Bengalis themselves. It surprises me that they do not realise it. Nor do they appreciate the fact that the Agreement is there and we are going to do our utmost to implement it. Any failure on their part will not put Pakistan in the wrong but us in the wrong. They seem to imagine that if they manage to upset the Agreement, the burden of this will fall on Pakistan, which is absurd. Bengal tends to isolate herself from India. That is not good for India, but it is still less good for Bengal.

The main purpose of my writing this letter however is different. It may perhaps come as a slight surprise to you. You know that in terms of the Constitution, we have to reconstruct our Cabinet. The present Cabinet is the pre-Republic one and it is not proper to carry on with it in that way. Of course it is open to us to have the same persons over again or many of them. The time has now come when a change is essential. In any event this would have been so ~~say~~ but the resignation of Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Neogy has made it even more urgent. Indeed we shall have to take some step within the next week or so.

Rajaji is here and I have been discussing this matter with him and with Vallabhbhai Patel. Rajaji's presence here is extraordinarily helpful with his mature wisdom and keen intelligence. All of us feel that it would be a very good thing if you left your present job and came to the Centre. It is time that we strengthen the Centre with stout and able colleagues of ours. Personally it would be a great joy and relief to me if you were here. There are not many people here with whom I can have what might be called personal talks. I am writing to you now just to warn you and to give you a little time to think. Personally I feel sure that your coming here will not only be good for me and our Government, but for you also. A change of this kind is good, but my misfortune is that I cannot take a change.

Nothing has been decided yet and we are all in the region of vague talks. But the decision will have to be made in the course of the next few days. But it may be that I shall telegraph to you. You know that in this matter of Cabinet making all kinds of relevant and irrelevant considerations have to come in. Therefore I am not sure exactly what developments might be...

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Sri Prakasa who was Governor of Assam was appointed Minister of Commerce in the Central Government

This letter is rather hurried, but you will realise that a good deal of thought lies behind it and a good deal of hope and expectation.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
May 1, 1950

My dear Krishna,

...The new constituted Government will not be exactly as I would have liked it to be. But, as you know, it is difficult to have a completely free hand and all manner of factors govern one's choice. On the whole I think the new Government will be more progressive and more homogeneous than the old. It will also be, on the whole, more favourably inclined to the Agreement with Pakistan.

I have been hard at work and feel tired out. Did I tell you that I shall be going to Indonesia in the beginning of June for about ten days? I shall go by sea by our Cruiser.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

3. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
May 1, 1950

My dear Pantji,

You can well imagine how depressed I am at various developments in the U.P. A part of this distress is due to the feeling that you are terribly worried and distressed over these matters. Indeed I have found a little difficulty to have discussions with you on these subjects. We did have some fairly long talks, but I found that we were thinking along different lines and so it was not easy to come to grips with the subject. Regardless of the facts (important as they are), I have a sensation that the handling of the situation has not been a happy one. Perhaps things would have

1. J.N. Collection.

been different, if differently handled. However, it is not about this that I am writing to you, although this is part of the background.

You will remember that on one or two occasions previously I mentioned to you the possibility of my inviting you to join the Central Government. Of course I would have liked to have you here at any time and you would have been a tower of strength to us. But always the thought came to me that it was difficult for you to leave the U.P. and so I desisted pressing you. That thought is still there, but it is modified to a considerable extent. I have come to feel that even apart from our needs here, which are great, it might be a good change for you to be free for a while of the great burdens you carry at present and to assume a new type of burden. A burden there is going to be anyhow and a heavy one. All we can do is to change about the burden and that itself perhaps brings relief and freshness. We are all tired men struggling against considerable odds. If we could change our jobs, it would do us good. But that is not easily possible.

I am wondering if this would be possible for you now in the present set of circumstances. My own general inclination is that it would probably be desirable. From my own point of view and that of the Central Government, it would be eminently desirable. But I was thinking also of other points of view and more especially a change for you. I cannot be certain of that, because I cannot grasp all the facts and consequences. But, as I have said above, I am more and more inclined to think differently from what I thought previously and to feel that even from that point of view, it might be a good thing.

I discussed this matter with Rajaji today and with Sardar Patel. Rajaji was very much of the opinion I have expressed above. Sardar Patel was rather doubtful, but did not rule it out. We all felt that your own reactions were the most important consideration.

The consequences of your leaving the U.P. would certainly be marked. I take it that Sampurnanand would become Chief Minister. He is good in many ways, but you know better than I do how this arrangement would work out. Naturally, it would be difficult for you suddenly to pack up and come. But, as things are, some kind of a quick decision should be made, so that we may know what to work for. I am therefore writing this letter to you and I should like a very early reply. Perhaps I might telephone to you just to get your initial reactions. In telephoning, I shall not refer to this precisely or very clearly, but in general terms.²

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Pant replied on 3 May: "So far as the provincial administration is concerned, I have never considered myself indispensable... Sampurnanand will prove better than myself, but as I wrote to you in one of my letters I think in the existing circumstances I can perhaps be more useful if I have no regular assignment."

P.S. Your letter of April 22nd moved me greatly. That letter and what it contains leads me to the conclusion I have referred to above.³

J.N.

3. Pant had written: "I am ashamed of the atrocities that have been committed in some places in this Province. Things seem to be gradually returning to the normal, but the fact is that happenings continue to oppress me... I could perhaps be a little more useful if I were free to act as an ordinary Congressman in a non-official capacity."

4. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi

May 2, 1950

My dear Pantji,

I sent you a letter last night. This is in continuation of that letter.

The more I think of it, the more I feel that the proposal I have made is desirable from every point of view. Our Central Government has not been functioning with that measure of harmony and unity that it should have. Dr Matthai has been a tower of strength in many ways. But he has progressively drifted away from our viewpoint in many ways. He himself feels it and I think it also. This produces a sense of frustration all round. Some time ago, about two months or so, Matthai in fact brought this matter to my notice and said quite frankly that he did not agree with me about basic matters in economic policy. He suggested, therefore, that he should resign from his present office, as he could not function effectively in these circumstances. I asked him then to continue as there was the Budget session and many other matters and I thought that any change then would be undesirable. So we have carried on.

Meanwhile, much has happened, including the constitution of the Planning Commission. Matthai is entirely opposed to this and said so. It was against his will that this was started and he thinks that it is not only a waste of money and energy but something worse. It is obvious that the Planning Commission will play a progressively greater role in policy formation for us and even perhaps in the implementation of that policy. This will mean continuous friction between the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry which ought to be closely allied.

There are other reasons also which I need not mention. But it is clear to me that if we continue as we are today, occasions will arise in the near future when there will be some such conflict. So far as I am concerned, I am not only Chairman

1. J.N. Collection.

of the Planning Commission but also intimately interested in its work. I want it to function effectively.

This leads to the conclusion that it is desirable for the Finance Ministry to change hands. If this is not done at present, it will have to be done somewhat later. It was in this connection more especially that I thought of you. You would fit in completely with this set-up. You bring generally the Congress viewpoint and more especially the planning viewpoint.

I can understand that it may be a little difficult for you to pack up suddenly and come here. I think that this could be arranged to suit your convenience as well as Matthai's. The Government will have to be reconstructed soon, that is within the next three or four days. But it is not absolutely necessary that you should come here within this period. I can ask Matthai to carry on for two or three weeks, say the end of the month, it being understood that he will be relieved at the end of that period. Meanwhile, you could make your arrangements and come here. I should like this to happen anyhow before I leave for Indonesia, which will take place on the 31st May.

I had a long talk with Matthai today. It was a frank and friendly talk and he himself pointed out his increasing difficulties in carrying on here because of the differences in approach etc.

While you may come later, I should like the announcement to be made earlier, so that people may know exactly how matters stand.

I have tried to induce Rajaji to join our Cabinet either as Minister without Portfolio or preferably, as Foreign Minister. As Prime Minister I do not want to have a portfolio. He has practically agreed, but he wants some time to adjust himself. After two or three days he intends going back to Madras and returning two or three weeks later. But in his case also I want the announcement to be made earlier.

I hope that all the reasons I have advanced appear adequate to you and that you will convey your approval and agreement to me as soon as possible.²

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. On 3 May, Pant replied that he felt he lacked the technical knowledge to be Finance Minister.

5. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
May 11th, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I have just received your letter of May 10th. Thank you for it and for your permission

1. J.N. Collection.

to make a press announcement.² I shall not make this announcement just yet but shall do so on my return from my brief Kashmir trip.

About Govind Ballabh Pant, the position becomes more and more difficult and complicated. I get messages from Muslims and others to leave him there. It is clear that Pantji is in a state almost of mental collapse, because he cannot properly face this burden of decision. Vallabhbhai writes to me that in view of these circumstances I should not press him. I feel myself that there is a limit to compelling a person to do something.

What is the alternative? I see none except that you should accept the Finance portfolio. I realise the burden this would mean to you, but we may even think of this as more or less temporary. Perhaps it will be easier to get Pant here by the end of July. In any event something has to be done fairly soon.

Vallabhbhai is very angry with Liaquat Ali and the Begum for what they have said in the U.S. He calls it a diabolical breach of the Agreement.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Rajagopalachari had written: "You may make the announcement as you propose. I think to make the best use of the arrangement, you should announce me as Foreign Minister rather than Minister without Portfolio. The latter would not touch the Indo-Pakistan issue which is the primary thing to keep in mind in recalling me to office."

6. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
May 11th, 1950

Dear Pantji,

I am afraid my proposal to you has caused you a great deal of trouble and embarrassment. You know the reasons for it. They are important. Nevertheless I do not want you to feel that you are being driven to doing something which you thoroughly disapprove of. Now that all the facts and arguments are before you, I should like you to decide without thinking of the embarrassment that your decision would cause me. Leave me out of the picture and decide on the merits. You are after all in the best position to do so. I shall understand whatever your decision might be.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. G.B. Pant Papers, N.A.I.

7. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
May 26th, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I am going off early day-after-tomorrow morning and I am thinking now more and more of Indonesia and less and less of the troubles of Delhi. Being rather irresponsible, I shall probably completely forget or at any rate put aside all the normal problems that afflict me here in Delhi and think of other matters till I return. You have written in your letter something about the conflict in Indonesia between Federation and the Unitary Constitution. I do not know how far you have studied that question. I have not, and one can hardly give an opinion without knowing the facts of a complicated situation. We did not use to relish advice from outside about our own problems which seemed so simple to others. We do not relish advice about Kashmir now. So it is rather unsafe to offer advice to other countries in such matters.

I have a feeling that the new Cabinet, and specially the new Ministers, will start well. Anyhow, they are earnest and eager about their work.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

8. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
June 26, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

On arrival here I received two letters from Rajaji. In one of these he said that he had progressed well now and hoped to come to Delhi about the second week of July. The rest in Ooty is doing him good. In his second letter he enclosed a letter addressed to you which he wanted me to forward to you. I am doing so. I do not know who has talked to you about Rajaji coming here.² My own impression was

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Patel had written to Rajagopalachari on 21 June: "From my talks with some people who have seen me, I am somewhat apprehensive about the reactions of your coming to Delhi in the party. The old prejudices which do not seem to have died down yet are likely to be revived and there might be some trouble. However we shall have to deal with the matter, as it arises."

that his appointment was generally welcomed by the Party. Quite a number of people, among them some who had opposed his name for the Presidentship, told me that they liked his appointment as Minister. I had not heard of any criticism thus far. I sent for Satya Narayan Sinha today and asked him about it. He said that possibly two or three persons might have a grouse for their own reasons. But he did not think that generally the appointment was unwelcome. Indeed he thought that the Party would as a whole like it. I consulted some other people here too today who are in touch with Party members and they also gave me the same reply.³

I do not think we need attach much importance to a few disgruntled persons. In any event, it would be unfortunate and harmful if at this stage we tried to make a change as Rajaji suggests.⁴ As you know, he is very sensitive. In this matter, however, there appears to me to be no reason for him or for us to worry.⁵ I am writing to him accordingly.

I have received a reply from Matthai to the letter I sent him. This reply does not appear to me to be in good taste. I do not propose to issue a statement on this subject. But I shall send him a personal reply. I shall send you copies of the letters.

The war developments in Korea are full of dangerous implications. Probably the next few days will show us what is likely to happen. I greatly fear that we are on the eve of a developing war situation.

I am not writing to you about my visit to the countries of South East Asia, as this will be a long story. This visit was an exceedingly interesting one and made me understand much of their problems and the present situation. With the Governments of Indonesia and Burma I was brought into fairly intimate contact and we discussed many common subjects and problems. Each one of these countries has to face innumerable difficulties and yet they seem to be making good slowly.

In Burma a rather complicated situation has arisen on the China border. Remnants of the Kuomintang army have entered Burma and have taken up an aggressive attitude. Indeed there has been some shooting between them and the Burmese forces. They want to stick on to that part of Burma and use it as a base of operations against China. This of course cannot possibly be permitted by the Burmese Government. But they are hardly strong enough to do anything in the matter. It is quite possible that the communist forces might chase the Kuomintang forces into Burma. We are asking our Ambassador in Peking to use his discretion in this matter and try to see that the Chinese Government forces do not enter Burma.

3. Patel replied on 27 June that his own impression of a possible grumbling in the Party was based not on talks with one or two persons but on some undercurrent of dissatisfaction on account of old prejudices.
4. Rajagopalachari wrote to Nehru on 24 June that the better course would be to drop the matter for the present.
5. Patel did not think there could be any question of dropping him at all: "We have merely to be forearmed for dealing with any possible dissatisfaction against his appointment."

I have advised Thakin Nu to inform the American Ambassador about this new development, as the U.S.A. is the only country that can deal with the Formosa Government effectively...

Yours,
Jawaharlal

9. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
June 26, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I returned this afternoon and received your two letters. Also your letter to Vallabhbhai. I have sent on this last letter to him with a covering letter, copy of which I enclose. I am also returning his original letter to you, which you had sent me.

I am quite sure that there is nothing serious or important about this reference of Vallabhbhai to some people raising objections. I cannot imagine who has seen Vallabhbhai at Dehra Dun. Not many people have gone there. I thought at first that Satya Narayan Sinha might have conveyed this information to him. But, on enquiry from him, he denied it and said that he was rather surprised to hear it.

I consulted Mahtab also who is in fairly intimate touch with Congressmen, party members and various currents of opinion. He expressed surprise at it also. So please do not worry yourself at all about this matter. I am quite sure that it would be very harmful if at this moment and for any cause we went back on our decision. There are of course a few members of the Party who have made it a business to give trouble. They are not opposed to you or to anybody particularly, but they have a grouse against me and almost anything that I might do is liable to their criticism.

The international situation is developing very rapidly and in a bad way. We really are up against a big crisis.

We shall expect you here at any time suitable to you in the second week of July. Would you like to go straight to your house when you arrive here or would you prefer to come to my house for a couple of days and then move to your house? I think the latter course would probably be more convenient to you.

My tour in South East Asia was extraordinarily interesting and instructive. Each one of the countries I visited was full of problems and difficulties, probably greater ones than ours. This comparison gives one a greater perspective.

1. J.N. Collection.

Amrit Kaur, who has recently come back from Europe, tells me that Dickie is very keen on paying a visit to India. But he just does not know how to manage it.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

10. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 6, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

I have just received your letter of the 4th July from Ooty.

I spent yesterday with Vallabhbhai at Dehra Dun and returned today. He spoke to me, on his own initiative, about what he had written to you. He said that there was a small troublesome group in Parliament which was often misbehaving. He didn't attach any importance to it, but he had written to you because of your sensitiveness and so that you might not feel upset at some odd remark by a member. He mentioned specially Mahavir Tyagi to me in this connection and also Kamath. He was himself quite certain and rather anxious that you should come, and come soon.

I might add that unfortunately Mahavir Tyagi is one of our frustrated individuals. I know him well because I have worked with him in the U.P. He feels that I have not been just to him in overlooking him and preferring others. From an entirely independent source in Dehra Dun (Tyagi is a resident of Dehra Dun) I came to know that Tyagi was expressing his opinion pretty freely about me. He was saying that he disapproved of my work completely and that I had done a lot of harm to the country by my ways and it was chiefly because of me that Government's prestige was low. He also disapproved of Govind Ballabh Pant in the U.P.

You will understand the background of all this now. As a matter of fact there is a regular and organised campaign going on here, as well as elsewhere, against Government and more particularly me. The Hindu Sabha people are taking the lead, also the R.S.S. and certain leading figures among the refugees. They hold almost daily meetings and condemn us. Incidentally, they criticise Gandhiji also as an appeaser.

1. J.N. Collection.

You must have read about events at Rajkot.² From a small issue about students' fees, this became a big affair in which all the opposition and anti-social elements joined together to upset the peaceful life of Rajkot. Some newspapers are particularly virulent nowadays. Since the Supreme Court decision about some newspapers,³ against whom some action was taken, free licence reigns. The Dalmia group of newspapers, including specially the *Times of India*, is going all out against Government in all it does.

This is the background here at a time when very grave international issues are facing us. The Korean war is not going to end soon and the situation is rapidly deteriorating from the international point of view. The drift to general war continues.

I shall expect you here some time next week. It is cool here now as the rains have started. You have not told me whether you would care to stay with me to begin with.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. A campaign against increase of tuition fees in Saurashtra started on 18 June 1950 and took a violent turn on 29 June when students pelted the police with stones injuring a number of them which led to the arrest of some students. On 1 July, the Government released them and introduced uniform tuition fees in Government schools in the State.
2. The Supreme Court delivered judgment in the petition filed by *Cross Roads*, a pro-communist Bombay weekly, holding that the ban imposed by the Government of Madras against its entry into the State was illegal. The Court declared invalid section 9(IA) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, under which the ban had been issued.

ADMINISTRATION**III. Migrations from U.P.**

1. Telegram to G.B. Pant¹

Information from Shahjahanpur city and district is that practically every Muslim family is packing up to leave for Pakistan.² Muslims in villages are beaten and threatened and not allowed to harvest their crops. Most of them have sold their possessions for very low prices. People go about telling them that they must leave.³ Factory labour has also been unsettled.⁴

In view of Agreement with Pakistan it is essential that we should implement it fully and if exodus continues, it means that we have failed to produce conditions of security for minority.⁵ I trust that your Government will make every effort to approach these Muslims sympathetically through officials and non-officials and induce them to stay. Those who are threatening them and inciting them to go should be checked and proceeded against.⁶

This might apply to some other districts also.

1. New Delhi, 11 April 1950. File No.57/78/50-Poll, M.H.A.
2. Pant replied on 15 April 1950: "Further inquiries have been made. Reports conveyed to you about Shahjahanpur are grossly exaggerated if not entirely incorrect."
3. Pant replied: "About 10,000 Muslims had evacuated rural areas to towns. Full arrangements for their rations, sanitation, protection etc. were made. Almost all of them have since been sent back to their homes with adequate arrangements for their safety and protection... Many Hindu villagers have themselves come forward to assist their Muslim co-villagers."
4. Pant wrote that the Muslims now leaving for Pakistan were in good spirits. Most of them were artisans who had got assurances of employment on high salaries. Some weavers were leaving on an assurance that some cotton mills had been opened in Pakistan. Persuasion not to go had little effect.
5. Pant replied that no incident occurred after 23 March. Ten magistrates and police had been touring the rural areas.
6. Pant wrote: "Large number of arrests totalling about 970, imposition of collective fines and other preventive measures suppressed the trouble almost completely."

2. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
May 6, 1950

My dear Pantji,

I do not know what the numbers of Muslims leaving the U.P. for West Pakistan are at present. Till two or three days ago our information was that about 4000

1. J.N. Collection.

Muslims were going to West Pakistan daily from various parts of the U.P. and Rajasthan. We are getting repeated complaints from Pakistan about this and Shahabuddin,² who was here, has also talked about it. He told me that he had broadcast that the statement that people were wanted in West Pakistan was entirely wrong and nobody should come.

One idea has struck me. There has, I believe, been a large-scale withdrawal of gun licenses from Muslims in the U.P. I am told that nearly all such licenses have been taken away in Shahjahanpur district. This kind of thing has occurred also on a big scale in East Bengal and licenses and guns have been taken away from the Hindus there. We are pressing the East Bengal Government to give back these licenses or at any rate some proportion of them. Would it not be advisable to give back some of the guns to Muslims who were old license-holders in the U.P. and whose licenses were withdrawn recently? I cannot imagine that this can lead to any mischief. At any rate a beginning could be made. It would certainly inspire some confidence in the minority.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Khwaja Shahabuddin was the Minister of Interior and Information and Broadcasting in the Pakistan Government.

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th May about Hakim Nisar Ahmed² of Jodhpur. I entirely agree with you that the real question is whether he can be considered a national of India or not. I am glad that you are going to look into this matter.

Mohan Lal Gautam, who has been touring about in connection with certain Muslim elections in the U.P., told me that he found an all-pervading sense of fear among the Muslims of those areas. This is a question worth enquiring into. There is no doubt that it is because of this fear that they are going out of U.P. We see processes happening of squeezing out because people feel that they cannot live

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 172-173.

in safety and security or carry on their vocation. It is something of the kind that we saw in Sind with this difference that the Government in the U.P. is trying to counter this prevailing fear. I think that the working of the evacuee property laws has something to do with this matter. Quite a number of old Congressmen, who have opposed the Muslim League in the past, have come in the grip of the laws because they sent some small sums of money to some relatives in Pakistan. A man possessing several lakhs worth of property sends 2,000 rupees to a relative and immediately he becomes an evacuee or intending evacuee.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

ADMINISTRATION**IV. The Sikhs**

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Master Tara Singh will be coming here soon.² Meanwhile, he is carrying on a tour of the Punjab, P.E.P.S.U., etc. The object of this tour is to demand a separate homeland for the Sikhs.

I think it would be desirable if the Ministers in the East Punjab Government as well as prominent Sikhs here said something about this demand. Remaining quiet will be misunderstood.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, p.444.
2. Patel replied on 11 July that Tara Singh had already been in Delhi since 9 July and had been making speeches in the usual tone.
3. Patel spoke to several ministers and politicians in the Punjab and thought that if Baldev Singh acted on the lines suggested by Nehru others would follow suit.

2. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1950

My dear Trivedi,

I see that Master Tara Singh is out again with the flag of homeland for the Sikhs and is carrying on continuous propaganda for it. In the circumstances, the Ministers of the East Punjab Government should not remain quiet about it and should definitely express their opinions against this demand of Master Tara Singh. I do not myself think that there is much in this demand, but small things become big if not nipped in the bud and, therefore, it is desirable that clear statements should be made by as many prominent Sikhs as possible, and more especially the Sikhs in the Government.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

3. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
July 11, 1950

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have been worried lately by the fresh campaign which Master Tara Singh has started. I am afraid Master Tara Singh is incapable of learning or of forgetting. The world may change, but he goes on in his old way. He is now again talking about a separate homeland for the Sikhs as well as many other things, which are entirely opposed to our policy. He talks about the terrible oppression of the Sikhs in the Punjab and perhaps elsewhere. I just do not understand all this business.²

Here we are in the midst of grave international crises and with national problems of terrible importance. But Master Tara Singh is completely oblivious of what is happening and goes on repeating his old slogans and no doubt thus adding to the confusion. I think that it is the duty of Sikh leaders to dissociate themselves clearly from this policy and campaign of Master Tara Singh and that you should give a lead in this matter. We should not allow a mischievous turn of events to grow and assume importance.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, p.446.
2. In his reply of 14 July, while agreeing with what Nehru had written, Baldev Singh blamed the East Punjab Government and the State Congress for encouraging people like Tara Singh. He mentioned the by-election in Ferozepur where the Congress lost because of factionalism in the State Congress.
3. He wrote that he had called a meeting of the ex-Panthic M.L.As on 23 July to adopt an organised stand against Tara Singh's activities.

4. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
July 14, 1950

My dear Baldev Singh,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th July about Master Tara Singh.² Whatever the sins of the Punjab Government or the State Congress might be, and I have

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See the preceding item.

no doubt they are many, they do not take away from the fact that Master Tara Singh has been functioning in an exceedingly irresponsible manner. You say in your letter quite clearly that you think his utterances are not only not in the interests of the country as a whole but detrimental to his own community. If that is so, then it is our business to dissociate ourselves completely with Master Tara Singh's activities and tell the public in the clearest language that what Master Tara Singh says is utterly wrong and we do not agree with him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter which I have received from Sardar Santokh Singh Vidyarthi.² I have suggested to him that he and his colleagues might wait upon you and explain their viewpoint to you. Much that he has written in this letter has weight and I have no doubt that the Akali Party is a most unreliable companion.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-1950*, Vol. 10, p.449.
2. In his letter of 30 July, Vidyarthi, secretary of the All-India Nationalist Sikh Party and private secretary to Baba Kharak Singh, had criticized Tara Singh's demand for a Sikh State and suggested that the nationalist Sikhs should be given more importance by the Government.
3. Patel in his reply of 31 July thought that the Panthic Sikhs rather than the nationalist Sikhs would be a more effective opposition to the Akali Party.

5

ADMINISTRATION

V. Other Matters

1. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
April 10, 1950

My dear Pantji,

As suggested by you, I have informed Mrs Zaidi² that she can visit her daughters on any date after the 16th of this month.

You read out to me on the telephone the jail report. That was typical of a jail report and you will forgive me if I do not accept it as necessarily true. All of us know what jail reports are. I have no doubt that the three girls must have created trouble and had to be dealt with accordingly. But in a case like this, it is desirable for some outside person to see the girls and find out for himself what the position is. The District Magistrate might do so or some non-official person whom you could designate.³

I am worried about this matter for a variety of reasons. It becomes rather symbolic of many things. Some of the brightest of our young men and young women are attracted to communism. How are we to deal with them? If we try to crush them completely, we may perhaps succeed in breaking their spirit entirely or, which is more likely, they may become embittered and completely anti-social. Their career would be ruined and all that they can look forward to are these intensely anti-social activities.

These three girls are known to be very bright. One of them has just taken a first class in the B.A. A fourth sister is in America and has taken her Ph.D. The other two have also done very well in their studies and are supposed to be far above ordinary students. Obviously this is good material if handled properly. Unfortunately the handling they get is inadequate in the universities or schools and then they are handled by the police and jail staff. Physically they are fragile girls. Their family and Saiyadain's⁴ family lost everything they possessed in Panipat. Their houses were destroyed or taken possession of by refugees. Every Muslim was driven out of Panipat. Gandhiji went there several times and even gave guarantees which were not kept by us.

Saiyadain went to Aligarh specially to see these girls after arrest, but he just missed them, as they had been transferred to Benares Jail. Previous to their arrest,

1. File No.7(204)/50-PMS.
2. Mrs Zaidi told Nehru on 8 April that her three daughters Khaliya, Zahida and Shahida aged 18, 19 and 21 respectively were arrested in Aligarh while demonstrating as members of the Students Federation and treated very badly by the police.
3. On 9 April, Nehru wrote to her that the Chief Minister had received information that the girls refused to enter the barracks which led to their being pushed in and there was no lathi charge or serious injury to anybody. Further enquiries were being made.
4. K.G. Saiyadain, Director of Public Instruction in Bombay at this time, was the brother of Mrs Zaidi.

they were on the point of appearing for their final examinations, but, I believe, at the suggestion of the district authorities they were expelled from the University. This made them more indisciplined than ever.

The report that has reached me is that they were handled very roughly in Aligarh by the police. The tooth of one of them was broken and it is said that a policeman stamped upon their necks. Whether this is true or not, I do not know.

In Benares they went on hunger strike, because they complained of the food. That was probably the usual communist technique. Then there were some troubles, which led to conflict with the jail authorities and they were put in solitary confinement, each separately. The jail staff itself stated to the mother that there had been a lathi charge.⁵ The mother, hearing of this, broke down and became hysterical, which was rather natural. The old lady is devoted to her daughters and her life revolves round them. Two of the girls were sent to the jail hospital. It was suggested that an outside doctor might see them. This was not allowed.

These facts may be partly true and may be partly untrue. But the major fact is that three bright and very promising girls are going astray and are subject to treatment which will make them embittered for life and which will spoil their future completely. That is a loss to the country. This kind of thing spreads and others are affected. They are just the class of girls like my daughter or yours.

I would suggest that you might ask some one or two persons in Benares, including the District Magistrate, and some non-official to visit the girls and see how they are. A human touch is always good. Also the three sisters might be kept together and not in a solitary confinement. After all they are very young.⁶

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. In the lathi charge in Benares jail, the girls were injured.

6. Pant replied on 16 April that he had instructed the jail staff not to treat them as ordinary convicts. But when the staff were attacked by prisoners and were unable to control the situation, they might act with severity. An enquiry was being held by the District Magistrate and Sajjan Devi, the M.L.A. from Banaras. The girls' uncle was to see them the next day and Pant had asked the Magistrate to seek his good offices so that the girls might give up their hunger strike.

2. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1950

My dear Defence Minister,

Some days ago, you referred the case of proposed promotion of an officer. This

1. J.N. Collection.

had been recommended by the Selection Board but, because of various reasons which you stated, had not been approved of by you.

This has led me to think of the wider and general problem of promotion in our Defence Services. Indeed it applies not only to promotion but to appointments and selections throughout. The more I think of it, the more I feel that in the higher ranks seniority should be only one of the minor reasons for promotion. Seniority means or should mean experience which is naturally valuable. But there are other qualities necessary today in our officers, which are of far greater importance than seniority. At any time these qualities of intelligence, initiative, capacity to absorb new ideas, leadership and a certain technical understanding of modern warfare are important. In the rapidly changing circumstances of today, in so far as the art of warfare is concerned, it becomes still more necessary that officers in senior commands should fit in with new ideas and should not be merely attached to the old routines and ruts. Some routine is essential, just as discipline is essential in any force. But too much routine and too little of other qualities dulls the mind and lessens its adaptability to changing conditions.

The world has now definitely taken to what is called scientific warfare. Old style methods are out of date against any modern enemy. Scientific warfare involves an entirely different and a more technical approach to the problems than the old style of warfare. It is well known that almost every weapon that was used in the last War is out of date, and a new war on a major scale will be fought by entirely new weapons. It will be far more than ever that of scientists' and technicians' war. We cannot expect all our officers to be scientists and technicians. But we should expect them to have a certain scientific and technical approach to problems and a capacity to understand these new ideas in regard to warfare that are accepted by the leading countries today.

This line of thought leads one to the conclusion that people, who are too wedded to old-style methods, may find it rather difficult to adapt themselves to new conditions. Thus seniority, though it brings experience, may not always bring experience of the right type and its value is lessened. I realise that it is not always easy to ignore seniority and this may even lead to possible nepotism. But the fact remains that if we intend having a really modern army, it must be thought out in modern terms and our officers must clearly understand this. Those who are too much wedded to old ways may, therefore, not be suitable for high and responsible posts. These facts should be borne in mind in the selection and promotion of officers.

Then again in selecting new men for the Defence Services, the tests thus far applied may not perhaps be entirely right or in keeping with the new India. I am told that a very large number of applicants are rejected after some kind of test or examination and then it is said that a sufficient number of people are not coming forward for the Army or the Navy or the Air Force. As an inducement, more pay and amenities are suggested. Apart from the fact that our country just cannot afford

to increase salaries and allowances of the Defence Forces, I think that our manner of approach to this problem is worth reconsideration. I cannot imagine that we do not have good material. Possibly one reason why many boys are not selected is their inadequate knowledge of English or their ignorance of what might be called social behaviour according to old practice. It must be remembered that in all our schools and colleges and universities, teaching is taking place more and more in the Indian languages and less and less in English. It is inevitable that in future the general knowledge of English will not be so good as today. If we make that as a test, boys will fail. In regard to social behaviour also, the average boy who comes from a middle-class family today, except a small group coming from more or less anglicised families, is unused to what the army expects. There will be an increasing tendency for our patterns of social behaviour to change, as they are changing today. To think therefore in terms of the old patterns and expect young boys to come up to those standards is to ignore realities.

What should be done therefore is for us to evolve new methods of selection, which should not take into consideration knowledge of English or social behaviour etc. Having selected the boy for other reasons, it should be up to us to give him the necessary training.

Thus far our officer class has been drawn from a relatively limited class in the country, which might be considered the upper middle class, which is more or less acquainted with English and English habits. We have to tap new classes now, as they have done in the U.K. and other countries and then train them up according to the standards we require. I should like you to consider these matters and confer with your military advisers on the subject. If necessary, we can discuss this subject in a Defence Committee meeting, though I hardly think that is necessary at this stage.

There is another matter which requires full consideration in the near future. Indeed, from a slightly different point of view, the Defence Committee asked the Chiefs of Staff to prepare a paper for a balanced force. I do not know if this has been done yet. In approaching this question, we must, for the moment, forget certain present-day difficulties (vis-a-vis Pakistan etc.) The right approach is to have a balanced force for normal needs and separately to consider any addition to it because of special needs. This balanced force must necessarily be efficient and as mobile as possible. It must take into consideration the financial capacity of the country, because no country can go beyond that for any length of time without inviting bankruptcy.

I have long held the view, and I have expressed it sometimes in Defence Committee and elsewhere, that even from the point of view of sheer efficiency in Defence, a smaller army is desirable. A big army may produce a sense of satisfaction and strength, but, in the ultimate analysis, if it is beyond the resources of the nation to equip and keep up, it is a weakness and produces inefficiency. Therefore we have to aim at a relatively small army but highly efficient and highly mobile, and capable of expansion in time of need. It is clear that the Air Force

is likely to play a more important role in our defence than the Navy. The Air Force therefore has to expand. I am attached to the Navy and want it to be efficient and effective, but in the balance we have to concentrate a little more on the other defence arms. The Navy should be small but highly trained and capable of expansion when the time comes for it.

Modern scientific and competent opinion is all against big ships, which are just targets for the new developed submarines. Therefore we should not spend large sums of money on the acquisition of big ships, but rather concentrate on the smaller ones. There was a proposal once for us to buy a second cruiser. This should be definitely given up. This for two reasons. Firstly, that such cruisers, except for some training facilities, are not much good from the point of view of war and are definitely out of date. Secondly, the amount spent on a cruiser can be far better utilised in other ways.

In considering the problem of our Defence Forces, we have to be clear in our own minds what we are aiming at. We cannot think in terms of rivalling the great powers in defence equipment. Indeed we have no desire to do so and no capacity either. We have to aim at protection from aggression, in effect at defence in the narrower meaning of the word. If that is so, then both the strength of our Defence Forces as well as their quality have to be considered from this point of view. For instance, we do not require heavy bombers, which can fly far.

I have merely put forward some suggestions for your consideration. I feel that we must be clear in our minds as to what we are aiming at and not continue functioning in the old ruts. I should like you and your officers to give thought to this matter, so that we can discuss them at a later stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
May 23, 1950

My dear Jayaprakash,
I have your letter of May 19th.²

1. File No.16(49)/50-PMS.
2. Citing the example of the by-elections for the U.P. Assembly in 1948, he doubted whether the coming elections would be free and fair.

To the questions that you have put to me³ the answers are clear, Government servants should not be used for party purposes. Ministers should bring no pressure on Government servants. Minorities should on no account be intimidated by the party in power for voting for them. Indeed no one should be intimidated.

While this is quite clear, obviously some difficulties might well arise. Ministers are no doubt interested in elections and are members of a party. They are bound to participate in the elections and to some extent, it may be difficult to distinguish between their individual and ministerial capacities. We are in the early stages of large-scale elections. We have not yet developed the conventions and the habits of mind which, say, a country like England has achieved through long course of years. We should try to do so of course and I hope that we shall largely succeed.

So far as I am concerned, I shall certainly draw the attention of all provincial Governments and others to this question of governmental interference in elections.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. Jayaprakash had raised the following questions: (i) should the party in power use Government servants for party purposes, such as influencing voters? (ii) should Ministers canvass the votes of Government servants? (iii) should the minorities be intimidated into voting for the party in power, on the plea that the latter alone could offer them protection? (iv) keeping in mind the morale of the general public in this country, would elections ever be free if the party in power were to utilize Government officers and official machinery for party purposes?
4. Replying on 30 May, Jayaprakash wrote that Nehru had treated a very grave problem in a light manner.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Your letter of 26 May about Tonk (state in Rajasthan). You will have noticed that I sent a copy of my letter to Hiralal Shastri (Chief Minister of Rajasthan) to the States Ministry. What I wrote to Hiralal was merely a report of what I was told.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 9, pp.477-478.

I informed those people that I could only be a listener as I did not know the facts. I did not express my opinion to them or to Hiralal about the facts, except in so far as I have been worried about the Muslim exodus from Tonk and from other places. The fact alone is damaging to our prestige.

I have no doubt that the fault in Tonk was not one-sided, but in all such cases I think it is a good rule to hold that the responsibility of the majority community is paramount, both in India and Pakistan. Minorities in both countries are fear-stricken and rather down and out.²

I have to see all kinds of people who wish to see me, provided I can find the time. Often they come from far distances. Naturally I avoid making any commitment to them. But I think it is right that I should try to see people who wish to see me.

I wrote to Hiralal Shastri, just as I write to any other Chief Minister, drawing attention to a particular problem. I send to all of these people, as you know, fortnightly letters and frequently other letters. Is there any basic difference now between the Chief Ministers of the States' Unions and of the old provinces? I presume they are supposed to be autonomous states, though of course a good deal of help has to be given and supervision exercised.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Patel replied on 28 May 1950: "I quite realise that in the matter of giving a sense of security to the minority the responsibility of the majority is paramount; but at the same time, we have to allow for the irritant effect of fears of the majority on the questions of loyalty of the minority community or a section thereof. I do not think it will be possible for us to ignore that altogether."

5. Security for the Prime Minister¹

I have written to you repeatedly about security arrangements made for me. On the eve of my going to Indonesia, I wrote again on this subject and said that I would go into this matter on my return. I propose to do so now and I hope that you have collected all the facts and figures not only about security arrangements for me but for all the other Ministers.

1. Note to P.P.S., New Delhi, 9 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

I imagine that more money is spent on security for me than we spend on the Prime Minister's Secretariat altogether. I think that this is indefensible and quite unnecessary. I believe in security measures being taken. But waste is always bad, both from the financial and psychological points of view. Having lived the life I have led in the past, this is peculiarly distressing for me.

In the course of the past year or more, I have drawn attention to this and spoken, among others, to the Home Secretary. He agreed with me to a large extent and said he would have them revised. As far as I can make out, there has been no change and there might indeed have been a change for the worse. To take one thing, there is a car following me about. The amount spent on this car and the people in it must be prodigious. Repeatedly I have been told that it will stop. But it has not done so. For over a year it has performed no useful function at all. I cannot conceive why anyone should imagine that it is necessary. My daily routine is between my house and the office. Sometimes to Government House, sometimes to some Minister's house, or to a dinner at an Embassy. I move in this restricted circle. I have a pilot motor-cyclist. I have also a police officer accompanying me in the car. Nothing more is necessary. I think it should be laid down definitely that no car need accompany me in New Delhi. If I have to go to Old Delhi for some special function, a car might be sent for, although I do not think it is necessary. Therefore this escort car should stop immediately. As for other arrangements being revised, I want to go into this matter with you.

I understand that all special arrangements have stopped in regard to the other Ministers except the D.P.M. This is good. But I would say that some slight additional arrangement might be made for Maulana Azad's house. I do not want a crowd there. But I think one man should be at the gate, apart from the armed orderly that accompanies him.

6. Security Measures¹

I am not satisfied with the note of Mr G.K. Handoo, Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau. With all my admiration for the police, I still think that I am a better judge of certain matters than they are. I know perfectly well that the general reactions of people to me are good or bad, and I know more about the Indian people and

1. Note to P.P.S., New Delhi, 11 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

crowds, both friendly and hostile, than probably any person in India. During the last thirty years I have made a special study of this and of how to deal with them. I recognise fully the necessity for security measures.

I think that it will be better if Handoo comes up and discusses this matter.

7. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
July 11, 1950

My dear Sri Babu,

Thank you for your fortnightly letter which I have read with interest. I have specially noted what you say about the situation on the Nepal border.

We have to be very careful about this Nepal situation and Bihar is specially affected, because most of the contacts of Nepal with India are through Bihar. Your officials should be made to understand quite clearly that in this matter our business is to prevent any violence or preparations for violence in India. Apart from this we have no business to interfere. We cannot interfere with constitutional agitation and we must not behave in a way as if we were helping the Nepal Government in suppressing people on this side. I write this because reports have reached me that some of the petty officials in Bihar on the Nepal border are very friendly with the Nepalese officials on the other side of the border and tend to help them in many ways. A report states that near Raxaul a local official said publicly that it was their duty to help the Nepalese Government in every possible way.

Again, I understand that the Indian C.I.D. are often harassing people connected with the Nepal Congress, etc., quite openly. It is right that our Intelligence should keep in touch with developments and may even shadow persons who may be considered dangerous. But the report that reached me is that Nepalese political workers in India are harassed in peculiar ways. Thus, the wife of the President of the Nepal Congress was awakened in a railway train at dead of night and interrogated before being allowed to go further. This seems to me both improper and foolish. If a watch has to be kept on any one it should be discreet and not noticeable.

Another case has come to my notice of a political prisoner being taken from one part of Nepalese territory to another through Indian territory. The political prisoner was named Harish and he was taken from Rupaidehi railway station, District Gonda in U.P., to Raxaul in Bihar about six weeks ago. We cannot permit Nepalese political prisoners to be escorted through Indian territory. Harish is reported to

1. J.N. Collection.

have been hand-cuffed and escorted by the Nepalese police who was assisted by the Indian police. It should be clearly understood, specially in the present state of affairs, that Indian territory cannot be used by the Nepal Government for any such purpose.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Alternative Systems of Medicine¹

The Health Minister² has drawn my attention to statements made both by Ministers of the Central Government and sometimes by Ministers of State Governments in regard to the public use of what are called the indigenous systems of medicine. The use of the word "indigenous" is not entirely correct in this connection. Normally this refers to the Ayurvedic and Unani systems. Sometimes reference is also made to the Homoeopathic and similar systems of medicine also.

Quite apart from the merits of any of these systems, it is desirable that our policy should be uniform and that Ministers should generally support that policy. Sometimes it so happens (I have a case of a State Minister in mind) when what is called modern medicine was condemned and the older systems were praised. Obviously this kind of thing produces confusion in the public mind and interferes with the growth of any uniform procedure and methods.

It is the business of the Health Ministry to propose a uniform policy and to get the approval of the Cabinet to it. In fact some such attempt was made about a year ago and Cabinet laid down, as far as I remember, some general rules.³ A committee was appointed to go into this matter and this committee submitted its report. I do not know what has been done since.³

It is obviously desirable for us not only to retain whatever there is of good in the older systems of medicine, but also to improve them by all means at our disposal. The question really is whether we should proceed in a haphazard, unscientific way of adhering to some tradition, or to have some scientific basis for our work. What is called modern medicine is really a growth out of the older systems and it has profited considerably by those systems. What has happened

1. Note to Chief Ministers, 22 July 1950, File No. 28(27)/56-57-PMS.

2. Amrit Kaur.

3. Adoption of modern scientific methods and establishment of special research institutions were recommended.

is that a new approach, which might be called a scientific approach, has been applied to problems of medicine, public health, etc. The question before us is whether the scientific approach should be considered desirable or even essential or not. I think there can be only one answer to this question and that is that we must proceed on strictly scientific lines and apply this to every system of medicine, whether it is Ayurvedic, Unani or any other. Thus the science of medicine would not be divided up into compartments but would be built up on solid foundations of past and present experience tested by modern scientific methods.

There is no doubt that there are very effective remedies in Ayurvedic and the Unani systems, and, scientifically utilised, they can be of the greatest use. But it is important that the method of science be applied to them. In surgery, which is so important, there is no alternative to modern methods. Even in medicine proper, the approach should be the same, that is, a scientific one of experiment.

Homoeopathy is also occasionally mentioned in this connection. Again I would say that the approach to it should be scientific. So far as I know, Homoeopathy is practised in India mostly by people who have had no real training of any kind and have just read a few books on the subject.

The State should not encourage any person to practise medicine without proper qualifications. There must be a basic qualification for everyone, who intends practising medicine, whether he adopts the Ayurvedic or the Unani or the Homoeopathic or the Biochemist or Naturopathic or any other method. That is to say the training must be scientific and normally the training that is given in our medical colleges.

It is often said that some systems of medicine are cheaper and therefore more suitable. That is hardly an argument. We should make prevention and treatment of disease cheap. But we cannot do so regardless of its efficacy or utility.

The proper approach therefore should be that any system of medicine to be followed or encouraged must be modern and up-to-date and should take advantage of all the accumulated knowledge we possess. That system can be called by any name.

6

AYODHYA

1. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
April 17, 1950

My dear Pantji,

Thank you for your letter about Shahjahanpur.² I am quite sure that your Government has taken strong and effective action during these recent troubles in the U.P. I am glad to learn that as a result of that action as well as a consequence of the Agreement, there is a tendency to settle down.

These recent occurrences in the U.P. have greatly distressed me. Or perhaps this was a culmination of what I had been feeling for a long time. People die and the fact of killing, though painful, does not upset me. But what does upset one is the complete degradation of human nature and, even more, the attempt to find justification for this.

I have felt for a long time that the whole atmosphere of the U.P. has been changing for the worse from the communal point of view.³ Indeed the U.P. is becoming almost a foreign land for me. I do not fit in there. The U.P. Congress Committee, with which I have been associated for 35 years, now functions in a manner which amazes me. Its voice is not the voice of the Congress I have known, but something which I have opposed for the greater part of my life. Purushottam Das Tandon, for whom I have the greatest affection and respect, is continually delivering speeches, which seem to me to be opposed to the basic principles of the Congress. Other members, like Vishambhar Dayal Tripathi, have the presumption to write and speak in a manner which would be objectionable in a member of the Hindu Mahasabha. We talk a great deal of disciplinary action. But these major distortions of the Congress policy are continually being made and accepted.

If the sea loses its saltiness, wherewith shall it be salted?⁴

I have not been to the U.P. for a long time. That is partly due to lack of time, but the real reason is that I hesitate to go there. I do not wish to come into conflict with my old colleagues and I feel terribly uncomfortable there, because I find that communalism has invaded the minds and hearts of those who were the pillars of the Congress in the past. It is a creeping paralysis and the patient does not even

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, telegram to G.B. Pant dated 11 April 1950, p. 267.

3. The Faizabad-Ayodhya area became a centre of communal tension and this caused anti-Muslim feeling in other districts such as Agra, Mathura and Bareilly.

4. Gospel of St. Matthew, 5:13; "You are the salt of the earth; but if the salt has lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted? It is therefore good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under foot of men."

realise it. All that occurred in Ayodhya in regard to the Mosque and temples⁵ and the hotel in Faizabad⁶ was bad enough. But the worst feature of it was that such things should take place and be approved by some of our own people and that they should continue.

It seems to me that for some reason or other or perhaps mere political expediency, we have been far too lenient with this disease, that has been spreading all over India and in our own province. Sometimes I feel that I should leave everything and take up this matter only. Perhaps some day I shall do that. If I do it, it will be a crusade with all the strength that I possess.

Law and order prevails in the U.P. and there are no incidents and the exodus has toned down or almost stopped. That is all very good. But the reports I get of the general atmosphere and of petty happenings reveal the true state of affairs even more than major incidents. A Muslim is walking along the street in a city. He is spat upon and told to go to Pakistan or he is given a slap on the face or his beard is pulled. Muslim women have vulgar remarks passed against them in the streets and always there is the taunting remark, 'go to Pakistan'. Only a few individuals may do these, but we have tolerated the growth of an atmosphere which permits this kind of thing being done and others look on and approve.

I have an instinctive feeling that our people, those who function in the Congress in large numbers, are still fairly sound at heart and can be made to understand. But the leadership is weak and is always compromising with something that is wrong and so the rank and file goes astray.

The fact of the matter is that for all our boasts, we have shown ourselves a backward people, totally lacking in the elements of culture, as any country understands them. It is only those who lack all understanding of culture, who talk so much about it.⁷

Yours,
Jawaharlal

5. Some images of deities were found in the mosque at Ayodhya on the night of 22-23 December 1949.
6. A Muslim proprietor of a hotel was ordered to vacate it by the district authorities. Some Hindus occupied it the next day.
7. Pant replied on 22 April: "I am ashamed of the atrocities that have been committed in some places in this Province. Things seem to be gradually returning to normal but the fact that we could not prevent these deplorable happenings continues to oppress me."

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your long letter of the 16th May, in which you have given me an account of your meeting at Dacca. On the whole the meeting seems to have gone off fairly well. It is obvious that the problems you deal with bristle with practical difficulties. But something what is even harder to tackle is the psychological difficulty and the suspicion on either side.

You are quite right in saying that the Moulvis and Maulanas are likely to give trouble. Apart from other reasons, there is an economic urge for them, as they want to become Qazis and some kind of judicial officers where Muslim personal law is concerned. But we have our Moulvis and Maulanas too, even though we call them by different names. The two cases you mention, racing and alcoholic drinks, are being attacked and suppressed by our enthusiasts. What is worse is the way some of our Sanatanists are raising religious or semi-religious issues. This has created a good deal of tension in parts of the U.P. In Ayodhya an old mosque built by Babar was taken possession of by a mob led by the *Pandas* and Sanatanists of the place and I regret to say that the U.P. Government showed great weakness in handling the situation. You will have noticed that there has been a pretty large migration of Muslims from the U.P. Altogether over 100,000 persons have gone to West Pakistan from the U.P., Delhi and parts of Rajasthan. Very little in the shape of incidents has happened in the U.P. and whatever happened took place early in March during the Holi. Nevertheless there has been this migration and there can be no doubt that in some districts of the U.P. the pressure on the Muslims was considerable and created a feeling of insecurity in them. This makes one understand easily enough the greater pressure on the Hindus in East Bengal.

I am glad you had a talk with Mohanlal Saksena. There was no question of your complaining against anyone to me. You wrote to me about Nikhil Sen and said that B.G. Rao had not been seeing much of you. I passed on this information to Saksena. I quite agree with you that you should be kept in the closest touch with all Central activities in West Bengal and indeed should be consulted about them.

The press in West Bengal is, I am afraid, still far from satisfactory. It is possible that when some of these newspapers go to East Bengal, they might increase the tension there.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

3. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
July 9, 1950

My dear Lal Bahadur,²

Akshaya Brahmachari³ came to see me yesterday and he gave me a long account of what had happened at Ayodhya. Much of this I had heard previously, much was new. You must be fully acquainted with all these facts and so I need not repeat them. Indeed, I asked Akshaya to keep in touch with you in this matter.

As you know, the Babri Mosque affair in Ayodhya is considered by us a major issue and one affecting deeply our whole policy and prestige. But apart from this, it appears that conditions in Ayodhya have become worse and worse. It is quite likely that this kind of trouble may spread to Mathura and other places. What distresses me most is the fact that our Congress organisation takes no interest in it and some prominent Congressmen like Raghavdas⁴ and Vishambhar Dayal Tripathi carry on propaganda of the kind which can only be called communal and opposed to Congress policy.

Akshaya told me that a hotel called the Star Hotel, owned by a Muslim in Ayodhya, was ordered to be vacated in December last under Section 144. The next day possession of this was taken up by some Hindus and four days later they started a hotel there called the 'Gomati' Hotel. This continues. Under what law or rule of commonsense or policy this was done or permitted to be done is not clear to me.⁵

Then I am told that it has become almost impossible for Muslims to be buried in Ayodhya. A case of the wife of one Ahmed Ali was placed before me when the corpse was carried about from one cemetery to another and ultimately sent outside Ayodhya for burial.⁶

1. File No.2(507)/49-PMS.

2. He was Home Minister in the U.P. Government at this time.

3. Akshaya Brahmachari was a Shrivaisnav sadhu of Ayodhya. He was also secretary of the Faizabad District Congress Committee, and a member of the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee. He undertook a fast from 30 January to 4 February 1950 when the Hindu-Muslim situation did not improve. It was given up on the U.P. Home Minister's assurance that he would take action.

4. Raghavendra Sheshappa Pachapurkar alias Baba Raghavdas (1896-1958); joined Indian National Congress in 1920 and worked in Gorakhpur for social uplift.

5. A subsequent report from the District Magistrate, Faizabad, said that the previous order served on the hotel was withdrawn in March. The building was allotted to the owner who opened a hotel of his own which was still running. The proprietor of the previous Star Hotel had been allotted another building. The premises were chosen by him with the consent of the owner and there were no problems afterwards.

6. The Magistrate denied this and said that there was opposition from the Hindus to the burial of bodies "within Panch Kosi Parikrama" limit of Ayodhya but not in the other graveyards.

A number of Muslim graves have been dug up also.⁷

These are one or two of the points Akshaya told me. I fear that we are heading again for some kind of disaster.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The Magistrate said that there had been no fresh damage to graves. Earlier cases of damage were investigated and the accused were convicted or acquitted on appeal. On some graves some Hindi words had been written in coal tar. These cases were being investigated and the culprits were being prosecuted.

CONGRESS ORGANISATION

1. To K.D. Malaviya¹

New Delhi
April 25, 1950

My dear Keshavadeva,²

I have your letter dated 23rd.³ I shall gladly see you and Sherwani but I am afraid I cannot do so before the 30th of this month. I am going away to Karachi tomorrow morning.

I know very well that all is not well in the U.P. I have tried in my own way to interfere a little, but without any success.⁴ To right a wrong by committing a wrong oneself is not a proper way to do it. It seems to me that the charges made by Triloki Singh and company, except for one or possibly two, were trivial. In any event any serious charge could and should be enquired into. Both the Parliamentary Board and the Working Committee were particularly prepared to proceed with some such enquiry, but I have been amazed by the wholly intransigent attitude of Triloki Singh and his colleagues. It becomes difficult for me to interfere when my advice is not taken and in fact flouted. Triloki Singh after agreeing to send a letter which was drafted by me changed it considerably without further reference to me. He cannot expect me to advise him in future.⁵

Again, after the Working Committee has very clearly said that Triloki Singh's colleagues who have been sitting apart from the Congress Party should return to their original seats, they have deliberately flouted the Working Committee's decision. No organisation anywhere in the world can submit to such active disobedience. It appears that they are anxious and eager to break away. In these circumstances, whatever justification they may have in regard to their original complaints is covered up by their subsequent behaviour.

I am dreadfully sorry that my province should go to pieces, but one lesson I have learnt is not to interfere when I am not wanted. It is clear to me that my

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Minister of Development and Industries in U.P.

3. Malaviya had complained about Congressmen in the U.P.

4. Malaviya had wished that Nehru could take "some initiative in your province and not be content with thinking that we are petty-minded and do not look to larger things."

5. A group in the U.P. legislature led by Triloki Singh had given publicity to charges of corruption and nepotism against the U.P. Ministry and hence were expelled from the Party. They formed the People's Congress or Jan Congress and sat with the opposition. The Working Committee's instructions to return were not carried out. Nehru tried to intervene and prepared the draft for the Working Committee after consultations with Triloki Singh but when major alterations were made in that he withdrew from mediation.

advice has no value for some of these gentlemen and they propose to do just what they like. In the circumstances I do not propose to waste my advice.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I enclose a cutting from *The Hindu*. I confess that I feel distressed to find that your Government is proceeding along these communal lines². There has been a great deal of criticism of this kind of thing and I fear that the standards in Madras will go down very much because of this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Government of Madras had extended the Communal G.O. of 1922—distributing appointments in Public Services on the basis of caste—to admission into certain educational institutions.

3. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
May 21, 1950

My dear Rafi,

The newspapers announce that the so-called expelled members of the U.P. are openly supporting candidates for election who are opposing the Congress candidates. What these people do, it is for them to decide and is not directly my concern. But I am writing to you to impress upon you that you should keep completely out of this business and not get entangled in it in any way. I hope that you will bear this in mind.

1. J.N. Collection.

As you know, Nisar Ahmed Sherwani came to see me this morning and he told me something of the latest developments in the U.P. in regard to himself.² I listened to him and could give him no advice in the matter. I shall however enquire into the matter further. I hope you will keep out of this too.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Sherwani told Nehru that he had offered his resignation from the U.P. Ministry because he and his Parliamentary Secretary were unable to work together. The Parliamentary Secretary, Har Gobind Singh, had also made various charges against him but despite this Singh had been reappointed Parliamentary Secretary in Sherwani's Ministry, implying that Sherwani was not wanted.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I thank you for your two letters of 27 and 28 June.

I do not propose to trouble you to come here specially for Cabinet meetings. We had two emergency meetings of the Cabinet to deal with the Korea situation. We may have more meetings, but I want to avoid consideration of important matters in your absence and in the absence of some other members of the Cabinet. We shall deal with secondary matters if a Cabinet meeting is held and of course any urgent matters that may arise.²

I have heard from Kala Venkata Rao about the Working Committee meeting. He said that you were prepared to have it from 12 July or from the 15th. As I intend going away on the 15th to Allahabad and Banaras for two days, I have asked him to fix the meeting for 12 July.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 354-355.
2. Patel had written from Dehra Dun on 27 June that whenever his presence was necessary in Delhi for disposal of any important business of the Cabinet, he could come over for a day though he would like to avoid the hot weather of Delhi.

As regards the Congress session, the sooner it is held the better, but Kala Venkata Rao told me that delays in elections made it almost impossible to hold the session by the middle of August as previously announced. He wanted a postponement of at least ten or twelve days for this purpose. I think a final date should be fixed as soon as possible as much depends on this date. We have to fix the date for the next session of Parliament. Mavalankar, as you know, wants to go to London for some opening ceremony of the new House of Commons. I have agreed to his going and I think he should do so. He will be coming back by the middle of September. I think we should have the session to begin some time between 15 and 20 September. In view of world developments, it is not right to delay holding of the session. If Mavalankar is absent for a few days in the beginning it should not matter.

There is no chance of the Maulana being well enough to go abroad before the middle of August at the earliest and it may take a week or two more.³ Therefore we are provisionally fixing the middle of September for his going. That will come in the way of the session of Parliament to some extent, but he will be able to attend the Congress session. Incidentally, that will be a better time of the year to travel and to visit places.

As regards the general elections, I quite realise the difficulties involved in making the necessary preparations. We are sufficiently committed to holding them some time before the rains commence next year. I think we ought to be able to manage by then. Delay will be harmful. Of course if insuperable difficulties come in our way, then there is no help for it. We have so tied ourselves up by all kinds of legal and constitutional difficulties that most of our lives are going to be spent in trying to overcome them.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. On the night of 25 June, Azad fell down and fractured his ankle bone and left arm. He was to undertake a tour of West Asia in mid-July.

8

KOREA

1. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your Telegram 4619 27th June.² Our delegate at Lake Success gave his vote on information available to him and there was apparently no time to refer matter to us at that stage. Such information as we possess indicates clearly that North Korea has committed aggression and has done so after full preparation. There is no other explanation of developments whatever minor events may have taken place earlier.³ We are informing our representative at Lake Success not to commit ourselves further in any way without reference to us. Copy of our telegram to him is being sent to you separately. You may use this information at your discretion.

1. New Delhi, 27 June 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon had asked if India had voted on the information available to Indian delegate on aggression by North Korea.
3. In 1949, the South Korean Government had debarred some members of the National Assembly and, fearing communist subversion, arrested many in the army, civil services, educational institutions and the judiciary.

2. Loy Henderson's Record of Talk with Nehru¹

Nehru's reception was friendly. After we had discussed briefly various aspects of his recent trip to South East Asia, I told him that the primary purpose of my visit was to explain events which led to introduction by the U.S. of two resolutions² into Security Council and to decisions of far-reaching character announced by the President on June 27.³

Nehru said it would have been preferable of course for the Government of India to have had an opportunity to give careful consideration to both the

1. Loy Henderson, the United States Ambassador in India, recorded the gist of his interview with Nehru on 28 June 1950. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, Vol. VIII, pp. 235-236. Extracts.
2. On 25 June 1950, the forces of North and South Korea clashed all along the 38th Parallel. On the same day the Security Council, in a resolution, called for immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel and urged the members of the United Nations to render every assistance in the execution of the resolution. The resolution of 27 June called upon the U.N. member States to furnish assistance to South Korea "to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security."
3. On 27 June 1950, Truman announced that American naval and air forces had been ordered to give cover and support to the South Korean troops, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet would "insulate" Formosa from attacks by the Chinese Nationalists and the communists on each other.

resolutions before presentation to Security Council, since their passage had great political and historical significance. He could not be over-critical, however, of our actions in this respect since he realized the importance of time element. Decisions announced by the President involving Formosa, Philippines and Indo-China made the matter somewhat complicated so far as the Government of India was concerned.⁴ There was little sympathy in India for French policies in Indo-China.

The Government of India had recognized the Chinese Communist Government and was hoping to develop with it as friendly relations as possible. There could be no friendly relations if the Government of India should appear to be giving support to the U.S. decisions regarding Formosa. Government of India had little concern regarding developments in U.S.-Philippine relations since there were special arrangements between these countries.⁵ Government of India furthermore did not wish to take any action which would embarrass its close associate, Burma, the relations of which with Communist China were particularly delicate, in view of the fact that Communist China could at any time invade Burma under the pretext of disarming the 26th Nationalist Chinese Army which had taken refuge there.⁶ India, Burma and Indonesia had common policy of non-alignment with either of the two power blocs and the Government of India must take care not to give the impression that without consultation it was shifting its policy. Internally also the Government of India had certain problems. He and his colleagues were already being criticized by various elements in India as tools of "Anglo-American imperialists". None of these considerations was overriding. Nevertheless, they could not be ignored. Furthermore, even if the Government of India should support resolution, it had no armed forces, money or material to contribute to the campaign against Northern Koreans. Its support would be merely of moral character....

4. Truman linked the question of Formosa and Indo-China with Korea. The defence of South Korea was a corporate obligation of the United Nations while the decision to protect Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa was taken independently of the U.N.
5. There was a bilateral security pact between the United States and the Philippines.
6. The remnants of Chiang's armies were active in northern and eastern Burma. They harassed the people of Burma and trafficked in opium and other contraband items. They were receiving military supplies through Thailand. Some Americans were helping these troops in operating their airfields.

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have spoken to you this evening on the telephone. I tried to get you for nearly an hour and a half before I succeeded. Our Cabinet met this evening specially to

1. J.N. Collection.

consider the statement on Korea² and went on sitting till after half past seven. The statement we have issued, I feel sure, will satisfy the U.S.A. and the U.K. people, and at the same time maintains the balance and gives us freedom to act as we choose. I had a long talk with the American Ambassador today and he himself suggested to me that we had every right to maintain our general foreign policy and to keep away from the various steps that President Truman had indicated in his statement. This would be very embarrassing to us as well as to some other countries in South East Asia.

We have to watch the situation and our steps very carefully as day-to-day developments take place. I find it difficult to leave Delhi in this state of affairs. Nevertheless, I shall try to pay you a visit some time early in July. Otherwise I am not going out till 15 July. I have to visit Banaras for a day on the 17th and I want to spend a day, the 16th, in Allahabad.

The international situation must have its reactions on Kashmir. What these reactions might be, I do not know. But to talk about plebiscite with the possibility of war facing us seems to me utterly unreal.

Vishnu Sahay and Kachru spoke to me about Shaikh Abdullah's attitude in regard to the *jagirdari* question. I spoke to Gopalaswami about it also. I agree that this attitude of the Kashmir Government is most unwise. I just do not know what we can do about it. I sent a telegram yesterday to Shaikh Abdullah asking him to come here with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed. I have had no reply yet. Today General Hodges, the U.N. Military Adviser, went to Srinagar.

I am far from happy about the situation in Bengal. While it is perfectly true that conditions in East Bengal are still abnormal and many incidents continue to occur there, the attitude of the East Bengal Government, from all accounts that we get, is fairly good and they appear to be in earnest to implement the pact. The general impression of foreign as well as our observers has been that the chief culprit at the present moment is the Calcutta press³ as well as Syama Prasad Mookerjee.⁴ The Pakistan press, more especially the West Pakistan press, has behaved well. Recently some kind of a goodwill mission went to western Pakistan and they had a wonderful reception wherever they went. They addressed vast gatherings all over

2. The Government of India accepted the second resolution of the United Nations saying that it did not involve any departure from the policy of keeping aloof from "rival and hostile groups of nations."
3. The only newspaper which had said that the Agreement was worth giving a fair trial was the *Lok Sevak* of P.C. Ghosh. In all other quarters the feeling was that the Prime Minister of India had been persuaded into accepting an Agreement which Pakistan could never be expected to implement.
4. For example, on 27 May, Syama Prasad Mookerjee contended that the Nehru-Liaquat Pact had done the greatest harm to the people of Bengal and asserted that "not a single refugee was willing to go back to East Bengal as the Delhi Agreement had not at all succeeded in restoring confidence."

Punjab and Sind. On our side, when Malik and Biswas went to Agartala, Malik was shouted down. Shankarrao Deo was also shouted down in Calcutta. All this makes foreign observers here think that the chief trouble is caused by some of our press and by the Hindu Mahasabha propaganda. The Delhi Hindi and Urdu press also continues to be very bad.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. To Agatha Harrison¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1950

My dear Agatha,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th June. I can quite appreciate your desire that something should be done. But I do not understand what you want me to do. As you say, a certain conviction persists in many circles that I could play an important part in this East-West tension. Perhaps I could. But I cannot jump in till an obvious opening and opportunity comes.

About South Africa, Malan has made it impossible for us to go to the proposed R.T.C. I am quite clear in my mind about this, and in any event, our people would not have tolerated it.²

The Korean situation is a very dangerous one. It is a little difficult to make future plans with this great danger facing us. It is perfectly true that we do not get any real information from the other side. I am afraid it will get progressively harder to do so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The passage of the Group Areas Bill had caused widespread public resentment in India and among South African nationals of Indian origin in the Union. The Government of India held that new legislation was clear indication of South Africa Government's decision to adhere to their declared policy of apartheid. In the circumstances no useful purpose would be served by their participation in the Round Table Conference.

5. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
July 1, 1950

My dear B.N.,

We have exchanged many telegrams during the last few days and we have come to a decision for the present at least. It is obvious however that the situation will change from day to day requiring fresh decisions. I shall therefore indicate to you how my mind is working.

Because you did not participate in the voting on the second resolution of the Security Council in regard to Korea and a long story was put out about your unsuccessful attempts at telephoning, there was some misunderstanding. Hints were also thrown out that all this business was a deliberate evasion of responsibility. You have dealt with this matter in your remarks to the Security Council.² As a matter of fact if you had got through on the telephone and I could have spoken to you that morning, my reply would have been that you could not vote till we had considered the matter more fully. This was too serious a matter for us to allow ourselves to be hustled. It is true that being in the Security Council and the matter coming up there, it was up to us to express our views. It is also true that the situation demanded some kind of an urgent decision. Nevertheless, the only possible answer I could have given you by telephone was that we wanted some time for consideration, and meanwhile, you were not in a position to vote. I could not possibly take the responsibility on myself to commit India to a course of action involving all kinds of responsibilities and possibly perils. I had to consult the Cabinet and discuss the matter fully with them.

Although the Cabinet had to decide and did decide, we have to take the country with us also. Any quick decision, without proper consultation in the Cabinet, would have produced wrong reactions in the country. As it is, we have to face a considerable amount of criticism. A decision of ours after full consideration has much greater weight both in the country and outside. It becomes a deliberate decision consciously taken after weighing all the factors in the case, not a decision taken in haste under pressure of circumstances or of some other Governments. As it is, people will imagine that undue pressure was exercised on us by other countries, more especially the U.S.A. and the U.K. I happened to see the U.S.A. Ambassador that morning and the papers have made much of it. That interview had of course nothing to do with our decision. The decision had been partly arrived at already in our minds before I saw Loy Henderson and an indication of it had already been

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Explaining the delay in getting instructions from his Government, Rau said that since India was, next to China, nearest to the scene of conflict, the Government of India had to weigh with special care the probable consequences of any particular course of action.

sent to you and to others by telegram. I wanted to have that confirmed by the Cabinet and this was done that evening.

There is thus no question of our being apologetic about the delay on our side to decide. In future also we are not going to be hustled and we shall take our time to make important decisions. India's decision in this case is of far greater consequence, if I may say so, than that of most other countries, excepting the U.S.A. and the U.K. because we represent a different approach, as well as a large section of Asian opinion, what we do influences a good part of Asia. We give a certain moral tone and backing to the U.N. decision which neither the U.S.A. nor the U.K. can give it. That is far more important than the supply of a gunboat or a bomber. We had to take into consideration not only our own people but Burma and Indonesia. Indeed I was inclined to wait another day till we could have some replies from Burma and Indonesia, but ultimately I decided not to do so.

I think it is highly important in the future that we should not allow ourselves to be pushed about in making decisions, or to become infested by the hysteria that seems to possess many people in the West. We must maintain our poise and our equilibrium of mind, so that any decision we take is at least the result of cool thinking.

The decision we took about the second resolution of the Security Council on Korea had certain implications. But, in the balance, it would not have been difficult to take it, if President Truman had not previously made a statement regarding Formosa, Indo-China, Philippines, etc. That statement put a different colour to this whole business and it was not a colour we liked at all.³ So far as Indo-China is concerned, you know that we have refused to recognise either Bao Dai or Ho Chi Minh. We propose to continue this policy and the fact that the U.S.A. is going to rush in to help the French in Indo-China, is not going to make any difference to our policy there. Indeed the U.S.A. action there is just the kind of thing which we dislike. The reason may be a fear of communism spreading, but in fact it is helping a colonial power to maintain itself against a movement for freedom.

So far as Formosa is concerned, the situation is worse. We recognise the new China and deal with it through our Embassy. We do not recognise the Kuomintang wherever it might be. If this is so, then it is clear that the Chinese Government has a right to Formosa, which is Chinese territory. If Formosa rebels against it, it is another matter. But for the U.S.A. to come into the picture as defenders of Formosa, is clearly an intervention by an outside power in favour of a regime which has been knocked out of China. It is a challenge to the New China with which we wish to be friends. This puts us in an embarrassing position and we do not

3. Announcing American air and naval support to the South Korean troops on 27 June, Truman ordered strengthening the U.S. forces in the Philippines and increased military assistance to the French forces and the associated states in Indo-China and directed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan.

know where it will lead us. So far as India is concerned, there is almost universal disapproval of this act of the U.S.A. I have made this clear to Loy Henderson and he appreciated our viewpoint.

It seems to me that it was exceedingly maladroit of the U.S.A. Government to mix up the Korean issue with Formosa, Indo-China, etc. That was the simplest way of weakening their stand on Korea and mixing it up with other policies of theirs, which are not approved of by large numbers of people. A little more wisdom should have shown them that the least they could do was to separate these issues.

It is a little difficult to separate them now. But, so far as we are concerned, we should like to treat them separately. We are committed to the support of the Korean resolution of the Security Council. We are committed to nothing else and we have tried to make that perfectly clear.⁴ What does our commitment on the Korean issue amount to? Trygve Lie has asked us to indicate what practical help we can give and we have sent you a telegram in reply to it.

This telegram mentions three points: Our defence forces and our entire scheme of defence envisages home defence only. Deliberately we do not think in terms of expeditionary forces and the like. We do not keep big bombers, which can go far. Our navy is in its "babyhood" and is likely to remain at that stage for a considerable time to come. An attempt to send any active help would be both ineffective, and would upset our plans here. After all, in this difficult world situation, anything might happen and we have to be prepared for such contingencies. Just to make a gesture of little use and suffer for it would be folly.

Secondly, the state of our finances does not permit these gestures. If it is a life and death struggle, then finances do not count. But we do not look upon this Korean war as a life and death struggle for us in that sense. Even if it were so in the long analysis, our sending an old Dakota or a Tempest or a destroyer would make no difference. You know that our financial position is very bad and we must conserve our resources.

Thirdly, MacArthur is in supreme command and he has been directed not only to deal with Korea but also with Formosa as well as probably Indo-China.⁵ You cannot separate these, so far as his command is concerned. If we put any of our

4. Rau stated on 29 June 1950 that India's acceptance of the Security Council resolution calling for assistance to South Korea did not involve any modification of her foreign policy and the Government of India hoped that even at that stage it might be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by mediation.
5. General MacArthur was chosen by the U.S. Government to lead the U.N. armed forces and the following 16 States sent their troops to Korea to fight under the U.N. flag: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The U.K. delegate had given an assurance on behalf of the sponsoring powers of the U.N. resolution that members were under no obligation to employ armed assistance in excess of those specifically provided in the agreements to be entered between the Security Council and members or group of members under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter.

forces at his disposal, we get mixed up with these other, and according to us, undesirable ventures.

So, for a variety of reasons, we cannot send any military, naval or air help for the Korean operations. Our moral help is a big enough thing, which outbalances the petty military help of some other countries.⁶

I wanted to make all this clear to you, so that as new situations arise, you can judge them accordingly. You can privately explain this position to Trygve Lie or anyone else. This position that we take up naturally flows from our general foreign policy and we wish to safeguard it even in the welter that is developing. Also, we are convinced that the only way to prevent a world war developing is to keep the Korean issue separate from others and to try to maintain friendly contacts, if possible, with China and the U.S.S.R. We are not in as strong a position as we were to approach China and the U.S.S.R. now. Still we have not quite lost our old position and there is some hope that we might be able to play a useful role in preventing the conflict from spreading or in bringing the warring factions nearer to one another. I am glad you are trying to do so.

We have felt for some time that the first essential step to lessen the immediate crisis is to bring the People's Government of China into the United Nations. I wrote some time ago to Mr Bevin, the U.K. Foreign Secretary, laying great stress on this.⁷ In his reply he agreed with me and said he was issuing instructions to his representative at Lake Success to support the New China. After that, the Korean development took place and I do not know what the U.K. Government might do now. But I think that the U.K. recognise the great importance of China coming into the Security Council. There is no other way of bringing the U.S.S.R. back to it and if these two countries do not come, the United Nations ceases to be what they have been and just become a group of countries in conflict with another group.

We cannot guess what the future will bring. It seems to me that even though we might avoid world war, we are in for a fairly long period of petty wars and intense conflict on the political plane. All this will require important decisions from day to day. We may not be able to do just what we like and often we may have to accept a lesser evil, though that is always a risky business. But in any event we must avoid being hustled into any decision or action and must remember our basic objectives and policy. I can well imagine that in the United States there is some kind of hysteria which prevents any reasoned thought. It was bad enough before this Korean affair; it must be worse now. We have to deal with this state of feeling with calmness, without surrendering to it or merely getting angry with it.

6. On 29 July 1950, India offered the following help to the U.N. forces in Korea: a field ambulance unit and 400,000 jute bags valued at £169,000. On 11 October 1950, India sent medical supplies worth £3,950.

7. See *ante*, pp. 365-366.

This may help you to understand our present position and how our mind is working.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1950

My dear Thakin Nu,

...The Korean situation is an exceedingly difficult and dangerous one. You must have seen the Government of India's decision in this matter. We had to come to a decision because we are members of the Security Council. The same urgency does not apply to Burma.

The fact of the matter is that the South Korean Government was not a Government with which we could have much sympathy. We did not recognise either South Korea or North Korea.² But, nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that North Korea organised this aggression and invasion on a big scale. It is immaterial what happened previously in the nature of border incidents. The fact is that serious armed aggression has taken place against South Korea. The United Nations were, therefore, justified in calling it aggression and asking North Korea to halt it. Having done so, they were equally justified in supporting resistance to it.

So far the position is clear enough and that is as far as the Security Council resolution goes. But a very serious complication has arisen by the statement which President Truman made. In this he has mixed up Formosa, Indo-China and the Philippines. We have absolutely no intention of getting mixed up with these other places. Indeed, we have clearly declared that we shall take no sides in Indo-China. In China we recognise the new Government as you do, and we do not recognise the old Kuomintang Government anywhere. From this it follows logically that the Chinese Government have a right to include Formosa in their territories. President Truman now comes in the way of this. We can be no parties to this. Naturally the Chinese Government is greatly irritated.

It is this combination of various issues by the U.S.A. that has produced a confusing and embarrassing situation. We have tried to make it clear that, while we support the U.N. Resolution on Korea, we do not in any way change our other policies, and therefore, we cannot associate ourselves with the U.S.A. policy in

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. India did not recognise either of these governments partly in the interest of the unification of Korea and partly to act in accordance with its policy on Vietnam.

Formosa or Indo-China. As a matter of fact the U.K. Government was also somewhat embarrassed by President Truman's declaration. We shall now have to watch our steps carefully.

The Secretary General of the United Nations has asked us what practical help we can give. As a matter of fact we are not in a position to give any such help. Our Defence Forces are meant for home defence and not for operations far away from India. Nor can we shoulder the financial burden of any expedition. The third difficulty is that if we send a token force or aircraft or naval ship, it would, in present circumstances, function under General MacArthur. General MacArthur is presumably dealing with Formosa also and possibly Indo-China. We do not wish to get mixed up with this.

For these reasons, we are not sending any of our forces to Korea. As a matter of fact a token force would make no difference, except to embarrass us. The fact that we have accepted the U.N. Resolution is, of course, of the greatest moral value to the U.N. and to the U.S.A. and the U.K. They know that very well and appreciate it.

It is very difficult for me to advise you as to what you should do in this matter. I can only place various considerations before you and tell you what we have done. It seems to me that the most you need do is to give your moral support to the U.N. Security Council Resolution and not to go any further. That is to say, that you should not directly support the U.S.A. attitude in Formosa or Indo-China. You can tell your representative in Peking to make it clear to the Chinese Government that you recognize them and not the Kuomintang Government and, therefore, you are not associating yourself in any way with any activities in relation to Formosa. Being members of the United Nations, a certain responsibility falls on you as on us regarding their Resolution on Korea. Also, we feel that there has been aggression in Korea, whatever the causes. All you can do is to give your moral support in regard to that aggression. More you cannot do.

It is difficult to say what the future will bring. We have entered a new phase which may lead the world into terrible war. There is, however, a slight chance of the Korean war being limited and some kind of mediation or other step being devised. The U.S.S.R. have been very cautious and this gives one some hope that the war may not spread. Unfortunately, people in America are rather hysterical and are apt to take steps without thinking, then adding to the complications of a difficult situation. We shall naturally try to keep out of any war as far as we possibly can. For Burma, this is even more necessary because of your geographical position and other factors.

With all good wishes and regards,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The Korean Question at the U.N.¹

I had a long talk with the Yugoslav Ambassador this morning. He said that the Korean situation had gone all wrong and while there was no doubt that North Korea had acted wrongly, it seemed to him that the United Nations had been over-eager to act without following their normal procedure. The United Nations had declared North Korea as an aggressor right from the beginning, without even calling upon them to show cause. The proper course for them would have been to order a ceasefire and to summon both parties before them. It was highly likely that the North Koreans would not have come. It would then have been perfectly proper for the Security Council to declare North Korea as an aggressor. As it was, in their eagerness to blame North Korea, they forgot their own rules and procedure.

It was clear that North Korea had the moral backing and possibly other backing of the U.S.S.R. There was a big difference between North Korea and South Korea. In the North, there was a great deal of popular revolutionary enthusiasm which strengthened the nation. In the South, there was no inherent strength except for what the U.S.A. might give it from outside.

It was now a question of prestige on either side and neither would be prepared to lose face, and so this trouble would go on the lines of the Spanish War. Probably there would be no world war in the near future as a result of this struggle. But conditions would progressively worsen and the possibility of any peaceful settlement will grow lesser and lesser.

The U.N., for all its faults, was the only hope for the maintenance of peace and therefore it was important to keep it going. It was unfortunate that the U.N. had not acted quite impartially in this matter and had shown undue eagerness to back up the U.S.A. or had been hustled into action by the U.S.A. That very action was probably inevitable, but it should have taken a different form. Then again, the U.S.A. had complicated the situation greatly by bringing in Formosa and Indo-China into the picture. This had nothing to do with Korea and this was an open challenge to China. China was by no means so weak as to submit to any threat or challenge. Hence, further difficulties had been created.

He asked me about our attitude to China and I told him that we had all along worked for the inclusion of the People's Government of China in the U.N. and Security Council and that we were still trying to do that. We were of opinion that so long as China and the U.S.S.R. did not function in the Security Council, there would be no settlement of major issues. He asked me if I was sure that China would agree to come to the Security Council and the U.N. after what had happened. It was possible that they might refuse. I said that that would be unfortunate and that

1. Note on interview with the Yugoslav Ambassador, 3 July 1950, H.K. Mahtab Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

would mean that the only possibility of some kind of a settlement was ruled out. Conflicts would continue till they widen themselves into world war ultimately.

8. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 6, 1950

My dear Krishna,

...From Burma I came to Calcutta and spent two days there. Calcutta was of course the centre of passion and excitement and fear and suspicion. In a sense, things were settling down, but at the same time any real solution seemed further off than ever. Hardly anyone in West Bengal believes that a settlement of the East-West Bengal problem is likely. It is entangled not only with the entire Indo-Pakistan position but also with the peculiar situation in East Bengal. No major incidents happen there now or have happened for a long time. But not a day passes without its quota of dacoities in Hindu houses, loot, abduction of women and rape. The Hindus are utterly demoralised. In spite of all this, a large number are returning to East Bengal. But probably most of them go there merely with the intention of bringing away their goods and chattels. Even those who remain are full of apprehension. In the balance about three thousand Hindus are coming away from East to West Bengal daily; from five hundred to one thousand Muslims are going from West to East Bengal.

The effect of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement has been definitely good in so far as West Pakistan is concerned. There has been an exchange of many goodwill missions and they have had cordial receptions both in West Pakistan and India. That shows that to a large extent popular ill-will has faded. It remains still among the refugees and of course it may be lashed into fury by any series of incidents or if the press want to do so. The press in Pakistan, more especially in West Pakistan, has behaved rather well.

All this change of feeling is not in evidence in East or West Bengal. Of course East Bengal is a very backward area and can be easily exploited by the *moulvies* and the like.

The press in India has, generally speaking, behaved well² with the exception of the Calcutta press and some other newspapers elsewhere. Even the Calcutta press has very reluctantly fallen into line somewhat. Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches in the

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

2. The *Jugantar* and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* which had been very hostile had now toned down.

United States and Canada have had a very bad effect here.³ Reports of what he said in private and off-the-record conferences have been much worse. The Begum behaved disgracefully on several occasions.⁴

This was the atmosphere in Calcutta when I got there. In Delhi things were quieter no doubt. But I soon discovered that they were far from well. A persistent and organised propaganda was being carried on in the open, chiefly by Hindu Mahasabha and refugee elements, but also to some extent, by some of our own colleagues in Parliament. Dr John Matthai's statement came in useful to this end. I was an appeaser of Pakistan and I wasted public funds. The Foreign Office and its missions abroad were my pet extravagances and I tried to push my relatives into positions in the Foreign Service. I was criticised for needlessly irritating the U.K. and the U.S.A. by what I said and did; I was also criticised for falling into their lap.

Some months ago the Supreme Court gave a decision in regard to some newspapers, which has resulted in open licence more especially among the communal papers.⁵ It is amazing what they write from day to day and the personal charges that they bring. *The Times of India* and the Dalmia group are outwardly a little more sedate, but have only one policy now: to attack Government and more especially me.

This was what I stepped into when I arrived in Delhi and immediately after, came the Korean affair. We have exchanged a large number of telegrams over this and I shall not write much. As far as I can see, we are drifting uncontrollably and almost inevitably to disaster. Probably there will be no big war soon, but equally probably, this drift to world war will be accelerated. All the bridges are being burned. Meanwhile, our public life progressively deteriorates and goes to pieces. It is not a cheerful outlook.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States from 3 to 26 May 1950. On 5 May 1950, he said in Washington that Pakistan would welcome a U.S. guarantee of its "territorial integrity." Two days later, he again stated that Pakistan needed such a guarantee because of "possible aggression" by India. On 19 May, he said that for two years India had stalled holding a plebiscite in Kashmir because if a fair vote were taken the overwhelming majority would vote for joining Pakistan. On 22 May, he reiterated that there could be no friendship with India unless the Kashmir problem was solved.
4. Begum Liaquat Ali Khan said in Washington: "India never took partition to heart and great massacres took place in India for which we were totally unprepared. Seven million refugees left their homes in India and came to Pakistan. One million Muslims were killed and sixty thousand women were abducted." She said in a speech at Frederick: "Great organised massacres of Muslims had started after partition. This resulted in deaths of about one million Muslims in about six months and forced migration of about seven million Muslims to Pakistan."
5. On 26 May, the Supreme Court quashed the precensorship order on *Organiser*, an English weekly published from New Delhi, and declared illegal the ban imposed by the Madras Government on entry into Madras of the Bombay weekly, *Cross Roads*.

You will have seen Arthur Krock's article in the *New York Times*.⁶ This was an amazing perversion of what happened. The American Ambassador told us that he felt quite humiliated at this perversion and had drawn the State Department's attention to it. Yet every such thing does mischief which you cannot easily get over. I suppose we have entered fully now into a phase of war hysteria, when it is impossible to talk or perhaps even think reasonably.

There is a feeble demand for a special session of Parliament.⁷ For the present we are not calling one, chiefly because it is a costly business. But it is possible that events may force our hands. We had intended having the Parliament session after the Congress, that is sometime about mid-September. Even the Congress dates have not been fixed yet and a new development has taken place unknown to Congress history. The courts came down with an injunction to prevent the holding of Congress elections in some places or other.

I hope you are not too oppressed by events and will not allow yourself to fall ill. Not that you are ever physically well. I have at least this great advantage over you that nothing seems to affect my physical condition...

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. Arthur Krock in his article "An Example of Diplomacy at its Best" (*New York Times*, 4 July 1950) stated that the U.S. Ambassador in Delhi, Loy Henderson, had influenced Nehru in adopting the line in approving of the U.N. resolution on Korea.
7. In view of the deteriorating situation in Korea, a special session of Parliament was summoned on 31 July 1950.

9. Fifty-Fifty Possibility of a World War¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Generally, as you know, I do not say anything to begin with and wait for questions and suggestions. I might, however, say something before I leave it to you to ask questions—something about this Korean situation as it has arisen. After that you can ask me questions about it.

You know that the Government of India announced their policy on the night of the 29th June. As there have been some misconceptions and some surmises about it, I should like to try and elucidate it a little. Of course, in a matter of this kind—in a changing and dynamic situation with all kinds of possibilities—it is never possible to elucidate everything completely.

1. Proceedings of a press conference, New Delhi 7 July 1950. File No. 43(102)/50-PMS.

To begin with, I should like to tell you, or remind you, that the Government of India did not recognise, in the diplomatic sense of the word, either North Korea or South Korea. Previously, we were connected with the United Nations Korea Commission.² There was an Indian representative on it right from the beginning. In fact, when the first Commission was appointed—if I am right—Mr K.P.S. Menon, who was our representative, was elected the Chairman of it for the first year. After that India has also had a representative there. Except for this fact, we have kept away from Korean affairs.

A great deal has happened there and has been happening both in North and South Korea, which we did not like at all. But it was none of our business to intervene or interfere, more especially, because this affair of North and South Korea became linked with much larger problems.

When North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea it was clear, without even a great enquiry, that this was a well-planned and large-scale invasion. There had been border conflicts. There had been all kinds of charges and counter-charges, but the fact of this major and well-planned invasion dominated all that had preceded it. In the delicate and rather precarious balance existing in the world, any such invasion and aggression was fraught with the most dangerous possibilities. If the aggression is allowed to proceed and to succeed, then the whole structure of the United Nations inevitably will collapse and large-scale war will result.

The whole basis of the United Nations is supposed to be to bring about a settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. If aggression takes place and the aggressor ignores completely the United Nations, then only two choices are left: either the United Nations condemns that aggression and tries to put an end to it, or it should come to the conclusion that it has ceased to be an effective instrument of peace and it should leave the decision of any dispute to war.

Now, that was the position that faced us and the world when this invasion of South Korea on a large-scale took place.

Possibly, if war stopped and there is an enquiry, much may come out as to the preceding causes—how far who was wrong and who was right—but, as I have said, the major fact of this aggression was far more important than anything that preceded it, because that aggression itself inevitably led to all kinds of consequences; because it upset a certain delicate balance that prevailed until then, and it was a very serious matter for any country to undertake or encourage such an invasion.

Thus, in this context of events, the Security Council had no alternative but to ask for a ceasefire, and declare North Korea an aggressor and subsequently call

2. The failure of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to agree on steps to implement the war-time promise of independence for Korea, led the United States on 17 September 1947 to submit the Korean question to the U.N. General Assembly. The General Assembly voted to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, in spite of the protests of the Soviet Union, with authority to observe the elections for a national assembly. The commission was denied access to North Korea and hence it could not function effectively.

upon the members of the United Nations to meet this armed attack and restore international peace. Whatever justification might be advanced for this aggression, and whatever might have preceded it, may have some importance, but it does not take away from the fact that it was well-planned aggression.

India supported the resolutions of the Security Council because that seemed to follow logically in the context of events and the Charter of the United Nations, and because that seemed the only course to avoid an extension of the conflict and large-scale warfare. In doing so, India's primary consideration was to serve the cause of peace. As stated in the Government of India's resolution, this did not involve a change in the basic foreign policy of India, which was one of non-alignment with any group of nations against another group. In accepting the resolutions of the Security Council, India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. Those resolutions refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation. In the statement issued by the Government of India, the hope was expressed that the dispute might be settled by mediation. This reference to mediation was general. India herself did not intend to offer mediation and has not done so. The U.N. Korean Commission has also suggested that mediation should take place. India can offer her good offices for mediation only if requested to do so by the parties concerned.

One of the principal reasons for the progressive deterioration of the international situation has been the withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from the Security Council, as well as other organs and agencies of the United Nations. This withdrawal took place because the representatives of the People's Government of China were not admitted to the United Nations. This Government, that is the People's Government of China, is in *de facto* control of the whole of the mainland of China and has been recognised as the *de jure* Government of that country by a number of nations. India is one of the nations that has recognised this Government. Because of this, India has been working through diplomatic channels to secure admission of the representatives of the People's Government of China to the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. She has done so because she felt that the fact of the change in China has to be recognised, and secondly, because she felt that this was the best way of bringing normality in the working of the United Nations. Otherwise, the position would deteriorate. Therefore, we welcomed the steps that Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, took to get over this impasse in the United Nations. The Government of India are of opinion that the admission of the People's Government of China to the Security Council and the return of the U.S.S.R. are necessary conditions to enable the Security Council to discharge its functions adequately and to bring the Korean conflict to a prompt and peaceful conclusion. The best assistance that India can render in this great crisis is to help in limiting the area of conflict and in trying to end it. Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's

defence forces have been organised essentially for defence and not for service in distant theatres of war.

Now, I shall leave you to put your questions.

Question: You have used the words "well-planned aggression" more than once. Could you disclose the sources of information for using these words?

JN: I do not think that we need go into any sources. The facts are clear enough. There is no doubt about it, and you can see very clearly from what has happened in the course of the last few days that a very carefully prepared large-scale invasion has taken place. Is there any doubt about that? There is none. You cannot have these things suddenly take place without good planning and arrangement previously.

Q: You have said that you have not recognised either North or South Korea, and Mr K.P.S. Menon in his speech which he delivered in the U.N. Korean Commission said that "Korea is one and not two, and the division is artificial."³ Therefore, how does the question of aggression arise? Is it not considered to be a civil war?

JN: Well, you can call it a civil war between one set of Koreans against another set, but the fact remains that they are functioning as two Governments and one Government attacked the other.

Q: You have mentioned that India would not mediate unless there is a request from both the parties. If there is a request made to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, not necessarily India, to mediate, from America or England, would you consider that?

JN: What I meant was this. There has been so much talk and reference in newspapers and elsewhere about mediation by India that people may think that we are going about offering ourselves as a kind of mediator. We have done no such thing and we propose to do no such thing. When a situation arises, when the parties think that the step would be helpful, any step whether it is governmental or individual, or anything, if that step is likely to be helpful, surely that step should be taken. But one must not vaguely talk about these matters when parties themselves are not thinking in those terms.

3. Korea was divided into two parts along the 38th Parallel after the Japanese surrender. North Korea, an industrially developed area, was under Soviet occupation, and South Korea mainly agrarian, was occupied by American troops. The North had 57 per cent of the territory and a population of seven to eight millions, while the South contained seventeen to eighteen millions.

Q: Would you approve of the use of the atomic bomb in the Korean situation?

JN: I think the atom bomb should be completely banned.

Q: Shri B.N. Rau has suggested a meeting between Truman and Stalin. Do you approve of it?

JN: I do not think these reports are completely correct. What our representative, Mr B.N. Rau, is trying to do is to explore some avenue where these matters can be discussed by the principal parties concerned. Obviously we have reached a stage that they can only be discussed in two ways. One way is in the Security Council with the major parties represented. The other is some high-level meeting, that is, outside the Security Council. I am not aware if Mr Rau made any specific proposals, but he discussed all possibilities so that the major parties might come closer together.⁴ Certainly the great powers are the major parties. South Korea and North Korea are very minor parties.

Q: Americans were keeping quiet when Kashmir was attacked by Pakistan forces, why are you now anxious to support them in this Korean matter?

JN: It is a question for you to address to the United States Government, not to me.

Q: But you are very much a party now?

JN: So far as we were concerned, we resisted aggression in Kashmir too.

Q: Why did America not condemn Kashmir aggression?

JN: You are, at the present moment, criticising the action either of the Security Council or of the United States, but how am I to answer that criticism.

Q: But at present China is not in the Security Council, nor is the U.S.S.R.

JN: We are trying our best to get back China and the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council.

4. At a press conference on 3 July, B.N. Rau was asked how mediation referred to in the Government of India's statement could be worked out through direct talks with the great powers. Rau replied that mediation had been suggested for the Korean conflict but a plan of direct talks was thought of in a different context even before the Korean conflict occurred. Asked whether Nehru would mediate in Korea by inviting Truman and Stalin to a conference at New Delhi, Rau replied: "We shall have to consider very carefully whether this is an opportune moment for a high-level meeting of the kind that has been suggested."

Q: Have you any report to make you believe that North Korea is being supported by Russia?

JN: No, except the facts of the situation.

Q: If China was now represented in the Security Council, do you feel confident that she would have supported the Security Council resolution?

JN: I do not think so, if you put it in that straight way. Probably the Chinese Government will not support that resolution. But the whole point is this: either you are going to find some way other than large-scale war, or you are going to drift towards war. The only way to prevent war is for the great powers, which are now opposed to each other, to meet and if they are keen enough they will find a way out not by supporting this resolution or that, which involves the prestige of great countries, but by making a genuine attempt to prevent the spread of conflict of large-scale war. If they cannot find some way out, then, inevitably, the drift to war continues.

Q: Is it a fact that one of the main causes of our being reluctant to send aid to South Korea is the fear that aid might be used against China or some other countries in that area, because U.S.A., which is in charge of the operations, has linked South Korea with Formosa and Indo-China?

JN: It is perfectly true that we are entirely against the use of our forces against the Chinese Government or even in the Indo-China conflict. We have kept apart from the Indo-China conflict. So far as China is concerned we have recognised the People's Government and have diplomatic relations with that Government. Obviously, we cannot have diplomatic relations and use our forces against it. It is a contradiction in terms. We have, therefore, made it perfectly clear that our support of the United Nations resolution is not to be extended to mean anything else than what it is.

Q: If the invitation comes to you, would you, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, (irrespective of India) as Gandhiji's heir accept an offer of mediation? Would you be prepared to go to the Security Council as India's delegate with this idea of mediation?

JN: I think I have answered that question. If there was any chance of peace coming out of any kind of negotiation, talk or meeting, Jawaharlal Nehru will go to the ends of the earth.

Q: Could you throw some light on Formosa? To which country does it belong—China, Japan or America?

JN: You want me to give what sort of opinion—juristic, legal or political?

Q: Your Government's opinion.

JN: As far as I remember—I speak subject to correction—towards the end of the last War it was decided among the great powers that Formosa should go to China. I believe this was decided at the meeting in Cairo of President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, Mr Churchill and Marshal Chiang Kai-shek. Before the War it was a Japanese protectorate. When Japan fell, American troops took possession of it. I am not quite sure in what numbers the American troops are there now. But it is certainly true that Marshal Chiang Kai-shek is there with a large body of troops. Who exactly is in possession—the Americans or Marshal Chiang Kai-shek—is not quite clear to me. Anyhow, it is not the Chinese Government that is in possession.

Q: As we find, the Korean war has most evidently split the world into two blocs, and brought into bold relief the alignment of different countries with one bloc or another. Then how do you still justify your dynamic neutrality?

JN: What exactly does 'neutrality' mean? Neutrality should not mean a passive doing-nothing. It simply means deciding any issue that comes up on merits, and not because some other nation has decided it otherwise. That is, it does not mean supporting one policy or one nation or not supporting it. It simply means not being bound down to any group. Suppose there is some kind of a military alliance of one country with another, it is bound down by that extent, and even if it disagrees it has to follow. What we mean is that we try to decide—we may err, that is a different matter—we try to decide each question, without being bound down to any group, as far as possible on the merits and in the interests of whatever India's objectives and ideals might be. It means that, and I think we are doing that. Whether we make a mistake or not can be discussed on the merits of the question. But "keeping away from everybody" is not a correct description of neutrality. It is not being bound down to any group.

Q: Do you equate the moral principles motivating the two blocs as the same?

JN: I quite agree that the moral standards are entirely different.

Q: While formulating India's policy, did you feel that Sir B.N. Rau's support of the first resolution bound India down to a certain policy—India had no other alternative but to accept the second resolution?⁵

JN: Well, to some extent each step taken is a determining factor for the next step, and if you want a philosophical discussion of determinism it is very interesting that our lives are determined by our past actions completely. There is very little loophole for getting away from that; there may be some, I believe, otherwise there is no point in any activity. No doubt the first step that was taken had a certain determining influence on the second, but not a final one.

Q: But when the first resolution was discussed, I believe we had not had any report from our representative in South Korea. Therefore, on what was our policy regarding the first resolution based?—on any report received by us or on his own initiative?

JN: I do not think we had received any report at that time. We decided on such facts as we had before us. The U.N. Commission had reported, not to us but direct to them.

Q: If the moral standards of the two blocs are different, it suggests that one is higher than the other. In that case would you say that India's policy is to support that standard which is higher or is it purely on grounds of expediency? Is your policy of non-alignment with any bloc one of expediency, or do you take moral values into consideration?

JN: Not only do we take moral values into consideration, but we want other countries to do so also. And we find that they seldom do.

Q: You said that the moral standards of the two blocs are entirely different. Can you kindly expand on that?

JN: When you talk about moral standards, we must have some basis, some standard of judgment, and, as far as I can see, the two standards, their measuring rods, the yardsticks, are different. The whole philosophy underlying the two is different. Therefore the standards are different. That is obvious. I am not for the moment going into them but the fact is that they differ. That is obvious, is it not?

5. B.N. Rau had no time to consult the Government of India and voted for this resolution on his own initiative. Delhi believed that Rau had been justified in considering North Korea an aggressor. But he was directed not to commit India further without prior consultation.

It may be India or any country may largely agree with one philosophical approach to a problem, that is to say, it may have its own standards which agree considerably with one set of standards, agree partly with another. It just depends, in the ultimate analysis, whether in life or in politics, to what you give the first place. You give truth the first place, if I may so put it, and as a famous person once said, or give it a second place. It makes all the difference in the world whether you give peace the first or the second place. Sometimes conditions may arise when peace may be, if I may say so, the perfect and absolute peace of the graveyard or the cemetery. That is not exactly what one desires but a living and a dynamic peace.

Q: From a very practical point of view India is tied up with Britain financially, and Britain to America. In view of that are we not committed to the Western bloc?

JN: You are perfectly right to some extent, that is because of past history and other political and economic developments; our economic, trade and other financial relations are obviously primarily with England today and secondarily with certain other western powers, including the U.S.A. That is true and to that extent our general, economic and other activities are affected by it. Whether they are affected to the extent of compelling us to adopt a certain political policy or not is another matter. One must choose when major decisions have to be taken and a major decision is obviously a difficult decision where you have to make a choice between, if I may say so, two evils. A choice between good and evil is always easy if they are clear but when there is something that you do not like and something that you like, you will have to take them in the balance and see what is the best way.

Q: Can you tell us what is our Government's attitude towards Indo-China, especially when America is allowed to make this civil war into a colonial war by sending all the arms?

JN: So far as our attitude is concerned, I think we have stated it previously and there is no change in that attitude. As a matter of fact, you are aware that French troops have been functioning there for a long time.

Q: Will not that situation materially change when American arms come in? A similar situation can develop in Formosa.

JN: It may; it all depends.

Q: Would you be prepared to sponsor a resolution declaring America an aggressor in these two areas?

JN: No. I would not. First of all, it is a hypothetical question. Secondly, our sponsoring any type of resolution will depend on how far it helps us to ease the conflict and not just to show off some tendency or some inclination.

Q: Do you think that all the colonial wars came to an end on 15th August, 1947?

JN: No.

Q: I have not heard you condemn any colonialism except in Indonesia after that. Do you know of any other colonial war than in Indonesia?

JN: I do not know if you are a close reader of what I say. I think I have sufficiently discussed colonialism and our policy rather frequently. I have said that I am quite convinced that the old-style colonialism is historically over. That means it survives. It fights for its life. Historically it is over. It cannot survive. Things are against it. That does not mean that the old-style colonialism is over and other forms of domination do not come into the picture. It may not be old-style. They are coming into the picture while the old-style is gradually fading away.

Q: Will not your moral sympathy to South Korea help French imperialism in Indo-China and American imperialism in Formosa indirectly?

JN: Not necessarily. Because, we have made it clear that our attitude applies to South Korea. It may have such indirect consequences some time. But, one cannot in a very complicated situation steer clear of all possible perils and dangers of interpretation.

Q: Why do you think that you would not have contributed to peace by remaining really neutral like Indonesia, Burma and Egypt instead of the neutrality which you have defined in your own way?

JN: So far as Indonesia is concerned, it is not yet a member of the United Nations. So far as Burma is concerned, I do not think they have come to any decision. Apart from the fact that they are fully tied up with their own difficulties, they can hardly say much about distant theatres. Egypt, again, so far as I know, has given its decision on factors which have nothing to do with this. All I can say is this: as I have stated in my previous statement, accepting aggression on a big scale inevitably meant the collapse of the United Nations. If you think that the United Nations, with all its weaknesses and faults, is, nevertheless, the one international forum for peace, etc., then one works for its continuation in so far as one can.

Q: What do you think of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council?

JN: The question is one which is being discussed frequently, and has been gone into sufficiently. That means that it is given to any one member of the Security Council to hold up all the work of the Security Council in the United Nations. That is an impossible position. Apart from that, it has been held previously—not now—that abstention does not amount to a negative vote. These are legal questions and you can discuss them with lawyers and jurists. The practical fact is that on the one side if you permit any one power to put an end to the work of the United Nations, that does not seem to be a very useful way of looking at it. On the other hand, the real thing is that ultimately if the United Nations breaks up into big groups, then also it ceases to function. We have to find a way out.

Q: Are you willing to allow United Nations forces to pass through Indian territory?

JN: That would depend upon certain circumstances. I cannot straight off answer the question. It has not arisen so far.

Q: In view of the suspicion entertained that Russia has a hand in this affair, has India tried to find out to what extent Russia is responsible?

JN: Do you suggest appointing an investigation commission?

Q: When you were in America, you told the U.S.A. Congress that India would fight aggression wherever it occurred. Does it mean that India would intervene wherever there is aggression? For instance, if there is a conflict between East and West Germany, would India intervene?

JN: Apart from the logic or the merits of the question, the question of India taking upon itself to intervene all over the world is a little absurd. We feel that India obviously cannot give military help because there are only two or three countries in the world which can give effective help, nobody else can. But apart from that, we have tried our utmost to keep away from international entanglements—we may express our opinion—we do not imagine that we are in a position to, or we have any desire to, interfere in other people's affairs. So if any aggression takes place anywhere, presumably India will declare its views on the matter but to expect us to send an army or navy, we just can't do it.

Q: Do you condemn the bombing of civilian towns in North Korea? Subsequently it may be the use of the atom bomb also.

JN: Now how can we say what an army might do or might not do.

Q: Reference your statement of one power not being allowed to block the work of the United Nations. Is it not the very basis of the United Nations? Now you are trying to go round it.

JN: Big powers' unanimity is the very basis of it and India has supported it, not because she liked it but because circumstances were such. Difficulties have arisen which have repeatedly been discussed. But the position becomes somewhat different if a big power does not participate at all. It is not a question of discussion and deciding this way or not deciding, but just keeping away and thereby perhaps allowing the whole structure to tumble.

Q: There was a news item from Lake Success that General MacArthur is likely to be the United Nations Commander-in-Chief in the Korean operations. Has your Government been consulted in that?

JN: We have not been consulted about it. The matter may come up at the meeting of the Security Council in some form or other.

Q: The United Nations claims to be a peace agency, can it fight a war?

JN: It can certainly fight by virtue of the Charter.

Q: There are millions of people out of it?

JN: Whether it is desirable or undesirable to do it is another matter, but by virtue of the Charter they can certainly do so.

Q: What is the possibility of the Korean war developing into a world war?

JN: Fifty-fifty.

Q: In case there is a large-scale, well-planned aggression on the part of Bao Dai's Government against Ho Chi Minh's Government, would you give the type of support to Ho Chi Minh's Government that we are now giving to South Korea?

JN: I do not think that question as such arises because the two Governments are at war. They are doing their utmost to defeat the other. There is no question of any aggression.

Q: Has the United States taken over Formosa?

JN: I do not think it is correct to say that the U.S.A. has appropriated Formosa. What they have said is that this matter should be considered in connection with the Japanese peace treaty.

Q: They have said that America will defend any attack on Formosa.

JN: Maybe but they have said that the future of Formosa is tied up with the Japanese peace treaty. That is one of the places which Japan conquered and it has to be decided accordingly.

Q: You are just quoting the view of the State Department.

JN: I know.

Q: The real view is from the U.S. Defence Department, which says that America would not stand for any aggression on Formosa.

JN: Are you not mixing up two things? One is of aggression at the present moment; the other is the future of Formosa.

I am trying to understand the American statement. As far as I know, according to the present statement, they will not, as you know, tolerate any aggression on Formosa. Further, the future of Formosa should be decided in connection with the general position about the Japanese peace treaty.

Q: Do you believe Russia has any aggressive designs or territorial ambitions in view of the fact that her whole policy is one of ideological penetration? She has taken half of Europe and far more in Asia.

JN: Do you mean by aggressive designs by means of military conquest?

Q: Yes.

JN: Then I should personally imagine not in present circumstances. But as you yourself said, they act more by ideological penetration than by the other. I do not know what might happen because we are faced by strong expansionist tendencies in various parts of the world and a great deal of fear by one power of the other

power expanding, and fears lead to conflicts, and if a country imagines that it is going to be attacked, it will attack. All kinds of things happen when you are afraid of the other party.

Q: There is a press report about the whittling down of the Point-4 Programme from the original estimates of forty five million dollars to only ten million dollars; whereas the Arms Aid Programme is being stepped up considerably. That shows the difference in approach now in the light of events taking place.

JN: That perhaps is natural. What has happened is that ten millions have been appropriated out of the forty five millions. A further sum may be appropriated later.

Q: Do you consider it advisable to hold a peace conference in Delhi?

JN: Anything that promises results, we will gladly encourage. Again that becomes academic, unless there is some ground for it.

Q: You said in Indonesia about your not being against communism but against the Communist Party's tactics and violence and further that the Communist Party's tactics were really becoming a counter-revolutionary force. Do you imply that a good revolution can be carved out on Marxist principles?

JN: Well, I was discussing this matter with a large number of young men who had been intimately connected with the changes in Indonesian movement. I was discussing what revolution is. And if I may say so, with all respect, the use of the word 'revolutionary' by you is not in line with my thinking. I do not know what you mean by revolutionary. To me a revolutionary means a person trying to bring about certain big changes. Now any action that helps in those changes is revolutionary. People think rather loosely. A man who throws a bomb is called a revolutionary. That is incorrect. The throwing of the bomb may actually hinder the object of the revolutionary. Therefore, he becomes a counter-revolutionary. Mere violence is not revolutionary. It is just violence and nothing else. A man may be a dacoit, but he is certainly not a revolutionary. He may even be a murderer but he need not be a revolutionary. In the same way, a man who throws a bomb and just kills somebody, although he may have certain revolutionary sentiments, actually may commit a counter-revolutionary act by hindering the thing that he desires to achieve, that is, certain changes, political or social. So, I was developing that theory, and not saying what my view about communism was. I said I am prepared to allow any kind of discussion or propagation of the philosophy of communism, the theory of it, peacefully, as a Government which tries to respect civil liberties. But if communism becomes—or any 'ism' becomes—violent, then the State has to suppress it. That was the argument I was developing there. And

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

then I pointed out that looking at recent communist activities in South East Asia completely objectively they had, firstly, by their extreme violence and terroristic methods and, secondly, by their going against one of the dominant urges of these countries, that is nationalism, performed a counter-revolutionary act. That had nothing to do with Marx or Marxism. I am a revolutionary but I don't say I am a Marxist. I think Marxism is very helpful. It helped me certainly in understanding the various processes of history, but I certainly don't accept all the Marxist theories, and I think what has happened subsequent to Marx has disproved at least some of the things he stood for.

Nevertheless, I think big social changes are necessary. In achieving these social changes I cannot say that violence can be, must be, inevitably ruled out, but I do think that violence in the long run is not only not helpful but is tremendously harmful. The cost is great; cost, not merely material cost, but in human suffering and the cost in human degradation is terrible. After all what we aim at is making a human being somewhat better than what he has been, not to degrade him. You may get a perfect paper system, but if the human being is completely degraded that system cannot work.

Q: Do democracy and nationalism go together?

JN: Nationalism includes it obviously, or ought to. Nationalism may not be democratic—not necessarily. Narrowly interpreted, it is just anti-foreign and nothing more. In the narrowest interpretation, nationalism is against any foreigner interfering. But, normally, today nationalism is political democracy, but in some countries it is also economic democracy, if I may say so. So, it has all those various phases in it. You can take any country of Europe or Asia; in some of them you see one element more, in the others less. But the point is that the national sentiment in Asia today, which includes economic progress and economic democracy etc. to a large extent, is the more powerful and dominant urge. If you go against it, you weaken a progressive force and produce conflict internally, which brings about deterioration and degradation of the country.

Q: You made a reference to West New Guinea during your visit to Indonesia. Was it just by the way or was it premeditated?

JN: A newspaperman asked me the question at a press conference and what I told him was this. First of all, I said that I did not know what the conditions of New Guinea were. I had certainly heard of the problem but I did not know the internal conditions, what the people there want, etc. But I said two factors must govern this: one is naturally the wishes of and the advantages that might accrue to the people of that country. Secondly, that it should be settled peacefully and cooperatively between the parties concerned. Further, I added that *prima facie* I

would imagine that West New Guinea was much more closely associated with Indonesia historically, politically, etc. than with any other group. It can hardly stand alone. Therefore, I imagined that ultimately it may be associated with them, but I hoped that whatever decision may be arrived at it should be peaceful and cooperative and in line with the wishes of the people as far as one can find them out.

Q: Would it be correct to say that you consider that international communism is an enemy to the fate of the South East Asian countries?

JN: These are big and philosophical questions. Today we see the development of huge monolithic States under communist guidance. Possibly they do answer a certain question, economic question, at certain tremendous cost. I don't like monolithic States, I don't like authoritarian States, and I think that while economic freedom is essential or we have to aim at it, the price of giving up all political and individual liberty is very great. If any country can find a solution for this problem, that is by maintaining individual and democratic liberty and at the same time satisfying the economic needs of the people fully, then that country has solved the problem. Generally, stress is laid on one ignoring the other, but that is not a solution, and therefore we come into conflict. Therefore, we have to find out a solution with individual liberty and economic freedom.

Q: Does political liberty exist in monolithic authoritarian countries?

JN: I do think that individual liberty, what is normally considered political liberty, does not exist in monolithic authoritarian countries. They may get something which is very valuable to them, that is economic betterment, because their standards are low, and they may consider that even more important than individual liberty. But the point is that neither by itself is enough—you must have both.

Q: Descending to a very low level from the previous questions, may I ask: Are you aware that the West Bengal Government have converted certain rice-growing lands to jute cultivation with the result that the ration of West Bengal has been threatened to be cut down? Do you approve of that policy?

JN: I don't think that ration etc. has anything to do with an area of land being put under jute cultivation. That is entirely apart from it.

Q: But the West Bengal Government have announced that

JN: We do approve of certain areas in West Bengal or elsewhere being used for cotton and jute cultivation and we are balancing the two. Priority number one

continues and must continue to be food production, but we want to encourage the other things too, what might be called commercial crops, for various obvious reasons. Because we want some commercial crops which will yield us foreign exchange. So it is a question of balancing the two.

Q: But the West Bengal Government have declared that the ration may be decreased on account of the lands being diverted to jute cultivation.

JN: They must have talked about the future. Obviously, it will take effect only some time in the future, not at present.

Q: Do you agree with the statement by Shaikh Abdullah, in the course of which he says that in truth real freedom takes birth only from economic emancipation and that the rest of the progress is based on that. This is signed by Shaikh Abdullah and we think that it represents his current views. Do you concur with it?

JN: Real freedom ultimately comes from political freedom and economic freedom. Shaikh Abdullah has talked about certain economic freedom. That represents his views. I do not know the context so I cannot answer your question. But the point is this. There is a conflict between the economic aspect and political freedom. You will remember that in countries which are under bondage and underdeveloped, where there is starvation and want of millions of people, those people are more interested in a good meal or a certain economic betterment than in some theoretical political freedom. You and I are very much interested in political freedom. We are also interested in other things. That is why you see in Asia today a vast hankering for economic advance, and any person who promises that, naturally they look his way. Therefore, one has to meet this problem on the economic plane as well as the political plane.

As I grow older, I dislike those phrases and any ism. Because, as soon as you talk about any ism, immediately you shut up your mind to the consideration of that question and you talk in terms of pet phrases, grooves of thoughts, slogans and the like, which are helpful in a theoretical consideration but are not helpful for considering a practical situation. I am interested in India, not in any ism.

I am interested, if I may say so, in seeing that the hundreds of millions of people in India have sufficient food to eat, have decent housing conditions, adequate clothing, and have education and health care facilities, and opportunities for progress. I put it that way. If you convince me that there is another way to achieve it, well, I welcome it, or I try to find some middle way. Put it in practical terms instead of discussing vaguely communism, socialism, capitalism and the other isms.

Q: In the Korean situation, as you yourself pointed out, you are faced with an aggression from one of the power blocs. On this question, you have declared on which side you stand. But this is something that is going to spread, or at least that is the moral which many of us draw. Do you draw that moral and, if so, can you say on which side you stand?

JN: In regard to the Korean situation, we expressed our views with a certain measure of clarity. You ask me a question now that in the future you imagine certain developments taking place or a sort of a marching of those developments in one direction or something like that. Quite frankly, without any desire to evade the issue, I may say that no responsible statesman can answer for the future exactly. You can see indications of policy and which way one tends to go. At the present moment, what many people want us to do is to say that we stand by this group or alignment of nations or that. Now, just look at it. What does that mean? It means simply that we cease to count for the moment. We have no views left. We are just persons who say 'ditto' to somebody else. We are just taken for granted. Therefore, such influence as we can exercise on views or may be some variations of policy in what we consider essential matters are not possible. Major variations are not possible because world forces govern them, but still some variations may lead to peace and others to war. In the former case, we think that we might be able to help. We are not going to help in it if we are bound hand and foot by aligning ourselves with this group of nations or that. If we do that, we just don't count. As far as I can see, unfortunately we are developing—and perhaps inevitably—a war psychosis in the world today. Everything that the other party does is bad and everything that one's own party does is good. That is a bad thing. We try, if we can—I do not know if we can—to avoid that state of mind and help in so far as we can in a movement to lessen that war psychosis and that trend of drift towards war.

Q: If the governing powers of the communist group are advancing their movement solely by violence and penetration through war and this communist expansion is directed not from within the country concerned but by an outside power, then am I correct in interpreting your idea to be that you must be against this?

JN: Certainly. If this happens and all that happens then I am against it. But the point is people seem to think that a problem is solved by war. The first thing to consider is that war seldom solves a problem and in recent years it has never solved a problem. Why has it not solved it? I am not ruling out war. War may come. But the problem is that victory in war does not solve the problem. War comes in only in order to remove an obstruction that you have in achieving your objective.

There is always this confusion of thought that victory in war automatically brings you the results that you want and the objective you aim at. It does nothing of the kind. It merely removes an obstruction that lies between your objective and yourself. As soon as war starts a sort of psychosis is developed which forgets all objectives and all methods. The only object is to hit the enemy before you. The thundering victories of the Allies during the last war have not solved any problems or achieved any objectives for which the war was fought. Not only have the old problems not been solved, but on the other hand, new problems have been created.

Q: What have you to say on Dr Matthai's statement?

JN: I would prefer not to say anything, unless naturally my colleagues in Parliament or in the Congress Party wish me to. I do not think it would be right or proper for me to discuss these things at a press conference or the like.

Dr Matthai referred to—as far as I remember—three points. One was the Planning Commission, the other was the Indo-Pakistan Agreement and the third was some amount of extravagance, which he said I was guilty of, or the Ministries under my control were guilty of.

So far as the Planning Commission is concerned, I am quite convinced that planning and that a planning commission are quite essential. That has been our policy throughout. For the past ten or eleven years it has been the Congress policy. It has been the policy of the present Parliament as well. Repeated assurances had been given which have now been given effect to. If I may say so the Planning Commission which we have now appointed is a first-class body. Any idea that it is a rival body to the Cabinet is a completely mistaken one. Because we are not used to these, we think so. Any planning body has to work in closest cooperation with Government.

In regard to the Indo-Pakistan trade agreement, I have little to say, because we have said a good deal about it. Maulana Azad has already issued a statement on this aspect of the matter.

Then about this extravagance, I confess I was surprised at Dr Matthai's statement and I am going into that to find out exactly what he refers to. I have tried my utmost for the last two or three years to try to reduce the expenditure of the Government of India in every Ministry, more especially in those with which I am connected.

Q: Do you agree with the view that communism is not an ideology suited to the people of the East?

JN: Now what is communism? If you write an essay on that subject we can discuss it. These are vague terms. If you talk of communism in terms of the Communist

Party's policies that is something, though it changes from time to time. I do not think personally that the Communist Party's policy as such is going to work here in India, or for the matter of that, in most of the countries of Asia.

Q: I referred to Marxism. What is your interpretation?

JN: I am not interested in it. Why should I be? I am interested in finding a way out—not in interpreting Marxism, or taking others' views. There are people who believe that whatever is in a scripture must be true. But my mind unfortunately is not made that way. I read a religious book of course with great respect. But with an open mind I accept it or do not accept it.

Now Marxism is an economic policy which might be called socialism plus the technique to achieve power. Now socialism again has many interpretations, but, generally speaking, it means the control by the State of the major methods of production thereby having an equitable distribution of national wealth. There are a hundred and one ways of achieving it. A method which may suit one country may not suit another. For instance, the present economic framework may suit the United States of America very well. It may be completely unsuited—may I give an extreme case—to Central Africa. So that this business of talking in terms of rigid theories and dogmas and trying to apply them does not seem to be the correct approach. We have to find out which framework suits which country—the ideal being the Welfare State i.e., that the vast majority of the people or everyone should enjoy the normal amenities of life and have opportunities for progress.

Q: When are you meeting Mr Liaquat Ali Khan?

JN: I do not know. He is in London. I am not going to London.

Q: What is the Government of India doing to stabilise prices which are fast soaring up due to the war scare?

JN: Naturally, we want to stabilise prices.

Q: But how? After all you are the Prime Minister and you have to take some action.

JN: If we have to take action we take it. We do not discuss it with you at a press conference.

Before I finish there is one point that I would like to mention. Once before at a press conference I drew attention to a very serious lapse on the part of a correspondent. Since my return from Indonesia I have been going through the newspapers and I have been astonished to find a variety of information which has no relation to facts. Some of them show exceedingly great interest in foreign affairs,

in ambassadorial appointments and the like. For example my sister it is said is going to be sent to London, Mr Krishna Menon to Moscow and Dr Radhakrishnan to Washington. So far as we are concerned, we are entirely satisfied at least with our major Embassies and we are not going to make any changes in them. I don't mean to say that I am perfectly satisfied with every legation or consulate.

Our Labour Minister, Mr Jagjivan Ram, as you know, went to Geneva to attend the I.L.O. Conference. Two or three days later he was elected President of the I.L.O. In a periodical an article appeared which is fantastic in the inferences it drew; it stated that. Iran wanted to become President, the Iranian Government had approached us; there was a great tussle, some members of the Cabinet pulling one way, some others pulling the other way, and ultimately a good deal of canvassing, and Maulana Azad's name was also brought into the picture suggesting that he was protagonist for one group. It looked an extraordinary jumble of falsehoods.

Q: Would you mention the name of the paper?

JN: It is *Blitz*.

I will give you the facts. They are very simple. The fact is that our Minister had no intention to go to Geneva. He wanted one of the provincial ministers to lead the delegation but in the last few days the provincial minister could not go, so that the Labour Minister had to go. Nobody knew that he was going to become President. I think about two or three days before he went, the Labour Secretary wrote to say that there was a great deal of talk there among the delegates that Mr Jagjivan Ram should be elected President of the I.L.O. this year. It was just a piece of information and it remained in the file of the Labour Ministry and nobody knew anything about it.

Mr Jagjivan Ram left on the 2nd morning from here. Nobody knew anything about the Iranian delegate wanting to stand. On the 2nd afternoon, after Mr Jagjivan Ram had left, we had a letter or telegram from our Ambassador at Teheran, saying that the Iranian delegate was standing, just informing us so that we might be able to support him. We got into touch with the Labour Ministry and passed on that telegram to Geneva as a piece of information. In answer to it we got an immediate reply that the governing body previously had decided unanimously to elect Mr Jagjivan Ram. That is all. None of us here, or Maulana Azad, had anything to do about it. Mr Jagjivan Ram arrived there on the 3rd June and was informed immediately of the governing body's decision. On the 5th he received a letter from our ambassador in Iran repeating what he had said to us. We did nothing about it. On the 6th, the Iranian delegate finding out that it had been decided to elect Mr Jagjivan Ram withdrew, but wanted support for Vice-Presidentship which we promised. The next day Mr Jagjivan Ram was elected as President and the Iranian delegate as Vice-President.

The whole thing was so friendly. Neither the Government of India nor any Minister knew anything about it. All this story of disaffection, pulling this way and that way and running down our Labour Minister and bringing in Maulana Azad, and all kinds of things, it is most astounding. It surprises me how this kind of thing is done. Obviously, I cannot believe or expect anything from a periodical or newspaper which indulges in such fanciful flights of imagination.

Q: Last time you said something, the *Blitz* editor, Mr Karanjia, came and the dispute was patched up. He said it was just a family quarrel. Might be, this time also it might become a family quarrel.

JN: I was never aware that Mr Karanjia belonged to my family.

Q: Do you think that the Delhi Pact should be substituted by another pact?

JN: That Pact was to meet a particular situation at that time and I do not know what you mean by substituting it by another pact. We are continually considering the position, vis-a-vis Indo-Pakistan relations, its various forms and shapes, and taking such further steps as we can. There is progressive substitution. It is not a rigid thing.

10. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

Thank you for your letter of 26th June, which I have just received. I am a little surprised to read in it that you are still in doubt as to whether I want you to continue in Moscow or not. I thought I had made that perfectly clear and I think it is essential that you should continue in Moscow. In view of your commitment, you can go to Oxford, and I think that it would be desirable for you to come to India afterwards for consultations. You can then return to Moscow. We think that your presence as our Ambassador in Moscow is essential.

Since you wrote your letter, many developments have taken place and we have been in touch with each other through telegrams. I suppose that it is inevitable for the authorities in Moscow to think that we have aligned ourselves with the U.S.A. and other countries in this Korean matter. To some extent, circumstances have forced our hands and we had to take the decision we did. We took it without

1. J.N. Collection.

the least enthusiasm. You will observe, however, that we have been trying our utmost since then to check a worsening of the situation and a drift to general war. Whether we succeed or not, we should continue these attempts. They are certainly having some effect. In the U.S.A., there is progressive development of war psychology. In the U.K., there is a better realisation, I think, of possible consequence, and a desire to stop further deterioration.

There is a great deal of talk about mediation by India, but all this is vague. We cannot mediate in the air, nor is it any good suggesting that Truman and Stalin, etc., should meet, unless there is some basis for their meeting. We have felt, therefore, that the only feasible course open to us is to press for the acceptance of the People's Government of China by the U.N. and the Security Council. Even this is difficult and thus far there is no sign of a majority in the Security Council agreeing to this. The U.K. have told us definitely that they are anxious to have China there. But they have to proceed cautiously in order to bring in others. France, for her own reasons, is recalcitrant. Egypt, thinking solely in terms of Palestine, is at present unwilling. So there the matter stands. Our position in this respect is quite clear and has been publicly stated.

We are keeping in touch with Panikkar in Peking. Yesterday I had a very interesting letter from him showing the new developments in China.

All we can do in this present context of affairs is to go on trying. What the ultimate result will be lies with the gods.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I have just dictated a letter to you.² Soon after I received your strictly personal letter of the 30th June.³ I entirely appreciate and understand what you have said

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. See the preceding item.

3. Radhakrishnan had written that since Yugoslavia voted against and Soviet Russia was not present, Security Council resolutions were in substance of one group. Had Russia been there, she would have vetoed the resolutions. India's support to these resolutions gave great strength to one bloc and would disturb India's relations with China "with whom we have always been friendly."

in this letter. All I can say in reply is that sometimes the course of events and circumstances are too strong. What is happening in Korea would undoubtedly have put an end to the United Nations if nothing else was done. We had to take the difficult decision and do it without waiting too long. In the way we did it we laid some stress on not falling in line with the U.S.A. etc. Our subsequent conduct has emphasised these distinctions and differences. In fact it is influencing the action of other countries, to what extent I cannot say. However, we have in mind continually what you have written.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

Nan dear,

...I have had three letters from you recently, dated June 26th, 29th and 30th. I do not propose to write to you about Korea and the international situation etc. I am a little wary of this subject, which seems to weigh upon us all the time. Not being swept away by passion, not possessing a single track mind, trying to judge of events as objectively as possible, and at the same time having to consider all kinds of forces at work in India and outside, it is no easy matter to come to a decision. What we have decided in regard to Korea is not very popular in India as a whole, though many approve of it. In any event there is not the least enthusiasm about it. I do not have any enthusiasm. It is always a frightfully difficult matter to try to balance oneself on the edge of a sword. Whether India's policy will turn out to be right or wrong, the future will show. Meanwhile, we have of course displeased very much many people and countries and not pleased anybody. I suppose the American press is not quite so pleased with me now after my various explanations and elucidations of our decision, as it was the day that decision was announced.

I would not worry very much about these external expressions of opinion, if I was sure of my own people. But India is in a mess of confused thinking and complete indiscipline. The Congress is in a very bad state and I do not know how it will pull itself together. The East-West Bengal situation continues to be bad and

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

thousands are still migrating daily. The one good effect of Korea has been to divert attention from our local problems...

With love from
Jawahar

13. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

Your letter of July 7th. We shall expect you here on the 13th morning by the night plane.

The press cutting you have sent me is from one of the most objectionable Hindu Sabha organs in Delhi. It has no importance, but every bit of poison does its mischief.

The Korean affair is, I feel sure, the beginning of a new age of change in Asia, and to some extent, the world. I do not think that any big war is coming soon, though it becomes more and more probable. The United States are too deeply involved in Korea to leave it, and yet it is as clear as anything can be that they have no roots there and can develop none. They can only function with their armies and aircraft and navy. That has its limitations. They have not understood either the problems of Asia or the psychology of the people there. I sometimes wonder if we in India have not failed to understand these problems and this psychology of our own people. We give them good advice often enough. But more and more our advice falls flat. Is this the inherent weakness of the people or the self-complacency of the leaders?

In this wide context of change and upheaval in Asia, the problems that worry us here seem rather small.

Meanwhile, the Congress goes to pieces.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

14. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

I have just now seen summary of Sir David Kelly's² conversation with Mr Gromyko³ and your Moscow Ambassador's comment on what Gromyko said: 'If, as I sincerely hope, it is not impossible that Soviet Government are genuinely seeking a means of escape, perhaps including a compensatory concession about the admission of Communist China to enable them to cooperate with the Security Council, I think a strong argument now exists for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom pressing upon the United States of America's Government the solution for which we have been working. Since entry of the New China into the Security Council and return of U.S.S.R. can be secured without the United States of America either recognising Peking Government or voting for its admission to the Council, no surrender by America would be involved in removal of obstacle to seven votes being cast for Peking's admission.'

The United States of America might be afraid that entry of China into the Security Council and the return of U.S.S.R. might, through adopting unreasonable attitude by one or both, or by exercise of veto, impede rather than accelerate settlement of Korean dispute. Unless U.S.S.R. desire extension of conflict, which seems unlikely on present evidence, resort to such obstructive tactics is hardly probable. World opinion will react mostly unfavourably to both Soviet and People's Government of China if they utilise their presence in Council to defeat progress toward settlement. In our view, end of present deadlock in Council will be a step forward. It cannot make the present situation worse, it may well improve it.

I should be grateful if in your consideration of present situation and your next step, you will take foregoing proposals into account. I have put them forward solely with desire to bring present conflict with all its danger to speedy end.

A report from our Ambassador in Peking, dated 8th July, which our High Commissioner will communicate to you, will serve to emphasise the grave possibility of extension of conflict that exists in the Far East.

1. New Delhi, 10 July 1950, V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.N.M.L. This telegram was sent through Krishna Menon and was repeated to Panikkar in Peking, Radhakrishnan in Moscow and Vijayalakshmi Pandit in Washington.
2. (1891-1959); entered diplomatic service, 1919; British Ambassador in Argentina, 1942, in Turkey, 1946-49, in the U.S.S.R., 1949-51; author of *Thirty-Nine Months*, *The Ruling Few*, *Beyond the Iron Curtain*, *The Hungry Sheep*.
3. Andrei A. Gromyko (1909-1989); Soviet politician and diplomat; ambassador to the U.S., 1943-1946; Deputy Foreign Minister, 1946-1952 and again from 1953 to 1957; ambassador to Britain, 1952-1953; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1957-1983, Deputy Prime Minister, 1983-1985.

15. Cable to Sita Ram¹

You will have seen Government statement of 29th June on India's position in Korean dispute. This was further explained by Prime Minister at press conference on 7th July. Events have been moving with such rapidity that it has not been possible for us to keep all friendly Governments informed of our aims and policy. We are anxious, however, to keep in touch with such Governments and would like you to convey this to Pakistan Foreign Office and to give them following appreciation of situation as we see it.

2. North Korea has undoubtedly been guilty of aggression, despite border incidents in some of which South may have taken initiative and extremely reactionary character of Syngman Rhee regime. For this reason, we have supported Security Council resolutions. But we have limited support to U.N. action in Korea. In our view, President Truman's references to aid to Indo-China and especially Formosa have created complications. We regard internal conflict in Indo-China as one in which communists are taking advantage of nationalist sentiment against French colonialism. Therefore, we have recognised neither rival Government and feel that dispute should be settled according to wishes of people and without outside interference, even by the French. Whatever is the factual position of Formosa, we think that this island rightfully belongs to China, though we by no means favour resort to force for assertion of this right. U.S. action relating to it has created intense feeling in Peking and our Ambassador there reports that if Korean conflict is not promptly and peacefully terminated, drift towards world war will continue since People's Government of China are determined to "liberate" Formosa and will not be "cowed down" by American force. If new China and U.S.A. should clash over Formosa, former is likely to invoke Russian aid under Sino-Soviet Pact, and that may well bring about global war.

3. American and British appeals to Moscow to persuade Russia to bring about cessation of Korean conflict have failed. Though high-level talks between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. or, on broader basis among major powers may be desirable, there is no indication that time for these has arrived. Only hope of bringing them together seems to lie in reactivating Security Council by bringing in representatives of new China and thus enabling Russia to return to U.N. We are working for this through diplomatic channels. Seven votes will suffice for this purpose, which can be achieved by members of Council limiting favourable vote to China's entry and not recognising its new Government, if they do not wish to. U.K. recognise force of our contention

1. Drafted by Nehru and sent to Sita Ram, Indian High Commissioner in Karachi, New Delhi, by the Ministry of External Affairs, 10 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

but are holding back out of regard for American sentiment. We feel strongly that, in interests of world peace and to prevent break-up of U.N., U.S.A. should not use its influence to prevent entry of new China and re-entry of U.S.S.R. That presence of either involves risk of obstructive use of veto is not a valid argument against course favoured by us. Veto is inherent in Charter and resort to it must depend upon ultimate policy of Governments that can use it. Only if Russia is determined on war will it use veto in case of re-entry into Council. If it is unprepared for or does not seek war, at least in measurable future, its return to Council through admission of new China will help to save "face" and provide normal venue for discussions within or without Security Council to settle dangerous situation in Korea peacefully. It is worth recalling that Berlin dispute was settled last year through informal contacts between American representative, Dr Jessup, and Russian representative, Malik.² Present outlook for success of our efforts is not bright but we intend persisting as we can think of no other way of averting world conflagration.

4. Meanwhile, we have asked our Ambassador in Peking to urge restraint on Chinese Government and urged U.S.A. to issue explanatory statement which may help to prevent military entanglement over Formosa.

2. Jacob Malik (1906-1980); Soviet ambassador to Japan, 1942-1945; Deputy Foreign Minister 1946-48; Soviet representative to the U.N., 1948-1952 and 1968-76; ambassador to Britain, 1953-60.

16. To Marshal Stalin and to Dean Acheson¹

In the interviews which our Ambassador has had with the Foreign Office in Moscow he has explained India's position in the Korean dispute. India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take seat in the Council, the U.S.S.R. can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem. In full confidence of Your Excellency's determination to maintain peace and thus to preserve solidarity of the United Nations, I venture to address this

1. Nehru addressed identical messages to Marshal Stalin and Secretary Acheson on 12 July 1950. Published in all newspapers, 20 July 1950.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

personal appeal to you to exert your great authority and influence for the achievement of this common purpose on which the well-being of mankind depends.²

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Replying on 15 July, Stalin agreed to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council having representatives of the five great powers including People's China and after hearing representatives of the Korean people. Acheson replied that the Korean question should not be tied up with China's admission to the U.N.

17. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

Many thanks for your reply to my telegram of 10th July which your Acting High Commissioner has forwarded to me today.² While I am grateful for consideration that you have given to our views, I confess that I see no prospect of an early settlement of the Korean dispute on what I understand to be the intention of your proposals.

First of conditions mentioned in paragraph 5 of your reply is that there should be no Chinese attack on Formosa. Our Ambassador in Peking has the definite impression that the Chinese have no intention to embark upon any such enterprise, provided that the present deadlock in the Security Council is quickly broken by admission of representative of Peking Government and consequent return of U.S.S.R. to Council and way thus opened for peaceful solution of Korean affair and problem of Taiwan (Formosa). Second and third conditions in your paragraph 5, read with paragraph 6, suggest that (1) North Koreans should first withdraw to 38th Parallel North, and (ii) Russia should return to Security Council before

1. New Delhi, 14 July 1950. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. In his message of 13 July 1950, given in reply to Nehru's message of 10 July, Attlee stated that: "My impression is that the Americans regard the action that they have taken over Formosa as dictated by the military needs of the moment, in order to limit the area of hostilities to Korea." He listed some conditions if the Korean conflict was to be localised: no Chinese attack on Formosa; hostilities in Korea should terminate and Northern forces return north of the 38th Parallel and Russia should return to the Security Council.

the issue of Chinese representation can be dealt with. It is clear to us that, if one party insists on fulfilment of conditions before the representative of Peking Government is admitted to Security Council, the other party will also suggest conditions precedent to the satisfaction of the demands or suggestions of the first party. For example, the U.S.S.R. might insist upon the cancellation of what it considers to be an illegal resolution of the Security Council, though this view may be wrong, and the Peking Government might insist upon some kind of a declaration by the U.S.A. regarding Formosa before they would agree to join the Security Council. If I may say so frankly, once a question of 'face' arises, each party which is afraid of losing 'face' is apt to make conditions, and positions thus adopted are more and more firmly adhered to. For all these reasons, we have ventured to suggest that the reactivation of the Security Council should be the first objective and that it should be achieved without anyone concerned attaching conditions to it. Your Government had, before Korean incident, already decided to vote for entry of new China into Security Council. U.S.A., while not willing to vote themselves for entry, had announced that they would not use their veto. Insistence upon fulfilment of prior conditions by U.S.S.R. and Peking Government before question of admission of latter to Security Council cannot, in my view, be considered really essential. I find it difficult to believe that the North Korean invasion was staged in order to compel the U.S.A. and the U.K. to admit the new China into the Security Council and other organs of the U.N. I can only appeal once more for a dispassionate and independent settlement of this issue. By helping to bring this about, the U.K. and the U.S.A. will be serving the cause of peace and the survival of mankind; they will not be surrendering any vital principles or national prestige. If, after new China's entry into the Security Council and the Soviet's return, representatives of these two powers abuse the veto, the world will hold them guilty of imperilling world peace. I still feel that the new China certainly, and the U.S.S.R. probably, is anxious to avoid a world war. Perhaps the course that I have suggested involves the exercise by the U.K. and the U.S.A. of magnanimity and faith. This would be in conformity with their highest traditions and, as such, I can honourably urge that both Governments act with faith and magnanimity.

18. Cable to S. Radhakrishnan¹

I don't think that we should ask Moscow for any elucidation at this stage. I am telegraphing immediately to London and Washington, urging both U.K. and U.S.

1. New Delhi, 16 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

Governments to abandon hesitation and work for prompt admission of Peking's representatives to Security Council and thus open way for return of Soviet and for peaceful solution of Korean problem. As I am now in direct communication with Attlee and Truman-Acheson, discussion with American or British representatives in Moscow does not seem necessary.²

2. Radhakrishnan had suggested this.

19. Cable to C.R. Attlee and Dean Acheson¹

I consider reply most encouraging. I have already explained why, in my opinion, apprehension that entry of China into Security Council and return of Soviet may possibly lead to obstruction of proceedings should not be allowed to stand in way of restoring to Council its full representative character. Insistence on prior fulfilment by Moscow or Peking of conditions such as return of North Korean forces to 38th Parallel may be pleaded by both as evidence of lack of desire of Western Powers for peaceful settlement. On other hand, if Soviet and China prove unreasonable after entry into Council, world opinion will hold them responsible for consequences. My honest belief is that Moscow is seeking a way out of present entanglement without loss of prestige and that there is real chance of solving Korean problem peacefully by enabling Peking Government to enter, and Soviet to resume its place in Security Council, without insisting on conditions. This may be an act of faith, but the gravity of alternatives seems to justify it. In view of urgency of matter, I shall be grateful for earliest possible answer.

1. New Delhi, 16 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

20. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1950

Nan dear,

...Our efforts to do something to tone down the war fever, resulting from the

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

Korean affair, appear to be doomed to failure. We have not had formal replies of the U.K. and the U.S.A. yet, but they are likely to come by tomorrow. It almost seems that all of us are destined to move inevitably and inexorably to war and disaster. If that is a destiny that cannot be averted, then we cannot escape it.

Liaquat Ali Khan is coming here day after tomorrow for the Kashmir talks. They promise no result. Meanwhile, Shaikh Abdullah has been behaving very badly in Kashmir in regard to domestic affairs and he appears to be bent on seeking a conflict with us. He is got into the wrong hands there and is being misled. Poor Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad is very unhappy about it all, but does not know what to do.

With love,
Jawahar

21. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1950

My dear Subbarayan,²

I have your three letters of the 10th July.

As you know, we have been trying to find a way out of the Korean tangle. We have felt that the People's Government of China should be accepted by the United Nations. This will not solve any problem, but it will create conditions for a possible solution. I am afraid the U.S.A. and the U.K. Governments are not agreeable to what we have suggested. We have not yet received their formal answer. Meanwhile, the situation deteriorates....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. India's Ambassador in Indonesia at this time.

22. To Dean Acheson¹

New Delhi
19 July, 1950

My dear Mr Secretary of State,

I thank you for your letter which your Ambassador conveyed to me last night.²

I am grateful to President Truman and to you for the consideration that you have given to my message of July 13 and to the subsequent communication forwarding Marshal Stalin's reply to my message to him of the same date. I recognize that one of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the U.S.A., is to assist in maintaining world peace, and that the U.S. Government is firmly of the opinion that the U.N. is one of the most effective instruments yet devised for maintaining and restoring international peace and security.

As Your Excellency must be aware, the maintenance of peace and support of the U.N. has consistently been the policy of the Government of India.

My suggestion for breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take their seat in the Council³ and the U.S.S.R. can return to it was designed to fulfil this policy, not to weaken it.

In voting for the resolutions on Korea adopted by the Security Council, on June 25 and 27, it was our purpose to strengthen the U.N. in resisting aggression. Since the Government of India recognized the People's Government of China on December 30, 1949, it has been our endeavour to bring about the admission of its representatives to the various organs and agencies of the U.N. Our present proposal was a renewal of this effort. It was made on its merits and also in the hope that it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peaceful solution of the

1. Correspondence released to the press and published in all newspapers on 20 July 1950.
2. In his letter of 18 July 1950, Acheson stated: "There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself.... The decision between competing claimant Governments for China's seat in the U.N. is one which must be reached by the U.N. on its merits.... The decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression...."
3. On 25 July 1950, Acheson replied that seating of People's China in the U.N. should not appear as part of a deal to buy off aggression in Korea. The U.S. had consistently opposed such seating but would accept the decision of a constitutional majority. He further stated some of his other objections: Peking had no interest to establish relations with other States; it had singled out American citizens and interests as objects of its hostility; it had made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the international obligations of China; there was still room for doubt that it exercised effective control throughout the mainland; and it was supporting communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere.

Korean problem. I do not think that the admission of China now would be encouragement of aggression.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

23. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

I thank you for the message on Korea that was sent to me yesterday by your acting High Commissioner. I am deeply grateful for the time and thought that you and your colleagues have given to the suggestion that I made to Marshal Stalin and to Mr Dean Acheson.² As you say, there are variations of attitude and outlook among us. In a matter of such complexity, it is natural that this should be so. I should like you to know, however, that, before I made my proposal to Moscow and Washington, I had taken into account all aspects of it that present themselves to me, and this included the more important mentioned in your message. My present views are fully stated in the reply that I sent to Mr Dean Acheson yesterday and which should have appeared along with rest of the correspondence in today's papers. For convenient reference I am requesting our High Commissioner in London to send you the full text.

1. 20 July 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Attlee in his cable of 18 July said that though a settlement of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was desirable, there were grave dangers in linking up this question with the Korean conflict.

24. To C.R. Attlee¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1950

My dear Prime Minister,

I am grateful to you for the two messages that you have sent me through your High Commissioner here. They were delivered to me on the 19th July and we have

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

naturally given the most careful consideration to them. I have already sent you a brief reply in acknowledgment as well as copy of my reply to Mr Acheson.

2. I am now venturing to write to you, because I am greatly distressed at the turn events are taking. I agree with much that is contained in the two messages you have been good enough to send me. I had not overlooked the main factors mentioned by you in my approach to Moscow and Washington. I have decided not to pursue my suggestion further, at least at this stage, but I am still convinced that certain basic and important aspects of the crisis that faces us have not been fully appreciated.

3. I am quite clear that North Korea, probably with the connivance of the Soviet Government and certainly after full preparation, deliberately committed aggression on South Korea. Because of this, the United Nations were fully justified in declaring North Korea as an aggressor and we supported them in this decision, even though all the available information at our disposal about South Korea is not to its advantage.

4. It appears to be common ground that we should endeavour to limit the area of hostilities to Korea; further that we should try to bring them to a satisfactory end as soon as possible. There should be no question of surrender to aggression. All this is agreed to. But how are we to achieve this, and how are we to prevent hostilities from spreading and even taking the shape of a world war? It would be poor logic that led us inevitably to such a war, a war which would be disastrous for everyone.

5. It seems to me that there has not been any clear realisation of the position in Asia by the countries of the West. An attempt is no doubt made to understand the new forces at work in Asia, but the process of adaptation lags behind and events occur, which continually take people by surprise and upset preconceived plans. We never seem to catch up with events. You will forgive me, I hope, if I say that there has been a consistent record of failure in the policies adopted in the Far East and in parts of South East Asia by western powers. That failure was due, I think, to a complete lack of understanding of these vast dynamic forces that are at work in Asia. To a small extent, we in India are in a somewhat better position to judge of these forces. We are more directly and closely affected by them and so we have given a great deal of thought to them. The first fact to be borne in mind is that Asia is undergoing vast revolutionary changes. Those changes, before they appear on the surface, have already taken place in the minds of millions of people. These people are not communist. But they seek social change, more especially in the agrarian sphere, and they are not prepared to put up with existing conditions. In particular, they are intensely opposed to any form of colonial control. If a choice is to be made by them, they prefer communism to colonial control. To talk to them of the dangers of communism does not frighten them at all. Any help or encouragement given to a colonial or a socially reactionary regime immediately produces a powerful reaction in them against the country that gives that help. I am merely stating facts, not expressing an opinion.

6. If this is the state of mass opinion in most of the countries of Asia, it has to be dealt with in some other way than a rather naive condemnation of communism. As we have seen in China, military strength and money cannot win in the end, if they are opposed to these basic urges of the people.

7. It was with this background in view that we urged, towards the end of last year, the recognition of the People's Government of China. I spoke at length on this subject to Mr Acheson in Washington in October last. I also spoke on the same lines to Mr Bevin when I met him in London last November on my return journey from America. Later, India recognised that Government and I was happy to find that the U.K. Government also gave it recognition. Recognition by itself had little meaning and could not bring the advantages that should have flown from it, unless certain other natural consequences followed. These did not follow and a crisis occurred in the United Nations because of the non-inclusion of the People's Government of China.

8. Again in Indo-China, a curious situation has existed for sometime. The more the help that is given to the French there, the more the people become hostile to the French and their supporters. There may be ultimately a French military victory in Indo-China. But it will be at the cost of a hostile population. How long can that victory endure? Step by step, we are getting entangled and there is no clear way out even by victory in war.

9. This is the position in a great part of Asia. The approach of the western powers makes no appeal to a great majority of people in Asia because it lacks understanding of what those people desire and there is a general impression that the western powers support reaction. The Soviet Government and its allies generally appear to support what might be called the progressive forces in most countries. I know very well that the Soviet Government is probably playing its own expansionist game and that it would be a disaster if it succeeded in that. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the western powers, by their policies in Asia, indirectly help the Soviet in Asia. The continued exclusion of the new China from the U.N. helps to increase sympathy for the People's Government in Peking among vast numbers of Asian peoples and distrusts of the policies of western powers.

10. I have little doubt that the North Koreans will be driven out of South Korea in the end.² What will happen then? The moment foreign troops are withdrawn, the same position would arise again or perhaps a worse one. The alternatives thus will be: armies of occupation and full control on colonial lines of these countries or leaving them to shift for themselves and drift inevitably to communism. The

² In spite of the resistance offered by the armed forces of the United Nations the North Korean Army continued to advance in the initial stages of the war. They overran almost all South Korea except for the small perimeter around Taegu and Pusan. Then in September, General MacArthur landed U.S. forces on Inchon and by cutting off the supply lines compelled the North Korean forces to retreat behind the 38th Parallel.

former alternative appears to me out of the question for any length of time and the longer it endures, the more we strengthen communism there. If this analysis is correct, then the policy adopted by the western powers does not and cannot lead to any solution, which is satisfactory to them, or what is no less important, conducive to world peace. In a sense this argument may apply to Japan also.

11. There is another aspect to the general world situation to which, I think, I should make at least passing reference. It is conceivable that, in the event of the military campaign in Korea being prolonged, the western powers may get involved in deeper commitments along the periphery of the Soviet. The Soviet Union may not be directly engaged in these conflicts and its striking power will thus not be affected. In this way also a world war might be brought nearer.

12. If there is world war, that will be a disaster for everyone. But apart from the disaster, what will even victory in it lead to? War, of course, cannot be avoided, if there is aggression and there is no other way out. But war is meant to help in achieving a certain objective. That objective is not merely the defeat of the enemy but something more positive. If that positive objective disappears, then the sole redeeming feature of a war also disappears and we have not only the disaster of a war but also complete failure afterwards, in spite of military victory.

13. These are rather trite and obvious remarks and you will forgive me for making them. But I do feel that we are drifting fast in a wrong direction, which can only lead to evil results. There is too facile an impression that military strength and economic resources will solve the problem in the end to our advantage, but it seems to me perfectly clear, in Asia at least, that something more is required than military and economic strength. That something at the present moment is lacking in the approach of the western powers. They have forgotten that millions of people in Asia have strong feelings and cannot be suppressed for any length of time. We cannot outlive the past easily, nor can we cure the evils of the past by the methods of the past.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

25. Cable to S. Radhakrishnan¹

Your telegram No. 67.² After line taken by Soviet, both publicly and in private,

1. New Delhi, 21 July 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. On 20 July, Radhakrishnan had cabled that both the U.S. and Russia were concerned with the termination of hostilities in Korea and a peace settlement through the Security Council. The U.S. was against China's admission and Russia insisted on it. Considerations of prestige and fear of obstruction in Security Council by China and Russia on Korea were weighing with America. He suggested a fresh approach to Stalin.

with Kelly³ regarding ceasefire and withdrawal to the 38th Parallel, I see no likelihood of Stalin agreeing to support immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of North Koreans to 38th Parallel. Had U.S.A. and U.K. not closed door to immediate and independent consideration of admission of New China into Security Council and also not insisted that U.S.S.R. should return to Security Council unconditionally, there might have been an opening for a new personal approach by me to Stalin. As situation now stands, I think it best to refrain from any fresh move.

3. Sir David Kelly, British Ambassador in Moscow.

26. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Report of your speech in Security Council yesterday quotes you as saying: "Our internal needs at present are such that we cannot afford to send any portion of these forces to remote areas outside India". This is likely to draw comment, especially in U.S.A. and U.K., that our inability to spare combatant forces is due to our relations with Pakistan in general and dispute over Kashmir in particular. As we have already explained, real reason for our inability to spare such forces is that we have no surplus over strictly defence requirements of India.

In everything that we say publicly, we have to be specially careful of effect on opinion in China. Our effectiveness in their capital to prevent extension of conflict depends upon avoidance of statements that may, perhaps even wrongly, be construed as support of U.S. military activities. Independent opinion even in England is critical of so-called strategic bombing that is now being carried out by U.S. aircraft. Distinction between legitimate military activity in Korea and its opposite is difficult to draw. Best policy, in circumstances, seems to be, to limit public comment on Korean situation generally to minimum.

1. New Delhi, 29 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

27. Cable to Trygve Lie¹

My Government have given most careful consideration to your Excellency's telegram of 14th July. As has already been explained, the structure and

1. New Delhi, 29 July 1950. J.N. Collection.

organisations of our armed forces is designed strictly to meet requirements of India's own defence. It is not possible, therefore, to spare ground forces for Korea. My Government are, however, anxious to render such aid as lies in their power. They therefore, offer a field ambulance unit and will be glad to make it available quickly for despatch, should such help be needed. In addition a small surgical unit can be provided. Both will be drawn from the regular establishment of our Defence forces.

28. To Dean Acheson¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1950

My dear Mr Secretary of State,

Very many thanks for your letter which was conveyed to me on the 26th July² by your Ambassador in New Delhi.

2. It was indeed good of you to have found time, in the midst of your urgent and anxious preoccupations, to write to me so fully. I am also happy that you have written frankly, because it is only on this basis that we can understand each other, even though we may not always agree.

3. There are only two points, arising out of your letter, on which I think it desirable to dwell in some detail, and I shall do so, to quote your own words, on a "strictly personal and confidential basis."

4. The first relates to the People's Government of China. You have referred to your conversations last year on the subject of the recognition of this Government. I explained to you then our point of view, and I think it worthwhile to recapitulate what I said before. Our recognition was not based either on approval of communism or all the policies of the Peking Government; it conformed to our view of the facts of authority over continental China, which is far the greater part of China, and to our appraisal of the psychology of the majority of the peoples of South East Asia. A process of revolution is at work in most of these countries; Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya and Burma offer abundant proof of this. It is both political and economic. Stated in broad terms, the political conflict is one between the urge of nationalism and colonial rule. Communism has found an ally in nationalism, especially in those countries where the resistance of colonialism to nationalist

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Acheson, in his letter of 26 July to Nehru, requested him to convince China that her own interests required that she should avoid intervention in Korea or an attack on Formosa.

aspirations has proved obdurate. The political evils of communist totalitarianism have not proved an obstacle to this alliance so far, nor is it likely to prove so in future, as long as a people's natural longing for freedom from foreign domination is not satisfied. Moreover, since all the countries that I have mentioned have a predominantly agricultural economy, and land reform is their crying need, any regime which carries out such reform successfully is bound to make a sympathetic appeal. We felt that to withhold recognition from the People's Government of China would be to ignore these highly important considerations, and to create a gulf not only between ourselves and China, with whom we have a history of almost immemorial friendship, but also misunderstanding between India and the peoples of South-East Asia, who are now struggling for their freedom. For us, situated as we are and where we are, the recognition of the new China was not only inevitable but urgent. Our latest effort to seat China in the Security Council, an effort, which, as I have already explained to you, has been consistent and spread over the last six months or so, was prompted by the honest conviction that such a step was necessary to preserve the United Nations as a representative organisation and to maintain world peace. I think you will agree that so long as a nation of 450 million people remains outside the organisation, the organisation cannot be regarded as fully representative. This view has nothing to do with the condonation of aggression whether by China or by any other country. Were China to resort to acts which, in our opinion, constitute aggression, we should not hesitate to adopt the same attitude towards China as we have towards North Korea. The reports that we have received from our Ambassador in Peking have led me to the conclusion that, given the chance, the new China will take a line of its own and work for peace, so vital to its economic and social reconstruction, rather than try the hazard of war, of its own will or at some one else's behest. But that chance can scarcely come if she is, for whatever reason, kept out of the community of nations. I do not presume to challenge your sources of information but, quite naturally I have to be guided by my own.

5. My second point deals with your request to apprise our Ambassador in Peking of the President's statement with respect to Formosa, and to continue our endeavour to persuade the authorities there that they avoid intervention in Korean situation or an attack on Formosa. The President's statement about Formosa was repeated to our Ambassador in Peking as soon as we received it from our Ambassador in Washington. Mr Panikkar was instructed, in the first few days after the conflict in Korea started, to impress upon the People's Government of China the necessity, in the interests of world peace, of avoiding action that might extend the area of armed conflict. You may rest assured that we shall persist in this endeavour.

6. In conclusion, I should like you to know that the divergence of our views on the Peking regime detracts in no way from our desire for cooperation between

our two countries to terminate the hostilities in Korea and to ensure, for the world, lasting peace.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

29. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegrams 5116 and 5117 30th July. Possibility of Malik² ruling against presence of representative of Nationalist China in Security Council and ruling being challenged was referred to us by B.N. Rau. We have instructed him to vote in favour of ruling. Unless challenger can muster seven supporting votes, ruling will prevail. For United Kingdom and Norway, which have already recognised Peking Government, to vote against ruling would be not only wholly illogical but would gravely prejudice chances of United Kingdom establishing full diplomatic relations with new China and prove psychological blow to British position in South East Asia where such illogical course is bound to be regarded as proof of complete subordination of United Kingdom to United States of America. Matter is obviously one for decision of United Kingdom. I have however no objection to your explaining our position to Attlee.

3. If Malik's ruling is upheld result would be purely negative in that Nationalist China would cease to be represented in Security Council. In our view best course for Council is to follow this up by admitting new China to vacant seat. We shall certainly vote for such a course.

1. New Delhi, 31 July 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. On 1 August 1950, Jacob A. Malik, the representative of the Soviet Union, returned to the Council after an absence since January, and became President of the Council for the month.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. People's Republic of China

1. To Madame Sun Yat-sen¹

New Delhi
April 29, 1950

My dear Madame Sun,²

It is a long time since I have written to you or heard from you directly. But I need hardly say that you have been very often in my thoughts. Our Ambassador,³ while he was in China, used to keep us in touch with events there and send us news of you from time to time, which was very welcome. Now that our Ambassador is going to China to represent us there, I take this opportunity of sending this brief letter with him carrying my good wishes to you and to your great country which has endured so many trials in past years.

I am very happy that India and the People's Republic of China are exchanging diplomatic missions which will help them to keep in touch with each other and develop, I hope, closer contacts. Our two great countries have played important roles throughout the course of history, and I have no doubt that in the future they will also have to face great responsibilities. During this long past of thousands of years, it is a curious and significant fact that these two great and dynamic countries have never come into violent conflict with each other. They have lived at peace with one another and their contacts have been cultural, artistic and in the domain of thought, and each has profited by inspiration drawn from the other. That is a unique instance in history and it is my earnest wish that this uniqueness should continue, and that our contacts should ever remain friendly and cooperative.

It is more than 22 years since I met you in Moscow for a brief while. But long before that I had heard a great deal about you and come to admire you for your personality and the work you had done. Since then I have not had the pleasure and good fortune to meet you again, although I had hoped to do so on several occasions. But your example has been an inspiration for many of us throughout our lives, and often, when dark clouds surrounded us, we thought of you and your indomitable personality, and derived comfort from that thought.

I send you my homage and my affectionate regards.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Madame Sun Yat-sen was the Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council, which was the chief legislative body of China.

3. K.M. Panikkar.

2. Cable to Nahas Pasha¹

Your Excellency will have read Mr Trygve Lie's peace programme.² Much of it is long-term and can be usefully taken up only after certain preliminary obstacles have been overcome. Of these, the deadlock over the admission of the People's Government of China to the United Nations and its allied agencies is at once the most dangerous and most formidable. Since this issue came to a head over seating of representative of the new Chinese Government in Security Council last January, the U.S.S.R. has extended boycott to every U.N. organisation that has met so far. There can be little doubt that, unless matter is resolved beforehand satisfactorily, she will boycott forthcoming session of U.N. Assembly, an event that will gravely imperil the very existence of the United Nations.

Opinion must differ on wisdom of Soviet tactics. In my view, more prudent and cooperative course would have been to continue participation in activities of United Nations even after first attempt to seat representative of new Chinese Government in Council had failed. The correct democratic method for a minority is to continue effort to cover the majority. This error, however, does not relieve those of us who regard U.N. as sole agency for concerted international effort to save world from catastrophe of war, of responsibility to do everything possible to break present deadlock.

As Your Excellency is aware, India took the step last December of recognising the People's Government of China. This involved approval neither of ideology nor policies of new Government, but only of an established political fact. China's permanent membership of Security Council, main executive organ of United Nations, is due to her size, population and resources. It can hardly be disputed that Government of Peking more truly represents these attributes of China's as a nation than Government which has sought refuge in Taiwan. The logic of facts therefore, favours recognition as *de jure* Government of China of those who are in effective control of that country. This is the reason why, since last January, India has voted for inclusion of representative of this Government practically in every organ or agency of U.N. where question has come up.

1. New Delhi, 26 June 1950. J.N. Collection. Nahas Pasha was the Prime Minister of Egypt at this time.
2. Trygve Lie, the U.N. Secretary-General, convinced that the crisis for the United Nations resulting from the Soviet boycott could only be resolved through the admission of People's China to the United Nations, visited the capitals of fifty-nine countries where he urged that a distinction be accepted between diplomatic recognition of the Peking Government and its representation in the U.N.

In some quarters, there is reluctance to take similar step because of declared intention of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues to identify themselves with foreign policy of Moscow.³ First impressions of our Ambassador, who only recently presented his credentials in Peking, suggest that, if treated as equals, present Government may make an independent and constructive contribution to the solution of world problems. To continue to keep them at arm's length can only accentuate their sense of bitterness over what they regard as political ostracism by those who refuse to admit them to the world community of free nations.

For reasons of their own, U.S.A. and France find themselves unable to recognise the new Government. I venture to suggest that Egypt, like us, has no ideological prejudices but, on the contrary, deep solicitude for the preservation of the United Nations and the promotion of world peace. In practically all major world issues, India, since she attained independence, has found herself united in understanding and action with Egypt. Both Egypt and India today are members of the Security Council. It is my sincere conviction that, if Egypt were to join us in trying to seat the representative of the People's Government of China in Security Council, she would be making an outstanding contribution to the future of the United Nations as also of world peace. I have, therefore, decided to appeal to Your Excellency most earnestly to give this matter your prompt and favourable consideration.

I would naturally prefer that Egypt recognise the new Government of China and also work for admission of its representative to Security Council and, as occasion offers, to other organs of the United Nations. If, for any reason, recognition of Government in immediate future be found impracticable, I would strongly urge that Egypt should at least vote for entry of representative of Chinese Government into Security Council and other organs and agencies of U.N.

3. On 1 July 1949, Mao Zedong had stated that China "would lean to one side, the side of the Soviet Union, because the U.S.S.R. would help China politically and economically—and the imperialist powers would not." The two countries signed a military pact linking their security interests.

3. To Ernest Bevin¹

New Delhi
27 June 1950

My dear Bevin,

Your letter of the 15th June was duly forwarded by our High Commissioner in London and I received it on my return to New Delhi yesterday. I am grateful to

1. J.N. Collection.

you for having taken the trouble to write to me at such length from your sick-bed. I do not think it necessary to go further at this stage into the question of Indo-China.² As regards the admission of the Representatives of the People's Government of China into the U.N. Security Council and other organs and specialised agencies of the United Nations, I am happy to find that you have reached a decision which is in harmony with our own policy.³ I have addressed a personal message to Nahas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, in which I have appealed to him to recognise the Peking Government or, at least, to vote for the entry of its representative into the Security Council. We are not diplomatically represented either in Cuba or in Ecuador. A direct approach to these Governments by us is not, therefore, possible. I am, however, considering the transmission of a request similar to one that I have sent to Nahas Pasha to one or both of these Governments through their Ambassadors in Washington. If anything comes of these efforts, I shall let you know.

I have just returned from a three weeks' tour in Indonesia, Malaya and Burma. This was most interesting and instructive and made me understand a little better the problems of these countries, and promoted our friendly feelings towards each other.

I am glad to notice from press reports that you are making a good recovery and sincerely hope that you will soon be restored to your normal health and be able to resume your official duties.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Bevin agreed with Nehru that French Indo-China was a political problem and its people should be given the opportunity to determine their own future.
3. Bevin had thought if the Chinese Government had shown more readiness to establish diplomatic relations with foreign powers, the number of nations giving *de jure* recognition would have been more. However, the U.K. Government had decided to vote for the admission of the new Chinese Government at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

II. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers in London

1. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi

May 5, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I have your letter of the 21st April. It makes interesting reading.

Regarding the press cutting from America² that you have sent me, that made us rather angry, because it is full of wrong statements. Indeed the American Embassy here got upset about it too.

It seems to me that we should be rather wary about making any move to end the cold war.³ We must know first how the U.S.A. and the U.K. react. What Winston Churchill has said is all very vague.⁴ Meanwhile, the U.S.A. appears to have stiffened its attitude.⁵ It is quite possible that a time may come when we might take a step. But we cannot take the initiative in this. The Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., U.K., and France are meeting in London soon. This meeting may give us a clue about future possibilities.

It is a truism of course that we must put our own house in order before we seek to clean up others' houses. Fortunately there has been some improvement here, but the position is still difficult.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Radhakrishnan enclosed a cutting from *The New York Times* dated 12 April 1950 which stated that the efforts of the Ambassadors of the U.S. in Karachi and Delhi had led to the Delhi talks on the Indo-Pakistan Agreement.
3. Radhakrishnan had been in favour of India trying to bring about a summit conference.
4. Radhakrishnan had been in touch with Churchill who showed interest but would not commit himself.
5. Acheson, the Secretary of State, confirmed publicly his country's policy of containment and "building a situation of strength."

2. To Horace Alexander¹

New Delhi

May 8th, 1950

My dear Horace,

I am returning to you Ray Newton's letter which you left with me.

As you know, I am in agreement generally with the approach to this question.

1. J.N. Collection.

But I do not think it will be at all wise for me to rush in and act as a kind of adviser or mentor of others. It is a good thing for public opinion to be cultivated, as your friends appear to be doing, and for the peace movement to grow. But it is quite a different thing for me both in my individual capacity and as Prime Minister to push myself forward as some kind of mediator. All I can do at the present moment is to remain more or less quiet except to say something when occasion arises. Even then what I say will be general and sometimes rather indirect.

Official opinion in the United States appears to me stiffening in regard to Russia and at the present moment Foreign Ministers are meeting in London to consider their policy. We have to wait and see what happens.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
12 May 1950

My dear Krishna,

...I have read with interest your letter about the Foreign Ministers' meeting. I do not think there is any feeling in India at all in favour of being dragged into any orbit. In fact such feeling as there was previously is rather fading away. Sometimes we are dragged by circumstances into attending conferences like the Sydney Conference.² Our instructions are, however, quite clear to keep out of this orbit business.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. A six-year programme of economic aid to South and South East Asia was worked out by seven British Commonwealth countries at a conference in Sydney from 15 to 19 May 1950.

4. Cable to Ernest Bevin¹

Your High Commissioner has communicated to me account of tripartite talks held in London from 11th to 13th May between Foreign Ministers of France, U.K., and the U.S.A. I appreciate your decision to keep Commonwealth Prime Ministers informed of the content and outcome of these important talks.

2. As regards South East Asia, I note that the Conference reached the following conclusions:

- (1) The British and French have direct responsibilities in the area which make its security of even greater concern to them (than the U.S.A.). The forcible expulsion of French and British forces from Indo-China and Malaya respectively would be both a military and political disaster.
- (2) The United States has taken and will continue every diplomatic action which appears practicable to defend South East Asia against further communist encroachment. It is also prepared to accord military aid within its capabilities and is examining the possibility of according economic aid to Indo-China and certain other parts of the area.

We have never questioned the necessity of military and other necessary action in Malaya by the U.K. Government to maintain law and order. As regards French Indo-China, our point of view has all along been that military or economic efforts will not by themselves solve what is pre-eminently a political problem, viz, satisfaction of nationalist aspirations. Information derived by us not only from our own diplomatic sources, but from the writings of independent American and British correspondents, confirms our view that important nationalist groups in French Indo-China, who have no sympathy with communists are dissatisfied with French policy, because they feel that they have not been granted real independence. So long as this sentiment persists, neither the French nor any French-sponsored Government in French Indo-China are likely to succeed in restoring peace and stability to this important region, nor will communism which will make full use of frustrated nationalism, be defeated by purely military means. If the western powers seek a peaceful and permanent way out of the present unhappy and dangerous situation in Indo-China, it is our considered view that the only way to

1. New Delhi, 24 May 1950. J.N. Collection.

do it is to give the people of Indo-China an effective opportunity to determine their own future. One way of doing this would be through a constituent assembly, elected on the basis of a broad franchise, in which representatives of all parts of Indo-China, including the one now controlled by Ho Chi Minh, would participate freely. If the French were to make such a declaration it is possible that, for the period intervening between such a declaration and the conclusion of the work of the constituent assembly, some interim arrangement for the government and defence of Indo-China could be negotiated. The French must, of course, agree to allow the constituent assembly to determine not only the future form of the government of Indo-China, but its relations with the French Union. I am aware that, only recently, the French Minister for Overseas Territories has declared that independence for such territories must be found within the French Union. In our view, insistence on this condition, at least so far as French Indo-China is concerned, will involve not only prolongation but unpredictable deterioration of the present troubles.

The other subject on which I wish to comment is that of relations with the Soviet Union.² Until the result of Mr Trygve Lie's conversations³ in Moscow becomes known, specific suggestions for ending the present deadlock might be premature. What seems clear to us is that no procedure designed to achieve this end will succeed unless the new People's Government of China is brought into the negotiations. According to the communication made to me by the High Commissioner, the Governments of France, the U.K., and the U.S.A., have decided to keep this matter under consideration. In our view, the longer a decision to admit the representative of the Chinese People's Government to the Security Council of the United Nations and its other organs is delayed, the greater becomes the danger to the solidarity of the U.N. organisation and its effectiveness as an instrument for attaining world peace. The first impressions of our Ambassador, who has only recently presented his credentials in Peking, suggest that, if treated as equals, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues might make an independent and constructive contribution to the solution of world problems. To continue to keep them at arm's length can only accentuate their sense of bitterness over practice of political ostracism by the western powers (other than U.K.) and strengthen those elements in China which seek to identify their policy in international affairs with that of the Soviet Union. Even if the U.S.A. and France should find it impossible to alter

2. The Foreign Ministers had declared on 13 May that they would seize any opportunity to reach an accord with Russia and the East European bloc but must safeguard Atlantic defenses "as long as some nations are not willing to cooperate in conditions of equality and mutual defense."
3. Trygve Lie visited Moscow on 11 May to discuss the representation of China at the U.N.

their present attitude, there are other powers on the Security Council, e.g., Egypt, Cuba and Ecuador, whose support for seating the representative of the Chinese People's Government in the Council would help us out of the present impasse. We would suggest that the U.K. and other like-minded Governments, in a position to do so, should exert themselves in this behalf. India has no diplomatic relations with Cuba or Ecuador, but will be ready to utilise all its contacts with the representatives of these two countries, and make direct representation to Egypt⁴ in support of steps designed to persuade these three Governments to work for the early admission of the People's Government of China to the Security Council.

4. Since your High Commissioner's remarks have been conveyed to me confidentially, I am addressing this communication to you only. We should, however, like to make similar approach to the U.S. and, possibly, to France, if you see no objection.

4. See *ante*, pp. 364-365.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
III. United States of America

1. The World Situation¹

I hope that India and Pakistan will eventually be able to develop common policies governing economic affairs, transport, irrigation, communications and national defence.

In the normal course of events, we should draw steadily closer to each other—even closer as two friendly neighbouring countries.

Politically perhaps such a relationship might resemble that which prevails between the United States and Canada. But there are even deeper bonds to be strengthened. Partition cut up something that was a very living entity in terms of economics, transport and communications. It was even deeper rooted psychologically and culturally. There are vast numbers of people on each side who are related.

So, when we quarrel, that quarrel sometimes assumes the bitterness of a family quarrel—worse than strangers quarrelling. But ultimately we should develop a common economic and defence policy. Forces may well be gradually driving us in that direction—irrigation, communications and national defence.

It is unlikely that anything dramatic can be expected from the meetings starting tomorrow in the Pakistani capital. I and Liaquat Ali don't meet in formal conferences and the major problems to be discussed are so well known that no formal agenda is required.

I believe the subject of evacuee property claims on both sides will be reviewed and that the formula² applied in East and West Bengal on this topic may be worked upon with a view to employing it in terms of West Pakistan and India.

India's attitude is governed by certain idealistic factors, but essentially it is one of having enough troubles to face at home without taking on burdens elsewhere.

The people of Asia are in a state of acute mental change. They are more politically conscious than ever before as a result of the change-over from the period of colonial rule. Their first reaction is to expect a betterment of their economic condition. I refer to things dealing with the primary essentials of life.

And what might be called the nationalist urge is strong, after the colonial stage. The economic urge tends to make any policy which would appear, whether it does

1. Interview to C.L. Sulzberger on the eve of Nehru's departure for Karachi, New Delhi, 25 April 1950. Published in *The New York Times*, 26 April 1950.
2. According to the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, migrants were allowed to take along with them their movable property and some cash (Rs. 150/- for adults and Rs. 75/- for children). Jewellery or other valuable objects could be deposited in a bank. Liaison officers were to be appointed to see that migrants were not harassed. Owners were not to lose the title to their property in case they returned before 31 December 1950. If their properties were occupied by others, the Government concerned had the duty to rehabilitate the aggrieved party. A minority commission had to decide on issues concerning the sale or exchange of property. The two Governments also promised to help each other to recover property.

or not, to relieve or improve their condition, to have an appeal. When those two urges can be joined that produces a powerful movement. Any policy should be founded upon that realization and should never forget the deep-seated "anti" feeling—the suspicion of any relic of colonial days.

If the United States applies this theory it means encouraging nationalist elements as such and helping them in so far as possible to achieve economic betterment. If sufficient incentives were supplied in that direction it would attract the support of many elements.

I should imagine most intelligent people do not regard the United States as a colonial power, but I suppose there are plenty who have rather vague and undefined suspicions merely because yours is a powerful country.³

1. The Soviet Union "more and more" is following "a nationalist expansionist policy, rather than old-style concepts of communism."⁴
2. Any successful United States policy in Asia must take into account equally the vigorous nationalist feeling of this huge continent, which suspects the slightest tinge of colonial vestiges, and the basic economic needs of the area. The problems of Asia "cannot be solved by military means."
3. India's contacts, economic and otherwise, are closer with "what might be called the western countries than with the others." Her political ideas and Constitution are derived from the former. But India also seeks economic as well as political democracy.
4. The traditions, size and national genius of China will not permit her to be dominated by any of other country or any foreign ideology owing prior allegiance to other than Chinese interests.⁵

3. Sulzberger summarised the rest of the interview in these numbered paragraphs.
4. Sulzberger had submitted a copy of his account of the interview and it is available in the J.N. Collection. The paragraph referring to Soviet Union as available in the report read: "Nehru said that many people had in the past thought of the Soviet Union as a liberalising force in Central Asia partly because that area was frightfully backward. But many who admired Soviet's cultural achievements did not at all like its tendency to suppress individual freedom which apparently has grown more and more into what might be called a nationalist expansionist policy rather than the old style concepts of communism. This has created an adverse reaction."
5. The report also contained some sentences which were not in the published version: In response to questioning on India's attitude towards rival blocs in the 'cold war', Nehru said: "It is very difficult to distinguish between pure black and pure white but may be in a moment of crisis one would have to choose. Talk of such a crisis seems like counsel of despair. The prospect of another war is too terrible to contemplate and degrading to the world. But obviously at the present moment our contacts, economic and otherwise, are far more close with what might be called western countries than with others. India's political ideas had been founded on those of the Occident influenced by socialist trends but said 'socialist' did not specifically imply Leninist or Stalinist." He said a country like China "by its bigness and essential national character which is so deeply imbedded can hardly be expected to function on behalf of someone else. In the long run its national genius is bound to assert itself."

2. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
May 9th, 1950

My dear Ambassador,

When you were here in February last, you gave me a letter from Walter White addressed to you and dated February 2nd. In this letter a proposal was made for trade unions and management to give to India on a people-to-people basis farm and other machinery which would be helpful in aiding India to meet current food problems.

So far as I remember, I welcomed this proposal. We were asked as to what particular types of machinery we were most in need of. I am now sending you lists of the types of small size machinery which are likely to be particularly useful here.² These lists do not contain tractors, but of course tractors are always welcome. You may send these lists to Mr White and tell him that his proposal is very welcome. For facility of reference I am enclosing a copy of the letter that Mr White wrote to you, dated February 10th.

In regard to American help in various forms, we are of course perfectly willing and agreeable to consider any proposal. But it should always be remembered that we do not wish to tie ourselves down in any way or to accept conditions which might not be to our advantage, or which might limit our discretion. This of course does not apply to the proposal of Mr White referred to above, because there are no conditions attached to that proposal. I am merely referring to it as a matter of general policy.

Recently we have seen that American help is often associated with political pressure, as in the case of Greece and Korea. Anything savouring of political conditions or pressure or the possibility of such pressure being exercised in the future would of course be totally unacceptable to us. We have therefore to be a little careful in considering proposals of financial help. Even in the case of the U.K. this political pressure, though not so obvious, becomes apparent occasionally. There is a tendency in the U.S. to treat the countries they help as some kind of clients to it, which are expected to toe their general policy. This is a warning to us and has to be borne in mind.

I do not want you to repeat this to anyone in the United States, but the fact should be kept in mind.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 37(70)/50-PMS.

2. These were small agricultural implements and power-operated sprayers and dusting machines.

3. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1950

Nan dear,

...Your accounts of Liaquat Ali and the Begum are very interesting. The Begum's speeches have not been reported and a good thing too. Liaquat Ali's speeches have created a certain resentment here coming at a time when the milk of human kindness was flowing here as between India and Pakistan. There has been a good deal of press criticism and Sardar Patel is angry.² I sent you a brief message to be transmitted to Liaquat Ali.

I must say that the Americans are either very naive or singularly lacking in intelligence. They go through the identical routine, whether it is Nehru or the Shah of Iran or Liaquat Ali. I suppose now that they have followed this routine, they will have to repeat it, whenever anyone comes as a State guest. I do not mean to say that I deserve more honour than others. But merely repeating everything on every occasion takes away the significance of it. You mention that Columbia University refused to give a degree to Liaquat Ali, and yet today's papers announced that degree.³

I regret greatly to say that my admiration for American official intelligence is not so great as it used to be. All this lessens the value of their fervent protestations and the superlatives they use. A superlative used too often ceases to have any meaning. Having been trained in a school of more restrained language and action, I am afraid I do not appreciate this kind of thing.

We have not finished with Cabinet-making here yet. Pantji is undecided and all kinds of pressure are brought to bear upon me to allow him to remain in the U.P. I suppose I shall let him do so, because it is not much good compelling a man entirely against his will to do anything. I suppose there are few more difficulties than to form a Cabinet. The material to choose from is not too good and then one has to take into consideration all manner of things. It is surprising that anything emerges out of all this. Anyhow I want to complete this business before I go away to Indonesia and I am greatly looking forward to that change.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Vijayalakshmi had referred to the attacks on the Indian Government in the Pakistan Publicity Section Bulletin for which the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington apologised to her. She added that her invitation to Liaquat Ali for lunch or dinner was declined.

3. Vijayalakshmi had written that Columbia University had refused to honour Liaquat Ali and after checking with several others, University of Kansas agreed to confer an honorary degree on Liaquat Ali. But Columbia appears to have changed its mind and in fact gave him an honorary degree.

I am going to Srinagar for a couple of days this week-end to talk business. I am very sorry to say that Shaikh Abdullah is behaving in a most irresponsible manner. The most difficult thing in life is what to do with one's friends.

I was naturally interested to learn of Munshi's reaction to my offer to him. I expected a marked reaction from him, but not quite total collapse. He is arriving here tomorrow and I wonder what is going to happen when he meets me. You say that it takes all sorts to make a world. Well, it takes all sorts to make a Cabinet.

With love from
Jawahar

4. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
May 29, 1950

Nan dear,

...About the general attitude of the U.S. Government towards India, it does appear that there is a concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down, if I may say so, India. It surprises me how immature in their political thinking the Americans are! They do not even learn from their own or other people's mistakes; more especially in their dealings with Asia they show lack of understanding which is surprising.²

I have no particular grievance against Loy Henderson and there is no question of his being partial or impartial.³ His thinking is governed by one or two major factors which have no direct relations with India. I get on well with him. But I think he has an idea that I do not encourage him, simply because I do not see him frequently. That is due to lack of time...

With love from
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Vijayalakshmi had said that the United States was building up Liaquat Ali as a great Asian leader while sniping at Nehru's 'socialist' leanings.
3. Vijayalakshmi had met Floyd Blair who was concerned about Nehru's attitude towards Loy Henderson. He spoke of Henderson's impartiality, friendship for India and admiration for Nehru.

5. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi

July 1, 1950

Nan dear,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to B.N. Rau.²

I have received your letter of the 19th June. I met Loy Henderson the other day and spoke to him strongly about these wrong statements being made by the State Department about arms supply to India. I also expressed my regret that some people in the State Department (not Acheson) were bent on adopting an anti-India attitude. Loy Henderson assured me that this was not so, which of course he was bound to do.

The stories of Liaquat Ali and the Begum are revealing enough. I find that the Begum has a very poor reputation among the diplomatic corps here.

I liked my visit to Indonesia very much, or perhaps it is more correct to say that it produced a great impression on me, more especially my visit to Bali.

With love from

Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. See *ante*, pp. 311-315.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IV. Indonesia

1. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
April 16, 1950

My dear Soekarno,

...I am more eager than I can tell you to visit your beautiful country and, even more so, to meet you and Padma again, as well as other friends. Events march swiftly in Asia and the world and it is desirable that we should have a chance of meeting from time to time to discuss them.

As you know, we have had a great deal of trouble since you left² and have had to face serious problems. We face them with such courage and ability as we possess. There is some slight turn for the better here, but still constant attention is necessary. Hence it becomes difficult for me to be sure about my future movements. I intend, however, if nothing very extraordinary happens, to pay a visit to Indonesia. Probably the date will be early in June. I should like to stay a week there. I fear it cannot be more. Much will depend on circumstances in India. I should of course love to visit Jogjakarta and Bali. In any event our Navy will send some of their ships to cruise about those waters. They wanted to take me all the way by sea and to visit Djakarta, Bali, etc., by sea. I told them that this was not possible, so far as I was concerned, because it took too much time. The most I could do was to go by one of our Naval ships from Singapore to Djakarta. They would stay there a day or two and then proceed to other places in Indonesia, including Bali. I shall send you their provisional programme.³

I shall thus have to travel by air to Singapore and then by sea. I shall return wholly by air. On my way to Indonesia, I shall pass Rangoon, Bangkok and Singapore. It will be difficult for me to pass these places without making brief halts of at least a day or two in each place. This will prolong my absence from India and I do not quite know how long I can be away.

You have been having some trouble in your country from certain rebel elements.⁴ I hope this is nothing serious.

You mention the invitation you received from President Quirino of the Philippines. The Philippines are having a good deal of trouble, both political and economic.⁵ They have not been very wise in their policies. At the conclusion of

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Soekarno left India on 29 January 1950.

3. In fact, Nehru travelled by INS *Delhi* from 2 to 6 June 1950.

4. Three hundred East Indonesian state troops, formerly in the Dutch army, after a revolt of 14 days surrendered on 19 April 1950.

5. The Filipinos were faced with problems of administrative inefficiency and political corruption. A rebellion had started, led by the Hukbalahaps (Huks), the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

the war, they received large sums of money from the United States of America. Instead of utilising this money for productive purposes and laying the foundations of important enterprises, they wasted much of it in luxury imports and now they are in difficulties. They have also had to face some internal trouble. Their international policy has also not been very wise. Their attempts to deal with Chiang Kai-shek and South Korea needlessly involve them in complications. Obviously the Philippines are not in a position to influence events very much and it would have been wiser for them to remain quiet. But, unfortunately, a certain desire to function on the international stage induced them to take these steps which they could not possibly follow up.

For sometime past President Quirino and General Romulo have been inviting us to a conference at Manila to discuss South East Asia problems. Apart from our difficulty in attending such a conference in the near future, we did not wish to get involved in any kind of "anti-group".⁶ Thereupon President Quirino assured us that this would be a cultural and economic conference. We have said that we shall try to send a representative, but we have suggested that the time fixed should be a suitable one. There is going to be some kind of a Commonwealth South East Asia Conference in Australia fairly soon, to which we shall send a Minister. I shall not be able to go there. It is best to avoid overlapping in these various conferences.

I am meeting tomorrow the members of the Mission you are sending to Moscow.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. It was feared that this conference would take an "anti-communist" tinge.

2. Seeds of Conflict in Asia¹

Political freedom without progress is meaningless, and economic development is of fundamental importance to Asian countries. Asia needs peace from all conflicts to reconstruct her economy and raise the standard of living of the toiling millions, and until this primary task is fully accomplished, it will be premature to think in terms of undertaking the responsibility for solving world problems.

A conference of all Asian nations can conveniently be convened to further the friendship and mutual understanding among nations without considering military reactions elsewhere.

1. Address to the Parliament of Indonesia, Jakarta, 7 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 8 June 1950.

India and Indonesia have ancient cultural ties between them. The majesty of the past is before us to inspire us. Nevertheless, the past has faded away and we have to face the problems of the present and of the future. That past can help us if it gives us the proper perspective. It can help us—in spite of the stress of events of the day—to maintain poise and tranquillity, and not to allow ourselves to be swept away.

We must combine the spirit of the ancient civilisation as represented by the great continent of Asia with the mighty achievements of the present day which the countries of Europe and America represent. Actions divorced from reality are not likely to lead to good results. We have to learn much from other countries if we have to play our own role. We cannot do so by imitating or merely copying what others do.

One of the major events of the age is Asia's coming into her own after hundreds of years, and after cutting at the root of colonialism. Some countries, however, have still to achieve their independence.

Political freedom will have little meaning if it is not followed fairly rapidly by economic freedom. Political freedom is essential because it gives opportunities to the people, but it is not an absolute end in itself. We have to labour hard to raise the low standard of living of the people, give them opportunities for progress, and thus try to solve the larger problems of the world. It is essential that we work for the cause of peace, and not merely desire peace. Otherwise, all progress will stop.

I am no stranger to Indonesia. I have many friends here and hope that, as in the past, so in the future as well, both countries will work together for peace, for the advancement of our peoples, for peace and equilibrium in Asia, and for promoting cooperation among the nations. We have all been concentrating on our respective national movements, but after a certain stage nationalism in the world will become a restrictive force and retard advancement.

Asia cannot be ignored and she is coming into her own. But everywhere there are seeds of conflict. We must strive for progress and peace before other problems overwhelm the Asian countries. There is a continuous revolution, not in the sense of active violence or war, but in people's minds about social and economic conditions. If Asian nations work without getting excited or afraid and pull together, peace can be assured to Asia and the rest of the world.

I wish to assure you of the friendship and comradeship of the people of India. While we feel conscious of the great problems that face you, us and the continent of Asia, we can discuss these problems without unnecessary fear of certain possibilities occurring. In any event, fear is no good. We had to face many perils in the past and in future too we will face many, calmly and bravely. *Merdeka*.²

2. The Indonesian revolutionary slogan meaning "freedom".

3. The Gandhian Way¹

I hold out before the people of Indonesia, truth and non-violence, preached and practised with success in India, for being emulated in tackling the stupendous problems facing their country. We have followed with anxious interest and sympathy your struggle for freedom and have learned with great joy of your success. We did so because of a feeling of old kinship, and because we were convinced that our own freedom was strengthened by the freedom of Indonesia, just as Indonesian freedom was strengthened by the existence of the free independent Republic of India. So it is not only a question of sympathy but of mutual interest for each country to desire the freedom of the other.

The struggle for freedom in India has left no trace of bitterness between the peoples of India and Britain. The leaders and people of Indonesia should realise that ultimately it is only through the absence of hatred and through efforts at close cooperation that successful results can be achieved.

Political freedom is meaningless if it does not ensure equal opportunity and rights to all classes of people, irrespective of religion or race, and usher in an era of economic progress. All parties and groups should sink their personal differences and work together with the Government as a united team. The South East Asian countries which have won their freedom, should work hard with vigilance, confidence and friendship, with the cooperation of all nations, with enmity towards none, and without hatred in their hearts to build up brick by brick, stone by stone, may be for generations.

It is not enough to achieve national freedom, but you must think of the freedom of humanity as a whole. Asia has been asleep for a long time, and just now an awakening from a long slumber has come. Countries in Asia should not get involved in mutual factions, theoretical disputes and ideological arguments, but work hard. There is so much to do. In Indonesia we have a vast population and in India there is an even bigger one. We must bend our energies to secure the primary necessities for our people. This cannot be done unless we put an end to the spirit of faction.

Today the minds of the peoples of great and powerful nations are gripped with fear. If the Asian countries had faced their struggles haunted by fears, they could not have overthrown colonialism. Because of fear, people are armed and talk of the possibility of war. Every government which is responsible for the maintenance of security and peace has to prepare for any possible contingency, because it can take no risks. But even in doing so, it need not add to that fear.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Jakarta, 8 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 9 June 1950.

It is not possible for some parts of Asia to remain free while other parts are not free.

Some of your problems are the same as ours, some are different. But whatever the problems may be, the basic approach to them should be governed by the same principles. You have great and experienced leaders whom we in India also honour and respect, and it is not for me to offer advice to you as to what you should or should not do. But after a varied experience stretching over thirty-five years of intense public activity, with all its ups and downs, failures and achievements, I want to tell you that I am convinced that the progress of my country, as well as others, depends greatly on our adopting that basic approach which Gandhiji taught us. It is in the measure that we do that that we will solve our own or the world's problems.

We have to build up and maintain unity among all the people of our respective countries and make them all equal sharers in our freedom. Keeping true to our ancient ideals, we must build up a modern State in which all our people, to whatever religion or faith or creed they may belong, have equal place and equal opportunity. That is the ideal of the modern secular State which we have adopted in India and to which we have given shape in our Constitution. Any other ideal, I am sure, would be harmful to India and a throwback to medieval conditions, when it would then become difficult even to maintain the freedom that we had achieved.

Our mother continent of Asia is in great ferment today. Having woken up from its long slumber, it finds it difficult to adjust itself and to find a new equilibrium. That is natural and we should not be frightened because of it. We should strive to understand these great changes that are going on in Asia and elsewhere and try to mould them in so far as we can for the advantage of human progress and world peace. That peace is of the most urgent consequence to us for without it there can be no progress. We see today many of these great forces working for peace and many working for war. We see that very freedom being threatened and man becoming dehumanised and losing that vital spirit and individuality that have made him great. Having rid ourselves of colonial domination, we have to work for advancement not only of the nation, but of the individual in every way, to raise his standard of living, to give every opportunity of progress, and to increase his spiritual stature.

That will not come by the promotion of war, from conflict and hatred, but by larger spheres of cooperation and avoidance as far as possible of violence and war. It is true that, when aggression and evil threaten us, we cannot submit to them, and we have to face them with all our strength. But even in doing so, we must always remember the basic objectives we have, lest the success we achieve be superficial only, and lead ultimately to some other form of degradation.

We in India, and you in Indonesia, have a great and splendid task before us—to build up new and free nations on old foundations and to cooperate in the advancement of humanity both in the East and in the West. That is a splendid

enterprise which beckons us all today. And all pains and penalties that are involved in this are of little consequence when we think of the great cause we work for.

I wish the Republic of Indonesia courage and unity and good fortune in this enterprise and assure you of the friendship of the people of India and their goodwill.

4. The Need for Vigilance and Hard Work¹

I would ask the youth of Indonesia not to treat freedom in a casual way or to imagine that it can continue and enlarge itself without incessant effort. Eternal vigilance and hard work are the price we have always to pay for liberty. We live in a hard and dangerous world, full of perils, and no man knows what tomorrow may bring. If we are to preserve our freedom we have to be wise, and understand this world's problems and work hard to strengthen our people and nation. Only strong and stout hearts can survive and maintain their freedom. Those who waste their energy in talk and petty conflict do ill-service to the nation at any time and more so at this critical period in the world's history.

The world has changed and many of the slogans and discussions of yesterday are out of date now. Imperialism in the form of the old colonialism is no longer a major menace though it still continues in places. Imperialism, however, survives in other forms and garbs and may even talk in terms of freedom and social change. We have, therefore, to be on our guard against words and phrases which have lost or changed their meaning.

For a young nation like Indonesia the first duty is to consolidate itself and build up a united people, cooperating together in the great tasks of today. It is wrong to allow empty enthusiasm to take the place of solid work without which no people can raise themselves. The youth of Indonesia have a proud and a tremendous task before them—the building up of their country and the advancement of their people. Those who work for a great cause not only serve that cause but raise their own stature in the process.

They cannot serve that cause by any method which is false or evil, for then they distort or even destroy what they are working for. You have to avoid hatred

1. Address to students, Bandung, 10 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 11 June 1950.

and violence and thus lay true foundations for the future. You have seen how hatred and violence have not solved any question but led only to an unending cycle of evil.

When we are young we dream brave dreams and think of how we shall realise them. Looking back, I find that some at least of the dreams that came to me in youth have been realised, though not, in the way I imagined, and some still remain unfulfilled.

5. No Toleration of Violence¹

No Government will tolerate violence and killings under whatever name it may be practised. If you are under the impression that in India labour leaders are kept in prison, you are completely wrong. I do say that my own Government has been more lenient towards these elements of destruction than any other Government in the world, and these people have enjoyed greater liberty and freedom of action than those in many other countries which talk of socialism and equality.²

I am greatly touched by the welcome, which I consider is not merely personal but a welcome to India. India and Indonesia have ancient ties. They must now look to the future. We have to discard ruthlessly anything from the past which had made us backward and weak. Because of our past backwardness we have been dominated by other powers.

In any event we must strive to combine the past and the present and work for something better. We must learn from western countries what gave them their strength, discipline and scientific advancement.

In a changing world no country can remain isolated. Independence must be based on international cooperation.

At all costs, we must maintain the secular ideals of the State and work unitedly.

Today many "isms"—capitalism, socialism, communism—are being talked about. I consider myself more or less a socialist, not in a dogmatic way but in essentially a basic way.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Jogjakarta, 11 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 13 June and from *National Herald*, 12 June 1950.
2. Some placards were shown at this meeting. One read: "Release Indian labour and peasant leaders", another: "Justice to Indian labour".

6. Communist Activities in India¹

South East Asia is potentially a most dangerous area and great conflicts might begin here which may spread to the rest of the world.

Whatever happens in this region affects India, and whatever happens there will have repercussions here. Hence, what we do and do not do, becomes of paramount importance not only here but in the larger sphere of the world.

South East Asian countries which have only recently won independence are not strong enough and cannot influence world affairs greatly, but, nevertheless, they can do so tomorrow or the day after. Their first task should be to build themselves up and improve the standard of living of the masses.

Communist activities in India do not tend to build up anything but to disrupt everything—producing chaotic conditions and reactionary forces. I have nothing against the doctrine of communism, but the present activities of the communists are indeed counter-revolutionary. The result of their efforts to create chaotic conditions is the very negation of the basic principles of revolution.

1. Discussion with members of a committee of the Jogjakarta Republican Parliament, Jakarta, 12 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 13 June 1950.

7. Military Pact with Indonesia¹

Question: What is India's stand on Indo-China?

JN: I reiterate India's foreign policy to remain aloof, recognising neither Bao Dai's nor Ho Chi Minh's Government. We believe that the more interference there is, the more difficult is the solution. This is not a negative attitude, but a slightly positive one, because we do not want to make more difficult Indo-China's fight for independence.

India wants to be left alone to develop her own country. It is utter nonsense to say that we want to be the leader of Asia.

1. Remarks at press conference, Jakarta, 16 June 1950. From *The Hindu*, 17 June 1950. Extracts.



ON INS Delhi en route TO INDONESIA, JUNE 1950



WITH P. SUBBARAYAN ON ARRIVAL AT DJAKARTA. JUNE 1950



TAKING THE SALUTE WITH PRESIDENT SOEKARNO, DJAKARTA, 8 JUNE 1950



AT BOROBUDUR, 12 JUNE 1950

Q: Is there the possibility of an Indian-Indonesian pact or treaty?

JN: No such agreement is being discussed or is especially likely to be. But I see nothing against some arrangement by which trade between the two countries may benefit. As India and Indonesia are non-military powers, it is not reasonable to talk about any form of military alliance.

Talk of a military pact with Indonesia betrays complete lack of understanding of the situation. We are not, either of us, military powers. All our influence is on the moral plane. In the political sphere, such influence is in persuasion and in being bold enough to vote at the United Nations. Apart from ideological reasons, there are also practical reasons for not having military pacts. I know nothing of any impending Asian conference. The first Asian Conference held in New Delhi was the result of non-official endeavours and was held to discuss the economic and cultural aspects of Asia.

The second Asian Conference held in New Delhi was entirely on a governmental level to discuss a serious political problem. Indonesia and Australia also participated.

It is rather difficult at the present stage to envisage any kind of an Asian conference on a governmental level because governments normally consulted with each other through their ambassadors, and foreign policy matters cannot be discussed at public meetings.

During my stay here I have had general talks with Indonesian leaders and there is a proposal to send some kind of trade delegation to India to discuss trade matters, but there is no talk of a treaty of friendship, such as India is having with Afghanistan, Iran, Switzerland, and other countries.

Q: What about China?

JN: Generally speaking the Indonesian approach to the new China is more or less the Indian approach.

Q: And New Guinea?

JN: I stress that the question of West New Guinea must be settled in a peaceful and cooperative way between the parties concerned. I feel that both history and geography give weight to the Indonesian demand for inclusion of western Irian in the Indonesian Republic and that the chief consideration in the solution of the problem should be the progress and development of West New Guinea itself. It is my view that ultimately it is inevitable that West New Guinea should be associated with Indonesia in some form or other though I cannot say how and in what way.

Dr Soekarno enjoys an amazing popularity. I am confident that Dr Soekarno will be a tremendous force in the consolidation and cementing of the Indonesian

nation. My impressions of the country and people of Indonesia are that they are an extremely fascinating and lovable people whose love of beauty and artistry is equally extraordinary. I am not at all surprised that the people who have visited this country want to come back.

8. Message to A. Soekarno¹

We have had ten wonderful days in Indonesia and we are very sad at coming away. We carry away precious memories which enrich us and we shall cherish. We are deeply grateful to you and your gracious wife, to your colleagues in government, and to the people of Indonesia for all the friendship, affection and hospitality they have showered upon us and the goodwill they have shown to my country. We shall always think of the charming and gifted people of Indonesia with affection and look forward to seeing them again. *Merdeka*.

1. 17 June 1950. J.N. Collection.

9. To Mohammad Hatta¹

New Delhi
July 1, 1950

My dear Hatta,

My visit to Indonesia has left the most vivid impressions on my mind. I can truly say that no other journey abroad to any other country has created such a powerful impression in my mind. This was due to a variety of circumstances, old and new. As I said in the course of one of my speeches, Indonesia attracted me emotionally more than any other place, with the sole exception of Kashmir. Apart from this emotional attraction, the political significance of Indonesia in the present context

1. J.N. Collection.

of events is of course of the highest importance to us. Personal friendship with some of the leaders of Indonesia was an additional factor of considerable importance. I am very grateful for this opportunity of having seen something of the new Indonesia. I realise fully the great and difficult problems that you have to face but I feel that you will solve them in the course of time. To President Soekarno and you I am particularly grateful. You are my oldest friend in Indonesia and my interest in the Indonesian freedom movement dates specially from the time I met you 23 years ago.²

Emotional bonds have value as between individuals and countries; personal friendships between those who direct the destinies of different countries are also of great value; but ultimately nations are affected by a community of interest. I see this community of interest between India and Indonesia and therefore our association must necessarily be fundamental and lasting, whatever possible developments there might be in either country.

The world has suddenly plunged into something of the greatest consequence. Developments in Korea are serious enough in themselves, but their seriousness becomes infinitely greater when you think of all the possible consequences that flow from them. Are we on the verge of great wars which may last years and years, I do not know. I hope not, and to the best of our ability we shall try to throw our weight on the side of peace. Forces have been set in motion which perhaps no country can control now.

As you know we have accepted the two resolutions of the Security Council in regard to Korea. We did not accept them without the most serious thought. So far as those resolutions go, they seem to follow logically from what happened in Korea. But President Truman's statements, which referred to Formosa, Indo-China, etc., go much beyond the Security Council's resolutions. We are certainly not prepared to accept them as they involve a direct challenge to the new Government in China. We have therefore carefully limited our acceptance to the Security Council resolutions and nothing more. We could not remain silent because we are a member of the Security Council. So far as you are concerned in Indonesia or so far as the Government of Burma is concerned, there is no immediate necessity for you to make any kind of statement.³ Of course, this is for you to judge and must depend on fresh developments. In any event we have to be extremely careful and wary. While acting on the practical plane, we cannot forget or bypass our ideals and principal objectives.

2. Nehru first met Hatta at Brussels in 1927.

3. The Indonesian Government declared on 27 June 1950 that their most urgent task was to cope with domestic problems and it would be "premature and useless" for them to give an opinion on the Korean question and take up a position.

We feel that it is most important to get the new Government in China into the United Nations. This, if accomplished, will lead to the U.S.S.R. also coming back to the U.N. If that could be done the dangers of widening the conflict will be much less. We are therefore trying our utmost to get the Representative of the People's Government in China to join the Security Council of the United Nations. The U.K. Government has largely accepted our viewpoint in this matter and is also anxious to have the new China in the Security Council. Unfortunately some of the steps that the U.S.A. have taken in the Far East come in the way of this. Nevertheless, we are doing our best to further this policy.

In these difficult and trying days ahead it is a great comfort to know that we have sincere friends in Indonesia and that we can cooperate in a large measure in these world policies. We shall keep you informed of any steps that we might take and we shall be glad to know what you propose to do.

I am not writing to President Soekarno separately and hope that you will share this letter with him.

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
4 July 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 3 July.² I have also, only now, received your letter of 5 June which was sent to Djakarta and missed me there.

In this letter to Djakarta you suggest the sending of a deputation of scholars from India to Indonesia to study their history and their contacts with India. As a matter of fact what is required are archaeologists more than normal historians. That is why I took Chakravarti³ with me, but owing to some misunderstanding he returned soon after I returned which was a very foolish thing to do, as I wanted him to stay on. I took also with me K.C. Neogy's son⁴ who is a promising archaeologist. I have left him there.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In this letter Patel had discussed matters concerning Korea, Kashmir and Bengal.

3. N.P. Chakarvarti was Director-General of the Archaeological Survey of India from 1948 to 1950.

4. Prithvish Neogy.

I think that the one step which will have a very good effect is to get some Indonesians, some young men from Bali, to come here for study for a while. In fact some Bali Hindus asked me about it. I said vaguely that they will be welcome. If we could provide a few scholarships here for Indonesians (I would not like to confine them to Bali, but Bali would be included), it will have a very good effect in Indonesia and ultimately on our contacts.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
V. Malaya

1. The Re-emergence of Asia¹

One of the biggest events of the century is the re-emergence of Asia as a force in world affairs. Enough appreciation of this fact has not been shown, and it is quite possible that well-laid plans of some powers might be upset by this re-emergence of Asia.

I hope that Asia will not try to dominate any country. She is trying to get rid of what remains of colonialism, and even if she has made many mistakes she is on the whole doing well.

Malaya is a land of many races and if here they can evolve a nationality, they will have achieved something valuable. Indians in Malaya must be loyal to the land they live in and to integrate themselves with other communities inhabiting it. The Indians have not perhaps learnt this lesson well and have a tendency to function even on a provincial plane instead of the all-India plane.

Wherever Indians went, they were in a sense ambassadors of India, taking a little of India with them. They must see that they do nothing that would cast a slur on their country. They should also function to bring about goodwill between India and the country they lived in.

In the present context of things we must not think of leadership but of cooperation among countries. Immediately we think of leadership, there are mental conflicts. India's desire is to be left to herself to work on her problems. She does not have resources to deal with the problems of others. If she succeeds in solving her own problems, it will help in solving world problems.

1. Speech made after laying the foundation-stone of the Indian Association, Singapore, 17 June 1950. *National Herald*, 18 June 1950. Nehru was in Singapore from 17 to 19 June 1950

2. The Forces of Conflict in South East Asia¹

South East Asia is a greater danger zone in world affairs than any other. The danger may pass, it may not come to a head, but it will be solved not by bombs but by psychological and economic methods.

1. Press conference, Singapore, 17 June 1950. From *National Herald*, 18 June 1950.

The forces in conflict in South Asia are colonialism and imperialism, nationalism and communism and a vague and very important demand for social justice. Fading colonialism has now lost its grip and ultimately must disappear. The greatest force along with social change is nationalism. Communism has been weakened because not only has it parted company with nationalism but it has opposed it. Any analysis of the situation shows that whatever group or party has supported nationalism will go ahead.

It does not follow that perfect freedom will flow once colonialism has been ousted, because some kind of domination such as economic domination can survive. We feel in India that no problem in Asia can be solved on the basis of any form of colonial domination.

Question: Do you think that Britain should withdraw from South East Asia now?

Jawaharlal Nehru: If it goes today there may be difficulties. The colonial mind is a perverted one, subsisting on power. Britain's current efforts in Malaya might go some way towards solving the problem, but it will not be solved before her withdrawal. The trouble in Malaya is not really concerned with nationalism. As long as the Malaysians, Chinese and Indians remain as separate communities, difficulties will continue.

Q: What is India's stand on Indo-China?

JN: India does not propose to recognise either Bao Dai or Ho Chi Minh because it means taking part in an international dispute. We are not prepared either to agree to the French continuing there.

Q: What is your opinion about the Group Areas Bill?

JN: We did not think the Union would proceed with the Group Areas Bill, when we agreed to a round table conference with South Africa on the treatment of Indian nationals. When they did we called off the conference. Indians abroad must stand on their own feet. We do not want our people anywhere in the world to exploit other people.

Q: Would India help Malaya in her fight against the terrorists?

JN: India is not in a position to help anybody except herself. The best that she can do is to help raise her own living standards. The activities of terrorists in

Malaya can only be harmful to her.² The terrorists' objective is to create chaos, and India dislikes terrorism intensely because it leaves a trail of violence and makes the succeeding generation destructive. In India, we have followed peaceful methods during the past 30 years under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

Q: How is India going to tackle the question of communism?

JN: Communism has grown up organisationally during the war and with the support of the British Government, which was given for war purposes. The communists, however, used that support for building themselves up and became an organised party, but in that process they lost the vague popular support they had before. In the last general elections in India they have won only about 20 out of 1,500 seats, and those too on personal grounds. The communists have been exploiting India's economic difficulties, and in some parts of South India they have created trouble in a small way³ like the present trouble in Malaya.

Q: What is the progress of the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement?

JN: The Agreement on minorities has done a great deal of good but has far from solved our problem. There is still a good deal of difficulty but on the whole the Agreement has improved the conditions for minorities on both sides. India and Pakistan have entered into an agreement in the nature of a limited barter agreement on trade, and are still discussing trade matters. I think, however, that a final settlement is possible only when the exchange question in relation to the Indian and Pakistan rupee is solved. That will probably be settled by the World Bank.

Q: What is going to be the future of Dutch New Guinea?

JN: The future of Dutch New Guinea, I hope, will be decided amicably and peacefully.⁴ I feel that historically, culturally and geographically, western New

2. Communists had been active in Malaya since 1948. Though they numbered only four to five thousand they were well organised especially for jungle warfare. Most of them were Chinese and had been able to secure the support of certain sections of the Chinese population. This had increased the difficulties confronting the British in carrying out their military operations against the insurgents.
3. The Communist Party had been banned in the State of Madras on 26 September 1949. In Hyderabad State there had been a rebellion in Telengana and many political murders and dacoities in Nalgonda District in 1949.
4. New Guinea was shared by Australia, which exercised sovereignty over Papua and the North-East territory, and by the Dutch which controlled the western part of the island. When Indonesia became sovereign, the Dutch Government had made a provision for special treatment of New Guinea because the people of the island were of a different stock from the Indonesians. The Indonesians, however, argued that the question was not of ethnology but of colonialism and laid claim to the territory.

Guinea should go to Indonesia. It belongs in many ways to the Indonesian group, but how soon and in what manner that comes about is a matter for negotiation. If the Dutch remain there it will be a continuous irritant, no matter how good the Dutch are, because of their past history of colonial domination.

Q: How can India help Indians abroad economically?

JN: India's first job is to improve the economic conditions within the country. We are greatly interested in Indian labour abroad and I think it is our duty to give it such help as is possible to improve its economic condition. If there is any discrimination between Indian merchants in any foreign country and other merchants there, India will help in getting such discrimination removed. Apart from that, there is possibly no other direct way of helping Indians abroad economically. They have to stand on their own feet.

India does not want Indians to go anywhere where they do not get equal treatment. Also Indians abroad cannot claim anything which might become a burden on the people of that country. Thus we cannot support Indians in Africa if they claim anything which will be burdensome to the Africans.

Further, Indians abroad must choose if they are going to adopt Indian nationality or the nationality of the country they live in. That matter is arising now in countries like Burma and Ceylon and is likely to spread to other lands. If Indians there are content to have Indian nationality they are welcome to do so. If not, India is still interested in them but cannot treat them as Indian nationals.

Malaya is a peculiar country with a greater racial mixture than in most other places. The closer the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities get to each other the easier will be the solution of Malaya's problems.

3. No Quarter to Terrorism¹

Malayan terrorism is excessively harmful and should not be tolerated. It passes my comprehension how a campaign of violence can lead to any good whatsoever. It degrades humanity.

1. Address at a public meeting, Singapore, 18 June 1950. From *National Herald*, 19 June 1950.

The basic ideals that Mahatma Gandhi has taught India are of the most essential importance for the world today. Their central message is that evil must not be done even if it might yield some good temporarily, because it must have its reaction and produce more evil.

Cooperation between the different nations, races and communities is essential in the present world situation. Malaya with its Malay, Chinese, Indian and other population can set a great example to the world in such cooperation.

Mahatma Gandhi has also taught the unity of a nation—unity of its different parts—everyone thinking more of India as a whole and less of its different provinces or sections, also the unity of religions. He has further emphasised that the progress must be measured in terms of progress of the masses, and not of a few.

Another very important thing that Gandhiji has taught is to cooperate and work together, employing peaceful methods in our struggle. India has not always acted up to that teaching but does abide by it generally. It is this method that has brought freedom to India and along with that freedom also friendship and goodwill with Britain. The virtue of the method that Gandhiji has taught is that it is a true solution of problems and one that does not bring in its trail bitterness and connected difficulties.

The national movement in India had its anchorage in wider internationalism that saved India from narrowness.

I am not a very good politician or a very competent diplomat and, therefore, I will not rush in to say things where wiser men fear to tread. That is because my training has been in dealing with common folk, and one cannot be diplomatic with the masses. I grew up accustomed to talking frankly to people, knowing their minds and expressing my mind to them.

It was when India and Pakistan were faced with vast upheavals following partition that for the first time in my life I sometimes had moods of pessimism about the future of my country.

I was not afraid then, and I am not afraid now, that we might internally weaken. We had sunk so low. I do not know what would have happened to India if Mahatmaji had not been with us in those early months after partition. To him we owe the fact that we gained confidence in ourselves and our people. Now we face our problems with confidence, not indeed easy, airy confidence, but confidence born of certainty of the capacity of the Indian people to overcome difficulties.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

VI. Burma

1. Indian Attitudes¹

Friends, I have been here a little more than two days, in Rangoon, and in the course of these two days I have delivered a number of addresses, spoken on many occasions, and at some length. I doubt if it will serve any useful purpose my addressing you just in the air and perhaps repeating what I have said elsewhere. My normal practice at press conferences is not to address them but straight away to invite suggestions, questions, etc., perhaps a number of them, because that gives me some idea of how your mind is working and what particular subject or aspects of a subject you wish me to deal with. That makes it easier for you and for me. Otherwise, I might go off at a tangent and deal with something in which you are not greatly interested, and something which you consider important might be left out completely. Therefore I think we might adopt that practice and I shall not say much on my own.

One thing which I do wish to say is that I have had intimate contact with the press in my younger days and therefore I feel completely at home in the company of newspapermen, and I should like to talk to you less as a Prime Minister and more almost, though not quite, as a fellow journalist. There are of course certain limitations and inhibitions facing the Prime Minister and a Foreign Minister which I cannot get over although sometimes I am foolish enough to do so. So let us talk frankly. To the extent that I can be frank on any subject I shall be so, if not I shall tell you I cannot.

In the Chairman's address a reference was made to the Prime Minister of Burma and to the fact of our friendship with each other. It is a matter of not only great satisfaction, but of something deeper than that for me that I enjoy the friendship of the Prime Minister of Burma whom, ever since I have known him, I have greatly respected. It has been my privilege, to have had the opportunity of meeting many of the eminent persons whose names appear in the public press from day to day. It often happens that some persons who are very well known and who play an important part in the world's affairs, that those persons do not appear quite so big on closer contact as they appear from newspapers. On the other hand, there are some people who, the more you know of them, the bigger they become. It depends, of course, on what values and standards you have to measure human greatness. I think at any time, and more specially at a time of difficulty and crisis such as we live through today, it is important to have someone at the head of affairs who, apart from other qualities, is well known to be perfectly straight, perfectly above

1. Press conference at Rangoon, 22 June 1950. A.I.R. tapes.

board, a person with ideals, a person who will not barter his ideals for any expedient purpose. And it is the privilege of Burma to have such a person who is not only liked but respected by those who have come into contact with him. And it has been a privilege to me to have known him and to have secured his friendship.

Now, I shall wait for suggestions and questions.

Question: What do you think of the situation in Malaya?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I suggest that, instead of perhaps answering each question separately, individually, if you would put me half a dozen questions I can then deal with them together. It is a little easier. But about Malaya, I really am not in a position to answer it. I just do not know about the exact situation in Malaya. I cannot tell you much, how far it has improved or how far it is static. I spent two days in Singapore and a day and an hour in Kuala Lumpur, and the only means I have of judging is from the news that appeared in the press, more or less. Obviously, as far as one can see, there is trouble in certain parts of Malaya. Obviously also, a good part of Malaya is carrying on its normal life and business without troubling too much about the problem. Now, exactly to what extent there is trouble and, whether it is less or not, it is very difficult for me to say. Rather vague.

Q: What is the position of Kashmir?

JN: This is not a question which I should personally prefer to deal with on this occasion because, as you know, the United Nations representative is in India, or may be in Pakistan, to deal with this question and I do not think it will be quite appropriate for me to deal with this matter. I might say that so far as India is concerned, our attitude has been perfectly clear, and has been clearly stated on many occasions. We have attached importance to this Kashmir issue for a variety of reasons, among them perhaps the most important being the origin of this dispute and the way Kashmir was invaded and encouraged to be invaded through Pakistan in a way which is not only aggression, which is not only violation of all international canons, but which was a brutal way in the extreme. We will not and cannot forget that, and that fact has to be borne in mind in deciding this issue. For the rest, we are committed to the people of Kashmir deciding their own destiny. That is an undertaking that we gave to the people of Kashmir and, if you like, to the world at large. That has nothing to do with Pakistan so far as we are concerned.

Q: Your book, *Glimpses of World History*, suggests that you are a Marxist. Is that so?

JN: I have not heard any one previously describe that book as what might be called a Marxist analysis of history. It is no doubt influenced among other things by

what is called the scientific interpretation of history but nobody, no Marxist, I take it, would have called it a Marxist analysis, because he holds certain dogmas rigidly, and he will presumably continue to hold them whether they have any reality or not, because he believes in them as some of our friends who are dogmatically religious believe in dogmatic religion, regardless of facts. So far as I am concerned I have a horror of dogma whether in religion or in economics or in anything else. Therefore, it is quite impossible for me to be a Marxist, and that too, a dogmatic Marxist. I think there is a great deal of truth in the Marxist or the scientific analysis of history and one should learn a lot from it, but again always taking into consideration the dynamics of history, the changing events of history. For instance, if you will permit me to say so, Marxist analysis, which contains a great deal of close thinking of past events, I think singularly fails to explain many things that happened after Marx, or in the early days of this century or between the two wars. However, we need not go into a discussion of Marxism. I am merely pointing out that I try to understand events as my mind understands them, not as somebody else's mind understands them, whether it is Marx or anybody else. It is of no consequence to me if anybody quotes to me chapter and verse from a holy book or an unholy book. If it appeals to my mind I accept it with reverence, if it does not, I reject it with reverence. My approach is, I hope, a reasonable and scientific approach, as approximately near the fact as I can make it but only in so far as I can understand and interpret those facts, not in so far as anybody else has done so. Of course, what other people say may throw some light, it may help me to think and to analyse, but ultimately it must come out of my mind, not out of somebody else's mind.

Q: What is your understanding of socialism? Is nationalisation necessary?

JN: Questions such as these are interesting because these questions relate to certain static words, static ideas, static forms, static phrases, static dogmas, static slogans, which do not change in a man's mind. War and tumults and revolutions and counter-revolutions may occur but people go on thinking as if nothing had occurred. Therefore, it is a static state of mind which refuses to understand an event except in terms of something that happened long ago. In other words, it does not understand the event. The mind does not change as events are changing. Asking me whether I am a nationalist or a socialist has no meaning to me. If I ask a hundred persons I will promptly get a hundred answers of what their idea of socialism is. There are very few socialists, groups of socialists, which have the same ideas on socialism, what it should be. Vaguely of course you might say socialism is anti-capitalism or the view that the community should own the methods of production. These are vague phrases which you may accept. But when you ask me to apply them, I have to apply them in a certain context, in a certain scheme of things. Do you think that the economic structure of a country, be it socialist or fascist or any thing

else is formed by passing a resolution? Obviously not. You have to build it up. If I have to pass a law that from tomorrow India is a socialist country, that has no meaning. It has only a meaning in a school boy's debating society and nowhere else.

Also, you deal with human material. An engineer deals with bricks, with cement, with iron, steel, stone, or whatever. You can measure and gauge the strength of it, the weakness of it, the tension of it. Still it is a difficult matter. The engineer goes through a long process of training. A man dealing with human beings deals with human material which is very different from stone or steel. You deal with masses of human beings. You may push them in this or that direction possibly, but you have to deal with the power, the ability of the human being, the power of resistance, the cooperative power, the technical ability and hundreds of other factors. Therefore, the type of social structure that you erect has something to do, no doubt, with certain principles that you may hold, but very much more to do with the exact situation, the objective situation in the country or group that you deal with. Otherwise, you think in the air. It has no reality. Obviously, if you thought in terms of, let us say, Central Africa today and you were a confirmed socialist, you would not think of the type of social structure which you may have, say, in Germany, you may be a socialist both for Germany and for Central Africa but you realise that Germany is a highly developed, industrialised, technically advanced country while Central Africa is not. Therefore you cannot obviously deal with them in the same way. I have given you two extreme examples. The other examples are all in between.

You have to erect a social structure which fits in with the standard of development, technical and other, of the community you deal with. You may work them up of course as rapidly as possible, but you cannot do it theoretically and call a country socialist or anything else without taking into consideration those objective conditions prevailing in that country.

Now, what is my own approach to these problems, because I have begun to suspect words and phrases by themselves? You and I or some people may sit down and argue about the merits of the capitalist or the socialist structure of society and no doubt in spite of all the arguments you will probably not convince each other. Therefore, it seems to me a far more fruitful effort to ask why do you want socialism or why do the capitalists talk about capitalism? The socialist aims at something. What does he aim at? Presumably he aims at social justice, if you like, he aims at raising the standards of the people. I can understand that. Let there be social justice, let there be raising of the standards of the people in every direction.

So instead of talking about socialism or anything else let us consider in a given situation, in India, in Burma, how can we have social justice, how can we raise the standards of the masses? That is a specific proposition which you can consider and which you can discuss with other people without losing yourself in academic debates. Again analyze that raising the standards of the people. What does that mean? What are the primary necessities for a people? Food, clothing, housing are the

three primary necessities. That of course. Then education, health, you go on drawing up the list of the things that are necessary. How are we to provide that, to the community as a whole, to the masses, and not to a few? Try to work out a scheme. I think if you work out such a scheme it would be very largely socialistic. But that is neither here nor there. Forget the terms socialism, communism and capitalism. Put down the data. We want social justice, we want the advancement of the masses. What are the ways of advancing them in the conditions prevailing, with the resources at your disposal? Because obviously the resources are limited. What are the resources? Resources may be money resources. Money after all is rather secondary but to some extent it becomes important for the time being. Ultimately the resources are technical resources, the technical ability of the human being. If you want to industrialise Burma, as presumably you would like to raise standards, well, you want a certain technical ability apart from money, you want machinery, you want equipment but above all you want technical ability, you want highly qualified engineers, highly qualified electricians. Now if you have not got it, obviously you cannot erect a factory in spite of passing a resolution on socialism or a law. Or you have to rely on a foreigner to come and do it for you or you have to go and learn from the foreigner. All these difficulties come in and you have to consider all these and find a way out, how to get social justice, how to raise standards, call it what you like, nationalism, socialism or a mixture of the two, whatever you like.

So I would prefer your approaching this question in this rather matter of fact way. Certainly, discuss the theory of socialism or the theory of communism or the theory of any other ism if you like; it is interesting to discuss them because they throw light, they bring us the results of other people's thoughts; but ultimately, in considering the question, put aside theories, and consider the actual facts before you. Burma or India, the main problem is achievement in the shape of food, clothing, housing, production. Put it in another way. If we want to raise the standards of any country we have to increase the wealth producing capacity of that country because obviously the wealth will not come from another country. We may borrow from others and have to face that. Ultimately you progress because of the increased wealth that you produce. There is no other way to do it. If India is to progress, she will have to produce more wealth from the land, from the factories, from anything, whatever it may be, from under the soil, above the soil.

The normal way of looking at producing more wealth is to adopt modern methods of increased production. You apply them to the land, to industry, big industry, small industry, and increase your productive output and thereby you produce more wealth. Then the second problem is that that wealth should not be concentrated in a few people's hands; we need equitable distribution. That is where socialism comes in more or less. So far as production is concerned, capitalism in its advanced stages solves in theory the problem of production. America produces an enormous quantity of wealth daily, that is why it is rich, because of its highly specialised apparatus of production. The other problem then comes of equitable

distribution. Consider these problems in their practical application as you would if you were in charge of it, if you were the government or if you were in charge of a particular department of government. You know very well that a government decree saying that something should happen does not necessarily result in that happening. If I want a bridge made over the great river here it is obvious that no number of government decrees will make the bridge until I get the engineers and the material and start building the bridge. It is a simple operation, relatively, building a bridge. Now you want to build a whole economic or human structure of society without the necessary material for it. You have to collect the material, you have to collect the technical personnel to do it, then build the bridges, build everything, increase your wealth producing capacity and go ahead.

Nationalisation of industries is an interesting question. Why do you want to nationalise industry? Because, I take it, you feel that in private hands the profit of that industry goes into private pockets, and it becomes a vested interest and the community as a whole does not profit by it. Well, agreed. Of course industries are of very many types. You may come to the conclusion that it is better for the small industry to remain with the private owner, the big industry to be state-owned—that is a matter for consideration. But having accepted the principle, let us say that important and key industries should be state-owned and should not be controlled by private interests. How do we set about it? There are two ways, whether it be land or industrial undertakings, for the state to acquire them. One is expropriation, that is acquisition without any compensation, the other is acquisition on payment of whatever might be considered equitable compensation. What is equitable compensation is another matter. It cannot be exaggerated compensation, it cannot be compensation which is no compensation, it must be something in between. If it is expropriation the question of compensation does not arise, but other questions certainly arise because in the act of expropriation you upset many things. I am for the moment not going into the justice or injustice of it. You create conflicts, and what is more, it is quite possible that for the moment you upset and destroy the productive machinery of the state to a large extent. In order to increase the wealth-producing capacity of the country, the first thing that we do is to lessen the destruction of productive machinery considerably in the hope that ultimately it will produce more. It can be argued that, let us destroy it now if necessary because ultimately we will build up something which will produce more. There is something in that argument, except this, that for the moment you waste a generation, make a generation suffer tremendously while you are building for the future. Because the transition period is more or less violent and in conflict, it means wastage, lack of production, the breaking up of the existing machinery of production in the hope of something better. Putting up a new machinery of production takes time, and in the gap period which may well extend to a generation, standards go down because wealth-producing capacity has gone down. Ultimately you produce more no doubt,

but what happens ultimately nobody knows and by the time the ultimate comes you and I may be dead.

I am quite prepared to admit that in regard to, not everything but many things, the owners or the proprietors have made so much money previously that there is not very much justice in their demand to get much more money as compensation. But the real issue is the practicality of it, that in any violent seizure of that type there is a break in production resulting in a lowering of the wealth-producing capacity and lowering of standards. One does not quite know when you will bridge that gap again and start afresh and one does not quite know if after that conflict and break in production you will be the top dog or somebody else will be the top dog.

In Germany, for example, in the early thirties, the two major parties were the Social Democrats and the Communists. Probably the Social Democrats were more powerful and they controlled the state to a large extent as well as hundreds of municipalities. Well, everybody thought that Germany is going to be either Social Democrat or Communist or something in between the two. But while the Social Democrats and the Communists quarrelled what really happened was Germany became Nazi and fascist, and both the Communists and Social Democrats were crushed to smithereens by Hitler and his regime so that something else emerged out of that conflict. So you cannot be sure at all of what will emerge after you break up something. There are all kinds of forces at play and some utterly and absolutely reactionary force may come up and gain control and your petty quarrels among yourselves about this or that ideology will mean nothing at all. Normally speaking, expropriation means conflict, and conflict is a costly business, sometimes more costly than compensation, more costly in terms of money and certainly more costly in terms of the disruption and the ill-will generated. Therefore from a practical point of view it is safer to give compensation, whatever the equitable compensation may be, and to keep the machine running and not allow it to run down.

With compensation, however, other questions arise. If we use the money we have to buy up one or two big plants of private companies and nationalise them, that would be carrying out our policy no doubt. But then we would have nothing left for further industrialisation, for starting further plants, for further production. If we have spent all our money in nationalising certain industries, our production remains exactly the same that those industries were producing at the time. It is true that some of the profits of that industry will then come to the state instead of going into private pockets, and that is something. But for the moment our production remains exactly the same or more or less the same.

Now, the alternative to this is that we spend the money we have on new industries, state-controlled, state-owned, nationalised industries, so that the nationalised sector of industry, the state-owned sector, grows and further production takes place. That is to say, we do not for the moment touch certain private industries, big industries—I am talking of big industries—we allow them to function under

the general control of the state, and apply the funds that we have to spare on setting up further plants and encouraging big industries of a nationalised type. Thus we get nationalisation of industries growing apace and get more production, therefore more wealth, therefore higher standards resulting from it, instead of giving all our surplus wealth in nationalising something and having nothing left to increase production. That is a question of judgment of what is the immediate issue, what is better. If you go on putting in your additional money into new, nationalised, state-controlled undertakings, your nationalised industry is more up to date than the old industry which you proposed to pay money for and buy up, and later, when you feel like it, when you are in a position to do so, you can acquire the other industries.

Of course if we have unlimited resources we can do all together; we can start new industries, as well as acquire the old ones. But no country has unlimited resources, much less our countries, India and Burma. We have to make our very limited resources go as far as we can and we have to give priorities. We cannot spread our money out everywhere and we have to choose where to supply it. We have got, at the present moment in India, about five hundred schemes or thereabouts, big schemes, small schemes, tremendous schemes which will revolutionise the whole of India, increase tremendously the power supply. And remember, no country can be industrialised unless it has a sufficient degree of motive power. That is the basis of industry.

If you look at the map of India you will find that the huge Himalayan chain, the enormous mountain barrier cutting off India from the whole of northeastern Asia. That mountain barrier, as a German engineer was telling me, has more potential power confined in it than any like area in the world. The tremendous rivers that come out of it, bursting and flooding and destroying, if you harness the strength of those rivers and convert it into electric and other power, you can supply the whole of India not just electric light but with the power to develop India. But suddenly we found, it is all very well, but where is the money to come from for all these schemes? Our provinces had schemes of their own expecting money from the Central Government. The Central Government have its own schemes. We thought bravely that we have plenty of money at our disposal but then we found that we were mistaken and we had to pull ourselves back and think how to use our limited money to the best advantage, and we had to cut down ruthlessly our expenditure on merit of our important projects. In fact we had to give up some of our projects which were dear to us because we felt that, instead of trying to do a hundred things and not doing any of them well, we must select two, three, four, five projects, complete them and then take the next step. That is, we had to evolve a system of priorities. We are evolving it and we have got now a very high-powered Planning Commission at work on these things.

So you see how complicated this problem is. You must consider from the practical point of view your objective—not in terms of theory but practical details. I think that is the only way gradually to achieve, that is, by progressive

socialisation. I do not talk about socialisation but I try to realise that aim in the best possible way with the resources at my disposal.

Q: Being a follower of Gandhi, why did you use force in Hyderabad?

JN: A simpler question would have been how could I, being a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, as Prime Minister keep an army and a navy and an air force going. Obviously that, and not what we did in Hyderabad or elsewhere, is the basic question. Well, the question is both easy and difficult to answer. It is easy to answer because I do not think I can presume to call myself a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, but there are certain basic conceptions, basic principles of state policy which are I think perfectly correct and which, in so far as possible, every state should try to follow. But as always happens with very great men who are in the nature of, if I may use the word, prophets or seekers after truth, they seek the truth regardless of consequences. It just does not matter where their search for truth leads them to, they proceed; if it leads them to the pit of hell, they enter hell. That is the prophet, he does not mind, he does not care for consequences in his search for what he considers truth, and in his adherence to what he considers truth. Now the politician or the statesman—at the best of his time, I am not talking about the poor type of politicians or statesmen—has to deal with human affairs. He has not only to understand and perceive the truth but he has to get the others to perceive it also because he has to function through others. If the others, the masses, do not perceive it, then his perception of the truth is not enough because the agency through which he works has not perceived it. Therefore he is limited in his application of any truth, presuming that he accepts the truth. If he does not wholly accept the truth difficulties arise. So you must appreciate that a certain truth may be a truth but the frailty of the apparatus of the human being may be such that it can neither understand that truth nor, even if it has a certain glimpse of it, act up to it.

Then what is one to do? The prophet does not care. Mahatma Gandhi could say with perfect truth and courage that he did not care if India was shattered to atoms but he would stick to the truth. He had the courage to say that. I have not that courage to say that even if India be shattered to atoms, let the truth prevail. No average person has the courage to say that. So the result is that the good statesman I am talking about, for the moment presuming that I am a good statesman, always has this difficulty of compromising with the truth as he conceives it and the lack of perception of the apparatus through which he works. Always, in any activity, whether it is politics or anything else, he comes up against that difficulty and therefore he has to compromise. When one once starts compromising it is a slippery and a dangerous slope. One has to compromise and if I may say so even Mahatmaji was practical enough, without giving up his truth, to compromise on

many minor matters. So one has to compromise and once one starts compromising one may get into the habit of compromising, which is bad, and one may even forget the truth in the maze of compromise; that is worse still. There is that risk and therefore the average politician gradually becomes a person devoid of many principles and living from one compromise to another and slipping down the slope all the time. These are the dangers of public affairs and public life and politics—compromise with existing conditions and realisation of existing conditions. But if he remembers the truth all the time then he might keep himself from slipping too far. If he forgets that principle and lives only with compromises and opportunism then he has slipped and there is nothing left but the normal career of the politician.

I should like a world where violence has almost ceased, I should like nations to disarm, very largely, and all that, but as a person with some responsibility for the destiny of India I cannot disband our army or my air force or small navy. I cannot do it. If I felt, and I am quite honest about it, if I felt that the people of India understood Gandhiji's teachings and could act up to it. I would have no hesitation in disbanding our army and I would face the consequences. But I know that we are not up to the mark—nobody is at the present moment, or few people are—and I do not want the other alternative. Remember this, Mahatma Gandhi was opposed to violence, absolutely, in all forms. And yet he said that violence is better than cowardice because cowardice is the greatest sin. So you see again, you get an alternative. Violence is bad and yet something is worse than violence, and sometimes you have to choose, the politician has to choose, you have to choose in your individual life between the greater and the lesser evil.

The question is related to Hyderabad. Why Hyderabad particularly I do not know, because the Hyderabad action was perfect of its kind, and as peaceful as any military action can be, and it saved I think a great deal of violence, it prevented future violence and did something which was quite inevitable.

Q: What are your views on communism in South East Asia and in China?

JN: Communism in Asia, in various parts of Asia, used to be a kind of wing or on the fringe of the nationalist movement. As such it was tolerated, because there was no particular conflict, there might be criticism, they might condemn each other's policies, but there was no basic conflict between communism and nationalism because both aimed at anti-imperialism and the like. When political freedom was achieved by the nationalist movement in the main, then the anti-imperialist urge more or less disappeared as such in that country, and other questions, social and economic, came up, understandably.

When I first became a member of the Indian Government, that was three and half years ago or slightly more, for about a year and a half after that the

Communist Party of India was good enough to proclaim support of the Nehru Government in India—not that it made much difference to me whether they supported me or not—nevertheless they did, that was their policy. A very critical support no doubt, often condemning our actions but nevertheless a general support, they extended. Then, about two years ago they reversed their policy, not only in India but in many other places and kicked out all their old leaders who had built up the Communist Party, and started a new phase of active rebellion, insurrection, rebellion gradually descending into individual terrorism.

No government in the world, calling itself a government, can tolerate a rebellion. It ceases to be a government, somebody else becomes the government. An insurrection or a rebellion has to be put down by any government if it occurs. If the rebellion takes the form of terroristic activities, every decent human being quite apart from government, should try to put it down because I am dead certain that out of terroristic activities nothing good can come but only degradation of human nature. Leave out this phase. When the communist parties in some countries rebelled against nationalist governments, they have every right to rebel, and take the consequences of rebellion. What a rebel has not a right to do is to whine if he gets beaten.

Something occurred which separated the nationalist movements in some places in South East Asia from the communist movement, not wholly, but to a large extent. Uptil now communism had been vaguely allied to nationalism because of its anti-imperialism. Now it began to oppose nationalism thinking possibly that it was strong enough to upset these new weak nationalist governments. It is up to you to consider what the strongest urge is today in South East Asia. I think even today the strongest urge is the nationalist urge. In India the strongest urge is the nationalist urge which includes the demand for social justice, because our whole nationalist movement was based on certain fairly advanced economic and social ideologies. The nationalist urge is fundamentally the government urge of the various countries in South East Asia. The Communist Party's activities tried to upset that, and because nationalism is the strongest urge, that communist activity did not succeed. The moment the Communist Party came out in the open against nationalist governments and parties they weakened themselves because they came up against the strongest element against them. They gambled, they thought they were strong enough to meet them, and, generally speaking, they failed in that gamble. I cannot speak for the future, I cannot speak about every part of South East Asia, I am talking about my own country. They failed miserably in India and apart from the fact that they made a nuisance of themselves occasionally, they caused us not a single headache at any time. They went about killing poor innocent people. I can understand an armed insurrection and people fighting in the open, but I cannot understand and I cannot tolerate people killing women and children in their beds and calling it the spread of communism or whatever it is. And that is what is happening in most places—sheer and pure terrorism just to terrorise the neighbourhood, women and

children. Boys and girls are being killed so that that neighbourhood may be terrorised. This kind of thing—I am speaking from my experience—naturally irritates exceedingly the general masses of the people. It irritates not only the nationalist sentiment of the people which is strong, it irritates their humanitarian sentiments, and the result is—there is no doubt about it, there is not a shadow of a doubt—that the Communist Party in India has been growing weaker and weaker and is more and more disliked and their actions resented. In fact, the Communist Party in India, from such accounts as we get, is on the verge of splitting up because many of its own members are dissatisfied with what it has done and, as always happens with numerous parties, purge after purge goes on and ultimately it purges itself out of existence or something happens. I cannot speak for Burma. You know better. But I think the general principles that I apply to India apply elsewhere too, that is where communism defies nationalism. In South East Asia it weakens itself because nationalism is the stronger force; where it goes hand in hand with nationalism it can play some part and an important part.

Well, for a variety of reasons and very obvious reasons. I do not wish to criticise any other nation's activities. It is obvious that there is conflict in Indo-China, that neither party to the conflict is in supreme control of the whole country. Normally speaking, before recognising, one waits; you do not jump in and recognise, unless you want to take some part in the conflict, either active or passive. That is the normal way of recognizing governments, and we are following the normal way of not recognising till some final decision is achieved there, because we cannot be parties to that conflict. We have not the resources to do anything of the kind, we do not puff ourselves up with the thought that we are very powerful and very strong. Some people foolishly say, we are leaders of Asia. We are nothing of the kind. We are just a country determined after freedom to consolidate itself, to look after its own interests and not to get involved, and we are just going to be entangled in other matters in so far as we can help it. When we have built ourselves up, when we are strong enough, when our voice counts, our voice will be heard. We do not want just to raise our voice which is not heard, we do not wish to indulge in idle chatter.

Also, as you know, our policy, which has been repeatedly declared, is not to align ourselves with rival blocs of nations. We may have our sympathies, but it is totally immaterial. It is not a negative or merely a neutral policy. It is neutral to some extent, it is negative to some extent, but it is also positive to a small extent because it is a definite, positive approach to world problems. We feel that this kind of lining up of every country on this or that side, apart from the merits of the issue, leads inevitably to a drift towards war. That is a terrible thing, because if war comes, that war is going to be a catastrophe of the worst kind, of the biggest dimension and whatever the result of the war may be, whether it is a long or a short war, it will be a catastrophe for every country involved, and it will bring down the level of human existence all over the world. It means a putting an end

to all the dreams we may have of advance for, I do not know, one generation, two generations, whatever the period might be. The whole productive capacity of the world will go down immensely apart from the actual destruction caused. Millions of people will starve to death, even those who are not involved in the actual war, and, what is more, the whole of humanity which has been brutalised by the recent wars and conflicts will suffer still more.

Well, that is not a prospect one easily looks to and it is not a prospect which I should like passively to wait for. It may well be that India as she is today cannot make very much difference in world politics. We are not strong enough either in the military or in the financial and economic sense, and so we do not shout very much. But whether we are strong or weak I just do not see why I should be compelled to take a wrong step, a step which might perhaps precipitate a war, or at any rate bring the world slightly nearer to a war. Whatever little strength, one per cent, or one in a million, that I may have, I want to put on the side of peace, and on the side of prevention of war, and I think by keeping out India or may be some other countries keeping out of this continuous thought of war, preparation for war, lining up this way or that way, to a very small extent we might perhaps exercise a moderating influence, we might perhaps in a crisis make a difference. I do not put it high, it is just a possibility. I am willing to work for that possibility because the other consequences are so terrible to contemplate. Therefore we have adopted this policy.

I do not know what future developments in the world may be. It is a dynamic situation. But this is a well thought out policy. But may I say, may I remind you of something in a completely different context? Normally speaking any country in India's position or, if I may say so, in Burma's position—though I have no business to talk about Burma in this context, it is for the Burmese leaders to decide—any country, which has won its independence recently, cannot possibly take any other course. I say so with the greatest confidence. Taking up any other course means only one thing. It means that you are too weak, you are swept in, that you cannot stand out of these world currents sweeping this way or that way. Well, however weak we may be, we are just not going to be swept aside or pushed or hurried by anybody.

I will give you an example, which is an old example, nevertheless a useful one to remember. About hundred and seventy or eighty years ago when the United States of America became free after the War of Independence against England, sometime after, there were great wars in Europe. We may think that we are living through a terrible age with wars and conflicts of powers. But if you had lived in the later years of the eighteenth century with revolutions in Europe, with Napoleonic wars in Europe, with empires tumbling and all that happening, well, that was frightful enough for those days. And in those days few people talked about this, that you must join this bloc or that, how can you remain neutral? Well, the leaders of the American nation refused to join anybody. They said, we are going to remain

out of this business, why should we be pushed and hurried about, we remain out of it—and they did remain out of it, and wisely too. Although the context was different, fundamentally the position is the same, for a new country which has newly won its freedom, why should it be hustled into these things? It has to look after itself. It can make little difference, I mean to say, militarily or otherwise, but it may make a difference by holding aloof, by possibly throwing in a little its weight such as it possesses, at the right moment on the right side in favour of peace. So it is the only conceivable policy if you look at it objectively for a country like India to remain aloof.

Apart from this, we may have fallen away very greatly from Mahatma Gandhi's ideals and policies but still my generation, and I think the generations that follow me too, can never forget all that he taught us. For the last thirty years or so in our national history we have thought of our foreign policy in a certain way which was a projection, a development of our national policy, of the policy of our national struggle. We had several resolutions to that effect about our foreign policy even before we became independent. Those resolutions were not thrown out just in an academic way, they were well thought out decisions of the National Congress. Our present foreign policy flows naturally from that policy of thirty years. We cannot suddenly break our tradition of thirty years. Normally we could not do it.

Then again as I told you a country which has newly acquired its freedom automatically adopts such a policy as ours. The United States of America did so when they acquired their freedom. Now all these parallels of course do not go very far because conditions differ, but these are certain considerations which have to be borne in mind. If we can make little difference in this war business we can make a big difference in the peace business. So why should we not try to do that? The odds may be against us but it is worth taking those odds.

And so, to come back to Indo-China from which I started, recognition of any group in Indo-China in the present context of events means lining up with another major group. We do not propose to line up with a major group. When we are sure of the position in Indo-China we recognise the right government. For the present moment our recognition does not mean much. We do not support anybody, we do not hamper anybody.

Q: What do you think of the policies of the United States?

JN: It is not my function to justify or criticise American policies. I talked to you about my desire to concentrate on building up my own country and my own people peacefully. It is equally obvious that in the present context no nation can isolate itself. We take part in the various organs of the United Nations. We have embassies and legations. These are all meant for cooperation or whatever it may be, for

communication, for information. We have to do that. It is a question of emphasis. I am not advising any country to isolate itself. It would be fatal for it to isolate itself from world events.

2. The Obligations of Freedom¹

Mr Prime Minister, comrades and friends,

I am afraid I have taken up a long time already in addressing this vast audience in Hindustani.² It is always a difficult matter to choose the language one should speak when there is a mixed audience and the whole audience does not understand any one single language. Anyhow, as a large number of my own countrymen were here, and I was particularly anxious that I should be understood by, if I may say so, the under-privileged and poorer sections of my countrymen who are here and who probably would not have understood me if I spoke in English, so I began in Hindustani. I am sorry that I cannot speak in Burmese, otherwise I would do so.

I have come to this country after, in a sense, eleven years or in another sense after four years, really after eleven years. And these eleven years have been years of the most tremendous happenings in this world, as we all know, the most tremendous upsets and upheavals and there is no end to that. The process continues. Although the great war, the great Second World War is over, was over some years ago, we know that all kinds of tumults and changes and dynamic forces continue today, and no man knows what tomorrow might bring. Now the first thing that we have to learn, that we have to remember is that we are living in a fast-changing world, that the world today is different from what it was yesterday or five or ten years ago. It is vastly different from what it was ten years ago, and ten years later it may be still more different from today. So if we are living in this dynamic and changing world we have to keep pace with it, we have to understand it, we have to understand the forces that impel it in this or that direction. We have ourselves to be dynamic in outlook and in action, because if we become static in outlook in a dynamic world then we are left behind. The world goes on and we remain thinking of something that occurred yesterday or the day before. We should not

1. Speech at Baa Ground, Rangoon, 22 June 1950. A.I.R. tapes.

2. The Hindi part of the speech is not available.

allow our thoughts to fall into a rut or into a groove which will prevent us from following the changing phases of our national or international life.

It is an extraordinary thing how human beings, human minds, are apt to fall into ruts. The curious thing is that the most revolutionary thing in creation is the human mind. After all, everything that has come, every revolutionary change that has come in human society has come out of the human mind some time or other. It is the human mind that is the cradle of revolution and change and invention and discovery. And yet at the same time it is odd to find that human mind itself falls into ruts and refuses to come out of them, and the world advances and leaves that mind behind. It then has to catch up rather painfully. It seems to me a strange phenomenon. When the world is advancing or changing slowly, it does not much matter if you do not keep pace with that change, but when changes are swift and rapid then it becomes necessary for you to think swiftly and rapidly and not allow some past thoughts or slogans to capture your mind and prevent it from advancing.

We talk of conservatives and progressives and radicals and socialists and communists and reactionaries. We give these names and labels, and there is a great deal of truth sometimes in a label. A conservative is a person who thinks in terms of the past, who does not like change to occur, he likes things as they are. A progressive is supposed to want change more swiftly. The first type of conservative is the person who is rooted in the past, whether it is the religious past or the economic or the political, whatever it may be. When I say religious I do not mean the high principles of religion, not that, but rather the way people have exploited religion in the past by bringing it into politics and making it govern our political activities in a changing world. If religion has any value, that value is that it contains certain eternal truths which you should believe and accept. But if you apply that very religion to a changing political and economic situation then you misuse that religion. In the past we have seen a great deal of misuse of it and thereby a kind of religious communalism has grown up which is fatal to the growth of a nation, which narrows a nation's outlook and which creates conflict. Today no nation can be governed by what might be called the old medieval religious outlook where a person belonging to any other religion is more or less an outcaste in that nation.

That is not the concept of a modern nation; that is not the concept of democracy. Democracy means that in every country, every son of the country, son and daughter who owes allegiance to that country has equal rights, equal opportunities of growth. So the conservatives stick to the past. Now there is no doubt about it that the past is something very valuable, the past is something which is full of lessons for us, which we should respect.

In fact, what are we today except the product of that long past behind us? All we have of culture, of civilisation, is the accumulation of past ages. That is true. We are the final embodiment of that past if you like. But that being true, nevertheless it is a dangerous thing if we think in terms of the past because it means that we look backwards all the time when we have to march forward, and no person who



BEFORE AN IMAGE OF THE BUDDHA AT BOROBUDUR, 12 JUNE 1950



BIDDING FAREWELL TO PRESIDENT SOEKARNO AND MOHAMMAD HATTA, DJAKARTA, 17 JUNE 1950

looks backwards can march safely forward, he will stumble and fall. In fact he will not see where he is going because he is looking backward. Let us therefore learn from the past, be inspired by the past, remember the eternal truths of the past, the culture and civilisation it has brought, but remember also that if we are the children of the past, we are the parents of the future and we have to look to that future and we have to act in the present so as to build that future and we must not allow ourselves to be tied by the past in whatever shape it may come.

It is fairly easy to discover the usual type of reactionary, even if he exploits religion to cover up his political reaction. But there is another dangerous type of reactionary who talks in terms of revolution, who utters slogans and cries of revolution but who has completely lost touch with the advance, if you like, even of revolution or of social change, who repeats slogans that had been valid a generation ago or twenty years ago or ten years ago but have no validity today. Here again although he calls himself a revolutionary his mind has got stuck in a rut and he does not realise that. Let us take India or let us take Burma. We have become independent sovereign nations. Now, surely that is a big change in India and Burma.

We live in a complicated world in which people pull in different directions, in which wars occur. Great countries go down and are defeated in wars. We have even seen the victors themselves go down and suffer. But people do not realise this complicated and difficult situation and talk lightly about India doing this or Burma doing that, jumping into the international field and changing the fate of nations and countries. We have to be realistic. We have to keep pace with the times and avoid living in an unreal, artificial world of our own creation. We are independent; it is a solid undeniable fact. Nevertheless, it is also a solid undeniable fact that this independence does not necessarily make us a strong powerful nation. We have to build up our nation. It is no good calling ourselves strong and thereby deluding ourselves about our strength. We have to go step by step.

It was not an easy matter to gain our independence. We had to push out a powerful nation from our countries. But it is an infinitely more difficult matter to build up our strength brick by brick. We require material resources. But we also want highly qualified and trained human beings in a sufficient number—all kinds of human beings, not politicians only. In fact an independent nation might perhaps do without politicians, but it cannot do without engineers, doctors, teachers, scientists and the like. A politician has a certain importance, I suppose, but a mere politician becomes less and less important in a free community.

Today if you ask me what is the most important job for India, or Burma, I would say, undoubtedly the engineer's job. I would gladly sacrifice with the greatest goodwill a hundred thousand lawyers in India. Nobody wants them. But I want a hundred thousand engineers instead and scientists and builders and electricians and all other technical personnel including doctors and teachers. There are so many activities that a new nation wants to build up that you have to get those people

to work and produce the things that you want. You need strong economic and financial foundation and you have to build up at the same time the psychology of the nation, the psychology of a free people.

Now, what is the psychology of a free people? Freedom does not stand by itself. It is always accompanied by responsibilities and obligations. A nation, which discharges its obligations and responsibilities deserves and retains that freedom. A nation which does not discharge its obligations weakens that freedom and ultimately loses it.

Indeed Mahatma Gandhi's lesson to us was, perform your obligations, shoulder your responsibilities, do not bother about freedom, because if you perform your obligations and shoulder your responsibilities, freedom is bound to come.

Our political freedom is precarious because we have not yet conditioned ourselves psychologically to that freedom. We live in a peculiar past, in which we carry on with the old slogans which have no meaning today; and we live in an artificial present when we think that having become free we can do anything we like in the world which we cannot. We can only go as far as our strength allows us and therefore if we cannot go quite far we should not talk of going far, because just talk weakens a country. We have to build up the sense of obligation and responsibility which goes with the freedom that we have got.

It is a cruel and a ruthless world. It shows no pity to the weak. Let us by all means keep our head high and never lower it before anybody. But do not imagine in the pride of your new freedom that you can challenge everybody in the world.

The first duty of a country that is free, or not free, is to have unity. And if you look back into past history, speaking about my own country, India, and looking back over its tremendously long past history of thousands of years, it is a magnificent history, but it is also a shameful history. We have always come down in the scheme of things or have been dominated by alien powers not so much because of the strength of the outside enemy, but because of our weakness due to inner disruptions, and internal quarrels among ourselves. Your country, Burma, was completely isolated from the world when the British came here. You did not know about the world. We did not know much about the world. And if you are isolated you become a stagnant backwater, and the outsider comes and controls your destiny.

So we have to learn the lesson of history. We have to lay the greatest stress on unity. There are bound to be differences of opinion in a great country, a living nation does not consist of "yes" men. But there are certain matters on which every person in a nation must say 'yes'. On the question of the freedom of the country, if anyone says "no" my country must be a slave country, then there is no place for him in that country. But having agreed to that principle, yet some people act in a way which obviously, if their action succeeds, disables and weakens the country and leads to loss of freedom. If that is the obvious consequence of a certain act, then, is not that act itself tantamount to saying that we want our country to lose our freedom?

Therefore, it becomes important that we accept that unity is of the first importance at any time, but more specially at a moment like this when the whole world is full of sharks and wild animals. As we are old nations but young, in the sense of young in freedom and young in outlook, we have to build up our nations. You cannot do so by arguing and talking and quarrelling. It is better sometimes to take a wrong path than not to take a path at all, and quarrel all the time and push this way or that way.

Let us discuss everything by all means; but having come to a conclusion let us follow that path with a certain determination and cooperative effort.

Today the world is full of strange happenings and adventures. Constituted as I am, I feel rather excited by this prospect of adventure and change. Although many things happen that pain me, nevertheless, the whole thing taken together excites my imagination and is a challenge to me to do my best, to put in my utmost effort.

Much of my effort, such effort as I could put in during my life, most of it has been put forward and I do not know what of my life remains, a few years, perhaps more, perhaps less, it does not really matter. But whatever may remain to me or to others of my generation, who have laboured for India's freedom, will be spent in furtherance of such ideals that we have. And then the burden will fall on others, on many of those who are in school or college or just out of college today. They will have to shoulder the burden, bear aloft the touch and carry it forward and meet all these perils and adventures. Well, I hope you will meet them with courage and confidence and with a certain spirit of welcoming adventure and facing it, not with fear or apprehension, but with confidence, that if one does the right thing in the right way, right results will surely follow.

3. To Thakin Nu¹

Camp Calcutta
June 25, 1950

My dear Thakin Nu,

I have just received your letter of the 25th June with its enclosures.

If any force like the Kuomintang force enters Burmese territory, international law demands that it should be disarmed and interned till any further arrangement

1. J.N. Collection.

could be made in regard to it. It appears that your Government or your army intended doing this, but were resisted by the Kuomintang forces. This obviously puts those Kuomintang forces completely in the wrong. They have no business to be in Burmese territory as an armed force and much less to resist the Burmese army.

If your attitude to these Kuomintang forces is clear, I do not see why any communist forces should enter Burmese territory. They might have some slight justification for doing so, if you aided and abetted the Kuomintang forces and allowed them to use Burmese territory as a base for operations against China. As you are obviously not aiding and abetting them and in fact have taken some steps to oppose them, no question arises of the communist armies coming in. Of course they may find some pretext for doing so.

I am going back to Delhi tomorrow morning and we shall give immediate consideration to this matter and communicate with our Ambassador in Peking. We shall give him the facts and probably leave it to his discretion as to how to approach the Chinese People's Government in the matter. He will be in a better position to judge about the step that he could take in order to help you.

I would suggest to you to point out both to the U.S.A. Ambassador in Rangoon and to the U.K. Ambassador the position that has arisen and the embarrassment which it is causing you. I am sure that they will themselves not like this development and may try to do something to put a stop to it. They can hardly get into direct touch with the Kuomintang General Lai Iang Sao Tia. The U.S.A. Government is in some kind of intimate contact with the Formosa Government and they could make it perfectly clear to the Formosa Government that this kind of thing is most objectionable and will create great difficulties all round. Further that if these Kuomintang forces continue in Burma, they will have to be disarmed by force.

The three-point demand made by General Lai Iang can of course not possibly be met by your Government. You can make it clear to him that you have no desire to undertake any military measures, but you cannot tolerate the presence of an armed force of any country in your territory. He must therefore either withdraw from Burmese territory or consent to be disarmed. Presumably he will refuse to do either. According to you, you have not got enough forces to take any effective measures against this Kuomintang army. If so, the best course would appear to be, for the present, to try to contain it and not allow it to come any further pending the other negotiations that you are carrying on. That is to say your troops should not, for the moment, attack the Kuomintang army but see that they do not advance. The only course is to resist it.

For the present it does not seem very necessary for your Ambassador-designate to China to come to New Delhi. If we feel this is desirable, then we shall let you know. It may be worthwhile for him to come to Delhi before he goes to Peking. About that too, I shall let you know.

I am sorry that you have to face this additional trouble. I hope that you will get over it, as you have got over most of your other difficulties.

I must thank you again for the delightful time we had in Rangoon and for the generous hospitality and friendship that you extended to us.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

FOREIGN AFFAIRS**VII. Portuguese Settlements in India**

1. Negotiation with Portugal¹

... We are hardly in a position to take any more direct or stronger steps in regard to Goa. It is for us to consider, however, if it is worthwhile for us to keep up an expensive legation in Lisbon if our negotiations come to a breaking point.²

1. Notes to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, 30 June 1950. J.N. Collection. Extract.
2. The Portuguese Government had refused to discuss the political future of Goa and stressed that Portuguese India formed an integral part of Portugal.

2. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1950

My dear Kher,

I want your advice and help in regard to our Consulate-General in Goa. Goa, as you know, is a peculiar place and our Consul-General is not very much concerned with normal consular duties. He is concerned with developments there, the reactions of the Government, the people and so on and so forth. He has to be wide awake, not aggressive because that is not right for a Consular officer, and at the same time not submissive in any way. The Goan authorities frequently misbehave and we do not wish to tolerate this.

The Portuguese Goans are a most peculiar people. They live in some medieval world. It is not particularly easy to know how to deal with them. We can hardly take an army there. We are trying to find out what we can do on the economic plane, but even that is not very easy because it hits the people more than the Government. . .

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS**VIII. Other Matters**

1. Exclusion of Some Countries from the U.N.¹

The proposal² to limit the United Nations by the exclusion of some nations has surprised me greatly. Indeed it seems to forget the very purpose and the very name of the United Nations. It is true that the high hopes with which the United Nations Organisation was started, have not been fulfilled. At the same time there can be no doubt that by the mere fact of its existence, it has saved us from many dangers and conflicts. Also there is no doubt that in the world today it offers the one hope of finding some way for peaceful cooperation between nations. If the United Nations ceases to be, or if it radically changes its position and nature, then there is nothing left which might inspire that hope for the future and we shall have to go through other terrible experiences and face disasters before we again come back to something which offers a forum for all nations, even though they differ from each other. The whole conception of One World, however distant that One World may be, involves an organisation like the United Nations. To imagine that by strict conformity to a single doctrine or approach, we can solve the problems of the world, is to forget the lessons of history and to ignore the realities of today. However difficult the path, it has to be pursued by repeated attempts at cooperation between all nations. Once that attempt is given up, the consequence can only be preparation for conflict on a worldwide-scale and the conflict itself.

It is thought by some people that in the circumstances of today it is quite inevitable for the world to be divided up into two parts, hostile to each other, and for every country to line up on this side or that. There is undoubtedly that hostility, but there is also undoubtedly a refusal on the part of many countries to line up in this way. These countries imagine neither the pressure of world events nor their own destiny requires this lining up on either side and they will, therefore, maintain their separate identity and viewpoint and thus serve the causes they have at heart.

If any attempt is made to change the essential nature of the United Nations, it will not lead to another or a more powerful organisation which can work for peace. It would only mean the break-up of something that is actually and potentially valuable with nothing to take its place. I think, therefore, that the proposal to exclude any independent country from the United Nations is unwise and harmful.

1. This message dated 5 May 1950 for the United Nations Radio Department was broadcast in a special United Nations programme by the Mutual Broadcasting Company and was published in the *National Herald* on 8 May 1950.
2. Herbert Hoover, President of the United States from 1928 to 1932, had proposed on 27 April 1950 that the U.N. should be "reorganised without the communist countries in it" or "a definite new united front should be organised of those people who disavow communism."

2. The Sydney Conference¹

The brief for the Sydney Conference was considered in Cabinet today. The last few sentences in the brief concerning our attitude towards Japan were not approved and were amended. There is no reason whatever why we should go about saying that we must prevent Japan from becoming a menace in the military or economic sense of the word. If there is any danger of that in the future, the Sydney Conference will not stop it by its resolution. Countries like Japan are not kept down permanently. The only way to do so is to create conditions which prevent Japan going in a wrong direction. Then again it seems rather hypocritical for any country, which is militarily strong, to talk about others following the paths of peace. Anyway we need say nothing about it, and I do not think we should subscribe to any statement which lays down that Japan should be kept weak in any sense of the word.

It is quite possible that Japan may be a serious competitor for us in the economic field especially in regard to consumer goods. The only way to deal with that is by agreement and not by casting a ring round Japan to prevent its growth.

My point is that our Delegation should not fall into the trap of echoing the Australian viewpoint in regard to Japan. I do not myself see why the question of Japan should come up there at all, except indirectly. Once Japan is discussed, it is hardly possible not to refer to China and the possible future relations of China and Japan. All kinds of complications arise.

Then again it is quite possible or even probable that the Australian Delegation might bring in anti-communism in its approach to South East Asia problems. Our Delegation must be warned against falling into this trap and it should be explained to them that we are not going to make ourselves parties to the creation of what might be called an anti-communist bloc in South East Asia. It is true that the urge to do something in South East Asia, in so far as Australia is concerned, arises chiefly from fear of communism spreading. Nevertheless to talk about raising economic standards in order to counter communism is a wrong approach. The grace of the act goes and the people who might be benefited feel that this is incidental to some other and more opportunist purpose. Also it puts the question of economic help to South East Asia in the sphere of political controversy and conflict.

The question of Indo-China might also arise as things are there at present. I do not suppose that economic help is asked for or can be given. Still it is just possible that an attempt might be made to bring in Indo-China into the picture from the anti-communist angle. Again our Delegation should be warned to avoid any such entanglement.

1. Note to Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, 6 May 1950. File No. 330-CJK/50, M.E.A.

I understand that most members of our Delegation are leaving tomorrow. If there is time still, the points mentioned above can be explained to them or a copy of this note given to them. Otherwise you can send them a note on the subject.

The leader of the Delegation, Shri Ramaswami Mudaliar, will be coming here soon and the position might be fully explained to him.

3. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi

May 26, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I am writing a brief letter to you almost on the eve of my departure for Indonesia. We have just completed the formation of our new Cabinet. I am sorry to lose some of my old colleagues, but I think I am right in saying that the new Cabinet is not only stronger but more homogeneous. In addition to this, the Planning Commission that we have established shows promise of very good work. I hope, therefore, that the next few months will be a period of constructive advance on some fronts.

The situation in Bengal is certainly better than it was, but numerous petty incidents continue. The fact of the matter is that the social structure of Bengal, and more especially of East Bengal, has been broken up and so is their economy. The result is that there is a great deal of disorder, dacoity, etc. This is only remotely connected with the communal issue. But it takes that garb. Our main difficulty in West Bengal is the press as well as the Hindu Mahasabha and their like. The press of Calcutta, with a few exceptions, has forgotten to play any constructive role and can only attempt to destroy. This is unfortunate. But even more unfortunate is the fact that to some extent it represents the prevailing mentality in Bengal.

In regard to the other major problems between India and Pakistan, we are proceeding rather slowly. Kashmir will be in the picture now and Dixon, the U.N. mediator, is arriving tomorrow. I do not myself see any easy way out and Pakistan's attitude is far from accommodating. Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches in America have not been good. There has been plenty of insidious propaganda in them and he has not, if I might say so, played the game.

Meanwhile, the international situation is as bad as ever. Whatever may happen in Europe, I feel that the real danger points are in Asia. More particularly in Indo-China. I am convinced that the policy adopted by the U.S.A., and to some extent

1. J.N. Collection.

the U.K., in Indo-China is a wrong and harmful policy. On the whole our relations with China are good and the exchange of speeches between our Ambassador there and the President was distinctly friendly.

My main purpose in writing to you, however, is to request you to stay on in Moscow during this difficult period. No one can perform miracles. It is something at least to hold the fort and generally to ease the situation. You have done that very well in Moscow and therefore it would be a pity if you left. I know of your commitments at Oxford and elsewhere, but I feel that in the present context of things, your presence in Moscow is far more important.

I am greatly looking forward to my visit to Indonesia. The people there attract me and they are very friendly.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To B.V. Keskar¹

On Board *INS Delhi*
June 4, 1950

My dear Keskar,

On the eve of my departure from Delhi, I received your secret note dated the 30th May about your apprehension that we have modified our policy regarding non-alignment with different blocs.

I want to assure you that there is not the slightest variation or modification of our policy. Indeed nobody has suggested this and I am quite convinced in my mind that we should continue the old policy.

It is difficult to stop newspapers and individuals making vague surmises.

So far as the Baguio Conference was concerned, for over eight months we tried to avoid it. We laid down all kinds of conditions. Ultimately each one of our conditions was accepted by the Philippines Government and we just did not know how to get out of it. We had told them that the Kuomintang or Bao Dai must not be invited and there must be nothing anti-communist about it and that it should deal purely with economic matters. Indeed in the minds of some people at Baguio there was something else present.²

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Baguio Conference held between 20 and 30 May produced no formal regional organisation nor any declaration with regard to communism. It reaffirmed faith in the U.N. and suggested closer cooperation among the participating countries in social and economic fields. India and Indonesia insisted on neutrality in the cold war.

The Sydney Conference grew out of the Colombo Conference. Again we made our attitude perfectly clear, and to some extent, prevented that Conference becoming just an anti-communist affair.

The visit of our Commander-in-Chief to London has nothing to do with any conference. He went there at the invitation of the British General Staff to attend certain military exercises. The newspaper report about a South East Asia command is fantastic nonsense. There has been no conference of any kind in London and our express instructions to Cariappa are not to discuss any political matter there publicly or privately.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

On Board INS *Delhi*
June 6, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I have had four days on sea and we have been fortunate in having good weather in spite of the monsoon. This is my first sea voyage after 12 years. I have enjoyed it greatly. Tomorrow we reach Djakarta.

Among the various papers I brought with me, I had your speech at U.N.E.S.C.O. and I read it here. I liked it. I am glad that someone can speak straight about these matters.²

I am glad also that you made our position perfectly clear in regard to China, when the exclusion of the delegate of Kuomintang China was considered.

Because of the attitude that we are taking up in this and some other matters, notably in Indo-China, our policy is not at all approved of in the U.S. and even in the U.K., it is not liked. As you must have seen, every attempt was made to boost up Liaquat Ali Khan during his recent tour of America. He, on his part, did not miss any chance of insidiously running down India.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. At the U.N.E.S.C.O. general conference in Florence in May 1950, Radhakrishnan said that the organisation should commit itself to international understanding instead of becoming a political weapon against communism. It was the task of U.N.E.S.C.O. to reeducate man into a new sense of fellowship and social responsibility.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

I feel convinced that the policy we have been pursuing is the right one. It is often misunderstood. For instance, our participation in the Sydney Conference or in Baguio in the Philippines or our Commander-in-Chief going to England. All kinds of wild speculations are made, which have no basis in fact. Our Commander-in-Chief went to England for no political purposes whatever and simply to participate in a military exercise. We went to Sydney as a natural consequence of the Colombo Conference and we succeeded to a large extent in preventing that Conference from becoming just an anti-communist show. At Baguio we insisted on cultural and economic matters being discussed and no other, and because of us, Kuomintang China and Indo-China were not invited. As a matter of fact we had no desire to go to Baguio, but after eight months of semi-refusal, it became difficult to say no.

I have already written and told you how much I want you to stay on in Moscow. I think you are performing a great service there and it would be a great pity if you came away at this critical juncture. I do hope, therefore, that you will continue as our Ambassador there.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

New Delhi
8 April, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

You have been sent separately copy of the Agreement² that was signed today by me and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This Agreement deals principally with East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. But generally it concerns itself with the entire minority problem in Pakistan and India.

We met to consider these vital problems at a most critical moment in our country's history. We were, it might be said, hovering on the verge of a precipice. The significance of recent events and the terrible possibilities of the future gave great importance to this meeting. Very great interest has been taken in it in the principal countries of the world. This was so, not because people abroad are interested very much in the fate of millions in India or Pakistan, but because they realized that this was a matter which had the widest international significance.

After seven days of continuous and exhausting discussions we have arrived at an Agreement. It is possible to criticize some items in this Agreement or to suggest that there might have been an improvement here and there. But, it is clear, what counts is not any detail in the Agreement but rather the spirit underlying it and the future possibilities. We have crossed a very big hurdle, many hurdles remain. Although we discussed at length recent occurrences in East and West Bengal and Assam, we had all the time before us the basic problem of Indo-Pakistan relations. These have poisoned the air for us for these two years and a half and they had arrived at a stage when a measure of disaster had already overwhelmed us and a far greater disaster seemed imminent. It was the parting of the ways. We went either to this greater disaster or we took a turn in the opposite direction. The Agreement indicates a turn in that opposite direction. I wish to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic about this Agreement and the future will show what its consequences

1. These letters have been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 2, (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 63-154. A special letter in addition to the Fortnightly Letters, J.N. Collection.
2. By the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan Agreement signed in New Delhi on 8 April 1950, the Governments of India and Pakistan emphasized that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities was to the State of which they were citizens, and that it was to the Government of their own State that they should look for the redress of their grievances. Both Governments agreed to ensure complete equality of citizenship to minorities and extend all facilities to migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. The Agreement also provided that each Government would set up a commission of inquiry to enquire into and report on the causes and extent of the communal disturbances. In order to help to restore confidence, the two Governments also decided to depute two Ministers, one from each Government, to remain in the affected areas for such period as might be necessary, and to constitute separate minority commissions in East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam.

are. But I am quite sure that the mere fact of Agreement and this determined and sincere effort to turn the tide of events in a more hopeful direction is a good thing. It will bring immediate relief to millions of people who have lived or passed through disastrous happenings and for whom the future was terribly dark. That relief itself is something to be grateful for. We get time to consolidate this position and perhaps go some way in the right direction towards solving this most difficult problem.

Whatever the views of any person may be about the merits of particular clauses of the Agreement, the position we have to face, after the Agreement is signed, is clear. Personally, I think the Agreement is definitely a good one from every point of view and that it lays down the foundations of a future settlement. But, in any event, it is something which gives us a handle to work for better ends and it would be unfortunate in the extreme if we do not take full advantage of this. Having come to an Agreement, it should be accepted by all of us in the best of spirit and with a view to making it a living thing. There is no other way and no other alternative, except deliberately to aim at a big-scale conflict with whatever it may bring. There is no half-way house. I take it that almost everyone is agreed that we should avoid that conflict in so far as we can. If so, then we must of necessity give full support to this Agreement and implement it in letter and spirit.

There are many aspects of this communal problem. But perhaps the most important aspect is the psychological one, the prevalence of fear and hatred and passion. From no point of view can these emotions be justified, for they are weakening and disabling. This Agreement helps us to fight the psychology of fear. Let us take full advantage of it and let us do so with goodwill and not in a half-hearted way.

It is often said that we cannot trust the faith of the Government or the people of Pakistan. That may have some justification, though I think it is always wrong to treat a people in this way. Personally, I am convinced that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan is sincerely desirous of implementing this Agreement and trying to solve all the other problems between India and Pakistan. It is also well-known that the Prime Minister of Pakistan occupies a commanding position in that country and his word counts. We should accept that word of his and help him and help ourselves to implement it.

But quite apart from what Pakistan may or may not do, it appears to me incumbent on us to go ahead with this matter with all our strength and energy and goodwill. We are playing for very large stakes in which the future of our country and the well-being of millions of common folk are involved. We would be guilty of a gross betrayal if we temporized at this moment and allowed evil forces to have their way and merely looked on.

I earnestly trust therefore that your Government will do its utmost to implement this Agreement in every way and to make it perfectly clear that we stand by it to the full. We must try to capture the minds of the people and to influence them in this direction. We cannot do so by an attitude of cavilling and throwing the

blame on others. Others may be to blame, and if so, they will necessarily suffer the consequences of wrong-doing. But even that wrong-doing can be limited and controlled by us by our actions, if they are right. It has been a matter of great sorrow to us to learn of the sufferings of the minorities in East Bengal and elsewhere. But what has happened in some parts of our territory in India has been not only a matter of sorrow but a failure of responsibility. We must stop this.

The whole approach to this question must be a friendly one and not of blaming people. Only thus can we create an atmosphere that will help. We have to isolate the actual evil-doers who are not many. They flourish because they get a friendly atmosphere to work in.

I commend this Agreement to you and earnestly trust that you will seize hold of this opportunity which history offers us to stop the rot that was setting in and to turn the tide of events in a better direction.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III

New Delhi
15 April, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

Since I wrote to you my last fortnightly letter, I have already addressed to you another letter.² This was sent immediately after the conclusion of the Agreement between Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and me. This Agreement has been fully discussed in the press and you have no doubt studied it carefully.

2. It may be said that this Agreement has been generally welcomed in India, though without great enthusiasm, and with the exception of most people in West Bengal. It is easy to understand the reaction in the surcharged atmosphere of Bengal where people have suffered so much. The burden of much that has happened not only in the course of the last few months, but also since the partition, has fallen on West Bengal. I earnestly hope, however, that even people in West Bengal will gradually appreciate the good in the Agreement and will try to implement it to the full.

3. Two of my colleagues in the Central Cabinet, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Shri K.C. Neogy, offered their resignations on this occasion. Whatever their

1. File No. 25(6)-50-PMS.

2. See *ante*, item I.

differences of opinion might have been at an earlier stage, it seemed to me that after the conclusion of the Agreement, there could be only one course open to us and that was full implementation of it. I requested them, therefore, to reconsider and withdraw their resignations. I regret to say that they have expressed their inability to do so.³

4. It is clear that we have to implement this Agreement to the fullest in letter and spirit. Such indications as we have received from Pakistan go to show that the Pakistan Government is taking steps to implement the Agreement. The tone of the Pakistan press has changed very markedly for the better. A few unfortunate incidents have occurred, even after the signing of the Agreement, on the border between East and West Bengal. This is regrettable. But it is possible that new instructions had not reached those places till then. We are informed that clear and explicit instructions have been sent now and I hope that these border incidents as well as the harassment of migrants will cease. The West Bengal Government has also issued the necessary instructions.

5. For a considerable time past, almost since the partition, petty border incidents between East and West Bengal have taken place. The Radcliffe boundary⁴ was not a clear one and numerous petty disputes arose in regard to it. Some land thus became disputed territory and this was often the scene of these incidents. The Bagge Tribunal⁵ considered some of the more important of these disputes and gave its award, which was accepted by both parties. Unfortunately even that award was not quite complete and actual demarcation has to take place in some areas and so some kind of a doubt persists in regard to these small areas.

6. These border incidents attracted some attention previously. Ever since the new flare up in East and West Bengal, naturally every border incident has had much more importance attached to it. There is greater tension at the borders and large numbers of migrants are crossing them. Hence there has been greater possibility of incidents also.

7. One such incident, which was peculiarly sad, was the shooting down of a Calcutta medical student who was engaged in giving first-aid near the border to

3. The President accepted the resignations on 15 April 1950.

4. Cyril John Radcliffe, Chairman of the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commission, announced on 17 August 1947 the award demarcating the boundaries between India and Pakistan in the Punjab and Bengal.

5. The Bagge Tribunal was set up under the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 14 December 1948 to resolve boundary disputes between East and West Bengal and between East Bengal and Assam. Besides Algot Bagge, the other members of the tribunal were Chandrasekhara Aiyar, retired judge of the Madras High Court, and Justice Shahabuddin of the Dacca High Court. While the award announced on 4 February 1950 upheld India's claim over the disputed areas between Murshidabad and Rajshahi districts and about the course of the Kusiara river in East Bengal, its decision on the Mathabhanga issue favoured Pakistan. The award allowed the status quo to be maintained in the Patharia Hill forest areas.

refugees.⁶ Firing took place from the Pakistan side and this fourth-year student was killed. This took place about two or three weeks ago. The actual area where he was working was apparently disputed territory. It was a little over two miles in width and the railway crossed it.

8. A major incident took place in Kamalpur in Tripura,⁷ which is a township situated almost on the borders of East Bengal. A large number of Muslims left this township for East Bengal and then apparently came back and set fire to houses in the township. It is said that they were supported by some irregular forces from Pakistan. Considerable damage was done. This took place a little more than two weeks ago.

9. Some of the incidents on the border have been due to Muslim refugees coming back to recover some of their belongings. In doing so, they have sometimes tried to set fire to their old huts. There has naturally been conflict between them and the police on this side.

10. I think that these incidents are likely to cease before long, though one cannot guarantee that nothing will happen. The first effect of the Agreement should be a stoppage of this kind of conflict and violence, either private or official. Both sides are undoubtedly trying to put a stop to this and clear instructions have been issued accordingly. In regard to the little patches of disputed territory, we have suggested that these should be considered, for the present, as no-man's land, and the status quo should be maintained.

11. Whatever view one might take of the Agreement, one thing seems perfectly clear to me. Sardar Patel, in a very moving speech addressed to the Congress Party last evening, laid great stress on this aspect.⁸ This is the fact that having arrived at this Agreement, both our honour and self-interest demand that we should implement it to the full. Not to do so would not only discredit us but harm us greatly. To try to do so half-heartedly would be even worse, because we would get the discredit and no benefit at all. Therefore, even for those people who are not enthusiastic about the Agreement, the only right course is to work for its implementation. It is a relatively small matter whether some item of the Agreement might have been somewhat different or not. The main thing is the spirit underlying it and the effort to translate that spirit into action. If the spirit is absent, either on our side or that of Pakistan, then the Agreement fails. If there is that earnestness of spirit, then it does not matter much if some clause is not as good as it might have been. In the final analysis, this is a test of our faith in ourselves. Some people talk of the bona fides or the lack of it of Pakistan. That certainly is important.

6. Pakistan armed police opened fire on 31 March 1950 on a group of medical students and volunteers engaged in relief work at Jayanagar on the East Bengal border.

7. On 24 March 1950.

8. Patel exhorted the party members to strengthen the hands of Nehru and work for unity in the party and in the country so that a fair trial was given to the Agreement.

But essentially it is a question of our own faith and confidence in ourselves. If we have faith and are true to it, then we can wrest success even out of apparent failure. In other words, there can be no failure except our own failure from this point of view.

12. This may sound strange to some people, for memories are short, and we have forgotten already many of the lessons that Gandhiji taught us. In those days, which seem so far off now, we measured our action by our own faith and strength and not by what the opponent did. That opponent was out to check and counter us at every step. The lesson we learnt was that right action always strengthens, even though it might not produce the full result we desire. That right action, in order to produce results, must be based on faith in it and confidence in ourselves.

13. It is easy to criticize. But one has always to think of an alternative course of action, and often enough in public affairs, one has to choose the lesser evil. After this Agreement has been concluded, there is no alternative course of action left for anyone in India, except something that inevitably leads to disruption and chaos.

14. This rather negative line of argument leads to the conclusion that the Agreement must be implemented to the full. But I feel strongly that our case for the Agreement is not merely a negative one but a positive one. I cannot say what our future will be, for our path is full of difficulties and pitfalls. The passions of masses of people have been roused and we have seen behaviour which shames and degrades. We seem to be in the grip of elemental forces and long-suppressed emotions which suddenly erupt in volcanic outbursts. The difficulties are obvious. Nevertheless, even if this Agreement does not solve any problem to our satisfaction, it must necessarily help somewhat in its solution, provided we act correctly and as men and women of faith and determination.

15. There is no alternative to this course of action now. Was there an alternative before the Agreement was signed? I do not think so. The real alternative was only war. Some people talked about an exchange of populations. Any such exchange would have upset the whole fabric of our State in theory and in practice. It could not have been confined to any particular area. It would have spread gradually or suddenly to the whole of East and West Bengal and then to the rest of India.

16. At the same time, if some kind of automatic exchange becomes inevitable to some extent, the door is left open. We cannot force events by acting unrealistically and not recognizing the urge that is at present compelling masses of people to move. This urge will not suddenly stop, though it may ultimately lessen, because of the Agreement. Tens of thousands are already on the move and have uprooted themselves from their homes. They will not go back, at any rate, for the present. They will continue their unfortunate journey. Because of this, we have made this process as safe and as easy as possible in the circumstances. People can travel without danger and with their moveable property and jewellery and some cash. The rest of their property which they leave behind is protected or an attempt is

made to protect it. The door is left open for them to go back and regain their old property or to sell it or exchange it. Thus immediate fear and the loss of all they possessed is largely removed. That obviously is a considerable gain.

17. The migrations may continue in spite of this, though I think they will lessen and ultimately dry up, if we play our part properly. Even if they do not dry up, it cannot be said that the Agreement has failed, because it has eased the situation as between India and Pakistan and, more especially, eased it for these millions of people. We get a chance to breathe and work for a change for the better. Surely that is not a small gain, and it applies not only to the two Bengals and Assam, but also to States like the U.P. which had been gravely shaken by recent occurrences.

18. Before the Agreement was signed, the only real alternative was war. However much we may be opposed to war, unfortunately we cannot, in the present state of the world, rule it out. If we could rule it out, we would keep no army or navy or air force. Therefore, we keep prepared for any such contingency, however distasteful it might be. But let us be clear about the consequences of such a war. Most people, who have talked about it, have probably not realized at all what these consequences are. These consequences are terrible to contemplate. But apart from them, how far would war have solved the immediate problem before us? It is often said that war solves no problems in the modern world, even if it did so in ancient times. It is by no means easy to understand how we would have solved the problem that faces us in India by warlike measures. If we were compelled to resist by war, we would have had little choice and we would have had to accept this dreadful course of action, in spite of our bitter dislike of it. But it would have been a counsel of despair, leading to all kinds of unforeseen and disastrous consequences. So, if any alternative offered itself, we had to seize it. That alternative may not promise us the kind of success that we want, that is a solution of our present-day problems. But even if it takes us some way, it is worthwhile, and there is always the possibility of further advance towards a solution.

19. For my part, my mind is perfectly clear that we took the right step, both negatively and positively, and that any other step would have been harmful in the extreme. I have repeatedly spoken about this Agreement and the circumstances that surround it. Whatever I have said has not been, just as politicians say, to try to cover up our errors and find some excuses for our action. It has been the expression of my deeply felt thoughts. All of us had given earnest thought to this difficult situation that we had to face during these few months. Those of us who had the responsibility for decision on these vital issues at a moment of crisis in our history, bore a heavier burden and had to give their full mind and heart to this matter. I firmly believe that we did the right thing and I am equally firm in my belief that we must pursue this to the utmost limit. If it so happens that we fail in our endeavours, that will be our misfortune. But I see no reason why we should fail in spite of all that the pessimists and prophets of evil might say. In

any event, the die is cast and we cannot go back. To stand still is folly. We have therefore, to go ahead and do so with all our strength. We have to save ourselves not only from what Pakistan might do or not do, but also from ourselves. For, as things were, both Pakistan and we were heading straight towards a complete degradation of human behaviour. Out of that degradation, nothing good could come.

20. A criticism is made that we have deserted the minority in East Bengal by saying in the Agreement (Clause A) that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens. This was a truism and we have said it often enough before. But this does not and cannot get rid of the facts of the situation and of the intimate relationship that exists between many people in India and many people in Pakistan. In South Africa, we stood up as champions for people of Indian descent who are nationals of South Africa and who had been deprived of certain rights which we consider as inalienable human rights. How much more must we feel about those who are far more intimately connected with us, but who, by a turn of fate, became nationals of another country. We can neither ignore them nor forget them nor leave them to suffer by themselves.

21. We have been accused of appeasement of Pakistan. The word has a bad odour and a bad history. I do not myself see where appeasement comes in, either on the side of the Government or the people. If anything that is not war is appeasement, then perhaps we have appeased. It would be equally true to say that Pakistan has tried to appease us. If an attempt to prevent a reversion to barbarism is appeasement, then perhaps the charge is true. But we learnt long ago in the school of Gandhi that there can be firmness with decency, and even conflict with the hand of friendship never withdrawn. That is not weakness, for if it is so, then Gandhi might be termed weak. And yet we all know that he was the bravest man that we have known and that he would never give in where high principle was concerned. How far we have moved from those days, when a handful of us could challenge an empire, and challenge it with a smile on our faces and with little of ill will in our hearts! The strength lay in us then, not outside, and so nobody could ultimately defeat us.

22. So, at this moment of crisis, we cannot and must not falter. We must show the discipline of a united nation and the confidence of a people, sure of their cause. If we do so, no harm can come to us and we shall be able to serve not only the nation as a whole but those unfortunate and suffering friends of ours who live beyond the frontiers of present-day India.

23. If this is the choice we have made, and there is no other, then the work has to be undertaken with right goodwill. For Congressmen, more especially, it is a challenge and a test after their own hearts. If they have anything of the old spirit left, if they still believe in the ideals that moved them and which created human earthquakes in this country, then all is well. Even a small number of brave men and women can change the fate of a nation. But we are many. So why should any of us be down-hearted and pessimistic? We must go out to the people and

repeat to them the old truths, which never grow old, and carry the torch which lightened not only their burden but other burdens also. Let us tell the people the truth and pull them back from wrong thoughts and wrong action. But before we do so to others, we have to do this to ourselves. Only then can we influence others.

24. We talk of the implementation of the Agreement and we can do so literally by carrying out the provisions laid down in its various clauses. But that is not enough, for we are struggling to capture something that is in the minds and hearts of our people as well as the people of Pakistan. And so our actions must not be confined to the mere clauses of the Agreement, but to interpret the spirit that underlies it. When we deal with human beings, whether individually or *en masse*, the way of approach should not be that of the pettifogging lawyer or attorney. We have to be careful, of course, as responsible persons, not to sacrifice any national interest. But, at the same time, our approach has to be generous in order to draw out generosity and goodwill from others. Therefore, our words and writing and actions should be attuned to this end. A grave responsibility rests with the press. It would be unfair of me to criticize the press generally, for most newspapers have been very helpful. But there are some exceptions and it has amazed me to read with what bitterness of spirit and narrowness of vision they deal with matters of the gravest import.

25. Yesterday our Parliament passed the new evacuee property law.⁹ These laws of Pakistan and India are a mirror of our relationship, which has grown more and more strange and abnormal. In the circumstances, step by step, they became inevitable. Nevertheless, they are very extraordinary. These laws are not to blame, but rather that odd relationship that has developed during the last two years and a half. We are trying to come to grips with that relationship and to straighten out its crooked curves. Sometime or other, this will have to be done. That is inevitable, whatever shape it may take. If so, the sooner we do it, the better, and we might as well take advantage of the present moment to try to straighten it out as much as we can. The problem of evacuee property has been a difficult and intricate problem and millions of displaced persons have suffered because of this. We have tried repeatedly to come to some arrangement with Pakistan in regard to it, but have had little response. Meanwhile, these evacuee property laws come on our statute books and affect and upset the lives of large numbers of people. This is a big question to be dealt with later and separately. But it is important that in the application and working out of these laws and regulations, we should remember the spirit of the Agreement that has been arrived at. The whole object of that Agreement is to create conditions of security and peaceful and progressive living for all minorities. Anything that disturbs that security goes against the spirit of that Agreement. Therefore, it is necessary that the administration of these laws

9. The administration of Evacuee Property Act defined evacuees and evacuee property and laid down principles for the disposal of such property.

should be very carefully scrutinized and every appearance of injustice or hardship should be avoided. It may be that a few guilty persons escape. It is far more important that the innocent do not suffer. Therefore, Custodians of Evacuee Property all over the country should be directed to bear this Agreement in mind all the time and function with moderation. Let us see during the next two or three months how events develop and let us do nothing to prevent their developing in the right direction. This applies to the permit system also between India and Pakistan.

26. In the course of the next few days a delegation is going from Delhi to Karachi to discuss trade matters between the two countries.¹⁰ For some months now, trade between India and Pakistan has been at a standstill. Some talks on these matters took place between the officials of the two countries when the Prime Minister of Pakistan was here. It was decided then to continue the talks as soon as possible and we agreed to send our officials to Karachi for this purpose.

27. You will have seen that we have accepted the appointment of Sir Owen Dixon as mediator in Kashmir. So has Pakistan, and I suppose that he will come to India sometime early in May. Sir Owen Dixon is an eminent judge of the High Court of Australia and has a high reputation for learning and integrity.

28. The budget session of our Parliament will end within a few days. Before it does so, we have to pass a Representation of the People Bill.¹¹ This is necessary so that arrangements for the general elections might proceed as rapidly as possible. I have often written to you about the necessity for holding these elections early next year. We cannot possibly afford to delay them. A certain conflict arises between these elections and the census which also will take place early next year. It is proposed to hold the elections soon after the census. This might mean that the elections will be held sometime in April 1951.

29. The President and I are going to Dhanbad next week to open one of our major scientific laboratories, the Fuel Research Institute.¹² Among the many disappointments that we have had, there is at least one achievement for which we can take credit and that is the advance of scientific research in this country. Our new laboratories are magnificent institutions of which any country can be proud. In this connection, I should like to draw your attention to a certain tendency which is doing harm to science. This is a tendency towards separation of research from teaching. This is accentuated in India by the separation of most research institutes from the universities. Even from the point of view of governmental organization, they are separate. It seems to me essential that there should be the closest co-ordination between research institutes and universities. Also that we should

10. From 19 to 21 April 1950.

11. The Bill passed on 20 April 1950 prescribed the strength of the Lok Sabha, the State Legislatures and the upper houses and laid down norms for the preparation of electoral rolls, delimitation of constituencies and the qualifications of the voters.

12. The Central Fuel Research Institute was inaugurated on 22 April 1950. See *ante*, pp. 188-191.

encourage research work in universities. After all, our major research institutes must be fed from the universities and if the universities dry up, then the research institutes cannot survive for long.

30. One of the unfortunate consequences of the upheavals following partition has been the large number of students who were affected by it. A question has arisen as to whether these students can appear at university examinations as private candidates and without attending the normal number of lectures. I am all against lowering the standards of our universities and I dislike the private student system. The advantage of going to a university cannot be obtained by merely reading books and passing examinations. Nevertheless, I would like you to consider how far we can accommodate these refugee students as private candidates. I would not like the standards to be lowered for them. It may be necessary that the interval between the two examinations might be slightly increased for them. Thus the normal two years' course in a university might be increased to three for those who are attending evening classes, etc. I hope your Education Department and the universities in your State will pay heed to the needs of these students.

31. I hope to send you separately a summary of the programme of the Chinese Communist Government. This will be in their own language. China is of great importance in Asia and in the world today and it is necessary that we should know what they stand for, or, at any rate, what they say they stand for.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III'

New Delhi
2 May, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

The dominating feature of the past fortnight, as of the fortnight before it, was what might be called the Bengal situation. Everywhere people watched, with varying degrees of hope and apprehension, the results that flowed from the Agreement of 8th April. It is difficult to measure these consequences, though there are some tests which can be applied. One obvious test is that of the exodus. There was, to begin with, a fairly marked falling off in the exodus both ways in Bengal and Assam. Then figures rose again and now there is a tendency for these figures to go down, though not very greatly.

1. File No. 25(6)-50-PMS.

2. Two contrary forces are at play. One is the increased confidence of people to stay or to return. The other is fear, if not so much of the present, then of the future, and therefore to take advantage of present conditions to migrate. Thus while the Agreement and what has followed certainly bring some measure of confidence, at the same time it facilitates people's migrations, because conditions to do so are much easier and a good deal of moveable property, including jewellery, etc., can be brought over. There is thus a feeling of moving across the border while the going is good. One fact, however, which is not sufficiently publicized, is that a fairly considerable number of Hindus are returning from West Bengal to East Bengal. Thus the latest figures of Hindu migrations from East Bengal to West Bengal are about 12,000 a day. Hindus going back to East Bengal from West Bengal have numbered between 3,000 to 4,000 a day. That is a fairly substantial number, though not much. So far as Muslims are concerned, their exodus is much less from West Bengal than it used to be. Indeed, the exodus of Muslims from the U.P. and Rajputana to West Pakistan has been almost as big and has caused us a good deal of worry.

3. There is no doubt that the Agreement and what has followed it have changed the whole atmosphere of India and Pakistan. It has brought immediate relief to millions and a certain glimmering hope for the future. It is also true that Governments on both sides are trying their utmost to implement the Agreement. All the information that has come to me, as well as my personal observation, go to show that the Pakistan Government is determined to implement the Agreement. I was myself witness to a certain measure of popular enthusiasm in Karachi when I visited that city recently.²

4. All this is to the good and is a basic gain which no one can take away. The change in atmosphere was indeed so sudden that it appeared almost miraculous in some places. Newspapers, which had been breathing hatred and violence, became full of the milk of human kindness. Whatever the future may show, even the gains achieved in the present are remarkable and cannot be washed away. Nevertheless, it is perfectly true that fear and uncertainty of the future fill the minds of the Hindus in East Bengal and, to some extent, of the Muslims in West Bengal and parts of the U.P., etc. There have been no incidents at all in the U.P. excepting some trouble that took place at the time of the *Holi*.³ And yet the U.P. migrations had continued. This shows this basic fear and a sense of insecurity. We have a hard fight ahead of us against this sense of fear.

5. People who have given any thought to this matter realize the importance of the Agreement and the fact that there was no alternative to it except something which led to catastrophe and disaster.


2. On 26 and 27 April 1950.

3. There were disturbances in Aligarh, Moradabad, Pilibhit and Bareilly.

His Excellency Mr. Sukarno
President
Djakarta

We have had ten wonderful days in
Indonesia and we are very sad at
coming away. We carry away
precious memories which we shall
we shall cherish. We are ~~very~~
deeply grateful to you and your
precious wife, to your colleagues
in government, and to the people of
Indonesia for all the friendship,
affection and hospitality they have
showered upon us and the
good will they have shown to my
country. We shall always think
of the charming and gifted people
of Indonesia with affection.
Merdeka and forward to
seeing them again.
J. Woodruff Nelson

17/4/50



LAYING THE FOUNDATION-STONE OF MAHATMA GANDHI MEMORIAL,
SINGAPORE, 18 JUNE 1950

6. I paid a very brief visit to Karachi on the 26th and 27th April. I discussed with the Prime Minister of Pakistan many questions relating to this Agreement, as well as other matters of importance, which included Kashmir and the evacuee property question. Not much progress was made regarding Kashmir. But in regard to evacuee properties, I felt that we had succeeded in opening a door which has been shut for too long and that it would be possible to make some progress before long. It was not possible for me, in the short time at my disposal in Karachi, to discuss these matters in detail. The general principles were considered and I expressed the hope that we might, as far as possible, apply the rules that we had laid down for Bengal to West Pakistan and India.⁴ This is a difficult and intricate matter and all kinds of new and rather novel laws come into existence. I feel, however, that we shall be able to go ahead before long. We are considering this new approach to this problem now and probably there will be a special conference between the two countries to consider the evacuee properties.

7. I might mention that the International Red Cross of Geneva are sending a number of doctors and medical stores worth nearly 20 lakhs of rupees for Bengal and Assam. They are making this generous gift to us, and separately to Pakistan, and all that we have to pay is the air passage money of the doctors. We have gladly agreed to this proposal.

8. The ice has also been broken between India and Pakistan in regard to trade. The trade agreement⁵ is useful and helpful to both us and Pakistan. It does not go very far, but it does make a big difference and I hope that another step in advance will be taken soon.

9. The Education Ministry have suggested that the Inspectorates of Education in the States should be utilized to promote communal understanding in educational institutions. I think this is an excellent suggestion. I think also that our senior students, during their holidays, might well devote themselves to this highly important task. Whatever our views may be about political or economic problems, any man or woman with any sense will realize that no progress can be made unless we have this communal understanding. This is a challenge to us, and if we fail in this challenge we dub ourselves as backward and little-minded people lacking the culture that makes a nation grow and prosper.

10. The challenge is there, not so much from Pakistan, but from those of our own people who can only think and act on the strictly communal plane. It is

4. The Bengal Agreement liberalized conditions for removal of household effects including jewellery and cash, restored rights of ownership of immovable property and allowed the sale and exchange of such property.

5. A short-term agreement for three months was signed in Karachi on 21 April 1950 by which India agreed to supply certain essential commodities like cotton textiles, jute manufactures, mustard oil and steel in exchange for supply by Pakistan of 800,000 bales of raw jute. To avoid currency difficulties, both sides agreed that the transaction would be in rupees through a special account maintained in India.

extraordinary how soon many of us have forgotten one of the basic principles and planks of the Congress—inter-communal unity—for which we laboured ever since Gandhiji came on the political scene more than thirty years ago. The issue is a clear one, though attempts are made to befog it. We have talked about a secular State. Often enough, those who talked most about it have understood it least and belied it by their own words and actions. We have to decide firmly and precisely what we stand for in this important matter. There can be no half-way house and no sitting on the fence. Nor can we adopt a high philosophical attitude and allow matters to take their course. That is not the way of free men and women or of people who want to mould their destiny and not be mere playthings of forces they cannot control. Therefore, for all of us in India, and more especially Congressmen and Congresswomen, this issue of communal unity and a secular State must be made perfectly clear. We have played about with this idea sufficiently long and have moved away from it far enough. We must go back and go back not secretly or apologetically, but openly and rather aggressively, though with all courtesy. The Working Committee of the Congress has, of course, supported the Agreement and reiterated its old policy. But something more is necessary and that is for all Congress Committees to take this up as a question having first priority and as something which has been the very basis and foundation of our struggle for freedom. There can be no compromise on this issue, for any compromise can only mean a surrender of our principles and a betrayal of the cause of India's freedom. It must be remembered that once we surrender, even in part, on this issue, then disruptive forces come into play and carry this process further and further. Our society has for long ages past been very loosely knit with all kinds of inner divisions. Gandhiji and the great Congress movement broke down many of these inner walls and built up a widespread structure which symbolized the unity of India on every plane, though it had not interfered with the rich diversity of our country.

11. In olden days our loose-knit society had both an element of weakness and an element of strength in it and because of this strength it survived. In conditions as they exist today, no such loose-knit society could survive for long. If, therefore, we let loose disruptive forces, they will be too powerful for us to control and they will go much further than anyone can possibly imagine now. Therefore, quite apart from principle and our well-established policy, even a small degree of wisdom and foresight should convince us that there is only one way for free India to take and that is the way of breaking down barriers amongst ourselves, and more especially barriers put up in the name of religion or caste. All these barriers weaken the nation at a time when the utmost unity and strength are necessary, both from the domestic and the international points of view.

12. Whatever the consequences of the Agreement of April 8th, there can be no doubt that it has enhanced our prestige all over the world. It has also given us confidence in ourselves, because we solved the problem with our own unaided efforts and not relying upon a third party. It is very seldom that two countries,

inflamed with passion, going to the brink of war, pull themselves up and deliberately walk in a different direction. The real thing that counts ultimately for a people is their inner strength. The processes that were going on before the Agreement were snapping that strength and making us, as they made Pakistan, full of fear and hatred. The mere stopping of those processes is gain enough and strengthens us for further advance in future.

13. We have many problems to face, but for the present the most important and basic problem is the implementation of the Agreement in spirit and letter. In spirit, I would like to emphasize, because the letter by itself does not help much. The most pleasing feature of the past few weeks has been the psychological change and this is more important than even practical consequences. We have to take advantage of this new situation and not allow it to relapse. Governments and the machinery of the State can help very greatly in this. They will help only if all of them are imbued with a certain crusading zeal and a firm faith in the principles we stand for.

14. Parliament passed the Representation of People Bill just before it adjourned. This was to facilitate arrangements being made for the general elections. I repeat what I have said before that these elections must be held in the early part of next year and before the monsoon. This is of the highest importance, and I am sorry that some States do not quite appreciate this urgency. We have impressed this upon our Election Commissioner, Shri Sukumar Sen, and I would like you to impress this upon your officers concerned with this business. Our Election Commissioner will be visiting a number of States to discuss these coming elections and the preparations that have to be made for them. I hope you will give every cooperation to him in this task.

15. Some little time ago our representatives went to South Africa to discuss the proposed round table conference.⁶ On the whole, that meeting was a successful one, though it did not produce any substantial result. It is most unfortunate that the South African Union Government should persist in passing legislation which is harmful to Indians and others there.⁷ It seems to me clear that if the South

6. The Indian, Pakistani and South African delegates meeting in Cape Town recommended that a round table conference be convened to explore means to settle the Indian question in South Africa.

7. The discriminatory legislative enactments of the South African Government between February and July 1950 were the Group Areas Act providing for the separation of different ethnic groups and races, the amended Asiatic Land Tenure Act which introduced segregation for the purpose of trade and extended its application to areas other than Natal, and the Population Registration Act providing for compulsory registration and issue of identity cards to all citizens to emphasize racial differences.

African Government insists on this, then the whole basis for a round table conference is knocked out. We are in communication with the South African Government.⁸

16. I hope you saw or read the statement I made in regard to the Fair Wages Bill.⁹ We attach great importance to this, but unfortunately we could not pass it during the last session of Parliament. We hope to publish the Bill soon for public information and criticism.

17. After considerable thought certain decisions have been taken in regard to cotton policy for the next year.¹⁰ It has become essential for us to grow our own cotton. Otherwise, we are dependent upon foreign sources. We, therefore, wish to encourage cotton cultivation. Certain decisions have been taken by the Government of India in this respect and they have no doubt been communicated to you. Generally speaking, we are convinced that there should be no decontrol of cotton prices at present. We have suggested the remission of land revenue on additional land brought under cotton cultivation.

18. I have practically decided to visit Indonesia early in June. Just about this time, our naval squadron consisting of a cruiser¹¹ and some destroyers, etc., had organized a cruise in South East Asia waters. At the request of the Navy, I have agreed to go to Indonesia in our cruiser. We shall sail probably from Cochin on the 2nd June. I shall spend about 8 days in Indonesia and return by air, stopping at Singapore and Rangoon on the way.

19. Parliament ended in the course of the last fortnight after passing a great deal of legislation. The next session is not likely to take place before late August or September.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. The Indian Government in their *aide memoire* of 5 April 1950 had called upon the South African Government not to proceed with the Group Areas Bill and prosecution of Indians under the Asiatic Land Tenure Amendment Act pending the holding of the round table conference. In their note of 29 April, the Government of India, regretting the South African Government's refusal to comply with their request, stated that action under these enactments was "bound to create an impression that segregation is the settled and irrevocable policy of the Union Government, and that the only purpose of the proposed round table conference can be to discuss compulsory repatriation of Indians from South Africa."

9. See *ante*, pp. 221-222.

10. On 2 May 1950, the Government announced remission of land revenue and provision of other incentives to cotton-growers and asked the State Governments to remove all restrictions on cotton growing and provide irrigation facilities for it.

11. INS *Delhi*.

IV¹

New Delhi
17 May, 1950

My dear Chief Ministers,

Since I wrote to you last, a change has taken place in the Central Cabinet.² In accordance with the new Constitution, a new Council of Ministers had to be formed. Normally this should have been done soon after the new Constitution came into effect. But we were then at the beginning of our budget session and it was not at all desirable to effect any change at that stage. Other disturbing events followed in East and West Bengal. At last, this long overdue change was brought about early this month. I submitted my resignation as well as the Cabinet's resignation to the President,³ and he was good enough to charge me with the duty of forming a new Cabinet. I accepted that charge and presented a list of names to him.⁴ This list, as you know, contained the names of many old colleagues. There were already two vacancies in the Cabinet at that time due to the resignation of Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Shri K.C. Neogy.

2. At the time of presenting this list, it was stated that Dr John Matthai had expressed his desire to resign from his office of Minister, but had agreed to stay on till the end of the month. Shri Mohanlal Saksena had actually sent in his resignation to me sometime earlier.⁵ At my request, he also agreed to stay on till the end of the month. A third Minister who will go out of the Cabinet at the end of the month is Shri Jairamdas Doulatram. He is going to undertake the very difficult charge of the Governorship of Assam. The new Ministers are: Shri C. Rajagopalachari and Shri Sri Prakasa, both of whom will come about the end of the month, and Shri Hare Krushna Mahtab, till recently Chief Minister of Orissa, and Shri K.M. Munshi.

3. The Government that resigned early this month had been in existence since the 15th August, 1947, the day of the coming of our independence. As a matter of fact, many of them had been in office since September 1946, when for the first time we came into Government.⁶ Ever since August 1947, this Cabinet had continued, with minor changes and additions.⁷ This was a fairly long period for

1. File No. 25(6)-50-PMS.

2. On 6 May 1950.

3. On 5 May 1950.

4. The list included the names of Hare Krushna Mahtab, K.M. Munshi and C.C. Biswas. C. Rajagopalachari was also invited to join the Cabinet.

5. On 30 April 1950.

6. These included Vallabhbhai Patel, Baldev Singh, John Matthai and Jagjivan Ram. Maulana Azad had joined the Ministry in December 1946.

7. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and N.V. Gadgil had joined on 14 August 1947, Gopalaswami Ayyangar in September 1947 and Jairamadas Doulatram in December 1947.

a Cabinet to continue more or less unchanged. During this period the Cabinet had to face very severe crises and shouldered heavy responsibilities. It will be for the historian to judge subsequently how we discharged our task. No doubt we committed mistakes, but I think that it can be said with truth that we worked to the utmost of our capacity and ability and with the desire to serve India during this very difficult period of our history. I am sorry that one of the most eminent members of our Cabinet, Dr John Matthai, is leaving us. His high reputation for ability and integrity was a great asset to our Government and he has been throughout these years one of the strongest pillars of our Government.

4. I am sorry also that Shri Mohanlal Saksena is leaving us. His Ministry of Rehabilitation has often been severely criticized and its faults and errors of commission have been pointed out. Perhaps no Ministry had to deal with such difficult human problems as the Ministry of Rehabilitation. In criticizing this Ministry, we are apt to forget the great achievements to its credit and only think of what has not been done. The problem of dealing with millions of displaced human beings, many of them in a state of great physical and mental distress, involved a continuous and tremendous strain on those responsible for its solution. Our first Minister of Rehabilitation was Shri K.C. Neogy, who worked hard and conscientiously and achieved good results. But after a period the strain was too great on him and we decided to change his portfolio. This burden was subsequently shouldered by Shri Mohanlal Saksena and his advisers and colleagues. The problem of rehabilitating large numbers of people still remains, but it is worth while to find out what has already been done in this line, for the achievements are remarkable, if we compare the conditions of today with the conditions that existed three and a half years ago.

5. It must be remembered that we have had to face not only the immediate and colossal consequences of the partition, but also a continuous stream of refugees coming to India during these three years. In the last half of 1947, huge migrations took place between Western Pakistan and India. That was the basic problem and it was a problem of staggering dimensions. But this business did not stop there. Migrations continued, though on a lesser scale from Sind and from East Bengal throughout 1948 and a large part of 1949. As a result, practically the entire Hindu and Sikh population of Sind, with the exception of about one hundred fifty thousand Hindus, including about one hundred thousand people of the scheduled classes, left Sind for India. Also over a million and a half Hindus left East Bengal for India. Thus, the burden on the Ministry of Rehabilitation was a continuing and an ever-growing one. During the last few months, we have seen another upheaval in East and West Bengal and Assam and huge migrations again in those areas, as well as from Uttar Pradesh.

6. Thus, the problem of rehabilitation is very far from solved, though a great deal has been done. We have gained experience and we can deal with the problem now in a more methodical way.

7. The new Ministers who have joined the Government or who are going to join it soon are all able and experienced men, well-known to the public life of India. They are leading Congressmen and some of them have held high posts in the administration of the country. I welcome specially Shri C. Rajagopalachari who has consented, not without reluctance, to come out of his retirement to serve the country. I felt that I was justified in requesting him to do so because of his ripe wisdom and the need for that wisdom in the affairs of the country today. I am grateful to him for his agreeing to join us at great personal inconvenience.

8. The new Cabinet is facing our problems with good heart and the new Ministers who have already joined have brought energy and vitality to their task. I am sure that all of us will pull together as a team and face our problems and difficulties with courage and confidence.

9. The two dominating issues at present are Indo-Pakistan relations with all their ramifications, and the economic policy to be pursued in this country. The Agreement of April 8th, 1950 brought about a radical change in our approach to the former problem. The Agreement itself, though important and with far-reaching results, was really only a part of the big psychological change that came into evidence immediately afterwards. No one can presume to say that we have gone far in solving the various problems between India and Pakistan. They are difficult and intricate and the legacy of the past pursues us. There is Kashmir about which the two viewpoints differ radically and no obvious solution is in prospect. So far as we are concerned, our position is clear and we have already shown our spirit of accommodation to the utmost limit. There is little room for us to say anything more. Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. mediator, is due here sometime this month⁸.

10. The other issues between us and Pakistan are being tackled now in a different spirit. No great progress has been made thus far, but this new approach promises substantial results, in regard to both the evacuee property problem and canal waters.

11. The Agreement of April 8 related chiefly to East and West Bengal and Assam, and the major test of the implementation of that Agreement was its effect on migrations of people from one country to another. There has undoubtedly been an improvement in this matter, but I am afraid the improvement has not been quite so marked as we had hoped. One of the reasons for this, of course, is that facilities for travelling and carrying moveable property and jewellery have encouraged people to cross the border. A significant feature of this traffic of people between East and West Bengal is the growing number of persons who are going back to their old province or homes. This is undoubtedly a healthy sign. To give you an instance: from the 11th to the 12th May, 10,534 Hindus came to West Bengal from East Bengal. On the same day, 6,041 Hindus went to East Pakistan by railway from West Bengal. Of these 6,041 Hindus, a little over 2,000 were women and children.

8. He arrived in New Delhi on 27 May 1950.

It is probable that many people are going back in order to get their properties or bring some of their belongings, but it is highly unlikely that such large numbers of women and children would go back unless they intended remaining in East Bengal. Thus, it may be said that quite a substantial number of Hindus are returning to East Bengal.

12. During the same period, i.e., from 11th to 12th May, 4,664 Muslims left West Bengal for East Pakistan. At the same time, 2,509 Muslims came back to West Bengal from East Pakistan. Thus, both in the case of Hindus and Muslims, there is a marked flow back of population. We get many reports still of petty incidents occurring in East Bengal, and sometimes in West Bengal, which harass the minorities. But generally speaking, conditions may be said to have improved.

13. The latest figures received of the exodus on either side confirm this improvement as also the growing tendency of migrants to return to their homes. On the 15th/16th May, 7,843 Hindus came to West Bengal from East Bengal, while 4,821 Hindus left by train for East Pakistan from West Bengal. In this figure of 4,821, there were 1,500 women and children. On the same day, 3,446 Muslims left West Bengal for East Pakistan and 2,054 Muslims arrived in West Bengal from East Pakistan. Of the latter figure, over 900 were women and children.

14. One unhealthy feature of the situation has been the continuation of the exodus of Muslims from the U.P. and surrounding areas to Western Pakistan. This averaged four thousand a day, then it went down to two thousand, and then it rose again to five thousand and over. There has not been any incident in the U.P. for over two and a half months and yet this exodus has continued. Partly this was due to a mistaken belief that there was plenty of work at high wages in West Pakistan. But undoubtedly it is partly due to the atmosphere of fear which has affected minorities in various parts of Pakistan and India. The U.P. Government has tried its utmost to check this exodus and Congress workers have also helped in this process. We have also announced⁹ that all the Muslims who have gone from India to West Pakistan since the beginning of March can come back and be reinstated in their old properties.¹⁰ This is an application of the principle we have accepted for the two Bengals. The Pakistan Government has recently announced that it will prevent any further ingress into West Pakistan of people from India.¹¹ We have pointed out to them¹² that this may well have a contrary effect. In fact, the moment there was a rumour of this, the exodus increased because people felt they would not have a chance of going later.

9. On 13 May 1950.

10. To facilitate the process of scrutiny and verification of the claims of Muslim migrants, India requested Pakistan to furnish a complete list of such persons before 31 December 1950.

11. On 12 May, Pakistan decided to seal its border from 20 May 1950.

12. On 13 May 1950.

15. Early this month, a rather remarkable gathering took place in Delhi. This was a joint meeting of the newspaper editors conferences of India and Pakistan.¹³ A large number of Pakistan editors came and fraternized with the Indian editors. The whole proceedings were remarkable for their friendliness and desire to co-operate in bringing about normal relations between India and Pakistan. Generally speaking, it may be said that the press of India and Pakistan has behaved well and helped in implementing the Agreement of April 8th. Unfortunately, there are a few exceptions still.

16. It is difficult to have exact figures of the migrations during the last three or four months. But such information as we possess indicates that upto now about 17 lakhs of non-Muslims have crossed over from East Bengal to India, i.e., to West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. During the same period, about 7 lakhs of Muslims have crossed over from India (i.e., West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, as well as U.P., Rajasthan, etc.) to East and West Pakistan.

17. Among the new Ministers appointed is Shri C.C. Biswas, Central Minister in terms of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement. On behalf of Pakistan, Dr Malik has been appointed. These two Central Ministers are meeting in Calcutta¹⁴ and drawing up their procedure and programme of work. They are both starting with the fixed intention of co-operating with each other in the solution of the problems they have to deal with.

18. There has been a resumption of goods traffic between India and Pakistan and the trade talks have also resulted in some agreement.

19. It may be said, therefore, that, on the whole, we are progressing in the right direction, though the pace is rather slow and many hurdles remain. Unfortunately, some of the speeches delivered by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the United States¹⁵ have not always been happy in so far as Indo-Pakistan relations are concerned and there has been a good deal of criticism in the press of India in regard to them. Nevertheless, our main approach to this problem must remain the same. We have to choose between two basic approaches: one may be called the general Congress approach representing the Congress viewpoint in regard to communal matters during the last thirty years or more, and the other is the communal approach which is ideologically represented by the Hindu Mahasabha and like organizations. There are variations and gradations in between the two. But the choice is ultimately between these two. Because of the fact that Pakistan, from its very inception, has functioned in a communal way, we have naturally been

13. See *ante*, pp. 90-99.

14. On 17 May 1950.

15. Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States from 3 to 26 May 1950. On 5 May 1950, he said in Washington that Pakistan would welcome a U.S. guarantee of its "territorial integrity." Two days later, at a press conference, he again stated that Pakistan needed the guarantee because of "possible aggression from India."

affected by it and I regret to say that large numbers of our people, including Congressmen, have become rather communal-minded. That reaction is understandable, but it is not a right reaction if we judge it from the Congress point of view. To function along the old Congress lines does not mean weakness or appeasement; the old Congress was neither weak nor compromising where fundamental issues were concerned. But it did approach its problems, whether they were communal or Indo-British, in a particular way which Gandhiji had taught us. That way was not only ideologically correct, but, as events have shown, practically good and yielded results.

20. During the last two and a half years or more we have gradually drifted, because of the pressure of circumstances, towards a communal reaction to the communal problem. That way lay no solution, but only a continuous and mutual deterioration. We have pulled ourselves up and we have seen how popular sentiment, both in India and Pakistan, has reacted favourably to this change. This shows the way people's minds work and how they welcome any opportunity for cooperation and peace. Where principles are concerned, we have to be firm and unyielding, but in so far as the approach is concerned, if we have to follow what Gandhiji told us and what the Congress attempted to practise, we have to be friendly, co-operative, and even generous. Friendliness and generosity do not mean giving up anything which is vital, but represent a state of the mind which inevitably produces like results.

21. There is no doubt that the Indo-Pakistan Agreement and its immediate consequences produced marked results all over the world and increased our stature as it increased also the stature of Pakistan. The contrary approach, which may be said to be represented by the Hindu Mahasabha and like organizations, is not only completely negative but is essentially based on vague ideas of violence, hatred and conflict, in the hope that out of all this something good might possibly come. That is neither sensible nor logical nor good morals nor good policy. It is an adolescent way of thinking and action, giving way to an urge of the moment without thinking where it might lead to.

22. The second major problem, to which I have referred, is that of economic policy. That is undoubtedly the basic problem of the country. I am glad that in dealing with it we have the advantage of the advice of the Planning Commission. This Planning Commission, consisting of eminent and earnest men devoted to their work, is likely to be of the greatest help to Government in arriving at conclusions and in drawing up policy for the future. The Planning Commission has the advantage of viewing the entire picture as a whole and not losing itself in small parts of it. I drew your attention, in my last letter,¹⁶ to the planning conference that had taken

16. In fact, no such reference was made in the letter of 2 May 1950. For Nehru's speech at the National Planning Conference on 4 May 1950 which was attended by Chief Ministers, see *ante*, pp. 209-213.

place in Delhi. This planning conference passed a number of resolutions¹⁷ and also adopted generally a long memorandum¹⁸ which was placed before it by the Congress Planning Committee. You must have received both these resolutions and the memorandum. I shall send them to you again, because I should like you and your Government and officers to consider them with care. While the Planning Commission is not committed to this memorandum, it views it with a large measure of agreement. This conference laid stress on various activities on behalf of Government and the public. In particular, it pointed out that it was essential to activate the public if any great results were to be obtained. The Commission will probably address you on this subject separately and make some suggestions for your consideration and comment. One of the important subjects for us to consider is that of integration of rural and industrial economy.

23. Government is often criticized and a healthy criticism is to be welcomed. But there has been an increasing tendency on the part of industry and business to criticize Government in unrestrained terms. Recently, the Bombay Millowners' Association did so and made certain proposals which were certainly to the advantage of the millowners, whatever other results may have flowed from them.¹⁹ But what struck me as unfortunate was the possible consequence of this criticism in creating alarm in the minds of the farmers. Whoever else may be liable to criticism, I do not think the millowners can possibly consider themselves blameless. I think that our friends in business and industry have shown a lack of restraint in their utterances and in their criticisms which is unfortunate because it creates those very conditions which they deplore.

24. There has recently been held a meeting of Foreign Ministers in London which has attracted a good deal of attention.²⁰ This meeting dealt with the

17. The resolutions passed on 25 and 26 April suggested measures such as lifting of unnecessary controls, intensification of the land reclamation programme, encouragement of cultivation of cotton and jute and of increase in the yield of agricultural produce, restriction on import of consumer goods, promotion of exports, welfare of labour and encouragement of cotton and village industries for the planned development of the country.
18. The memorandum envisaged an integrated development of the rural and the industrial sectors within the broad framework of a decentralized co-operative economy. It was adopted by the planning conference on 25 April 1950 as part of an "Objectives" resolution.
19. On 7 May 1950, the Bombay Millowners' Association criticized the Government's policy on cotton as offering no inducement to the farmers to shift to the cultivation of cotton. It asked the Government to lift the control on the price of cloth and yarn and to stop the closure of mills and consequent unemployment.
20. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France, in a communique issued on 13 May after meeting for three days, expressed a keen desire to see the return of the Germans to "the community of free peoples" of Europe, but regretted that the Soviet refusal to permit the people of its occupied zone to rejoin their fellow countrymen gave little hope of a peace treaty with Germany which could pave the way for emergence of a democratic and united Germany.

problems of Europe and also probably of South East Asia. It is rather odd, in the context of today, for a number of western powers to discuss and try to decide policies in regard to Asia, without consulting Asian countries.²¹ It has not apparently been fully realized yet by them that no policy affecting Asia can be successful without the full cooperation of Asian countries. So far as we are concerned, we want to be friendly with every country, but we do not propose to be bound down by any decisions to which we are not consenting parties.

25. At the present moment, a Commonwealth Conference is being held at Sydney to consider the economic development of South East Asia.²² We are represented there by Shri Ramaswamy Mudaliar and an adviser. It is not clear yet whether this conference will yield any substantial results.²³

26. The treaties of friendship and trade and commerce with Nepal have been finalized,²⁴ but internal conditions in Nepal are by no means satisfactory and there appears to be a growing opposition to the present regime there.

27. Chandernagore was taken over from the French on the 2nd May.²⁵ The problem of the other French possessions still remains unsolved.

28. As I have already informed you, I intend going to Indonesia. I shall sail from Cochin in our cruiser *INS Delhi* on June 2nd, I reach Djakarta on June 7th and spend ten days there. I come back by air, spending two days in Singapore and three days in Rangoon. This means that I shall be away from India for about three weeks.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

21. The communique of 13 May 1950 also stated that the three signatories would support the new Governments in South East Asia to check the growing menace of "Communist imperialism." They called upon all the Governments in the region to cooperate in raising the standard of living of their peoples and expose the claims of Communists that they were encouraging nationalist movements when in fact they were seeking to control and exploit them in furtherance of their "expansionist policies."
22. The Commonwealth Consultative Committee on Economic Development of South East Asia met from 15 to 19 May 1950. —
23. A plan for three years, proposed by Australia, which later came to be known as the Colombo Plan, provided for technical assistance to the countries of South and South East Asia. £8 million earmarked for this purpose was to be administered by a bureau set up at Colombo.
24. By the treaty of friendship signed in Kathmandu on 31 July 1950, both Governments agreed that there should be "everlasting peace and friendship" between the two countries. They also agreed to consult each other and devise counter-measures to meet any threat of foreign aggression. The treaty of trade of ten articles was aimed at "facilitating and furthering" trade and commerce between the two countries. It established Nepal's right to trade with third countries through Indian ports.
25. On 2 May India took over Chandernagore, a 250-year old French settlement near Calcutta, by agreement with France.

V¹

New Delhi
May 26, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you about the application of the permit system and the evacuee property laws. Both of these have been forced upon us by strange circumstances and because of the example of Pakistan. I suppose it was unavoidable that we should have something of this kind. And yet it must always be remembered that both these systems are exceedingly unusual and distasteful, and almost unknown to domestic or international law.

Whatever the laws or rules may be in regard to these, what is much more important is the manner of their application. Many cases have come to me, which have surprised me greatly, for they seem to me a very unusual and unjustifiable extension of the law as it is. It is clear that many of our lower officers have no clear notion of how to apply these laws and much is left to their discretion. That is unfortunate, for these are not merely individual cases, but something which has far-reaching repercussions.

Since the recent Agreement with Pakistan, there has been some talk of doing away with the permit system and of strictly limiting the evacuee property laws to those who have been affected by them in the past. That is, for the future they will not affect any new person. I do not know what the result of these talks will be, but it is very likely that some modification will be made both in regard to the permit system and the evacuee property laws.

At the present moment, we are facing a heavy exodus of Muslims chiefly from the U.P. and partly from Rajasthan and Delhi. We are trying to stop this to the best of our ability, but we have not achieved much success thus far. It is rather odd that while we are trying to stop this exodus, which brings considerable discredit upon us, we should at the same time try to put out a few odd Muslims who may be considered undesirable. Apart from the justice or otherwise of these cases, this action of ours has a certain effect on the overall situation and tends to encourage the exodus by producing a certain feeling of insecurity.

The permit system was introduced originally to stop large numbers of Muslims coming from Pakistan to India. You will remember that neither the permit system nor the evacuee property laws were ever applied to eastern Pakistan or West Bengal. A subsequent development of the permit system was to prevent undesirable persons from coming to India. That was justifiable. A later development has been to push out people we do not like from India, if we get a chance to do so.

Thus we have sometimes used the permit system for a purpose for which it was not and could not be intended. I get reports from some States sometimes to

1. A special letter in addition to the Fortnightly Letters. J.N. Collection.

the effect that a certain person is undesirable and therefore the issue or otherwise of a permit to him or an extension of a permit should be governed by this fact. This is a mixture of issues, which is always bad in such cases. If a person is undesirable, we can proceed against him for that. But we cannot take advantage of the permit system to deal with him, except to keep out altogether undesirables who wish to come to India.

In regard to evacuee property also, the application has sometimes been most unfortunate. Of course, the whole conception of an 'intending evacuee' is extraordinary. The kind of cases that come up before me sometimes amaze me, for they cannot be justified by any normal law or procedure. Such cases have a far-reaching effect, as they tend to frighten large numbers of people and make them feel insecure. Our action thus results in certain consequences which we are seeking to avoid in another sphere of activity. That is not very logical or wise.

Some of our more enthusiastic junior custodians seem to imagine that they have been appointed to function as some kind of inquisitors. The fact of the matter is that there is a certain vagueness and our instructions are not clear enough.

However that may be, I wish to draw your earnest attention to these matters. We must remember that the permit system is not a device for us to push out people whom we do not like either on moral or political grounds.

Secondly, we must remember that people who went away from India for a while before the permit system was introduced cannot be punished by some subsequent enactment.

Thirdly, in view of the Agreement with Pakistan as well as the exodus of Muslims to West Pakistan from the U.P., etc., we have to tone down our activities in regard to these matters and not do anything which adds to the prevailing fear and discontent.

Fourthly, we have to make it clear to our custodians and assistant custodians that their functions are not policy functions but semi-judicial ones and they must not harass any people in carrying out those functions. They have to remember that they must function in a way so as to cause the least disturbance or disquiet. If they cannot follow this policy clearly, then they must make room for others, who understand Government policy and are prepared to follow it.

We cannot allow the larger interests of the nations, as well as the credit and self-respect of the country, to suffer because of the over-enthusiasm of some of our people.

The general principle of law that we follow is that a person has to be proved guilty before he is punished. But often enough this principle is not followed in regard to evacuee property and the burden of proof is cast on the unhappy person against whom steps are taken. This is patently wrong.

I am writing to you rather briefly on this subject, just to indicate how my mind is working. Big issues are involved and we cannot act in a petty way. I hope,

therefore, that your Government will consider these matters and that you will issue clear and explicit instructions to your officers as to how to deal with them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VI¹

New Delhi
May 30, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am sending you my fortnightly letter rather earlier than usual, because early tomorrow morning I start on the journey which will ultimately land me at Djakarta in Indonesia. This visit has long been in my mind and I have looked forward to it and, if I may say so, our friends in Indonesia have also looked forward to it. Few countries can have such friendly relations with one another as India and Indonesia have today. We have no alliance or pact and no special trade or commercial contacts have developed. Yet we have been drawn to each other not so much because of political or economic advantage, but because of other and more unsubstantial reasons. In the distant past of India, there were innumerable contacts with the people of South East Asia, and among them probably the closest to us were the peoples of Indonesia. Even today there are numerous survivals of those old contacts. Indeed, if we have to see and admire some of the finest examples of Indian architecture, we have to go to Java.

2. Those old contacts between the two countries ceased several hundred years ago and both fell under foreign domination. Most of us even forgot, or never knew, that old history of intimate relationship with the people of Indonesia. Gradually it came back to us by the labour of scholars and a new vista opened out for us.

3. It was really, however, after the end of the Second World War, less than five years ago, that a new chapter in our relationship began. It is difficult so say who started it, because on both sides there was this desire to meet. Almost it might be said that there was some destiny about it which brought us together and turned our minds and hearts to each other, even though there was no obvious reason for it. And so today we look at each other with a degree of affection and comradeship which seldom goes from one country to another.

4. I am very happy to go to this very friendly country, whose President came to us at the time of the inauguration of our Republic and I feel that there is a significance in this visit of mine just as there was a significance in President Soekarno coming to Delhi². Old memories revive and new hopes fill our minds. In the context of world affairs, there can be little doubt that South East Asia is becoming a hub and a storm-centre. This is particularly so in Indo-China. Mighty changes have taken place in South East Asia during the last three or four years. Our own country, after much travail, has gained her independence, but the travail and sorrow did not end and we have pursued since then difficult and sometimes a heart-breaking task. Yet some inner faith in the destiny of our country and our people has kept us going and I have little doubt that that inner faith is justified.

5. That great neighbour of ours, China, has emerged for the first time in history as a strong centralized State. That in itself is an event of world-shaking importance. Some are afraid of it, some welcome it, but whether we like it or not, it is an event of the highest importance in the present and in the future. In the southern mainland of Asia, there has been trouble and conflict in Burma and Indo-China, and Malaya has had continuing disorder for these three years. Now Indonesia emerges as an independent State and that event also changes the face of South East Asia and is of particular interest to us.

6. So in this present age of ours we see this changing, dynamic mass of humanity that lives in South East Asia and round about, gradually becoming the focus of the world's attention, for in it lie seeds both of discord and possible peace of the world. None can answer that question yet, but all of us who live in this part of the world have a great responsibility in shaping that answer and determining it to the extent that we can. India cannot disclaim that responsibility, for the whole course of history and her geography have led her to it. We want no entanglements, for our troubles are many and it is our first duty to look after our own problems before we think of others. But the choice is not ours. As an independent nation of great potential power, we cannot disclaim the responsibilities that come with independence.

7. I shall go to Indonesia and spend ten days there—far too short a time for that country and yet too long for me to be away. On my return journey, I shall

2. Soekarno and his wife, Padma, visited India from 23 to 29 January 1950.

visit Singapore and Burma, where I hope to meet the leader of the Burmese people and their Prime Minister, Thakin Nu.

8. On the eve of my departure, we have completed our reconstructed Cabinet, with one exception. Today some of the new Ministers³ attended the swearing-in-ceremony before the President. One new Minister was unfortunately not present owing to ill health. We hope, however, that Shri C. Rajagopalachari will soon be with us here to help us and guide us in many ways.

9. I wrote to you previously that the two major problems before us related to our economic policy and our relations with Pakistan. So far as the economic policy is concerned, we have now the great advantage of a Planning Commission composed of eminent and earnest men who believe in planning. The members of the Planning Commission are drawn from entirely different sectors of national life and have different experiences behind them. And yet I have noticed with great satisfaction that these members have been working like a happy team with complete understanding of each other. I expect substantial results from the labours of this Commission. Some people have criticized it and said that it has not done anything wonderful yet. That is strange criticism. It has been in existence just two months and even during this early and brief period it has done good work. Planning at any time, and more so for a vast country like ours, is a big and complex affair. I appealed to you sometime ago for the cooperation of your Government with our planning authority⁴ and I am grateful to many States for their ready response to this proposal.

10. You will have noticed that a Member of the Planning Commission, Shri Chintaman Deshmukh, is now our Finance Minister. I hesitated at first to invite him to undertake this most important office. I hesitated because I did not wish him to leave the Planning Commission, to which both he and I attached great importance. But on fuller consideration of this matter, I came to what might be called the inevitable conclusion of asking him to take charge of the Finance portfolio. His appointment has been almost universally acclaimed. He continues to be a member of the Planning Commission. This combination may well help us in bringing about the closest cooperation between the Government and the Planning Commission.

11. Our new Ministers, Shri Hare Krushna Mahtab, and Shri K.M. Munshi, have already somewhat shaken up their Ministries with their energy and driving power.⁵ Shri Sri Prakasa begins his ministerial career today. I doubt if any other Governor has left a province surrounded by such universal affection, esteem and regret as Sri Prakasaji earned for himself in Assam. He has come to another, and

3. Sri Prakasa, C.D. Deshmukh and Ajit Prasad Jain.

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, pp. 417-418.

5. Mahtab had taken charge of the Ministry of Industry and Supply and Munshi was entrusted with the portfolio of Food and Agriculture.

perhaps even more important, sphere of activity and I have no doubt that the Ministry of Commerce will improve and prosper under his care.

12. The new Cabinet, I venture to say, is stronger and more homogeneous than its predecessor. The problems before us are colossal, but we shall face them with good heart and with confidence in ourselves.

13. Among these problems is that of the refugees or displaced persons. There has often been criticism in the past of what we have done or not done. We have made many mistakes, but I am sure that our record of achievement in regard to rehabilitation is very noteworthy. But while we were attempting to solve the main refugee problem in northern and north-western India, an equally big problem arose in Bengal. This problem was somewhat different from that of the refugees from West Pakistan. While the old problem was gradually being solved, and townships and work centres and shops and houses were growing up there, we had to tackle the Bengal problem from the very beginning. Naturally we profited from our previous experience and did not make so many mistakes. It requires, however, careful and to some extent, separate handling. I am requesting Shri Mohanlal Saksena to spend some weeks in Bengal and Assam to examine this problem in all its aspects and to report to me. After that, I hope that we shall devise some effective method of dealing with it. Meanwhile, our officers there and the West Bengal and Assam Governments are helping in every way.

14. The implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement has, to a considerable extent, continued. Although the exodus has continued on both sides, there are indications of a substantial movement in the reverse direction. The exodus of the Muslims from the U.P. and Rajasthan actually increased and the Pakistan Government announced that they would close their Sind border.⁶ But there has been a marked lessening now in this exodus. In Assam, there is no marked exodus now in either direction. In West Bengal, however, about 8,000 Hindus still come from East Bengal and about 5,000 Hindus go back daily to East Bengal.

15. What is disturbing is not so much this exodus, which I think will gradually stabilize itself, but rather a number of incidents of dacoity and abduction that are reported from East Bengal. Partly this may be due to a general breakdown of the social and administrative machine. Nevertheless, it is disquieting. On the other side in Calcutta, the tone of the press has been far from satisfactory and this produces bad results. This problem of dealing with the press has become a very difficult and urgent one. Recently, the Supreme Court put aside some orders that had been issued in regard to a very virulent communalist organ in Delhi and a communist paper in Bombay. The influence of the press is considerable and if that influence

6. On 21 May, the Pakistan Government decided to withdraw, from 27 May, special transport facilities across the Sind-Jodhpur border, thereby virtually sealing its border with India.

is exercised in a wrong direction, it does great harm. In Calcutta, it is exceedingly unfortunate that old, established and respected newspapers should lose all sense of responsibility.

16. As I wrote to you in a previous letter, the issue before us is a very clear one. It is not primarily whether the Indo-Pakistan Agreement is fully implemented or not, or whether it succeeds fully or not, although we want that to happen. The issue is whether we as a country, as a Government, and as a Party, are going to adhere to old Congress principles in regard to communalism or whether we are going to drift away from them. It seems that some Congressmen and some newspapers which are normally considered Congress newspapers, have drifted far in the other direction. They have forgotten everything that we have stood for and have reacted to what has happened in Pakistan by behaving in the same manner. That way lies danger for India and we must resist it with all our strength. I am convinced of this more than of anything else that if we are to prosper and progress in India, we must adhere to the old Congress policy and prevent the spread of the communal spirit in India.

17. Generally speaking, it may be accepted that the majority communities in India or Pakistan are ultimately responsible. It is no good blaming the Hindu in Pakistan or the Muslim in India for being communal. He reacts to the living conditions he finds and if those conditions become too hard and unbearable, he migrates. That very migration means that the majority community and the Government of that country have failed to that extent.

18. I do not understand the mentality of those who are continually talking in a defeatist strain and prophesying failure of the Indo-Pak Agreement.⁷ Indeed, they seem to look forward to this and work for it. What result they aim at I cannot imagine, because any result will then be bad for us and bad for others. It is time that all of us pulled ourselves together and thought a little clearly of the present and of the future. It is time we stood up four-square against every attempt to promote the spread of the poison of communalism in this country. There can be no half-way house in the choice of these policies and our attitude must be clear and definite.

19. You will have heard that the Kashmir question has advanced a stage further by the arrival of Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. mediator, in India. He is an eminent Australian judge and there can be little doubt about his open-minded approach to this problem. But nevertheless, the problem is not an easy one to solve and so far as we are concerned, we have stated our position quite clearly and there is not much room for changing it. It must always be remembered that the Kashmir issue is affected by events in India. If communalism and the communal spirit increase

7. For example, on 27 May, Syama Prasad Mookerjee contended that the Nehru-Liaquat Pact had done the greatest harm to the people of Bengal and asserted that "not a single refugee was willing to go back to East Bengal as the Delhi Agreement had not at all succeeded in restoring confidence."

in India, an adverse effect is produced in Kashmir. Ultimately, it is clear that the future of Kashmir depends upon the people of Kashmir.

20. In regard to our other major disputes with Pakistan, we are proceeding rather slowly. These are the canal waters dispute⁸ and the evacuee property laws and the permit system. Some of these have got entangled with the question of the exchange ratio between Indian and Pakistan rupee.

21. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has finished his tour of America. I am sorry to say that his activities there and his speeches have not been in keeping with a friendly attitude to India. He has often spoken in disparaging terms of India and has asked for more and more arms and ammunition, presumably to be used against India, if need arises. The recent big explosion in the U.S. of arms being conveyed to Pakistan was a significant pointer.

22. As you know, there has been a long-standing and bitter dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁹ Our relations with Afghanistan have been very good and there is no reason why we should fall out. An attempt has been made by various countries, including some great powers, to bring pressure on Afghanistan to surrender their claims and to fall in line with Pakistan. Without going into the merits of this question, we felt that it was unfair for these countries to bring this pressure on Afghanistan and we have not associated ourselves with it. We have kept aloof and not identified ourselves with any policy in regard to this dispute.

23. In China, our Ambassador has presented his credentials¹⁰ to the President of the Republic and mutual complimentary speeches were made. Apart from these speeches, many private interviews took place and, our Ambassador reports, that the general feeling in China is one of great friendship with India and a desire to develop closer relations. We have welcomed this, as friendly relations between India and China can go a long way towards the maintenance of peace in Asia.

24. On the international stage the old questions continue to give trouble and no solution is found for them. There does not appear to be any danger of war, but the situation deteriorates and passions arise. Our policy, as you know, is to keep cool even though others get excited and not to align ourselves with any bloc. We shall continue that policy.

8. The discussions between the two Governments at Delhi from 29 to 31 May on the canal waters ended inconclusively.

9. During the British period the tribal areas of Afghanistan were deemed to be independent territory but under British suzerainty. After the British withdrawal Afghanistan revived her claim on them. Meanwhile, statements had been made by responsible people in Pakistan that the tribal areas were an integral part of Pakistan. This led to anti-Pakistan agitation in Afghanistan and strained relations. The Afghan ambassador in Karachi with most of his staff went back to Kabul. Rumours were spread in Pakistan that India had been financing Afghanistan.

10. On 20 May 1950.

25. Recently our representatives attended the Sydney Conference and a conference in the Philippines.¹¹ Both were supposed to consider economic and like matters relating to South East Asia with a view to the development of this region. Both conferences dealt, rather vaguely, with these subjects and no immediate picture of co-ordinated help has appeared. We attended both these conferences, but we made it clear that we were not joining any group hostile to another group.¹²

26. In South Africa, while we were waiting for a round table conference, the Union Government has been proceeding with further anti-Indian legislation. We pointed out to the South African Government that this was not in keeping with the round table approach and we suggested that the legislation should be postponed at least and further that no action should be taken to penalize Indians there meanwhile. Their answer has been disappointing and they continue to expedite the passage of this legislation. It is clear that we cannot participate in any round table conference, if the South African Union Government enacts these new laws in the near future. We are watching developments.

27. I have written to you separately about the working of the evacuee property ordinance and the permit system as between India and Western Pakistan. I would like to draw your special attention to this matter. I have requested the new Minister of Rehabilitation to examine this carefully. I have myself seen many cases where injustice has been done and widespread alarm created by the actions of Custodians and others. I think we shall have to revise our procedure and even our personnel, where this is not satisfactory. At present, the whole approach seems to me to be misconceived.

28. The possibility of promoting trade between India and Turkey has been examined by our Commerce Ministry and the Turkish Embassy in New Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. The conference from 26 to 30 May 1950, attended by the representatives of Australia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand, was convened by President Quirino of the Philippines to discuss cultural, economic and political matters.

12. This was clarified by the Indian delegate following the declaration of President Quirino that one of the objectives of the conference was to formulate ways and means to avert the tide of "totalitarian subversion" in Asia.

VII¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you after more than a month's interval. Owing to my absence from India, there was no letter to you in the middle of June. I have much to tell you about my travels in Indonesia, Malaya and Burma, but I must begin with the grave international crisis that has arisen in Korea.²

2. You know that we have decided to accept the resolution of the U.N. Security Council calling upon its members to help South Korea.³ This decision was by no means a simple one and we had to give a great deal of thought to it. Our natural inclination, because of our foreign policy which we have reiterated so often, was to keep out of these troubles and certainly not to undertake any kind of responsibility. This general inclination was supported by some other facts. While North Korea has been a full-fledged Communist State,⁴ South Korea has been far from a modern or democratic State.⁵ We had recognized neither of these two Governments, although indirectly we were connected much more with South Korea. For some time past an Indian representative⁶ has been on the U.N. Korea Commission,⁷ which functioned entirely in South Korea, because the North would have nothing to do with it. Indeed, the first Korea Commission had an Indian for

1. File No. 25(6)-PMS.

2. See *ante*, pp. 306-360.

3. See *ante*, pp. 320-323.

4. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 12 September 1948 with Kim Il-Sung as its Premier.

5. The Republic of Korea was proclaimed in South Korea on 15 August 1948 with Syngman Rhee as its President. In 1949, the Government debarred a number of members of the National Assembly and, fearing communist subversion, arrested many in the army, civil services, educational institutions and the judiciary under the National Democratic Law promulgated on 1 December 1948.

6. Anup Singh (1903-1969); Secretary, National Committee for India's Freedom, U.S.A., 1943-46; India's chief delegate to U.N. Commission on Korea, 1949-50; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-60 and 1962-69.

7. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (U.N.T.C.O.K.) was set up on 14 November 1947 to organize elections to the Korean National Assembly leading to the formation of the National Government. The elections were, however, held only in South Korea as the North Korean Government refused to cooperate with the U.N. Commission.

its Chairman.⁸ Nevertheless, it has been our desire to keep out of the Korean conflict and we did not approve of much that was done in both North and South Korea.⁹

3. Another complication and difficulty that arose was the mixing up by President Truman of Formosa, Indo-China and the Philippines with the Korean issue.¹⁰ We have nothing to do with the Philippines, but our policy in regard to China and Indo-China has been a clear and definite one and it has not been in line with the U.S.A. policy. Hence the mixing up of these issues with that of Korea was embarrassing in the extreme. We have no desire whatever to side with either group in Indo-China. With the People's Government in China, we are beginning to develop some kind of friendly relations and we want this process to continue. We do not want to behave as if we were the enemies of this new China.

4. All these were reasons for us to keep aloof from the Korean struggle. On the other hand, as members of the Security Council, we could not remain silent and we had to come to some decision and declare it. It seemed to us that there could be no doubt that the North Korean Government had committed aggression on a large scale on South Korea. We do not know what had happened previous to this. There had been many border clashes and it is quite possible that South Korea's record was not too good. But there can be little comparison between those border affrays and this major, well-planned invasion of South Korea. Thus aggression had taken place and to surrender to it was wrong and would have meant the collapse of the United Nations structure as well as led to other dangerous consequences. The first resolution of the Security Council¹¹ declared that there had been this aggression. Our representative voted for it. To some extent it followed logically that something in the nature of the second resolution should be passed later. Normally, therefore, there would have been no particular difficulty, in theory at least, in our giving immediate support to the second resolution. But, in practice, there were obvious dangers and difficulties and there were certain complications also to which I have referred above. The matter was too serious to be decided on the spot at Lake Success by our representative and we instructed him, therefore,

8. K.P.S. Menon.

9. The Indian representative on the U.N. Commission protested against South Korea's refusal to seek the cooperation of North Korea which could have paved the way towards the unification of Korea through a process of conciliation. India refused to recognize the South Korean Government as a duly elected National Government as envisaged under the U.N. resolution of 14 November 1947. The North Korean refusal to cooperate with the U.N. Commission was also criticized.

10. Truman's mention of Formosa and Indo-China in his statement of 27 June had no basis in the resolution of 25 June calling for assistance to Korea. This was what delayed India's acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 27 June calling for military action against North Korea's aggression.

11. On 25 June 1950.

not to take any further step without special reference to us. This was before the second resolution had been proposed. This second resolution was brought forward in a hurry and little time was given for consultation with Governments. So when it came up before the Security Council, our representative could only say that he was waiting for instructions from his Government and could not participate in the voting till such instructions came. An attempt was made to telephone to me, but it failed. Even if it had succeeded, the only answer I could have given was that we would consider the matter carefully. In spite of the urgency of the matter, it was essential that we should give it the most careful consideration and we could not allow ourselves to be hustled into a decision.

5. Our Cabinet gave it careful consideration and, as you know, came to the decision to accept the second resolution.¹² I think that logically or practically, there was no other course open to us. In our resolution of acceptance, however, we tried to make it perfectly clear that this did not involve any departure from our foreign policy of keeping aloof from rival and hostile groups of nations. It is true that it is not an easy matter to follow that policy when, to some extent, we do line up with a certain group. Nevertheless, there is a difference and we have tried to emphasize that. We have accepted a certain position which the U.N. took up, because we thought that there had been aggression and this aggression should be met. More than that, we were not prepared to do. We intend to maintain this distinction throughout. We do not wish to get entangled in the Formosa affair or in Indo-China.¹³

6. As a consequence of our decision, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has asked us, as well as other countries, what active help we can give. In our reply, we have pointed out that we are not in a position to give any active military, naval or air help. Our defence apparatus is meant for home defence only and is not built up for activities in distant theatres of war. We do not keep expeditionary forces, nor do we have aircraft or naval vessels to spare for this purpose. Financially we are in a hard position and cannot afford distant adventures.

7. There is another reason which I should like to mention to you. If we supplied any active help of the kind demanded, in existing circumstances, it might have got us involved in the other activities which the U.S.A. have undertaken on themselves, that is, Formosa, etc. We were not prepared for this. Thus we have

12. India did not participate in the voting on 27 June 1950, when the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending assistance to the Republic of Korea from all member nations. On 29 June, the Government of India, after "careful consideration", accepted the resolution in a special communication to the Security Council.

13. The Government of India dissociated itself from the American decision to intervene in Formosa and took the view that it might lead to a dangerous extension of the conflict in the Far East. The Government felt that every attempt should be made to localize the conflict in Korea.

pointed out to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that we cannot supply this type of help. What we might have given at the most would have been some token help of little real and practical consequences, but, nevertheless, meaning a heavy burden on us and involving us in many complications.

8. That is our present position and we hope to adhere to it. Lest it be thought that we have given an empty promise by our accepting the U.N. resolution and doing nothing else, I should like to say that our acceptance of that resolution itself is of great help to the United Nations. Perhaps there is hardly any other country, barring one or two, whose moral help is, in these circumstances, of the value and significance of India's. I think the world recognizes this.

9. The situation is a difficult and dangerous one and is changing from day to day. Some people think that this is the beginning of the much dreaded world war III. Others hope that war-like operations may be limited to the Korean region. I do not know what is going to happen. But there is undoubtedly a danger of the gravest kind. The least we can do is to try to avoid the type of hysteria which often prevails in countries when war comes or is threatened. We must keep cool and judge each issue as it arises, as dispassionately as possible, keeping in view our basic policy and our ideals. This is going to be a testing time for all nations and peoples, and it is likely to affect, directly or indirectly, most of our other activities. It may be that we are on the verge of a crisis that may change the future of the world, and such a crisis tests the inner strength of the people. Our normal politics and conflicts become unimportant when these great issues come up before us. We must, therefore, develop the right perspective, clarity of mind and the equilibrium of the spirit, in order to deal adequately with the problems that will encompass us in the days to come.

10. India has special and rather intimate connections with Burma and Indonesia, and my recent tour has underlined these relationships. In coming to our decision about Korea, we had to keep these relationships in mind. Our responsibility, therefore, was even greater than it might appear. Burma and Indonesia, not being in the United Nations Security Council, were not immediately called upon to make a particular decision. Indonesia has now declared that it will keep away from the Korean conflict.¹⁴ (Indonesia is not yet a member of the United Nations). Burma has a frontier with China and is trying to develop more intimate relations with that country. Both these countries have special difficulties and one can understand their desire to avoid getting entangled in fresh conflicts.

11. What chances there are of preventing the spread of this Korean war, it is difficult to gauge. There are not many. But undoubtedly there are some such chances, and thus far, the U.S.S.R. has not said or done anything which might worsen

14. The Indonesian Government declared on 27 June 1950 that "it would be premature and useless" for them to give an opinion on the Korean question and take up a position. Their most urgent task was to cope with domestic problems.

the crisis. China has naturally expressed her resentment over the American declaration in regard to Formosa.¹⁵

12. If there is a possibility of resolving this conflict, it can only be done, we feel, by bringing in the People's Republic of China into the United Nations. We have been trying to do so for some time and have pressed our viewpoint on other countries with some success. We propose to continue our efforts to this end. If the new China comes into the United Nations and the Security Council, then the U.S.S.R. will come back to them also and the internal disruption of the United Nations will be prevented. If the United Nations goes, then there is no other way left for maintaining world peace. The United Nations have been much criticized, and often justly criticized, but nevertheless they have performed an essential function in the maintenance of peace. Their continuance therefore seems essential. This was one of the reasons which induced us to support the United Nations decision to try to halt the aggression of North Korea.

13. My recent travels in South East Asia, just on the eve of these grave developments in Korea, have enabled me to understand the problems of the countries I visited a little better than I did previously. They have brought about greater mutual understanding, and I hope, respect. It is fortunate that I was able to pay these visits before all of us got entangled in other major developments. For me, this recent tour has brought many unforgettable impressions. I was received in Indonesia with a friendliness which made me feel completely at home there. I was not a stranger but a companion and a comrade in common tasks and undertakings. Indonesia has to face very difficult problems. But I found a spirit of vitality there, which promised success in overcoming any difficulties that might arise. The country is beautiful in a peculiarly attractive way and the people there are extraordinarily likable. The island of Bali is famous for many things and it lived up to its reputation. There is an enchantment about it which affected me all the more because of its living culture, derived so much from India in the distant past. I have never come across a more artistic people than the people of Bali. Artistry was at the tips of their fingers and in the toes of their feet. Every man and woman and child seemed to be born with this sense of beauty and grace. They danced and sang and painted and carved on a mass scale. All these were folk arts and not the privilege of a few. Most of their dancing and their folk plays were derived from the stories of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. There was harmony between these people and the nature

15. On 28 June, Mao Zedong declared that "the U.S. aggression in Asia will arouse the extensive and resolute resistance of the Asian people." He accused Truman of "tearing to shreds all international agreements regarding non-intervention by the U.S.A. in China's internal affairs." On the same day, Zhou En-lai also asserted that: "No matter what obstructive action the American imperialists may take, Formosa is part of China and will remain so forever... the people of our country will fight for the liberation of Formosa from the grasp of the American aggressors."

that surrounded them, which is so lacking in other countries. Some kind of harmony is also found among primitive people, but the Balinese as well as other Indonesians were very far from being primitive. They had a background of ancient and highly developed civilizations, intimately connected with India. So I came back from Indonesia powerfully impressed with what I saw and emotionally moved, and I have a certain nostalgic feeling when I think again of these places. We live in a world not only of hatred and violence, but also of vulgarity and lack of many of the qualities that have made life worth living. Grace and charm and culture and the restraints of civilization fade away, even though we shout so much about culture and the progress that civilization has made. So I felt as if I was in a haven of refuge from this ever-growing vulgarity, when I was in the island of Bali. A fear seizes me: will Bali retain this grace and charm and inner culture in spite of the advent of the tourists who will bring so-called modern civilization in their train?

14. In Burma I found that the situation had greatly improved during the past six months. It was still difficult, but it might be said that the Government was in definite control and the law and order situation was largely in hand. The Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, continues to be the dominating personality by sheer force of character. He is a man of the highest integrity and it is the good fortune of Burma to have him at the head of her affairs. Certain difficulties have arisen on the Burma-China border, because some Kuomintang forces, pushed out from China, entered Burma. Normally such forces should have been disarmed and interned. But they have been troublesome and have not at all behaved well towards the Burmese Government.

15. In Malaya, the situation is a very peculiar one, because nearly half the population is Chinese. There is not much friendly feeling or confidence between the Malaysians and the Chinese. The Indians there, who form the third largest group (13% of the population) are on the whole on friendly terms with the other people there. It is not an easy matter to evolve a united nation out of these differing elements. Meanwhile, certain terrorist groups, who are often styled communists, though they include many others who are just anti-social, have been carrying on an incessant warfare. There has been a great deal of cruelty in this warfare and senseless acts of terrorism. The colonial Government has proclaimed a state of emergency which greatly limits the freedom of the people.¹⁶ I do not myself see how that Government or any other Government can avoid the challenge of the terrorist groups. They have to meet it, as any Government would. But I did feel

16. On 18 June 1948, an emergency was proclaimed in Malaysia to deal with the Communist Party, which since February 1948 had resorted to direct action against the State by organising strikes and creating disturbances in the estates. The European planters were not well disposed towards the Indians who were a politically conscious group and could resist continued exploitation of cheap labour. A number of Indian labour leaders had been branded as communists by the British authorities and deported to India.

that any real solution of the problem must be based on political and economic approaches. An attempt is being made in Malaya to develop a common nationality for the Malayans, Chinese and Indians. If this attempt succeeds, it will go some way to bring about that sense of unity in a nation which is so essential for freedom.

16. On my return from my tour in South East Asia, I came to Calcutta and spent two days there.¹⁷ Immediately I was wrapped up in the problem of East and West Bengal. I found some things to my liking and some things which I disliked greatly. The question was often asked as to whether the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8th had succeeded or failed. That question seemed to me largely irrelevant. That Agreement was not a final solution of Indo-Pakistan problems, nor was it indeed a solution of the Bengal problem. It was a big step first in averting catastrophe and, secondly, in producing a favourable atmosphere for the solution of other problems. In both these respects that Agreement succeeded in a large measure. There is no doubt that it did avert catastrophe and there is also no doubt that it created a far better atmosphere than we had had for a long time. It gave immediate relief to millions of members of minority communities in both countries; it gave an opportunity to large numbers to migrate in safety and with their movable property. In Western Pakistan and in large parts of India, it brought about a very great easing of tension and the common people on both sides felt happier, as when a great burden is removed. The vast refugee populations in India and Pakistan (for the moment leaving out the Bengals and Assam) also felt relieved and could hope for an adequate settlement of their problems.

17. These were no small gains. And yet it is true that in East Bengal members of the minority community are still full of apprehension and there is little sense of security. No major incidents occur, as they did previously, that is, there is no mass trouble. But individual instances occur fairly frequently. Dacoity is rampant. This may, of course, be due partly to economic causes. But then this dacoity usually takes place in Hindu houses and even in the houses of poor Hindus. Also, it is accompanied sometimes by molestation of women and abduction. Clearly this is something much more than the usual dacoity. Such instances produce a feeling of fear and insecurity in the minds of the minority. Probably things are improving even in regard to such matters, but the process is slow. In West Bengal, such incidents do not normally occur now and, on the whole, the minority is slightly better off. But it would be an exaggeration to say that the Muslim minority in West Bengal has a full sense of security and has no grievances. In the U.P., the Muslim migration has stopped completely and many Muslims are coming back from Pakistan. Conditions may be said to be more or less normal in the U.P. and adjoining areas.

17. On 24 and 25 June 1950.

18. The figures of migrations in the two Bengals and in Assam are still formidable. Everyday brings its large quota of migrants. On the other hand, a fairly considerable number of old migrants go back daily. Roughly speaking, 2,000 to 2,500 Hindus come out from East Pakistan daily in excess of those who go back. Many of the Hindus who go back to East Bengal return with such movable property as they can bring with them.

19. The two Central Ministers for Bengal and Assam, Shri C.C. Biswas and Dr Malik, have carried out extensive tours especially in East Bengal, and their visits have done good. I am happy that these two Ministers are working together with considerable success. Generally speaking, Governments have earnestly tried to fulfil the terms of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, that is, both the Central Governments and the Provincial Governments in India and Pakistan. The lower officials in East Bengal, however, have not always done what they should; some of the lower officials in West Bengal also have not come up to the mark. The press of Pakistan has shown considerable discipline and sobriety ever since the Agreement. Many of the newspapers in West Bengal, however, have consistently attacked the Agreement and have continued to give stories of refugees which excite the public. I have been troubled both by the attitude of the Calcutta press and by the activities of some communal leaders in West Bengal. I am happy to say, however, that quite recently, the press in Calcutta has accepted certain rules or code of conduct which have been agreed upon previously by the newspaper organizations of both sides. This is a happy augury and I am sure it will produce good results.

20. There have been a number of visits of goodwill mission between India and Pakistan. They have generally met with a cordial welcome on the other side. One of such missions was led by Shri Bhimsen Sachar to West Pakistan. This travelled about all over West Punjab and Sind and met with an extraordinarily friendly reception everywhere. This showed that, given the chance, the people want to show their friendliness. They are tired of the conflict and the preaching of bitterness and hatred.

21. There have recently been talks in Delhi on the subject of evacuee property. They have resulted in some success and a full agreement¹⁸ has been arrived at in regard to movable property. Regarding immovable property, no decision has been reached, but I think it is right to say that considerable progress has been made.

22. One matter to which I attach great importance is the evacuation of mosques, temples and *gurdwaras* by refugees and others, who may have taken possession of them either in India or in Pakistan, and the handing over of these buildings to people of that religion who can look after them properly. A good deal was done

18. The Agreement of 28 June 1950 laid down the general principles of removal, sale or disposal of movable property by displaced persons without formal permission from the custodian. Facilities were also to be extended for the transfer of bank deposits, shares and insurance policies.

in Delhi in regard to mosques here, but I believe many mosques still remain in the possession of Hindus or Sikhs in the Punjab or elsewhere. So also many temples and *gurdwaras* remain in the possession of Muslims in Pakistan, West and East. I think we should concentrate on all these religious edifices and free them from this kind of forcible occupation. This has both a practical importance and a great sentimental significance.

23. The problem of minorities in Pakistan or in India has many aspects. But the most important one is the psychological aspect. In each country, conditions have to be created to produce a sense of absolute security in the minds of the minority. Government can do much. Officials can do a great deal and the public at large, of course, can make or mar any programme. But above everything, we must try to increase the morale of the minorities. Unless they have that morale, even external protection will do little good. In East Bengal, for some time past and today, the most unfortunate feature is the utter demoralization of the Hindus. It should be our first task therefore to attack this scene of helplessness and fear and try to make the minorities everywhere more self-reliant. The press can do a great deal in this respect. Reciting long tales of woe, even though they are true, and always pointing out the helplessness of the people concerned, has the effect of demoralizing still further. A different psychological approach is necessary. It is no good at all for the Muslims in Pakistan to preach homilies to the Hindus; it is equally no good for the Hindus in India to preach homilies to the Muslims. It is by the behaviour of the majority community and not by its sermons that it will be judged, and ultimately, the test is the reaction to that behaviour in the minority community. The whole future of our country as of Pakistan depends upon this growth of morale. Masses of frightened and demoralized refugees can do little good to themselves or to the country they go.

24. In my previous letter, I have drawn your attention to the desirability of relaxing and liberalizing the working of the permit system between India and West Pakistan. Also to a very liberal interpretation of the evacuee property laws. Instances continue to come before me of harsh and unfair treatment of individuals. I hope that it may be possible to do away with this abnormal legislation regarding evacuee properties. Meanwhile, we should tone it down and liberalize it in working.

25. I have referred above to the new regime in China. It may interest you to read some secret telegrams that we have received from our Ambassador in Peking. In these telegrams he has given some information about the various policies that the Chinese Government is following now. I am, therefore, enclosing copies of these telegrams, which should be treated as secret.¹⁹ You will notice that the

19. K.M. Panikkar thought that China was engrossed with her internal problems and had no desire to follow an aggressive policy beyond her own frontiers. He also believed that the Chinese leadership stood for friendship with India, and would respect the autonomy of Tibet. As for the economic programme, he thought the new Government, contrary to Mao's earlier declaration, did not intend to confiscate large estates.

Government of China is gradually changing its policy somewhat away from many things that can be called the socialist economy. It is interesting, for instance, to note what the President of China, Mao Tse-tung, who is also the leading communist there, says: "The idea of some people who think it possible to bring about an early elimination of capitalism and introduce socialism is wrong and unsuitable to the conditions of our country."²⁰

26. As you know, I travelled from Cochin to Djakarta on board our cruiser, *INS Delhi*. This gave me an opportunity of meeting many hundreds of our naval boys and I was very happy to come into more intimate contact with them. They were a fine lot of young men, drawn from all parts of the country, efficient, co-operative and cheerful. Mixing with them for a few days gave me a new confidence in the youth of my country.

27. While I was on board *INS Delhi*, on my way to Djakarta, I received a wireless message containing the long statement that Dr Matthai had issued in regard to his resignation. This was done in answer to some remarks I had made in a speech at Trivandrum. I must confess that I read the statement with great distress. Apart from the personal element and apart from the fact that there were incorrect statements in it, it seemed to me an act of grave impropriety for an ex-Minister to speak in this way. We are trying to build up conventions of public behaviour. We are still new to them and it takes time to build any such convention. For a man who had occupied so respected a position as Dr John Matthai, to issue a statement of this kind, was to do grave injury to those conventions and give a chance to others to behave in this manner.

28. Dr Matthai dealt with some vital national problems and I felt that it was necessary, in the public interest, that I should reply to him publicly. I decided, however, to wait till I returned from my tour. Meanwhile, Maulana Azad had said something in reply and had corrected some statements that Dr Matthai had made. On my return here, I gave fuller consideration to this matter and consulted some of my colleagues. On their advice, I gave up the idea of carrying on this controversy in public. If Parliament or our Party in Parliament desires me to make a statement to them, I shall then do so. Meanwhile, I have decided not to issue any public statement. I might add, however that I have corresponded with Dr Matthai on this subject.²¹

29. Dr Matthai's statement is said to have been provoked by what I said at Trivandrum. I made a few remarks there because many questions were put to me regarding Dr Matthai's first statement, in which he had said tht there were vital differences of policy between him and me. People naturally asked what these differences were and sometimes they made wild guesses. A rumour spread that we

20. Mao's written report to the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 6 June 1950.

21. See *ante*, pp. 227-232, 234-238 and 247-249.

had differed on the question of the exchange value of the rupee. This was completely untrue. I felt that these rumours and speculations would do harm and something should be said. So I referred to Dr Matthai's first statement and, in an exceedingly friendly language, said that he had differed from me and from others in the Cabinet in regard to the Planning Commission. I added that there was much in what Dr Matthai said, but, nevertheless, we thought it essential, even in existing circumstances, to have the Planning Commission. I do not think I used a single word that was wrong or unfriendly.

30. Dr Matthai's second statement was a bitter personal attack on me and referred to three matters specially. There was this Planning Commission, which he criticized very strongly and in regard to which he made certain statements about their status, etc., which were not correct. There is no question of the Planning Commission being a rival to the Cabinet. It is a purely advisory body of experts. It is a great advantage to me, as Prime Minister, and to the Cabinet, to have these experts to consult, whenever necessity arises. Indeed, most Governments have Planning Commissions of some kind or other. It was unfortunate that Dr Matthai did not like the idea of a Planning Commission, but that was the firm policy not only of the Congress but of our Government, repeatedly declared in the legislature. Personally I was entirely committed to it and believe in it and I could not possibly give it up. After much consideration the Cabinet accepted it, and in fact it was Dr Matthai who made the announcement in his budget speech.

31. The second point which Dr Matthai raised was his disagreement with the Indo-Pakistan Pact. He did this in language which surprised me greatly. I need not discuss this matter here, because that has been one of the corner-stones of our recent policy.

32. Thirdly, he referred to the extravagance of some Ministries under me. This again surprised me, because I had done my utmost to encourage economy. I have gone into this matter since my return and I find that the charge Dr Matthai made had little substance.

33. I have thought it fit to mention this matter briefly in this letter, because I am not issuing any kind of public statement at present at least. The whole episode has been unsavoury and totally unbecoming to our public life.

34. You will be glad to know that the latest reports we have received on the food situation are definitely good, that is to say that the Grow-More-Food Campaign of last year has shown definite results. This was largely due to the cooperation of the State Governments with this campaign. The following figures will give you some idea of the progress made during the past three years:

Years	Target Achievement (Lakh tons)	Percentage
1947-48	9,096.86	75
1948-49	8,867.71	87
1949-50	9,859.35	95

Thus the achievement for the year is 95 per cent of the target laid down. It is indeed hoped that it will go up to 98 per cent. This progress has been specially in regard to the irrigation schemes. Progress has also been maintained in regard to wells, minor irrigation, tanks, land reclamation, and the use of manure and fertilizers. Thus the result of the first year's working of the Emergency Branch of the Food Ministry may be said to be definitely satisfactory, and it is reasonable to expect that this progress will be maintained and indeed that it will gather momentum. We may, therefore, look forward with some confidence to the achievement of the goal of self-sufficiency within two years.

35. There is one snag however. The reports of production received by us are not always accurate and are based on figures supplied by unintelligent *patwaris* and the like. We are checking this now and we hope to have more accurate figures later. I need hardly add that there is absolutely no room for any complacency and we have to work hard to fulfil our objective. But we can work now with a certain confidence that we shall make good.

36. There has been an improvement in the petrol supply position and Government are making a cautious approach towards the decontrol of petrol by lifting rationing in the port cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Cochin and in the States of Assam and Manipur from 1st July 1950. Paper has been decontrolled.²² In regard to sugar, it has been decided to import 1,00,000 tons in the course of the next year. This import of sugar will be timed so as to prevent an accumulation or scarcity. The question of removal of control on the price and distribution of sugar will be considered in September 1950.

37. When I was away in Indonesia, Government made a slight variation in regard to their cotton policy. They have decided that for the 1950-51 crop the basic ceiling price will be raised by Rs. 150 per candy and an effective machinery working in close liaison with Government will be devised for collective purchase of cotton and for the maintenance of prices at reasonable levels subject to the ceiling. It is hoped indeed that the price will be kept low. In any event the new cotton crop will not come into the market before next year and there will, therefore, be no change in the prices of cloth during the next six months. The prices of cloth manufactured from the new cotton crop will be fixed, as usual, in accordance with the ruling prices of cotton. Our Minister of Industry and Supply hopes that there will be no rise in the price of cloth.

38. On the initiative of our Minister for Agriculture, the *Vana Mahotsava*, a national tree-planting week, is being celebrated and the Minister has put all his energy and enthusiasm into this work.²³ It has caught the imagination of the country and I am sure it will produce substantial results.

22. This was announced on 23 June 1950.

23. Launched by the President, Dr Rajendra Prasad, on 1 July 1950.

39. As the Government of the Union of South Africa have insisted on proceeding with and passing the Group Areas Bill in Parliament, the Government of India have informed the Union Government²⁴ that no useful purpose will be served now by holding the round table conference. The conference was meant to consider existing disabilities from which South African nationals of Indian and Pakistani origin suffered. While we were hoping that existing conditions would be improved, the South African Government have actually added to the burdens and disabilities of the people of Indian origin in South Africa. This clearly indicated that the Union Government had no intention of reversing the process of discrimination which they had started some time ago and because of which we had appealed to the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

24. On 1 July 1950.

VIII¹

New Delhi
July 15, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

The international situation dominates the scene and we live from day to day on the verge of some fresh tragic development. Anything that may be written today may be somewhat out of date when this letter reaches you. Our Foreign Office has naturally to bear the chief burden of this situation, but the main lines of policy must necessarily be determined by the Cabinet and, finally, by Parliament. It is for this reason that we have thought it fit to summon Parliament for a special session to consider more particularly this international situation. It will meet on Monday, July 31st, and it is expected to sit for about two weeks. We shall take up such other urgent matters also as may be ready for consideration.

2. There have been many critics of the particular line we have taken up in regard to the Korean situation.² But I think it is true to say that there has been,

1. File No. 25(6)-50-PMS.

2. The United Socialist Organization on 30 June and the Socialist Party on 9 July 1950 regretted the Government's failure to adopt an attitude of neutrality or "a positive policy in the Korean development," as India's support of the resolution in the United Nations without the Soviet presence had reduced the resolution "to a farce" and turned the Assembly into a handmaid of the Anglo-American bloc.

by and large, general approval of that line in the country. In moments of crisis, when passions are roused, it is no easy matter to make decisions from day to day. It is not difficult to line up with one particular group or way of thinking and thus to leave major decisions to them. But if we have to make our own decisions, we have to rely on our own judgement and analysis of the situation, and to keep in view our basic objectives and the foreign policy we have been pursuing thus far.

3. Some words are used loosely, and among these is "neutrality."³ Neutrality in peace-time has no particular meaning. It is only in war that a country can be neutral. But even in so-called peace-time, ever since the last World War ended, we have lived in an atmosphere of war and expectation of war, and hence people talk of this or that country being neutral in the cold war. In reality, all that this means is that we have not given up the right to decide for ourselves as to what we should do and what we should not do in any particular set of circumstances. To give up that right to decide means to give up both our independence of judgement and independence of action. In other words, it means to give up our basic independence and become a satellite of some other country tied down to a policy which we may or may not like.

4. India has, within the inevitable limitations imposed by events, tried to follow her own independent policy in foreign, as in other affairs. No country can be hundred per cent independent in such matters because every act or policy flows from other acts done before and other things happening in the world. But within those limitations, one can be more or less independent. We have preferred to be more independent. That was not only an idealistic approach but, I think, an eminently practical way of dealing with current problems. Also it flowed naturally from our past. Any other policy would have come in the way of our natural development and stunted us, apart from creating a great deal of internal friction.

5. Foreign policy may and should depend upon certain ideals and objectives of a country. Inevitably, it is governed by the interests of that country. Enlightened self-interest may take a short view or a long view, and in foreign policy, more than anything else, the short view is dangerous. The speed of events today rather telescopes the short and the long views and therefore the long view becomes even more important. We have tried in India to avoid entanglement in foreign affairs because we are busy with our own problems. But it was a consequence of independence and of India's position in the world that we could not keep away from other problems. More especially, we are bound up by what happens in Asia. For sometime past, whether in America or Europe or South East Asia, I have been

3. For example, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* carried an article on 6 July, stating that the "Democracies will be greatly heartened to know that Pandit Nehru's India who had declared her policy of strict neutrality has decided to accept the Security Council's resolution calling for assistance to South Korea."

venturing to point out the importance of Asia in the world situation today.⁴ That did not mean that any country of Asia had developed material or other kinds of power to influence world events. It meant that the change that had come over Asia by the progressive elimination of colonial control, and the nature of the problems that Asia had to face were of such vital importance, both in peace and war, as to affect the future of the world. The challenge and the conflict have come now in Korea. Korea may be relatively unimportant. It was called, in the old days, the Hermit Kingdom and then it became just a part of the Japanese Empire, struggling for freedom. But what is happening in Korea, it is apparent, affects the world. It may mean world war or it may mean our being for a long time on the verge of world war with all the tension and horror that this involves.

6. The critics of our policy have been of two kinds. Many of them have objected to our approving the U.N. Security Council's resolutions on Korea because that meant, according to them, an inevitable lining up with a certain group of powers, notably the U.S.A. The other critics, on the other hand, have said that we have not fully supported the U.N. or the U.S.A. action in the Far East, that we have limited our support and conditioned it and have not jumped into the fray with our defence forces, etc. Thus we have failed to take advantage of any clear-cut policy and are likely to suffer disadvantages from either side.

7. It seems to me that both these criticisms are misconceived and do not take all the relevant facts into consideration. We have been following a certain policy in foreign affairs and that policy has undoubtedly brought credit to India and made us in a small way an influence for peace. If we and some other countries did not do so, undoubtedly war would have been much nearer, apart from the internal difficulties that we might have had to face. We have, in any event, to carry our people with us, and no policy, that has not got large-scale public approval, can be carried on for long. To have changed our old policy at the first touch of harsh fact may have brought approval from some quarters, but it would have been to the great discredit of India and she would have counted for little in the great drama that is taking place. So we tried to adhere to that basic policy, though there was a variation of it under stress of circumstances.

8. We face today a vast and powerful Soviet group of nations, which tends to become a monolithic bloc, not only pursuing a similar internal economic policy but a common foreign policy. That policy is an expansionist one and thus there is a tendency for it to come into conflict with others. It is expansionist not only in the normal political sense but also in encouraging internal trouble in other countries. That internal trouble would not go far, if economic conditions were more or less satisfactory. We do not like this expansionist policy, external or internal. At the same time, we realize that there are certain factors which help it and unless those internal factors are changed, we cannot effectively meet that challenge.

4. See *ante*, pp. 386-387 and 401-404.

On the other hand, the approach of the rival group, though democratic in theory, tends more and more to encourage reactionary and military elements in various countries, especially of Asia. By the logic of events, it supports the relics of colonial rule. In the broad sweep of history, therefore, it becomes, whether it wants to or not, a defender of political and social systems which are out of date.

9. We want in India, and in other countries, democratic freedom for the nation and the individual and, at the same time, economic advance and social justice. Roughly speaking, the two governing ideas in the world today lay stress on one or the other of these. Ultimately, of course, there cannot be democratic freedom without social justice and there can be no social justice without democratic freedom. Is it possible for us in India to have both or try to have them? It is an ideal worth striving for and I am sure it is in line with the future development of the world, unless some great catastrophe overwhelms us all. Thus we have to follow a line which may not completely fit in with the two prevailing tendencies of the age, or rather which tries to harmonize between them.

10. In South Korea, we see that, in spite of a great deal of help given by the U.S.A., the political and social structure was excessively weak and it has cracked up. Indeed, from all accounts that we have had, South Korea was governed by as authoritarian a regime as North Korea, though both were entirely different. Numerous impartial observers have given us accounts of the bad state of affairs in South Korea during the past few months. So, it is difficult to be enthusiastic about South Korea. In Indo-China, we have kept apart from the two contending parties. One of these is supported by the French, and now the U.S.A. have promised military support to the French.⁵ Formosa, by a decision taken during the later stages of the War, was part of China.⁶ But now obstructions have been placed in the way of Formosa going to China.⁷

11. All this indicates how a certain policy leads inevitably to the support of weak and reactionary elements in Asia. In the long run that policy cannot succeed because Asia, however weak, is wide awake and in a rebellious mood. It is, therefore, not a wise policy and in effect encourages those very elements to which it is opposed.

12. Europe and America are far too much used to thinking in terms of military or economic power. There is no doubt that we cannot ignore the force of arms or of money. But it has been repeatedly seen in parts of Asia that there are strict limitations to what arms and money can do, if they go against the prevailing mood

5. See *ante*, p. 479.

6. By the Cairo Declaration of 1943, it was agreed that all territories occupied by Japan since 1894 should be given up. This was formalized by the Potsdam Agreement in 1945 by which Taiwan was to be returned to the Republic of China. After the Japanese surrender, the island was returned to the Nationalist Government to be administered by a provincial governor.

7. On 27 June 1950, Truman had declared that the determination of the legal status of Taiwan must await a peace treaty with Japan.

of millions of people. India is in a position to understand these Asian problems much better, not only from the political but also from the psychological point of view, and India is also respected by these countries of Asia because we have no particular axe to grind. Therefore, a heavy responsibility rests upon us to adopt a policy which we consider not only expedient but wise and in keeping with the temper of Asia. To fall blindly in line with others, whoever they may be, is to fall into a trap and to miss the historic destiny of India. What the future holds, nobody can say. But we can at least try to do our best.

13. I have tried to explain in press conferences and elsewhere our present policy in regard to the conflict in the Far East.⁸ We have given our moral support to the United Nations there and that is a great deal, as the world knows. It would have made a tremendous difference if we had withheld that support. But we have not sent any armed forces there and we do not intend to send them, so far as I can see. Of course, we are not in position to send anything that might be called effective. But apart from that, we do not wish to get entangled in the larger conflicts which might arise there and which are threatened. Also we do not wish to lose our position of some vantage which might be utilized in the cause of peace. I realize that, in the circumstances prevailing today, India's capacity to influence them is strictly limited. Nevertheless, there is a possibility of making a difference and that difference may be between war and peace. Whether people like a particular policy we adopt or not, there is a growing respect for India and we force people and countries to think a little more clearly than they might otherwise do.

14. So far as Formosa is concerned, we cannot possibly join in any action against the People's Republic of China with whom we have friendly relations. So far as Indo-China is concerned, we cannot become the supporters of French colonial policy. We are still facing that policy in what is called French India. It is astonishing how short-sighted that is and what a lot of trouble it is giving us.

15. We have been in intimate touch with other Foreign Offices and I am glad to say that there has been much in common between our way of thinking and the U.K.'s approach to this Far Eastern problem, though they do not express themselves quite so clearly because of some of their commitments.⁹ The vague talk about mediation has had no substance.¹⁰ But we have ventured to appeal to the Great

8. See *ante*, pp. 319-322.

9. Krishna Menon informed Delhi on 3 July that Attlee had said that "with him it was only a question of timing and that he had hoped that it would be possible to take the first step about China, but it now appeared a bad moment." Attlee agreed with Nehru that China and Russia should take their seats in the Security Council but blamed the Russians for the existing stalemate.

10. *Reynold's News* (London) and *Daily Compass* (New York) on 2 July 1950 called upon Nehru to play the role of a mediator. For Nehru's reply to a similar question at a press conference on 7 July 1950 see p. 325.

Powers in the cause of peace. We have felt that the only effective way out of the present deadlock is for the People's Republic of China to enter the Security Council of the United Nations. It has a right to do so, and to keep it out is completely illogical. If China comes in, then the U.S.S.R. also returns to the Security Council and in some ways the deadlock that has existed for some time past ends. We are not so foolish as to imagine that the problem is solved by that, and there may be great deal of trouble in the Security Council. But it will be a different kind of trouble and should not lead to war. Of course, if some of the big Powers are bent on war, then they will have it. But the way we suggest does offer a method of resolving the deadlock without unnecessary loss of prestige of any party concerned. So we have pressed for the inclusion of China in the Security Council on the powers concerned. There has been some little response,¹¹ but I am afraid it has not thus far been adequate.

16. Whatever the merits or demerits of our policy may be, it is certainly a clear one. And yet it is surprising how some people in foreign countries misunderstand it. A recent article in the *New York Times* stated that the U.S. Ambassador in Delhi influenced us in adopting the line we did in approving of the U.N. resolution on Korea, and further that the American declaration in regard to Formosa, Indo-China and the Philippines helped us in doing so. As a matter of fact, our decision had nothing to do with the U.S. Ambassador's visit and had been previously taken. The U.S. declaration about Formosa, etc. actually came in our way and we thought it was most unfortunate, as I pointed out to the Ambassador. Any person, with some knowledge of the working of our minds or of the mental climate of Asia, would have realized this.

17. There is no need for us to become excited or hysterical because of the turn events have taken in the Far East. Indeed, this is just the time when we should be calm and collected and be prepared for every contingency. This means that we should try to lessen, as far as possible, our reliance on foreign exports, because we may have to do without them sometime in the future. In this hard world we have to learn the virtues of austerity and do without anything that is not essential. We may have to produce some substitutes for the things we import. To a large extent, this can be done, if necessity arises.

18. I wrote to you in my last letter that the food situation had shown definite signs of improvement. I based that on the report of our Food Ministry. That was an overall view of all-India. As a matter of fact, in Bengal and Madras, the food situation is far from good, partly because of lack of rains and partly because of the huge influx of refugees in West Bengal. That means that we have to work hard for food production. I have previously drawn your attention to the necessity for pushing subsidiary foods.¹² That necessity may be all the greater in future. Certain

11. See *ante*, pp. 347-348.

12. See *ante*, p. 320.

recent experiments in our Food Research Institute tend to show that some of these substitutes can be used with profit by themselves or mixed with other grains. This at least gives us an assurance that in a time of crisis we can depend on ourselves alone, even though we may not get exactly the food we like. It is desirable, therefore, to some extent for people to be educated to vary their food habits a little. Much need not be attempted at this stage.

19. In this developing drama of Asia, it is clear that China must play a great part. It is, therefore, important that we should understand China and know what is happening there. Opinions vary about the general trend of China's policy. Some think that China will function more or less as a satellite of the U.S.S.R., both in foreign and domestic policy. Others think that this will not be so and China will develop on her own lines, though aiming generally at the communist objective. We have had many reports from our Ambassador in Peking and I should like to share some of them with you. I am enclosing these with this letter.¹³ You will find that China is proceeding with considerable caution but at the same time with tremendous vitality. The leaders of this China are evidently realists and do not propose to follow an adventurist policy. We have just received the members of the Chinese diplomatic mission in New Delhi.¹⁴

20. The situation in East and West Bengal and in Assam continues to be more or less the same. That is to say it is generally unsatisfactory, though it has considerably toned down and is at a low level. I am glad to say that the Calcutta press has improved greatly and both the Pakistan and the Bengal press have accepted a code of behaviour which was placed before them by the newspaper editors of both sides. Migration continues at a high rate in both directions and at the same time many of the previous migrants return. For some days the rate of Hindus coming over to West Bengal became rather high. Now it has gone down somewhat. This increase in the volume of the exodus was partly due to the monsoon and the rise of the river levels, which provided better facilities for travelling by river boats. But it is clear that internal conditions in East Bengal do not yet produce any feeling of security in the minds of the minority and daily incidents occur and pin-pricks, which tend to frighten the minorities. Barisal continues to be bad. Meanwhile, the problem of rehabilitation grows bigger and bigger. It is obvious that we cannot tackle it adequately without the full cooperation of all the other States. That cooperation has not been lacking and I am grateful for that. Nevertheless, it has to be on a much bigger scale if we are to solve this problem and I would like to draw your earnest attention to this.

21. Indo-Pakistan relations generally continue to be uneasy. There is no marked improvement in them, in so far as any solution of the problem is concerned. Some

13. Not printed.

14. Chen Chien, Charge d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy, called on officials in the Ministry of External Affairs on 14 July 1950.

progress has been made regarding evacuee property, but it is not much yet. In any event, attempts at solution continue. Meanwhile, goodwill missions go backwards and forwards between India and Pakistan and receive big welcomes on the other side. That is a very healthy sign and shows that the people generally want peace and cooperation.

22. One of the major difficulties in the way of our settling many of our differences with Pakistan has, as you know, been the exchange rate. Pakistan has now definitely joined the International Monetary Fund.¹⁵ As a consequence of this, some final decision about the exchange rate should be made within the next two or three months, unless Pakistan adopts delaying tactics. That decision and solution should go a long way to bring about some normality.

23. Ever since Sir Owen Dixon came as U.N. mediator on Kashmir, he has spent most of his time in Jammu and Kashmir State. He has visited almost every part of it and no doubt formed some opinion. What this is, I do not know. I saw him two days ago on his return from Kashmir. He suggested a meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan in Delhi. We told him that we were always prepared to meet Mr Liaquat Ali Khan but it was not clear to us how we would consider the question. We had met previously on several occasions and discussed the Kashmir issue without coming to a settlement. It would be unfortunate if that was repeated. Sir Owen Dixon said that all he could do was to bring us together. The problem should be discussed at the topmost level. It was no good corresponding and exchanging notes as in the past. If he had any suggestions to make, they would be naturally in terms of the U.N. resolution. If nothing came out of that, it would be open to the parties concerned to explore other avenues. There the matter rests. It is not very satisfactory. However, at Sir Owen's suggestion, I have invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan to come to Delhi on the 20th of this month.

24. A leading figure among the Sikhs in the Punjab, who ought to know better, has again started an agitation for what he calls a separate homeland for the Sikhs.¹⁶ He has not hesitated even to throw out feelers to Pakistan and to hint vaguely at an independent Sikh State.¹⁷ The astonishing futility of this demand and this approach does not prevent him from continuing this agitation, which is not only

15. On 11 July 1950.

16. In a press interview on 11 July 1950, Master Tara Singh demanded a separate Sikh state to "protect the Sikhs from the communalism of the majority." He also asserted that they were "consolidating Sikh opinion and when it is fully done, no power will be able to resist our demand."

17. In an interview to *Dawn* (Karachi) on 12 July, Tara Singh spoke of the "inevitability" of war between Pakistan and India, and added "this will be an opportunity for Khalsa to re-establish Sikh rule in the land." He wanted that the proposed Punjabi-speaking province should include the area up to Nankana Sahib in Sheikhupura district in West Punjab and in its place the Jammu and Kashmir State be ceded to Pakistan.

unpatriotic, but can only lead to grave injury to the Sikhs. The Sikhs have suffered greatly in the past from bad leadership and, to some extent, this misfortune continues. Most of them realize that these adventurist tactics can lead to no good and indeed they attach so little importance to them that they do not care even to reply. I think it is unwise to allow these wrong tendencies to grow and they should always be nipped in the bud by adequate propaganda by the people concerned. The one lesson we have learnt through blood and tears is that the unity and integration of India is essential to maintain our freedom and to make progress with some rapidity. In the present confused and dangerous state of the world, only a person devoid of all vision and sense of perspective can preach any doctrine which must disrupt India. It is necessary, therefore, for every such move to be countered by adequate propaganda and by clear enunciation of our policies. We should not leave any doubt in people's minds as to where we stand.

25. This applies to other reactionary and disruptive tendencies also such as communal tendencies in any other group in India. So far as the minorities are concerned, communalism naturally injures them. But it is the responsibility of the majority to free itself from this communal approach to any problem. Unfortunately, owing to past events many among even Congressmen speak a language today which would have been surprising a few years ago. I think that it is of the utmost importance that on this communal question we should repeat our policy of non-communalism freely and frankly and not allow these wrong, reactionary, disruptive and narrow-minded movements to gather weight.

26. The next Congress session has been fixed for September 12th at Nasik.¹⁸ That session will meet at a critical moment in our history and may well lay down basic policies for the future. We should be clear about these policies and not allow any vagueness or drift to continue.

27. The Fiscal Commission's report¹⁹ has just come out and I commend it to your attention. We have to view these problems not in the narrow way of the old fiscal commissions and tariff boards, but with the broad approach of this new Fiscal Commission. You will notice the importance they attach to planning. There is indeed no satisfactory method for solving our problems, except the planned approach. The Planning Commission here is applying itself to its tasks in all earnestness and I hope that in the course of a month or two they will produce something for your consideration.

18. It was postponed to 20 and 21 September 1950.

19. The report, released on 13 July 1950, advocated decentralization of big industries, total protection to defence and strategic industries and protection to basic and key industries as per the tariff authority's recommendations. The report also stressed that protection should not result in unequal distribution of wealth or uncoordinated growth of industries.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

28. Shri Rajagopalachari has arrived in Delhi. Unfortunately, ill health prevented him from coming here earlier. His presence in the Cabinet is going to be of the greatest help to us in facing the difficult problems and situations that confront us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11

MISCELLANEOUS

1. To Vincent Sheean¹

New Delhi
April 12, 1950

My dear Sheean,

Thank you for your letter of March 29th². I did not think that the peace of this planet depends upon any single individual, much less on me. I suppose some of us can make a difference. But the forces at play are elemental and imponderable. All one can do is to function to the best of his or her ability and not to be too afraid of what might happen. More and more I feel that fear is perhaps the worst affliction that possesses an individual or a nation.

With all good wishes to you and your wife,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. He had written: "I know with whatever faculties fifty years have given me that the peace of this planet depends upon you."

2. Basic Truths taught by the Buddha¹

I send my greetings to this Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists and my earnest wish that its labours will lead people to think more of the teachings of the Buddha and to attempt to act up to them. Those great teachings have a value in every age. But perhaps no other period in history required them more than this present one in which we live. We pass from crisis to crisis and think always in terms of violence and coercion, forgetting that these methods have seldom, if ever, yielded any substantial results. The vicious circle goes on and both as individuals and as national communities, we are dragged into it. Yet the old and eternal law remains that evil cannot be conquered by evil but by good, that violence leads

1. Message for the Conference of World Fellowship of Buddhists, New Delhi, 2 May 1950. Speeches and Writings, January 1950 to August 1950. PMS.

to violence only and not to peace, that hatred poisons everything it touches, that fear degrades and enfeebles and thus leads to other ills.

We seem to have lost anchorage and drift about in search of some magical remedy. Because we do not find this, we grow frustrated and fear overshadows the world. It is at this time, more than at any other time, that it is necessary to think of the basic truths that the Buddha taught, not the many dogmatic and other accretions that grow round every truth, but rather that truth itself in all its simplicity and nobility. I express my homage to the memory of the greatest of the sons of India, whose light and message have illumined millions of minds and hearts.

3. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 23, 1950

My dear Kailas Nath,

I have just received your letter of the 22nd May.² I am glad you have accepted my advice in this matter. I am quite clear in my mind that that was the only course we could adopt.

We are passing through a period of great transition, not only political and economic, but also social. We have to accept things as they are and not allow ourselves to be upset too much by anything that happens. In any event, the approach of affection is always the right approach.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Katju had offered to resign from the Governor's post because of some domestic problems.

4. To Indira Gandhi¹

Doon Court
Dehra Dun
July 5, 1950

Darling Indu,

As I left Delhi this morning at six the rain clouds gathered and it started drizzling.

1. *Two Alone, Two Together - Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964* (Ed. Sonia Gandhi) (London, 1992), pp. 570-571.

Later on the way it rained fairly heavily. It has been very pleasant here—first with the rain in the morning, then the rain stopped and the garden looked lovely. Later the sun came out and Mussoorie was topped by the deep blue sky. I am returning to Delhi tomorrow morning at six fifteen.

I hope you are having a good time at Chakrata.² If not then the fault must be yours and not Chakrata's. I am told it is very delightful round about Chakrata—and then there is Deoband which you were so keen on visiting.³ I suppose you know that the people living in Chakrata *tahsil*—the Jaunsar people—are rather unique. They have both polygamy and polyandry.

The ex-P.M. of Nepal—Juddha Shamsheer Jang Rana (the man who gave us the big brass Ganesha)—came to see me today. He said his wife the Maharani was rather ill. She was anxious to see you and give you some mementoes. I wonder if it is possible for you to go to his house for ten minutes or so on your way down. He lives on Young Road, Dehra Dun. It would be worthwhile for you to go there. I suppose anyhow you will break journey at Dehra Dun. The District Magistrate could direct you there. Or, on your way down, stop at the police station at Rajpur and ask for his house.

There is no particular necessity for you to go to the Maharani and you need not put yourself out for it. If it can be arranged easily then you can go.

Love,
Papu

2. A hill station in Uttar Pradesh.

3. Deoband, a town in Saharanpur district, is famous for Darul Ulum, a centre of Islamic learning.

5. To S.S. Dhawan¹

Allahabad
July 15, 1950

Dear Dhawan,²

I have your letter about the G.B.S. Society. I am glad to learn that you propose to form such a society in Allahabad. I am reluctant to join societies which often

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Shanti Swaroop Dhawan (1905-1978); lecturer in law, Allahabad University, 1940-54; High Commissioner for India in the U.K., 1968-69; Governor, West Bengal, 1969-71.

enough are started but do not function later. But I hope that your proposed society will have a better fate. I shall gladly join it as a member. I do not see the point of anybody becoming a patron unless he is not supposed to be good enough to be an ordinary member. If it pleases you and your colleagues, you can make me the patron, but I value much more being an ordinary member.

I understand that the motto of your society is going to be "A daily dose of Shaw." I am afraid I have not had daily doses, except for brief periods. But I remember well my first contact with Shaw's plays—and this was a little over forty years ago—and the excitement those plays and even more so the prefaces attached to them produced in me. Since then Bernard Shaw has occupied a niche in my mind and I have sought his company to my great advantage.

I hope your society will not merely talk about Shaw, but will read him and try to understand what he has preached during his long life. Much that Shaw has written is as fresh today as it was a generation ago. I am glad that you are going to undertake translation of his plays into Hindi.

I am sending you Rs. 5/- as my subscription for the society.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To D.B. Desai¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1950

My dear Dhiru,
Your letter of the 7th July.

You were quite right in giving an assurance to Fraulein Schenk¹² about her child.³ She need not worry about the child's future and we will gladly do anything that is necessary for the child's education etc.

What I suggested to you in my last letter was that some arrangement might be made to send her periodical financial assistance. It is clear from your letter that it is difficult for her to make both ends meet. There is no question of your asking her to work in your Legation. I do not consider that at all suitable. The only thing to do is to help her where she is. Even a little addition to her present salary will

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Emilie Schenk was the widow of Subhas Chandra Bose.

3. Anita Bose Pfaff.

make a difference to her life. Therefore I want you to arrange for this assistance to be sent to her monthly or quarterly or as you like. It is for you to suggest the sum and indeed, to send it to her without waiting to hear from me. You can then let me know and I shall arrange to have the money remitted to you regularly. As I have told you previously, this is entirely a private arrangement and is not a matter to be taken up with External Affairs.

I have read your report about Austria with interest.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi
July 20, 1950

My dear Munshi,

I have been feeling a little uncomfortable at your references to the rebuilding of the Somnath temple.² As a Government, we cannot undertake the building of any religious edifices. If once we begin doing so, we might be asked to favour a variety of religions. Also in the present economic condition of the country and the great lack of residential accommodation, any project for a large scale building of a temple seems rather out of place.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 8 May 1950, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, Rajpramukh of Saurashtra, laid the foundation stone of the new Somnath temple on the site of the ancient temple.

3. Despite Nehru's advice, the Somnath Temple was built and inaugurated by President Rajendra Prasad on 11 May 1951.

GLOSSARY

basar	rehabilitation
charkha	a spinning wheel
gurdwara	a Sikh temple
jagir	rent-free land granted by the government for services rendered
jagirdari	ownership of a jagir (estate)
Jai Hind	victory to India
Maulana	a title given to a Muslim scholar of Arabic and Persian
Maulvi	a learned Muslim well versed in Arabic and Persian literature
mohalla	locality
panchayat	village committee
panda	a Hindu priest at a pilgrim centre and a guide to pilgrims
patwari	a village accountant
Ramrajya	the rule of Ram, metaphorically the rule of the righteous
Sadar-i-Riyasat	regent
tahsil	a sub-division of a district
Vana Mahotsava	a programme of planting trees to develop forest wealth
zamindari	landlord's estate

INDEX

(Biographical footnotes in this volume and in volumes in the first series are italicized and those in the Second Series are given in block letters.)

- Abdullah, Shaikh, (*Vol. 7, p. 308*), 151,
154-155 fn, 309, 336, 351, 381
- Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, 1950
(Kashmir), 157 fn
- Acheson, Dean, (*VOL. 1, P. 511*), 108, 217,
347-348 fn, 350, 352 & fn-353, 354-355,
358 & fn, 369 fn, 382
- Afghanistan, 393, 476 & fn
- Africa, Central, 339, 412
- Agartala, 142, 310
- Agra, 293 fn
- Ahmed, Nisar, 172 & fn-173, 268
—, Rafiuddin, 146 & fn
- Aiyar, N. Chandrasekhar, (*VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 574*), 448 fn
- Akali Party, 275 & fn
- Akshaya Brahmachari, 296 & fn-297
- Alexander, Horace, (*Vol. 6, p. 208*), 369
- Ali, Asaf, (*Vol. 6, p. 42*), 249
—, Mohammad, (*VOL. 3, P. 316*), 88 &
fn-89 fn, 90 & fn, 137
- Aligarh, 279 & fn-280, 456 fn
- Aligarh Muslim University, 279
- All India Congress Committee, 202-203
- All India Nationalist Sikh Party, 275 fn
- All India Newspaper Editors' Conference,
(A.I.N.E.C.) 56, 99 fn, 111 fn
- Allahabad, 196, 309, 505
- Allahabad University, 505 fn
- Allied Powers, 338
- Ambala, 166
- America, 93, 199, 387, 491, 493
- American War of Independence, 421
- Amin, Nurul, (*VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 109*), 47 fn,
68, 83 fn
- Amrit Kaur, (*Vol. 11, p. 274*), 18, 262, 288
& fn, 461 fn
- Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 318 fn, 491
fn
- Amritsar Refugee Camp, 75, 89 & fn-90
- Amtus Salam, (*VOL. 6, P. 107*), 32 & fn
- Andhra Pradesh, 86
- Anjam (Karachi), 80
- Ansars, 41, 50, 136
- Arabia, 184
- Archaeological Survey of India, 396 fn
- Argentina, 345 fn
- Asia, 93-94, 132, 139, 143-144, 183, 195,
198-199, 334, 336, 339, 344, 354-356,
377-378, 381, 385-389, 392, 401-402,
420, 439, 455, 468, 472, 477 fn, 482 fn,
491-496
—, Central, 69, 378 fn
—, East *see* Far East
—, North Eastern, 416
—, South, 123 fn, 370 fn, 402, 468 fn
—, South East, 71, 123 & fn, 260-261, 307,
309, 312, 332, 334, 354, 358-360, 370
fn-371, 386, 388, 392, 401-402, 418-420,
438, 441, 460, 468 & fn, 471-472, 477,
482, 484, 491 fn
—, West, 303 fn *see also* Middle East
- Asian Relations Conference, first (1947), 393
—, second, 393
- Asiatic Land Tenure Act, 459 fn
- Asiatic Land Tenure Amendment Act, 460 fn
- Assam, 7-9, 17 fn, 19-20, 22-23, 25, 34,
37-38, 41 fn, 53 fn, 56-57, 63 fn-64, 79,
89 & fn, 95, 106-107, 114, 121-122, 125,
138-139, 174, 253 fn, 445 & fn, 448 fn,
451, 455, 457, 461-463, 465, 473-474,
484-485, 489, 496; Government of, 18 fn,
33, 116, 122, 474
- Assam Expulsion Act *see* Immigrants
(Expulsion from Assam) Act
- Atlantic Powers, defence of, 372 fn
- Attlee, C.R., (*Vol. 15, p. 109*), 46 & fn, 345,
348 & fn, 350, 353 & fn, 360, 494 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Australia, 125 & fn, 313 fn, 386, 393, 403
fn, 438, 468 fn, 477 fn
- Austria, 507
- Ayodhya, 293 fn-294 & fn, 295-296 & fn
- Ayyangar, N. Gopalaswami, (*Vol. 15, p. 248*),
18, 28, 31, 33, 36-37, 59, 79, 102, 129,
152, 156, 309, 461 fn
- Azad, Abul Kalam, (*Vol. 1, p. 353*), 25, 156,
173 fn, 243 & fn-244, 286, 303 & fn, 338,
340-341, 461 fn, 487
- 'Azad' Kashmir, 161 fn
- 'Azad' Kashmir Radio, 152
- Babar, 69, 295
- Babri Mosque, 294 & fn, 296
- Bacchae*, *The* (Euripides), 188 fn
- Badruddja, Syed, 140 fn
- Bagge, Algot, F.J., (*VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 573*), 448
fn
- Bagge Tribunal, 448 & fn
- Baghdad, 69
- Baguio Conference, 440 & fn, 442, 477 & fn
- Bajpai, G.S., (*Vol. 15, p. 568*), 152, 157
- Bakshi, Ghulam Mohammad, (*Vol. 9, p. 440*),
153-155, 309, 351
- Bali, 385, 397, 482-483
- Baltistan, 75
- Banaras (Benares), 280 & fn, 309
—, Jail, 279-280 fn
- Bangkok, 385
- Bao Dai, (*VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 12*), 312, 402, 440;
Government of, 123, 331, 392
- Bao Dai regime, 122
- Bardoloi, Gopinath, (*Vol. 8, p. 283*), 18, 33 &
fn, 162-163 fn
- Bareilly, 293 fn, 456 fn
- Bariha, Lal Ranjit Singh, 249 & fn
- Barisal, 41 fn, 47 fn, 143, 496
- Barnard, Geoffrey, 244 & fn
- Barpeta, 23
- Basu, S.K., (*VOL. 9, P. 160*), 26 & fn, 29, 39,
47, 107
- Belgium, 313 fn
- Benapole, 41 fn, 50 & fn
- Bengal, 5-6, 12-13, 20, 22-25, 28, 30-31, 42,
45, 49 & fn-50, 55, 58, 60, 66, 70 fn, 90,
97, 108, 113, 115, 120, 125, 133, 136, 141,
143, 170, 230, 253, 309, 396 fn, 439,
447-448 fn, 455, 457, 474-475 fn, 484,
495-496; Government of, 137 fn;
Legislative Assembly (composite) of, 47
fn, 74 fn
- , East, 7-9, 13-14, 18 & fn, 20, 22-23 &
fn, 26 fn, 29, 31-32 & fn, 34, 36-38 & fn,
41 fn-42 & fn, 46-47 & fn, 53 fn, 55,
57-59 & fn, 60 & fn, 62, 64-65, 68 fn, 70
fn-71, 75-76, 79 fn, 82-83 fn, 84, 86, 88,
95, 97, 100, 106, 108-109, 113-118, 125,
132-133, 136, 138, 142-146, 167, 169,
230, 233, 268, 295, 309 & fn, 318, 343,
377, 439, 445 & fn, 447-448 & fn, 449
& fn-450, 451-452, 456, 461-465,
474-475 fn, 484-486, 496; Cabinet of, 8;
Government of, 8, 26, 32, 38 fn, 41, 53
fn, 56-57, 62, 109, 111 fn, 116, 136, 268,
309
- , West, 4, 7-9, 14, 19-20, 22-23 & fn,
25-26 fn, 27, 29-32, 34-37, 38 & fn-39 &
fn, 41 fn, 46-47, 50, 53 fn, 56-58, 59 fn-
60 & fn, 61-63 & fn, 64, 67 & fn-68 fn,
70, 84-86, 89 & fn, 95, 97, 100, 103,
106-107, 111 & fn, 114-115, 117-118,
132, 134-135, 138-139, 142-143, 145-146,
167, 169, 171, 174, 218 & fn, 233, 253,
295, 318, 335, 343, 377, 439, 445 & fn,
447-448 & fn, 450-451, 456, 461-465,
469, 474, 484-485, 495-496, 505 fn;
Cabinet of, 8, 17, 56; Government of, 8,
32, 41, 50, 53, 57-58, 62, 87, 102-103,
111-112, 116-118, 134, 136, 146 & fn,
168 fn, 210 fn, 335-336, 448, 474;
Governor of *see* Katju, K.N.; Legislative
Assembly of, 146 fn; Pradesh Congress
Committee, 68 fn
- Benares *see* Banaras
- Bettiah, 85 fn
- Bevin, Ernest, (*VOL. 2, P. 472*), 314, 355,
365-366 fn, 371
- Beyond the Iron Curtain* (David Kelly),
345 fn

- Bhargava, Gopinath, (*Vol.4, p.178*), 145, 165-166
- Bhutan, 127
- Bihar, 7, 42, 45, 54, 61, 67, 69, 125, 139, 204
fn; Government of, 125, 210 fn; State
Assembly of, 223 fn
- Bihar Coal Fields, 151
- Bihar Land Reforms Act (1951), 223 fn
- Bihar Land Reforms Bill (1949), 223 fn;
Select Committee for, 223 fn
- Biswas, C.C., 74 & fn, 79, 84-87, 99-100,
105-107, 122, 135, 142, 310, 461 fn, 465,
485
- Blair, G. Floyd, 27 & fn, 381 fn
- Blitz* (Bombay), 340-341
- Bombay, 38 fn, 43 & fn, 72-73, 80, 213 fn,
228, 235, 263 fn, 279 fn, 319 fn, 474 &
fn, 489
- Bombay Government, 200 fn
- Bombay Millowners' Association, 467 & fn
- Bongaon, 169
- Bose, Anita, (*VOL.3, P.44*), 506 & fn
—, Emilie Schenkl, (*VOL.3, P.43*), 506 &
fn
—, Subhas Chandra, (*Vol. 3, p.46*), 506 &
fn
- Bretton Woods Conference, 217 fn
- Britain, 345 fn, 347 fn, 388, 402, 467 fn;
Government of, 50, 92, 125-126, 345, 403
see also England, United Kingdom
- British Army, 128
- British Navy, 245
- Brussels, 395 fn
- Bucher, F.R. Roy, (*VOL.1, P.76*), 52
—, Maureen, 52
- Buddha, Gautama, 503
- Burhanganj (East Bengal), 41 fn
- Burma, 110, 121, 124 fn, 139, 260, 308 &
fn, 312, 315-316, 318, 329, 352 fn, 358,
366, 404, 409-410, 412-413, 416,
420-421, 425-426, 428, 473, 478, 481,
483; Government of, 260, 395, 428,
483 fn
- Cabinet (British), 121
- Cabinet (Indian), 10 fn-11 & fn, 14, 42 fn-
43, 72, 74, 100, 112, 120-121, 128, 162,
200 & fn-201, 202, 214, 227-228, 229
fn-230, 231-232, 235-236 & fn, 237 &
fn-238, 241-243 & fn, 244, 246-248, 253,
257, 259, 288, 303 & fn, 308, 311-312,
338, 340, 380-381, 438-439, 447, 461 &
fn-462, 463, 473-474, 480, 488, 490, 499;
Committee on Indo-Pakistan Agreement
of, 237; Economic Committee of, 121,
232, 236, 242
- Cachar, 19, 33 & fn, 162-163
- Cairo, 326
- Cairo Declaration (1943), 493 fn
- Calcutta, 16, 24, 26 fn, 28, 31-32, 34, 36-37,
39, 42-44, 46-50, 54 & fn-55, 57-61, 63,
67, 70 & fn-71, 74 fn, 80, 83-84, 107-108,
111-112, 122, 132, 135, 141-142, 144,
171, 249, 309-310, 318-319, 439, 448,
465, 468 fn, 475, 484-485, 489, 496
- Calcutta Bar, 87 fn
- Calcutta Dental College and Hospital, 146 fn
- Calcutta University, 74 fn, 87
- Canada, 109 fn-110, 313 fn, 319, 377
- Cape Comorin *see* Kanya Kumari
- Cape Town, 459 fn
- Cariappa, K.M., (*VOL.2, P.376*), 54, 125,
441-442
- Celestin, W.E., 217 & fn
- Central Advisory Council, 221
- Central *basar* Committee, 141 fn
- Central Water and Power Commission,
204 fn
- Ceylon *see* Sri Lanka
- Chakrata, 505
- Chakravarti, N.P., (*VOL.7, P.543*), 396 & fn
- Chandernagore, 468 fn
- Chatra Gorge (Nepal), 204 fn
- Chaudhury, Nabakrushna, (*Vol.6, p.44*),
249 & fn
- Chen Chien, 496 fn
- Chiang Kai-shek, (*Vol.10, p.74*), 308 fn, 326,
386
- China, Nationalist, 312, 360, 363, 441-442;
Army of, 308; Government of, 131 fn,
315, 326, 493 fn

- , People's Republic of, 51, 121, 132 & fn, 144 & fn, 155, 204, 242, 260, 308, 311 fn-312, 314-315, 317, 322, 324-326, 342 & fn, 345-347, 348 fn-349, 350, 353, 355-356 fn, 357-358 & fn, 359-360, 363 & fn-364 fn, 365 fn, 372 & fn, 378 fn, 393, 395-396, 418, 428, 438, 440-441, 455, 472, 476, 479, 481-482 & fn, 483, 486 & fn-487, 493 & fn-494 & fn, 495-496; Central People's Government Council of, 363 fn; Government of, 131 & fn, 144, 204, 260, 308, 314-317, 322, 325, 342, 345-352 & fn, 355, 358-360, 364 & fn-365, 366 & fn, 372-373, 396, 428, 455, 479, 486 & fn-487; President of *see* Mao Tse-tung
- Chinese Communist Party, 144 fn; Republic of, 132; Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of, 487 fn
- "China in Evolution" (an article in *The Times*), 144 & fn
- Chittagong, 50 fn, 75
- Chittagong Mail, 41 fn
- Churchill, Winston, (*Vol. 4, p. 52*), 326, 369 & fn
- Civil & Military Gazette* (Lahore), 80
- Cochin, 71, 245, 460, 468, 487, 489
- Colban, Eric, (*VOL. 14 Pt. I. P. 202*), 157
- Colombia, 313 fn
- Colombo, 468 fn
- Colembo Conference (1950), 441-442
- Colombo Plan, 468 fn
- Columbia University, 380 & fn
- Commercial College, Delhi University, 87 fn
- Commonwealth Consultative Committee on Economic Development of South East Asia *see* Sydney Conference
- Commonwealth of Nations, 49 & fn, 123 fn, 125, 370 fn-371
- Commonwealth South East Asia Conference *see* Sydney Conference
- Communal G.O. (1922) of Madras Government, 302 fn
- Communist Party of India, 333, 339, 419-420
- Communist Party of Malaysia, 483 fn
- Communist Party of the Philippines, 385 fn
- Congress, Indian National, 3-4 & fn, 10-11 & fn, 17 & fn, 26 fn, 37, 40 & fn, 52, 59, 72 & fn, 74, 81, 85 fn-86, 88 fn-89, 91, 109, 120, 131, 134, 141, 167 & fn-168, 199, 201-203, 210-212, 227-228, 231, 241, 257, 260 & fn-261, 274 fn, 293-294, 296 & fn, 301 & fn-302, 303, 320, 338, 343-344, 422, 449, 458, 464-466, 475, 487-488, 498; Executive Committee of, 240
- Congress Parliamentary Board, 301
- Congress Working Committee, 68 & fn, 120, 167, 202, 209 & fn, 236, 240, 247, 301 & fn, 303, 458; Planning Sub-Committee of, 209 & fn-210, 467
- Constitution (Indian), 6, 65-66, 111, 130-131, 145, 156 fn, 177, 201, 223, 247, 253, 389, 461; Article 14 of, 223 fn; Article 370 of, 156 fn
- Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 6, 48; Objectives Resolution adopted by, 6
- Cooch Behar, 53 fn
- Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D., India's), 287
- Cross Roads* (Bombay), 263 fn, 319 fn, 474 fn
- Cuba, 366, 373
- Dacca, 26 & fn, 28-29, 39, 47, 75, 79, 83 & fn-84, 107, 116, 136, 295
- Daily Compass* (New York), 494 fn
- Daily Jang* (Karachi), 80
- Damodar river, 210 fn
- Damodar Valley Works, 42, 45, 70, 151, 210 & fn
- Darsana, 50 & fn
- Darul Ulum (Deoband), 505 fn
- Das, Maya, 16
- Dave, Rohit, 73 fn
- Dawn* (Karachi), 28, 41, 52, 80, 137 & fn, 497 fn
- Defence Committee of India, 282
- Dehra Dun, 154, 261-262, 303 fn, 505

- Delhi, 3 fn, 6, 15 fn, 39, 42, 45, 51, 56, 61, 67-69, 72 fn-73, 80, 82 & fn, 100-101, 110, 116, 128, 135, 141-142, 151 fn-152, 154-155 fn, 157, 162, 167-168, 171, 173, 176-177, 194, 200, 234-237, 240-241, 246, 249, 259 & fn, 273 fn, 286, 303 fn, 309, 319, 327 fn, 333, 344, 369 fn, 428, 440, 454, 465, 467, 469, 472, 474, 476 fn, 485-486, 494 fn-495, 497, 499, 504-505 *see also* New Delhi
- Delhi Agreement *see* Indo-Pakistan Agreement
- Delhi Agreement (December 1948), 56
- Deo, Shankarrao, (*Vol. 7, p. 617*), 142, 310
- Deoband, 505 & fn
- Desai, D.B., (*Vol. 11, p. 665*), 506
- Deshmukh, C.D., (*Vol. 15, p. 635*), 239-240, 473 & fn
- Dey, S.K., (*VOL. 6, P. 96*), 68
- Dhanbad, 42, 454
- Dhar, Durga Prasad, 153 & fn
- , J.R., (*VOL. 7, P. 85*), 63 fn
- Dharma Vira, (*VOL. 6, P. 395*), 177
- Dhawan, S.S., 505 & fn
- Dibrugarh, 19
- Diwakar, R.R., (*VOL. 9, P. 96*), 33 & fn
- Dixon, Owen, (*VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 205*), 14, 67, 110 & fn, 124, 151 & fn-152 & fn, 153, 157 & fn-158 fn, 439, 454, 463, 475, 497
- Djakarta *see* Jakarta
- Dnieper dam (U.S.S.R.), 211
- Dnieper river (U.S.S.R.), 211 fn
- Dnieprodzerzhinsk (U.S.S.R.), 211 fn
- Doulatram, Jairamdas, (*Vol. 4, p. 136*), 461 & fn
- Dublin, 237 & fn, 241-242, 246
- Durga Das, (*VOL. 8, P. 311*), 83 fn
- Dutch army, 385 fn
- Dutch Government, 403 fn *see also* Netherlands
- Dutt, S., (*VOL. 7, P. 644*), 34 & fn, 41, 48
- East Bengal Railway, 71
- East European bloc, 372 fn
- East India Railway, 71
- Eastern News Trust (E.N.T.), 80
- Ecuador, 366, 373
- Egypt, 329, 342, 364 fn-365, 366, 373
- England, 121-122, 125, 195, 249, 284, 323, 328, 421, 442 *see also* Britain, United Kingdom
- Ethiopia, 313 fn
- Euripides, 187-188 fn
- Europe, 93, 174, 183, 195, 199, 262, 332, 334, 387, 421, 439, 468, 491, 493; Balkan countries of, 155
- Evacuee Property Act, 164, 453 fn
- Evacuee Property Bill, 162-163 & fn, 164 & fn
- “Example of Diplomacy at its Best, An” (article by Arthur Krock), 320 & fn
- Fair Wages Bill (1950), 221 & fn-222, 460
- Fair Wages Committee, 221 fn
- Faizabad, 293-294, 296 fn
- Faizabad District Congress Committee, 296 fn
- Far East (East Asia), 345, 354, 396, 480 fn, 492, 494-495
- Faridabad, 174, 176
- Faridabad Development Board, 174, 176
- Ferozepur, 166, 274 fn
- Films Division (India), 101
- Fiscal Commission Report, 498 & fn
- Florence, 441 fn
- Formosa, 307 fn-308 & fn, 312, 313, 315-317, 325-326, 328-329, 332, 346-347 & fn, 349, 358 fn-359, 395, 479-480 & fn, 482 & fn, 479 fn, 493-495; Government of, 261, 428
- France, 313 fn, 342, 365, 371-372, 467 fn-468 fn; Government of, 124
- Frederick, 319 fn
- Free Press Journal* (Bombay), 70
- French forces, 312 fn, 328
- French Union, 372
- Friends Ambulance Unit, 62
- Fuel Research Institute (Digwadih, Dhanbad), 42, 45, 69, 190 fn, 454 & fn

- Gadgil, N.V., (Vol. 15, p. 248), 461 fn
 Gandhi, Indira, (Vol. 1, p. 232), 71, 504
 —, Mahatma, 6, 21, 36, 59, 64, 82 fn, 85
 fn, 88, 124, 131, 140, 167, 193, 197, 262,
 279, 325, 389, 403, 417-418, 422, 426,
 450, 452, 458, 466
 Ganges river, 196
 Gautam, Mohan Lal, (Vol. 4, p. 351), 268
 Geneva, 340
 G.B.S. Society, 505
 Germany, 194-195, 412, 415, 467 fn
 —, East, 330
 —, West, 330
 Ghosh, P.C., (Vol. 13, p. 1), 29 & fn-30,
 31-32, 41fn-42, 87, 309 fn
 —, Tushar Kanti, (Vol. 11, p. 365), 83 fn,
 100, 103
Glimpses of World History (J. Nehru), 410
 Goa, 433 & fn
 Goalpara, 19, 162-163 & fn
 Gonda (U.P.), 287
 Gorakhpur, 296 fn
 Greece, 313 fn, 379
 Gromyko, Andrei, 345 & fn
 Group Areas Act, 1950 (South Africa), 459 fn
 Group Areas Bill (South Africa), 310 fn, 402,
 460 fn, 490
 Grow-More-Food Campaign, 488
 Handoo, G.K., 286-287
 Harish, 287
 Harrison, Agatha, (Vol. 6, p. 208), 310
 Hatta, Mohammad, (Vol. 3, p. 129), 394-395
 fn.
 Henderson, Loy, (VOL. 7, P. 628), 104, 113
 fn, 217, 307 & fn, 309, 311, 313, 320 &
 fn, 352, 358, 381 & fn-382, 495
 High Court of Australia, 454
 High Court (Calcutta), 74 fn, 87 fn; Chief
 Justice of, 56
 High Court (Dacca), 448 fn
 High Court (Madras), 448 fn
 High Court (Patna), 223 & fn
 Himalayas, 184, 195, 416
 Hind Mazdoor Sabha, 222
Hindu, The (Madras), 302
 Hindu Mahasabha, All India, 11 fn, 15, 29-30,
 72 fn, 74, 79, 87, 131, 134, 143, 262, 293,
 310, 319, 344, 439, 465-466
Hindustan Times, The (Delhi), 34 fn
Hindusthan Standard (Calcutta), 100, 103
 H.M.G. *see* Britain, Government of
 Hissar, 166
 Hitler, Adolf, (Vol. 5, p. 477), 415
 Ho Chi Minh, (VOL. 1, P. 519), 312, 372,
 402; Government of, 123, 331, 392
 Hodges, Gen., 309
 Hoover, Herbert, (Vol. 15, p. 297), 437
 House of Commons (British), 303
 Howrah, 24
 Hukbalahaps (Huks), 385 fn
Hungry Sheep, The (David Kelly), 345 fn
 Hussain, Altaf, 137 & fn
 Hyderabad, 86, 403 fn, 417-418
 Iengar, H.V.R., (VOL. 2, P. 192), 173
 Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act (13
 February 1950), 18 & fn-19, 121-122
 Inchon (Korea), 355 fn
 India, Government of, 9, 14, 18 fn, 20, 42 fn,
 44, 54 fn-56, 58, 80, 90, 105, 113, 115,
 118, 128, 130 fn-131 fn, 137 fn, 141, 154
 fn-155 fn, 157, 161 & fn, 170, 174, 178,
 192, 200 & fn, 202, 210-213, 221 & fn-
 223, 229-231, 235, 248, 253 & fn-254,
 255-257, 262-263, 275 fn, 307-308, 309
 fn-310 fn, 311 fn, 313 fn, 315, 319-322,
 324 fn, 327 fn-328, 339, 341, 346, 352,
 358, 380 fn, 391, 416, 418-419, 445 fn,
 460 & fn-461, 463, 466-467 fn, 468 fn,
 470, 473, 476 fn, 480 fn, 489-490 & fn;
 Budget (1950) of, 238; Foreign Office of,
 319, 490
 Indian Air Force, 281, 283
 Indian Army, 51, 54 fn, 80, 126-128, 174, 281
 Indian Council of Cultural Relations
 (I.C.C.R.), 183
 INS *Delhi*, 244 fn, 385 fn, 460 & fn, 468, 487
 Indian Navy, 281, 283, 313, 385, 460

- Indian News Chronicle*, 34 fn
- Indo-China, 123, 308 & fn, 312 & fn-313, 315-317, 325, 328-329, 346, 355, 358, 366, 371-372, 392, 395, 402, 420, 422, 438-442, 472, 479 & fn-480, 493-495; Government of, 123, 372
- , French, 366 fn, 371-372
- Indo-Nepalese Treaty, 126
- Indo-Pakistan Agreement (14 December 1948), 448 fn
- Indo-Pakistan Agreement (8 April 1950), 3 & fn-4 & fn, 5 & fn-6, 7-10 & fn, 12-14 & fn, 15-18 & fn, 20-24, 26 & fn-27, 28-33 & fn, 34-36, 38 & fn-39, 40 fn-41 & fn, 42 fn, 45-46 & fn, 48-49 & fn, 50, 52, 54 & fn-55 & fn, 56-60, 63-65, 67 & fn-68 & fn, 70 & fn, 72, 74, 76-77, 79-83, 85, 87-88 fn, 89-90 fn, 92, 99-100, 103-104 fn, 105-106, 109 & fn, 111 & fn-112, 113-116, 118, 122, 128, 131, 133, 136, 138, 140-141, 145, 152, 162-165, 227, 230, 234 fn, 237-238, 240, 242-243 & fn, 244, 246, 248, 253-254, 258, 293, 309 fn, 318, 338, 341, 369 fn, 377 fn, 403, 445 & fn-446, 447-449 & fn, 450-457 & fn, 458-459, 463, 465-466, 469-470, 474-475 & fn, 484-485, 488
- Indo-Pakistan Agreement on evacuee property (28 June 1950), 485 & fn
- Indo-Pakistan Information Consultative Committee, 56, 111 fn
- Indo-Pakistan Minorities Agreement *see* Indo-Pakistan Agreement
- Indo-Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference (1950), 100, 233
- Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement (21 April 1950), 67, 70 & fn, 76, 338, 457 & fn
- Indonesia, 71, 102, 110, 124 & fn-125, 135, 139, 153-155 & fn, 179, 198, 246, 254, 257, 259-260, 285, 308, 312, 329, 333-334, 339, 351 fn, 358, 366, 382, 385, 387-390, 392, 395-397, 403 fn-404, 439-440 fn, 460, 468, 471 fn-472, 478, 481, 489; Government of, 395 fn, 481 fn
- Indonesian troops, 385 fn
- Industrial Policy, statement on (6 April 1948), 221
- Industrial Truce Resolution, 221
- Industries Tripartite Conference (1947), 221 & fn
- Inter-Dominion Agreement (4 or 5 May 1948), 129
- Interim Government, 13
- I.L.O. Conference, 340
- International Monetary Fund, 130, 137, 497
- International Red Cross (Geneva), 60, 62, 457
- Iran, 393; Shah of, 380
- Ireland, 237 fn; Government of, 246
- Ismail, Mohammad, 75
- Ispahani, M.A.H., (VOL. 1, P. 463), 380 fn
- Israel, 123; Government of, 122
- Jagadhari, 166
- Jagjivan Ram, (Vol. 15, p. 208), 221, 340-341, 461 fn
- Jain, A.P., (Vol. 8, p. 207), 473 fn, 477
- Jakarta, 385, 396, 441, 468, 471, 487
- Jama Masjid (Delhi), 101
- Jamia Millia Islamia (New Delhi), 34
- Jammu, 161 & fn, 196
- Jammu and Kashmir State, 497 & fn
- Jana Congress (People's Congress), 301 fn
- Janata (Bombay), 72-73 & fn
- Japan, 194, 326, 332, 347 fn, 356, 438, 492-493 fn
- Japanese Peace Treaty, 332
- Java, 71
- Jayanagar (West Bengal), 449 fn
- Jessore, 63 fn
- Jessup, Phillip C., (VOL. 13, P. 309), 347
- Jodhpur, 172 fn-173, 268, 474 fn
- Jogjakarta, 385
- Joint Conference of Newspaper Editors from India and Pakistan, 103
- Joint Consultative Committee of the Information and Broadcasting Ministries, 116
- Joint Indo-Pakistan Press Committee, 100 fn
- Jugantar (Calcutta), 318 fn
- Jullundur, 130

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Kabul, 476 fn
- Kachru, D.N., (*Vol. 11, p. 269*), 151 & fn, 309
- Kamalpur (Tripura), 449
- Kamath, H.V., (*Vol. 9, p. 397*), 262
- Kansas University, 380 fn
- Kanya Kumari, 196
- Karachi, 12 & fn, 39 fn, 42, 45 & fn-46, 49, 54-55, 58, 61, 66, 70 & fn, 72, 80, 82, 88, 102, 151-152, 231, 369 fn, 454, 457 & fn, 476 fn
- Karanjia, R.K., (*VOL. 1, P. 560*), 341
- Kashmir, 13-14, 27 & fn, 38-39 fn, 67, 70, 80-81, 89 & fn, 109 fn-110, 118, 124, 126, 129, 151-152 & fn, 153, 155 & fn-156 & fn, 157 & fn-158 & fn, 161 & fn, 196, 258-259, 309, 319 fn, 324, 351, 357, 394, 396 fn, 410, 439, 454, 457, 463, 475-476, 497; Government of, 153 fn, 157 & fn, 161 & fn, 309; Sadar-i-Riyasat of *see* Singh, Karan
- Kashmir Radio, 152
- Kathmandu, 468 fn
- Katju, K.N., (*Vol. 1, p. 154*), 32, 107-108, 170, 504 & fn
- Kelly, David, 345 & fn, 357 & fn
- Keskar, B.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 15*), 26 & fn, 29, 39, 47, 440
- Khan, Liaquat Ali, (*Vol. 10, p. 356*), 3 & fn, 5-7, 12-15, 18, 20, 26 & fn-27, 29, 34, 38 & fn-39 fn, 41-42, 45 & fn-46 fn, 47 fn, 48-50 & fn, 53 & fn, 55 & fn, 58, 60 & fn-61, 63 & fn-64, 67 fn-68, 71-72 & fn, 73-76, 79-82, 85-86, 88 & fn-89 & fn, 90 & fn, 92, 104 & fn, 108, 113 & fn-114, 118, 137-138, 143, 151-153, 157 & fn, 217, 230, 237, 242-243, 258, 318-319 fn, 339, 351, 377, 380 & fn-381 fn, 382, 439, 441, 445-447, 454, 457, 465 & fn, 497
- , Begum, 104 & fn, 108, 258, 319 & fn, 380, 382
- Kher, B.G., (*Vol. 8, p. 279*), 433
- Khosla, A.N., (*VOL. 1, P. 368*), 204 & fn
- Khulna, 50 & fn, 87
- Kidwai, Rafi Ahmed, (*Vol. 1, p. 270*), 301 fn-302, 461 fn
- Kim Il Sung, 478 fn
- Korea, 141, 143-144, 155, 260, 303, 308 fn-309, 311-313 & fn, 314 fn-315 & fn, 316-317, 320 fn, 321 & fn-322, 323-324 fn, 343-344, 346-347, 348 fn, 352 & fn-353, 354, 356 & fn, 357-358 & fn, 359-360, 379, 395-396 fn, 478-479, 480 fn-481, 482, 492, 495; National Government of, 478 fn-479 fn; National Assembly of, 478 fn
- , Democratic People's Republic of (North), 307 & fn, 315, 317, 321 & fn, 322-325, 327 fn, 331, 346, 354, 359, 478 & fn-479, 482, 493; armed forces of, 307 fn, 350, 355 fn; Government of, 478 fn-479 & fn
- , Democratic Republic of (South), 307 fn-308 fn, 313 fn, 315-317, 321 & fn, 322-325, 327, 329, 331, 354-355 & fn, 386, 478 & fn-479 & fn, 480 fn, 491 fn, 493; armed forces of, 307 fn; Government of, 307 fn, 315, 478 fn-479 fn; National Assembly of, 307 fn, 478 fn; National Democratic Law promulgated in, 478 fn
- Korean war, 263, 313, 326, 331, 481
- Kosi Dam, 205
- Kosi Project, 204
- Kosi river, 204 & fn
- Kremenchug, 211 fn
- Kripalani, J.B., (*Vol. 1, p. 237*), 85 & fn
- Krock, Arthur, 320 & fn
- Kuala Lumpur, 410
- Kunzru, H.N., (*Vol. 1, p. 270*), 176
- Kuomintang, 144 fn, 440-442
- Kuomintang army, 260, 427-428, 483
- Kushtia, 41 fn
- Kusiyara river, 448 fn
- Labour Relations Bill (1950), 222 & fn
- Ladakh, 196
- Lahore, 75, 80
- Lai Iang Sao Tia, Gen., 428
- Lake Success, 307, 314, 331
- Laski, Harold, (*Vol. 2, p. 401*), 49 & fn, 71

- Lie, Trygve H., (VOL. 10, P. 507), 14 fn, 313-314, 316, 322, 357, 364 & fn, 372 & fn, 480-481
- Lok Sabha, 454 fn
- Lok Sevak* (Calcutta), 309 fn
- London, 237 fn, 303, 339-340, 349, 353-355, 365, 369-371, 441, 467
- Lucknow, 80
- Luxembourg, 313 fn
- MacArthur, Douglas, (VOL. 7, P. 253), 313 & fn, 316, 331
- Madhya Bharat, 166
- Madras, 38 fn, 87, 113, 139, 202, 234, 257, 302, 319 fn, 403 fn, 474 fn, 489, 495; Government of, 263 fn, 302 & fn, 319 fn, 474 fn
- Mahabharata*, 482
- Mahtab, H.K., (Vol. 9, p. 435), 249, 261, 461 & fn, 473 & fn, 489
- Maintenance of Public Order Act (Madras), 263 fn
- Maitra, Lakshmi Kant, (VOL. 11, P. 169), 171
- Malaya *see* Malaysia
- Malaysia, 125 & fn, 128, 139, 352 fn, 358, 366, 371, 401-403 & fn, 405, 410, 472, 478, 483 & fn-484
- Malan, D.F., (VOL. 11, P. 270), 310
- Malik, A.M., 74, 79 & fn, 105-107, 142, 310, 465, 485
- , H.S., 218 & fn
- , Jacob, 347 & fn, 360 & fn
- Malta, 217
- Mamdot, 166
- Manipur, 489
- Mao Tse-tung, (Vol. 10, p. 75), 131-132 & fn, 144 fn, 155, 365 & fn, 372, 440, 476, 482 fn, 486 fn-487 & fn
- Marti, R., (VOL. 11, P. 147), 60 & fn, 62
- Mathabhanga, 448 fn
- Mathura, 293 fn
- Matthai, Achamma, (VOL. 7, P. 55), 170, 200 & fn
- , John, (Vol. 15, p. 101), 112, 130 fn, 200 & fn-201, 203, 227 & fn-228 fn, 229 & fn, 232-234 & fn, 235 fn-236 fn, 237 fn, 239 & fn-240, 241-243 & fn, 244, 246-247 & fn, 249-250, 256-257, 260, 319, 338, 461 & fn-462, 487-488
- Mavalankar, G.V., (VOL. 2, P. 614), 43, 303
- McNaughton proposals, 152 fn
- Malaviya, K.D., (Vol. 1, p. 260), 301 & fn
- Manila, 386
- Marx, Karl, (Vol. 1, p. 140), 334, 411
- Mehta, Chandralekha, (Vol. 4, p. 531), 382
- Menon, K.P.S., (Vol. 15, p. 326), 321, 323, 479 & fn
- , V.K. Krishna, (Vol. 7, p. 715), 50, 69, 108, 147, 232, 241, 254, 307 & fn, 318, 340, 345, 353, 360, 365, 370, 494 fn
- Middle East, 60, 62 *see also* West Asia
- Ministry of, Commerce, 474, 477
- , Defence, 90, 102
- , Education, 171, 457
- , External Affairs, 102, 107, 120, 236-237, 242, 246, 496 fn
- , Finance, 56, 232, 241, 256-257
- , Food and Agriculture, 473 fn, 495; Emergency Branch of, 489
- , Health, 288
- , Home Affairs, 101-102
- , Industry and Supply, 473 fn
- , Information & Broadcasting, 56
- , Labour, 340
- , Rehabilitation, 101-102, 119-120, 134, 165-166, 170-171, 462
- , States, 172 fn
- Minority Rights Committee, 74, 79, 135, 146
- Mitter, J.P., 87 & fn
- Mohammad, Ghulam, (VOL. 5, P. 80), 136-137, 143
- Mookerjee, Syama Prasad, (Vol. 11, p. 739), 3 & fn-4 fn, 5, 9-10 fn, 11 & fn, 16, 19, 24 & fn-25, 27-28, 30-32, 36, 40 & fn-41 & fn, 42 & fn-43 & fn, 44, 50, 54 & fn, 67 fn, 83, 87, 115, 118, 133, 141, 233, 242, 246, 253, 309 & fn, 447, 461, 475 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Moradabad, 456 fn
Morgenthau, Henry, 217 & fn
Moscow, 243, 340-341, 345-347, 349-350, 353-354, 357 fn, 363, 365, 372 & fn, 386, 440, 442
Moshaldanga, 53 fn
Murshidabad, 448 fn
Mustafi, 53 fn
Mountbatten, Edwina, (VOL. 3, P. 43), 82 fn, 217 & fn
—, Louis, first earl, (*Vol. 13, p. 276*), 82 & fn, 217 fn, 262
Mudaliar, A. Ramaswamy, (*Vol. 15, p. 299*), 439, 468
Munshi, K.M., (*Vol. 5, p. 292*), 213 & fn-214, 218 & fn, 381, 461 & fn, 473 & fn, 489, 507
Murray, Gilbert, (*Vol. 13, p. 19*), 188 fn
Muslim League, All India, 65, 100 fn, 143, 172 & fn, 198, 269
Mussoorie, 505
Mymensingh, 117, 122
- Nalgonda, 403 fn
Nanda, Gulzarilal, (*Vol. 9, p. 309*), 239
Nankana Sahib (Pakistan), 497 fn
Nanking, 131 fn
Napoleonic wars, 421
Narayan Jayaprakash, (*Vol. 4, p. 305*), 222, 283-284 fn
Narayanganj (East Bengal), 57
Nasik, 498
Natal, 459 fn
National Call (Delhi), 34 fn
National Chemical Laboratory (Pune), 188 fn
National City Bank (New York), 27 fn
National Committee for India's Freedom, U.S.A., 478 fn
National Physical Laboratory (New Delhi), 188 fn
National Planning Commission *see* Planning Commission
National Press Club (Washington), 105 fn
Nawa-e-Waqt (Lahore), 80
Nazimuddin, Khwaja, (*Vol. 13, p. 235*), 55
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3 fn, 10 fn, 11 fn, 12 & fn-13, 14-16, 17 fn, 23 fn, 26 fn, 37 fn, 39 fn, 43 fn, 45 fn-46 fn, 47 fn, 49 fn, 53 fn, 60 fn, 63 fn, 67 fn, 72 fn-73 fn, 75-81, 82 fn, 88 fn-89 fn, 109 fn, 112-113 & fn, 114, 116-124 & fn, 125-130, 155 fn, 161 fn, 173 fn, 188 fn, 218 fn, 227 fn-228 fn, 229 fn, 234 fn, 236 fn, 243 fn, 247 fn, 260 fn, 273 fn-274 fn, 279 fn, 284 fn, 301 fn-302 fn, 307, 320 & fn, 323-324 & fn, 325-341, 346, 348 fn, 358 fn, 378 fn, 381 fn, 385 fn, 392-393, 395 fn, 401 fn-402, 403-404, 410-411, 417, 419, 422, 449 fn, 491 fn, 494 fn, 507 fn
—, broadcasts to the nation, 20-22 and on United Nations Radio Department, 437; holds discussions with members of Jogjakarta Republican Parliament, Jakarta, 392; gives interview to, C.L. Sulzberger, 377-378, Loy Henderson, 307-308 and Yugoslav Ambassador, 317-318; gives reply to a short-notice question in Parliament on Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 55-58; makes statement, in Parliament on Fair Wages Bill, 221-222 and on Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 5-9, and to the press, 73-74; on Board INS *Delhi*, 234-246, 440-442; sends message to the Conference of World Fellowship of Buddhists, 503-504; speaks, at the inauguration of Indian Council of Cultural Relations, 183-188, at the joint session of Pakistan and Indian Newspaper Editors' Conference, New Delhi, 90-99, at the National Planning Conference, 209-213, at the opening of National Fuel Research Institute, Digwadih (Dhanbad), 188-191, in the Parliament of Indonesia, 386-387, at a reception given by Muslim citizens of West Bengal in Calcutta, 139-141, at a public meeting, in Bandung, 390-391, in Jakarta, 388-390, in Jharia, 64-66, in Jogjakarta, 391, in New Delhi, 34-36, in Rangoon, 423-427, in Singapore, 404-405, and in Thiruvananthapuram, 191-203;

speaks after laying the foundation-stone of Indian Association, Singapore, 401; talks to press, in Jakarta, 392-394, in Karachi, 81, in New Delhi, 12-16, 112-132, 320-341, in Rangoon, 409-423, and in Singapore, 401-404; visits, Allahabad, 505-506, Bandung, 390-391, Calcutta, 139-141, Dehra Dun, 504-505, Digwadih (Dhanbad), 188-191, Jakarta, 386-390, 392-394, Jharia, 64-66, Jogjakarta, 391, Karachi, 74-81, Rangoon, 409-427, Singapore, 401-405 and Thiruvananthapuram, 191-203

—, on Abdullah, Shaikh, 381; Afghanistan, relations with India and Pakistan of, 476, Americans, 380-381; Armed forces, 80, and English language, 282, concentration on western border of, 90, personnel and their families, 38, 75, 89, promotions in, 281, selection for, 281, size of, 282-283, use of ships in, 283; Asia, 93-94, 139, 354-356, 377-378, 386-389, 401-402, 439, 493-494, and U.S., 378, communism in, 418-419, importance of, 492-495, Asia, East, solution of problems of, 495, Asia, South East, 392, 401, 482, changes in, 472, communism in, 334, conflicting issues in, 402, treatment of Indians in, 402, Asian Relations Conferences, 393; Assam, 121-122; Assam Immigrants Expulsion Act, 18-19, 121; Australia, approach to South East Asian problems of, 438, attempt at creation of anti-communist bloc in South East Asia by, 438; Ayodhya, events in, 294-297; 'Azad' Kashmir radio, propaganda by, 52; Babar, 69; Baguio Conference, 440, 477; Bali, people of, 482-483; Bengal, 44, 46, 49, 230, 343-344, 377, 439, 448, 496, situation in, 309, 318, 464, 484, violence in, 64; Bengal, East, 447, 484, arrest of prominent Hindu citizens in, 47, 62-63, 146, derequisitioning of houses in, 68, 75, incidents in, 50, 136, 142-144, 474, Indian leaders' proposed visit to, 88, P.C.

Ghosh's work in, 59, return of Hindus to, 108, 114-115, Bengal, West, 46, Congress support in, 86, food position in, 218; Bengal boundary, 448; blackmarketeers, 66; Bose, Subhas, family of, 506-507; building the newly independent nations, 425-426; Buddha, teachings of, 504; Burma, Kuomintang army in, 260, 427-428, 483, and their demands, 428; Cabinet, functioning of, 247-248, G.B. Pant's induction into, 255, 258, joint responsibility of, 202, Rajagopalachari's induction into, 120-121, 257, 260-262, reconstitution of, 120, 253-254, 257, 380, 461-462, 473, Sri Prakasa's induction into, 253; Cachar, Muslims of, 33; canal waters question, 90, 98, 129, 476; Cariappa, K.M., London visit of, 441; cash crops, 335-336; Central Ministers, appointment of, 17, 28-31, 36, 39, 74, 79, 81, 85-86, 99-100, functions of, 105-107, meetings of, 465; China, People's Republic of, 131-132, 144, 312, 378, 472, 494, 496, admission in the U.N. of, 314, 317, 322, 355, 360, 364-366, 372, 396, 482, 495 and help from Egypt, 365, economic policies of, 486-487, flood control in, 204-205, impressions of India's ambassador in, 365, position in Asia of, 455, reaction to U.S. declaration on Formosa of, 482, recognition of, 365 by India, 308, 358-359, 364, relations with India of, 363, 476; cold war, proposed summit to end, 369; colonialism, 328, 402; Commonwealth countries, relations of, 125; communal harmony, 457-458 and educational institutions, 457; communalism, 35, 51-52, 64-65, 86-87, 130-131, 134, 144, 198, 293, 446, 466, 475, 498, and Muslim League, 143, 198, and religions, 424; communism, 338-339, 358-359, in Asia, 418-419, in India, 403, and violence, 333-334, 419; C.P.I., activities of, 419; complacency, danger of, 199; compromises by statesmen, 417-418;

Congress, 231, 343, 465-466, Nasik Session of, 498; conservatives, 424; contact between people of India and Pakistan, 101; controls, 212, 489; cotton cultivation, 335; cotton policy, 460, 489; criticism, 192, 319, by industry and business of the Government, 467; culture, 183-188, and civilisation, 183-184, and inner growth, 185, and roots, 185, and scientific approach to life, 185, domains of, 184; custodians, functions of, 470; Damodar Valley Works, workers involvement in, 210-211; democracy, concept of, 424; derationing in big cities, 489; detenus, treatment of, 279-280; distribution, 191-192, of wealth, 413-414; Dixon, Owen, 475, talks with, 152-153, 157-158; Dnieper dam, 211; economic advancement, 93, and right approach, 187; economic policy, 199-200; education, 455; Egypt, and India, 365, support to China for admission into U.N. by, 365; Equator, ceremonies on crossing of, 245; Europe, 93; evacuee property, 76-77, 98, 129, 485, laws for, 102, 469-470, 477, 486, administration of, 176-179, and Pakistan Government, 79; Evacuee Property Act, 453-454; Evacuee Property Bill, 163; evacuees, movements of, 71; Fair Wages Bill, 221-222, 460; Faridabad camp, progress of, 174-176; Fiscal Commission, report of, 498; fissiparous tendencies, 197; flood control, 205, in Kosi river, 204, in China, 204; foodgrains, shortage of, 194-195, 488-489, 495-496, in Bengal, 218, mixture of rice with tapioca to meet, 218; Foreign Ministers meeting in London, 369-371, 467-468, conclusions of, 371; Formosa, 326, 332, 349, 359, 493, Government in, 364 and People's Government, 364, and the U.S., 312-313; France, colonial policy of, 494; freedom, 493, and responsibility, 193, 426, economic, 192, 336, 387, political, 192, 336, 387, and preservation of, 390;

Gandhi, Mahatma, and perception of truth, 417-418, and violence, 418, basic approach of, 389, path of, 64, teachings of, 124, 140, 193, 197, 405, 422, 450, 452, 466; general elections, preparations for, 304, 454, 459, malpractices in, 284; German *Kultur*, 183; Germany, 194, factors leading to Nazism in, 415; G.B.S. Society, 505-506; *Glimpses of World History* (J. Nehru), 410; Ghosh, P.C., visit to East Bengal of, 59; Goa, negotiations with Portugal on, 433; Goalpara, jute cultivation in, 19; Government services, States' representation in, 119; Gurkha regiments, 126-128; hard work, 194; Henderson, Loy, 381; himself, 405; Hindus, 69, demoralisation in East Bengal of, 486; influx from East Bengal of, 46-47, 57, 61, 76-77, 114, 462, 474, 484, return to East Bengal of, 104, 108, 114; Hindu Mahasabha, 262, 465-466, in West Bengal, 439; Hindus and Muslims, 69, 82-83, differences among, 113; his contemplated resignation, 230; human mind, 424; human material and development, 412; history, lessons of, 198; Hyderabad, military action in, 418; imperialism, 390; India, 193-194, 378, communist activities in, 392, communist violence in, 419-420, economic relations with the West of, 328, foreign policy of, 123, 337, 392, 420-421, 442, 476, 491, 495, history of, 426, in world politics, 421, relations with, Burma, 329, China, 363, 476, Egypt, 329, 365; Indonesia, 198, 329, 387, 391, Pakistan, 67, 92, 94-95, 110, 129, 136-138, 230, 377, 410, 445, 496-497, strength of, 197-198, 458, unity and diversity of, 196, weaknesses of, 458; Indian Army, role in peace time of, 51; Indians abroad, 404; *INS Delhi*, voyage on, 487; Indian society, 69; individual liberty and economic freedom, 335; Indo-China, 123, 420, French policy in, 371-372, India's stand on, 402, proposed

Constituent Assembly for, 372, U.S. policy towards, 439-440; Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 3-5, 13, 17, 49, 55, 59, 65, 92, 131, 140, 164, 253, 403, 445-447, 458, 474, and abducted women, 60, and B.C. Roy, 27-28, and communal organisations, 141, and customs relaxation, 56, and evacuee property, 68, 76-77, and forced conversions, 145, and Gopinath Bardoloi, 33, and K.C. Neogy, 17-18, 30-31, 36, and Pakistan Government, 41, 48, 52, and Sardar Patel, 70, 74, and responsibility of officials, 103, and return of migrants, 138, and role of press, 34, 52, 56-57, 70, 76, 83, 111-112, 133, and S.P. Mookerjee, 10-11, 16-17, 19, 24-25, 30-31, 36, 42-44, 475, American pressure for, 113, circumstances leading to, 5-6, 20, 451-452, clauses of, 6-8, 56, 68, Congress support to, 458, criticism of, 35-36, effects of, 70, 318, 456, implementation of, 8-9, 12, 16, 21-24, 26, 28, 32, 34-36, 39, 54-56, 58, 63, 70, 81-83, 136, 162, 309-310, 446-450, 452-453, 459, 463, importance of, 8, international implications of, 458-459, psychological and human aspect of, 8-9, publicity measures for, 33-34, 38, 47, review of the working of, 114, test of success of, 13, 46, 58, 116, 463, 484-485; Indo-Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference, 100, 103, 233, 465; inflation, 65; industrial growth, 195; Indonesia, advice to youth of, 390-391, his sea voyage to, 244, freedom struggle in, 388, people of, 394, 397, possibility of a military pact with, 393, relations with, 391, 472, visit of archaeologists to, 396, visit to, 47, 482; Islamic history, 69; Islamic State, 68-69; 'isms', 336, 391; Jammu, refugee camps in, 161; jute cultivation, 335, in Goalpara, 19, 162-163; *Janata*, article in, 72-74; Japan, 194, future of, 438; Jaunsar people (of Chakrata, U.P.), 505; Dr. Karan Singh, 156; Kashmir, 351, constitutional status

of, 155-157, land reforms in, 155, 309, relations with, 154-157; Kashmir issue, 13-14, 124, 151-153, 410, 439, 463, 475-476, 497; Khan, Liaquat Ali, 12-13, 58, 138, discussions with, 457, speeches in the U.S. of, 105, 108, 318-319, 465, visit to U.S. of, 380, 382, 476; Khulna, raids in, 87; Korea, situation in, 310, 493, Korean issue, 315, 323, 351, 353-355, 357, 395, 481, 490-491, and Burma's position, 316, 481, and China's entry into the U.N., 345, 348-352, 359, and Formosa, 313, and Indo-China, 312-313, and Indonesia, 481, and other issues, 314, India's stand on, 307, 309, 311-313, 320-324, 326-327, 337, 341-343, 346, 352, 357, 478-482, 494-495 and its criticism, 492, role of U.N. in, 317, 321-322, 346-349, 352, 479-480, Security Council resolutions on, 307-308, 478-480, 492, Truman's statement on, 312, 315, 479, U.S. policy on, 307, 312, 315-317, 344; Korean war, and military considerations, 313, question of help by India in, 313, 316, 357-358, 480-481, 494, spread of, 314, 316, 325, 337-338, 345, 354, 356, 481-482; Kosi dam, 204-205; Labour bills, 222; land reforms, in Bihar, 223, in Kashmir, 155, 309; life, dynamism of, 199; Malaya, 401, difficulties in, 403, terrorism in, 404, situation in, 410, 483-484; Marxism, 339, 411; masses, 96-97, advancement of, 412-413; Matthai, John, 200, 232, and Congress policies, 227, and Planning Commission, 201-203, 235-236, 241, 244, 488, differences with, 201-203, 227-250, 256, discourtesy towards, 227-228, resignation of, 112, statement of, 200-201, 234, 241, 243-244, 246, 338, 487-488, and extravagant public expenditure, 236-237, 242 and Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 237-238, 244; medical student, shooting by Pakistan on, 448-449; medicines, indigenous system of, 288-289; migrations, 57, 114-116, 450,

456, 462-464, 485; minorities, 6, 484, 486, psychological approach to, 486; representation in the Cabinet of, 14; Ministers, rank and duties of, 122; Minorities Commission, 135; Mookerjee, S.P., 133, differences with, 10, on failure of the Agreement, 475, resignation of, 10-11, 16-17, 19, 24-25, 30-31, 36, 42-44; Muslim League, 143, 198; Muslims, exodus of, 57, 61, 70, 76, 89, 97, 101, 109, 114-115, 133-134, 162, 173, 462-464, 469-470, 474, 484, migrations of, 23-46, from U.P., 267-269, 295, 469-470, 474, 484, from Rajasthan, 285, 474, return to India of, 114; national culture, 184; nationalisation, and compensation, 415, alternative to, 415-416, of industries, 414-415; nationalism, 186, 334; natural resources, and development, 416; Nepal, 128, 468, relations with, 127, situation on the border of, 287; Neogy, K.C., differences with, 17-18, resignation of, 17, 30-31, 36; neutrality, 326, 491; New Guinea, 393, 403-404, situation in, 334-335; non-alignment, 420-422, 491-492; One-World concept, 437; opposition, role of, 199, tackling of, 84; Pakistan, American arms supply to, 104, 108, 118-119, 137, border disputes with, 53, economic relations with, 231, goodwill missions to, 142, 485, policy towards minorities of, 77, possibility of war with, 64, 451, relations with, 67, 92, 94-95, 110, 129, 136-138, 230, 377, 410, 445, 463, 496-497, return of Hindus to, 104, Swami Narayan temple (Karachi) in, 78, temporary visit to India of minorities of, 78, trade agreement with, 70, 76, 403, 457; partition (of India), 110, 377, parliamentary working, 202-203; past and future, 424-425; permit system, 101-102, 162, 172, 469-470, 477, 486, application of, 172-173; people, and adaptation to changes of, 189-190, raising of standard of living of, 192-193, potential of, 192; Philippines, 385-386; philosophical

approach to problems, 328; places of religious worship, 102, evacuation of refugees from, 485-486; planning, coordination in, 210, importance of, 209, public support for, 210, practical approach to, 212; Planning Commission, 202-203, 209, 338, 466-467, 473, and John Matthai, 201-203, activities of, 213-214, object of, 212-214, relations with Ministries of, 214; positive approach, 96-97, to economic problems, 187; poverty, removal of, 93; power blocs, 437, 492-493; power politics, 93; press, 28, 32, 73, 84, 91-92, 98, 108-109, 132, 134, 141-142, 203, 263, 318-319, 474-475, 485-486, and exchange of news, 80, false reports in, 339-341, in Bengal, 439, 485, 496, in Pakistan, 485, need to adapt to the new scheme of things by, 91-92, need to give the right lead by, 91-92, responsibility of, 22, 34, role of, 15, 56-57, 83, 111, 309; preventive detention, 16; prisoners of war, exchange of, 38-39, 75; production, and modern methods, 413-414, and resources, 416, inaccurate figures of, 489, of food, 191, of industrial goods, 191, of wealth, 414; progressives, 424; property, transfer of, 78; Providence, 186; Punjab, dispossession of tillers in, 166, ejection of tenants in, 166, land allotment to refugees in, 165-166; Radhakrishnan, S., continuance in Moscow of, 341-342, 440, speech in U.N.E.S.C.O. of, 441; Rajagopalachari, C., induction as Ambassador-at-large in the Cabinet of, 36-37, 39, 42, 45, 50-51, 63, proposed visit to East & West Bengal of, 59-60; Rajkot, increase in students' fee in, 263; R.S.S., 198, 262; refugees, 9, 75, 97-98, 118, 474, and military officers' help, 54, camps in Jammu for, 161, evacuation from mosques, temples and gurdwaras of, 485-486, Red Cross help for, 60, 62, 457, rehabilitation of, 68, 117, 119-120, 125-126, 134, 138-139, return of, 58, 88, 98, 114-115, 125, 136, 138; refugee

- students, 68, 170-171, 455; religions, 184-185, 424 and caste barriers, 458; Representation of People Bill, 459; revolutionaries, 333; Roy, B.C., 27-28; rural and industrial economy, 467; Sahni, J.N., 34; Sarabhai, Mridula, 84-85, relief work by, 167-168; science, 188-191, and industry, 189, spirit of, 189; scientific approach to life, 185; scientific research, 454-455; scientific warfare, 281-282; secular State, 6-7, 131; secularism, 389, 458; security arrangements, 16, 285-287; Sikhs, demand of separate homeland for, 273-275, 497-498; social changes and violence, 334; social justice, 412-413, 493; socialism, 199, 339, 411; Soekarno, A., 394; Somnath temple, rebuilding of, 507; South Africa, 452, Group Areas Bill in, 490, Indians in, 477, legislation discriminating against Indians and Pakistanis in, 459, Round Table Conference in, 310, 459-460, 490; Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 363; Sydney Conference, 123-124, 370, 438, 477; Tandon, Purushottamdas and Hindu culture, 52, 116; Tara Singh, 273-275, 497; terrorism, 419; Travancore, 203; Tripura, incidents in, 449; Tyagi, Mahavir, 262; U.N. effectiveness of, 364, 372, functioning of, 331, importance of, 437, 482, solidarity of, 372-373; U.P., 52, developments in, 254, differences in Congress in, 301-302, situation in, 255, 293; U.S.A., 378, and European wars, 421-422, and Formosa, 312, aid from, 379, attitude towards India of, 381, help on people-to-people basis from, 379, official intelligence of, 380, policy towards Asia of, 381, 479, wrong statements by State Department officials of, 382; U.S.S.R., 378, and U.N., 364, withdrawal from Security Council of, 322; unity, 426-427; *Vana Mahotsava*, 489; Vietnam, possibility of British arms supply to, 123; violence, 35, 51, 64, 418; veto power, 330; war, results of, 420-421; wheat, import from U.S. of, 217; world peace, effort for, 503; women, abduction of, 169; Zaidi sisters, detention of, 279-280; zamindari abolition in Bihar, 223
- Nehru-Liaquat Agreement *see* Indo-Pakistan Agreement
- Neogy, K.C., (*Vol. 13, p. 219*), 4, 17 & fn, 19, 25-26 fn, 27-28, 30-32, 36, 40 & fn-41 & fn, 42 fn, 44 & fn, 50, 54, 253, 396, 447, 461-462
- , Prithvish, (*VOL. 12, P. 470*), 386 fn
- Nepal, 127-128, 204 fn, 287, 468 & fn, 505; Government of, 126-128, 287-288, 468; treaty of commerce with, 468; treaty of friendship with, 468 & fn
- Nepal Congress, 128, 287
- Netherlands, The, 313 fn *see also* Dutch
- New Delhi, 107, 113, 286, 319 fn, 324 fn, 358, 365, 393, 428, 445 fn, 463 fn, 474 fn, 477, 496 *see also* Delhi
- New Guinea, 334, 393, 403 fn
- , West, 334-335, 393
- , Dutch, 403
- New York Times, The*, 113, 320 & fn, 369 fn, 495
- New Zealand, 313 fn
- Newton, Ray, 369
- North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), 78, 129, 176
- Norway, 360
- Nu, Thakin, (*VOL. 4, P. 452*), 261, 315, 409, 423, 427, 473, 483
- Nye, Archibald, (*VOL. 3, P. 5*), 42, 49-50, 55, 353, 373
- Ootacamund, 153, 240, 259, 262
- Ordinance for administration of evacuee property (18 October 1949), 163 & fn
- Organiser* (Delhi), 319 fn, 474 fn
- Orissa, 125, 139, 249, fn-250, 461; Government of, 126
- Oudh, 138
- Oxford University, 341, 440
- Pakistan, 4 fn-5, 6, 8-10, 12-15, 20-21, 23, 26 fn, 28, 30, 32, 38 & fn-39, 41 fn-42 fn,

- 47 fn, 49 fn, 52, 54 fn, 56, 58, 60, 64-67 & fn, 70-71, 75-76, 79-83, 85, 87-88 & fn, 89 & fn-90 & fn, 91 & fn-92, 93-95, 98-99 & fn, 101-102, 104 & fn, 105 fn-106, 108-109 & fn, 110-111 & fn, 112-113, 115, 118 & fn-119, 121, 130-131, 133-134, 137-138, 141, 143-144, 152 fn, 155, 157 & fn, 162, 164 & fn, 169, 172 & fn-173, 174, 196, 198, 230-231, 242-243, 253-254, 267 & fn-268, 269, 282, 285, 294, 309 & fn, 318-319 & fn, 341, 357, 377, 380-381, 403, 405, 410, 439, 445-446, 448 & fn-449 & fn, 451-454, 456-457 & fn, 459, 463-464 & fn, 465 & fn-466, 469, 473, 475-476 & fn, 484-486, 496-497 & fn; Ambore refugee camp in, 75; Government of, 6, 9, 14, 16, 20, 26 fn, 32, 36, 41, 46 fn, 48, 50, 52, 56, 66-67, 75-79, 81, 85, 90, 94, 102 fn-103, 105, 111 fn, 114-115, 129-130, 137 fn, 143, 152, 158, 174, 178, 268 fn, 380 fn, 445 fn-446, 456, 464, 474 & fn, 476 fn; Governor General of, *see* Nazimuddin, Khwaja; Gurukul refugee camp in, 75; Foreign Office, of, 26, 346
—, East, 38, 57, 61, 75, 88, 98, 115, 134, 174, 463-465, 469, 485-486; Government of, 38, 62, 146
—, West, 46 fn, 76-77, 90, 98, 100-101, 103, 133, 142, 162, 171, 267-268, 295, 309, 318, 377, 456-457, 462, 464-465, 470, 474, 477, 484-485
Pakistan Army, 157 fn, 324
Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 74, 79
Pakistan High Commissioner in India *see* Ismail, Mohammad
Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference, (P.N.E.C.), 56, 100 & fn, 111 fn, 137 fn
Pakistan Publicity Section, Bulletin of, 380 fn
Pakistan Radio, 89
Palestine, 342
Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, (*Vol. I, p. I*), 27 fn, 44, 66-67 fn, 73, 218, 245, 343, 350, 359, 379-380 & fn, 381 & fn-382
Panikkar, K.M., (*Vol. I, p. 384*), 131 & fn, 144 & fn, 204, 260, 342, 345-348, 359, 363 & fn, 365, 372, 428, 440, 476, 486 & fn, 496
Panipat, 279
Pant, Govind Ballabh, (*Vol. 3, p. 106*), 13, 88 fn, 209 & fn, 232, 254-255 fn, 256 & fn-257, 258 & fn, 262, 267 & fn, 279 & fn-280 fn, 293 & fn-294 fn, 380
Papua and the North-East Territory of New Guinea, 403 fn
Paris, 218
Parliament (Indian), 3-4 & fn, 5-7, 9-10, 18, 20, 25, 43 & fn, 60, 63, 87, 118, 121, 156 fn, 163 & fn, 177, 201-203, 221-223, 230, 234, 244, 247, 262, 303, 319-320 & fn, 338, 453-454, 460, 487, 490; Budget Session (1950) of, 227, 233, 256, 459; Standing Finance Committee of the, 236 & fn-237 & fn
Parliamentary Debates, 5 fn
Partition (of India), 196, 377
Pasha, Nahas, (*Vol. 5, p. 136*), 364 & fn, 366
Patel, Vallabhbhai, 3, 11-12 fn, 13 fn-14 fn, 15 fn-16, 23, 25, 28-31, 36-37 & fn, 39 & fn-40, 41 fn-42, 43 & fn-44, 46-50, 53, 55, 58-59, 61, 63, 67, 70 & fn, 72 & fn-73 & fn, 74, 82 fn, 88 & fn, 104 & fn, 152, 154, 172, 213 & fn-214 fn, 228, 235, 239-241, 243 & fn-244, 246, 253, 255, 258-259 & fn, 260 fn-261, 262, 268, 273 & fn, 275 & fn, 284-285 fn, 286, 303 & fn, 308, 380, 396 & fn, 449 & fn, 461 fn
Patharia Hill forest, 448 fn
Patiala, 169
Patiala and East Punjab States Union (P.E.P.S.U.), 145, 165 & fn, 273
Patwardhan, Achyut, (*Vol. II, p. 217*), 71-72 fn
Pearson, Lester, (*Vol. 10, p. 170*), 109 & fn-110 fn
—, Mrs, 110
Peking, 131 & fn, 144, 204, 260, 316, 342, 345-348, 350, 352 fn, 355, 359, 364-366, 372, 428, 486, 496; Indian Ambassador in *see* Panikkar, K.M.

- Philippines, The, 308 & fn, 312 & fn-313 fn, 315, 352 fn, 385-386, 442, 477 & fn, 479, 495; Government of, 440
- Pilibhit, 456 fn
- Planning Commission, 153 fn, 200-203, 209-210, 212-213 & fn, 214 & fn, 234 fn-235 & fn, 236 & fn, 239, 241-242, 243 fn, 244, 246, 256-257, 338, 416, 439, 466-467, 473, 488, 498
- Planning Conference (25-26 April 1950), 45, 203, 209 & fn
- Policy Planning Committee of the External Affairs Ministry, 153 fn
- Poonch, 75
- Population Registration Act, 459 fn
- Portugal, 433; Government of, 433 fn
- Portuguese India, 433 fn
- Potsdam agreement (1945), 493 fn
- Prasad, Rajendra, (*Vol. 3, p. 4*), 3, 11, 17, 19, 23, 25, 28, 36, 40, 42-45, 54, 69, 86, 151, 156 fn, 176 & fn, 188 & fn, 190 & fn, 223 fn, 227, 454, 461, 489 fn, 507 fn
- Press Trust of India (P.T.I.), 80
- Preventive Detention Act (1950), 15 & fn-16, 172
- Provisional Parliament, 15 fn
- Public Security Acts, 15 fn
- Punjab, 60, 97, 103, 118, 120, 126, 141-142, 165 & fn, 168-169, 273 & fn-274, 310, 448 fn, 486, 497
- , East, 129, 145, 165; Government of, 129, 174, 273-274 & fn
- , West, 78, 97, 129, 161 fn, 165 fn, 497 fn
- Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commission, 448 fn
- Punjab State Congress, 274 & fn
- Puri, 16
- Pusan (Korea), 355 fn
- Quakers, 48, 60, 62
- Quirino, Elpidio, (*VOL. 12, P. 389*), 385-386, 477 fn
- Radcliffe, Cyril, John, (*VOL. 3, P. 171*), 448 & fn
- Radhakrishnan, S., (*Vol. 4, p. 564*), 243, 340-342 & fn, 347, 349-350 fn, 356 & fn, 369 & fn, 439, 441 & fn
- Raghavdas, Baba, 296 & fn
- Railway Conference (Indo-Pakistan) (1950), 136
- Raja, P.S. Kumaraswami, (*VOL. 11, P. 19*), 302
- Rajagopalachari, C., (*Vol. 1, p. 350*), 11, 23 & fn, 28-29 & fn, 30, 36-37 & fn, 39 & fn, 41 & fn, 45, 50-51, 54-55 & fn, 59 & fn, 63 & fn, 82, 120-121, 239, 253, 255, 257-258 fn, 259 & fn-260 & fn, 261-262, 344, 461 & fn, 463, 473, 499
- Rajasthan, 97, 115-116, 173, 268, 284, 295, 465, 469, 474
- Rajkot, 263
- Rajshahi, 448 fn
- Rajya Sabha, 153 fn, 478 fn
- Raman, C.V., (*Vol. 4, p. 564*), 188 & fn
- Ramayana, 482
- Ramner, 173
- Rana, Mohan Shamsheer Jang Bahadur, (*VOL. 11, P. 377*), 127 fn
- , Judha Shamsheer Jung Bahadur, (*VOL. 2, P. 52*), 505; wife of, 505
- Ranaghat, 169
- Rangoon, 71, 135, 385, 409, 428-429, 460, 468
- Rao, B.G., (*VOL. 11, P. 81*), 295
- , B. Shiva, (*Vol. 4, p. 345*), 83 fn
- Rashidi, P.A.M., 99 fn, 100 & fn, 116
- Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R.S.S.), 72 fn, 130-131, 198, 262
- Rau, B.N., (*Vol. 14, p. 559*), 310 & fn, 313 fn, 323 & fn, 327 & fn, 357, 360, 382
- Raxaul, 287
- Representation of People Bill (1950), 454 & fn, 459
- Reserve Bank of India, 70 fn
- Reynold's News (London), 494 fn
- Rhee, Syngman, (*VOL. 12, P. 391*), 346, 478 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Romulo, Carlos, (VOL. 12, P. 7), 386
 Roosevelt, F.D., (*Vol. 6, p. 10*), 326
 Round Table Conference (South Africa), 310 & fn, 459 & fn
 Roy, B.C., (*Vol. 4, p. 230*), 12, 16, 23, 27, 29-30, 36, 41 & fn-42, 48, 54, 59 & fn-60, 62-63 fn, 67 & fn-68 fn, 82, 85-86, 99, 102, 112, 125, 132, 135-136, 141-142, 146, 166 & fn-167 & fn, 171, 218, 295
 —, S.B.S., 54 & fn
Ruling Few, The (David Kelly), 345 fn
 Rupaidehi, 287
 Russia *see* U.S.S.R.
 Sachar, Bhimsen, (VOL. 2, P. 304), 485
 Sadiq, G.M., (VOL. 2, P. 271), 153 & fn
 Saha, Meghnad, (*Vol. 13, p. 320*), 40 fn-41 & fn
 Sahay, Vishnu, (VOL. 11, P. 142), 154 & fn-155, 309
 Sahni, J.N., 34 & fn, 83 fn
 Saiyadain, K.G., (*Vol. 15, p. 295*), 279 & fn
 Sajjan Devi, 280 fn
 Saksena, Mohanlal, (*Vol. 1, p. 233*), 79, 118, 161 & fn-162, 163, 177, 179, 295, 461-462, 474
 Sampurnanand, (*Vol. 2, p. 143*), 255 & fn
 Sarabhai, Mridula, (*Vol. 5, p. 316*), 84, 100, 167 & fn-168 & fn, 169
 Saurashtra, 263 fn, 507 fn; Government of, 263 fn
 Scientific Research Department, 236-237
 Sen, Nikhil, 54 & fn, 295
 —, Satindra Nath, 47 & fn-48, 68, 79, 143
 —, Sukumar, (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 418), 459
 Sen Gupta, Nellie, (*Vol. 5, p. 489*), 32
 Shahabuddin, Khwaja, (VOL. 9, P. 244), 102 & fn, 129, 137, 268 & fn
 —, Justice, 448 fn
 Saharanpur, 505 fn
 Shahjahanpur (U.P.), 267 & fn-268, 293
 Shastri, Hiralal, (*Vol. 15, p. 426*), 284-285
 —, Lal Bahadur, (*Vol. 5, p. 164*), 296 & fn
 Shaw, G.B., (*Vol. 1, p. 35*), 506
 Sheean, Vincent, (*Vol. 8, p. 792*), 503
 Sheikhpura, 497 fn
 Sherwani, Nisar Ahmed, (*Vol. 8, p. 133*), 301-302 & fn
 Shridharani, Krishnalal, 245 & fn
 Sind, 77, 79, 97-98, 103, 120, 133, 142, 173, 269, 310, 462, 474 & fn
 Sind Editors' Conference, 56
 Singapore, 71, 110, 124 fn, 385, 401 fn, 410, 460, 468, 473
 Singh, Anup, 478 & fn
 —, Baldev, (*Vol. 14, p. 122*), 273 fn-274 & fn, 280, 461 fn
 —, Har Gobind, 302 fn
 —, Dr. Karan, (VOL. 10, P. 237), 155 fn-156 & fn
 —, Kharak, (*Vol. 4, p. 80*), 275 fn
 —, Nathu, 51
 —, Master Tara, (*Vol. 4, p. 572*), 273 & fn-274 & fn, 275 & fn, 497 fn
 —, Triloki, (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 437), 301 & fn
 Sindri Fertilizer Factory, 42, 45, 70
 Sinha, Satya Narayan, (VOL. 2, P. 17), 10, 17, 43, 260-261
 —, Sri Krishna, (*Vol. 3, p. 420*), 223, 287
 Sino-Soviet Pact, 346
 Sita Ram, (*Vol. 5, p. 356*), 346
 Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, (*Vol. 3, p. 265*), 209
 Socialist Party (Indian), 490 fn
 Soekarno, A., (*Vol. 14, p. 452*), 385 & fn, 394-395, 472 & fn
 —, Padma, 385, 472 fn
 Somnath temple (Gujarat), 507 & fn
 Spanish Civil War, 317
 Spain, 69
 Sri Lanka, 404, 477 fn
 Sri Prakasa, (*Vol. 2, p. 203*), 51, 239 & fn, 253 & fn, 461, 473 & fn
 Srinagar, 151, 153 & fn, 309
 Srinivasan, C.R., 99 fn
 Stockholm Peace Congress, 153 fn
 South Africa, 26 fn, 80, 310, 313 fn, 402, 452, 459 & fn-460 fn, 477, 490; Government of, 310 fn, 459 fn-460 & fn, 477, 490; Parliament of, 490

- South Amboy (New Jersey), 118 & fn
 Stalin, Josef, (VOL. 2, P. 397), 324 & fn,
 326, 342, 347-348 fn, 352-353, 356 fn-357
 State Bank of Pakistan, 70 fn
 Students Federation of India, 279 fn
Students' Handbook of Operative Dentistry
 (Rafiuddin Ahmed), 146 fn
 Subbarayan, P., (Vol. 8, p. 359), 351
 Sulgrave Club (Washington), 105 fn
 Sulzberger, C.L., 378 fn
 Sun Yat-sen, Madam, (Vol. 2, p. 286), 363
 & fn
 Supreme Court of India, 111, 177, 263 & fn,
 319 & fn, 474 & fn
 Swami Narayan Temple (Karachi), 78
 Switzerland, 393
 Sydney, 123 fn, 370 fn, 468 & fn
 Sydney Conference (15-19 May 1950), 123
 & fn, 370 & fn, 386, 438, 441-442, 468
 & fn, 477
 Taegu (Korea), 355 fn
 Taiwan, 312 fn, 348, 364, 493 fn
 Tandon, Purushottamdas, (Vol. 1, p. 127), 52,
 109, 293 & fn
 Telengana, 403 fn
 Thailand, 308 fn, 313 fn, 477 fn
Thirty-Nine Months (David Kelly), 345 fn
The Times (London), 144
 Tibet, 196
 Tonk State (Rajasthan), 284-285
 Trade Union Bill (1950), 222 & fn
 Travancore and Cochin state, 195-196, 198,
 200; Government of, 192
 Tripathi, Vishambhar Dayal, (Vol. 9, p. 571),
 293, 296
 Tripura, 7, 53 fn, 57, 63 fn, 89 & fn, 109, 445
 & fn, 449, 465
 Trivandrum, 71, 234 & fn-235, 246, 248, 487
 Trivedi, C.M., (VOL. 3, P. 5), 273
 Truman, Harry S., (Vol. 15, p. 297), 307 &
 fn-308 & fn, 309, 312 & fn, 315-316, 324
 & fn, 342, 346, 350, 352, 359, 395, 479
 & fn, 482 fn, 493 fn
 Turkey, 313 fn, 345 fn, 477
 Tyagi, Mahavir, (Vol. 5, p. 211), 262
 Yellow river (China), 204
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 (U.S.S.R.), 125, 144 fn, 153 & fn, 204,
 211 & fn, 242, 314, 316-317, 321 fn-322,
 324-325, 330, 332, 342 fn, 345-348 & fn,
 349, 352 & fn, 356 & fn-357, 360 fn,
 364-365 fn, 370, 372 & fn, 378 & fn, 396,
 481-482, 494 fn-495, 496; Foreign Office
 of, 347; Government of, 345 & fn,
 354-355
 United Council for Relief and Welfare, 170;
 Bengal Branch of, 107, 170
 United Kingdom (U.K.), 37, 42, 45, 49-51,
 55, 201, 233, 282, 309, 311-312, 313 fn-
 314, 316, 319, 342, 345-346, 349, 351,
 357, 360, 369, 371-373, 379, 428,
 440-441, 494, 505 fn; Government of,
 314, 316, 350-351, 355, 366 fn, 371; 396
see also Britain, England
 United Nations Charter, 322, 331, 347;
 Article 43 of, 313 fn
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and
 Cultural Organisation (U.N.E.S.C.O.), 441
 & fn
 United Nations General Assembly, 35, 321
 fn, 364, 490 fn
 United Nations High Commission for
 Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.), 54 fn
 United Nations Organisation (U.N.O.), 14,
 109 fn-110, 123, 155, 157 fn-158 fn, 307
 fn-308 fn, 309 fn, 312-313 fn, 314-317,
 321-322, 329-331, 342-343, 346-347 &
 fn, 348 fn-349, 351-352 & fn, 353 fn-
 355 & fn, 359, 364 & fn-365, 366 & fn,
 372 & fn, 393, 396, 410, 422, 437 & fn,
 439-440 fn, 463, 475, 479-482, 490 & fn,
 492, 494-495, 497; armed forces in Korea
 of, 313 fn-314 fn, 315, 330, 355 fn
 U.N. Secretary General *see* Lie, Trygve
 U.N. Security Council, 13, 307 & fn-308,
 311, 313 & fn-314, 315, 317, 319, 322,
 324-325, 330-331, 342, 345-348 & fn,
 349-350, 352, 356 fn-357, 359-360 & fn,
 364-366, 372-373, 395-396, 478-480 &
 fn, 481, 491 fn, 494 fn-495; Resolution

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- (14 November 1947) of, 479 fn;
Resolution (14 March 1950), of, 152 & fn; Resolutions (25 & 27 June 1950) on Korea of, 307 & fn-308, 311-313 & fn, 315-316, 320 fn, 325, 342 fn, 346, 352, 479 fn-480 fn, 481, 492, 495, 497
- United Nations Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information, Monterideo session of (May 1949), 14 fn
- United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (U.N.T.C.O.K.), 321 & fn-322, 323, 327, 478 & fn-479 fn
- United Press of America (U.P.A.), 104, 118
- United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), 12-13, 22-23, 35, 38 & fn, 46, 61, 76, 89, 97, 103, 109, 116, 133-134, 136, 142, 162, 166, 173, 254-255, 256 fn, 262, 267-268, 287, 293-294 & fn, 295, 301 & fn-302 & fn, 380, 451, 456, 462, 464-465, 469-470, 474, 484, 505 fn; Government of, 115-116, 173, 267, 269, 293, 295-296 fn, 464; Legislative Assembly of, 13, 283 fn, 301 fn
- U.P.P.C.C., 109, 293, 296 fn
- United Socialist Organisation, 490 fn
- United States of America (U.S.A.), 35, 37, 42, 45 & fn, 51, 67 fn, 104 & fn-105, 108, 113, 118, 125, 137, 217 & fn, 233, 242, 258, 261, 279, 307-308 & fn, 309, 311-313 & fn, 314-317, 319 & fn, 321 fn, 323-326, 328-330, 332, 339, 341-347 & fn, 349, 351-352 & fn, 356 fn-357, 360, 365, 369 & fn-370, 371-373, 377-379, 386, 414, 421-422, 428, 437 fn, 439, 441, 465 & fn, 467 fn, 476, 479-480, 482 fn, 492-493, 495; armed forces of, 307 fn, 312 fn, 321 fn, 326, 355 fn; Arms Aid Programme of, 333; Defence Department of, 332; Embassy in India of, 369; Government of, 113, 313 & fn, 324, 350-352, 381, 428; Point-4 Programme of, 333; State Department of, 104, 119, 217, 242, 320, 332, 382
- U.S. Congress, 105 fn, 330
- U.S. Seventh Fleet, 307 fn, 312 fn
- Vana Mahotsava*, 489
- Vidyarthi, Santokh Singh, 275 & fn
- Vietnam, 123, 315 fn
- Washington, 73, 105, 217 & fn-218, 319 fn, 340, 349, 353-354, 359, 366, 465 fn; Pakistan Ambassador in *see* Ispahani, M.A.H.
- Wavell, A.P., (*Vol. 13, p. 185*), 120
- Western Irian, 393
- White, Walter, 379
- World Bank, 403
- World Fellowship of Buddhists, Conference of, 503
- World War II, 127, 194, 209 fn, 326, 338, 423, 472, 491
- Yellow river (China), 204
- Yugoslavia, 342 fn
- Zafrullah Khan, (*Vol. 9, p. 394*), 80, 111 fn-112, 132, 152 fn
- Zaidi, Mrs., 279 & fn
- ____, Khalija, 279 & fn
- ____, Shahida, 279 & fn
- ____, Zahida, 279 & fn
- Zamindar* (Lahore), 80
- Zhou En-lai, 482 fn

The dominating feature of the period from 8 April to 31 July 1950, which is covered by this volume, was the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement. The Agreement brought confidence and hope as well as relief to millions in both countries. There was a marked falling off in the exodus both ways in Bengal and Assam and a resumption of trade between India and Pakistan.

Other major problems were the rehabilitation of refugees, arrangements for the first general elections, general economic policy, the formation of a new Council of Ministers, shortage of foodgrains, and the control of prices. In foreign affairs, apart from the perennial Kashmir problem, Nehru's attention was engaged primarily by the issues raised by the war in Korea.

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